“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[pood]

Yeah, if hard determinism is true I had no choice to write what I wrote, and you had no choice to write what you wrote.

So?

Of course it is not true, so there is that.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism as Compatibilists define it to be . If the world is not deterministic, Compatibilism has no bearing on how the world works, which makes it practically irrelevant. The question then becomes, what is the nature of free will in relation to a non deterministic world, and how does this definition of free will relate to the workings of a non deterministic world with its random and/or probabilistic events.

 

[Copernicus]

Compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism as Compatibilists define it to be . If the world is not deterministic, Compatibilism has no bearing on how the world works, which makes it practically irrelevant. The question then becomes, what is the nature of free will in relation to a non deterministic world, and how does this definition of free will relate to the workings of a non deterministic world with its random and/or probabilistic events.

If the world were not deterministic, then compatibilism would be irrelevant by definition. There is a sense in which we do live in a nondeterministic world--quantum indeterminism. However, we interact with reality at a level of events in which experience tells us that causality works and we live in a deterministic world. Moreover, there are ways of interpreting quantum mechanics such that determinism makes sense (e.g. Everett's Many Worlds Interpretation).

 

[bilby]

Accepting the paradigm of Determinism as true (which is may well not be), Free Will would be impossible, because the pre-determined act of seeming to choose between illusory alternatives is not an exercise of will. It is simply a programmed response.

This assumes that programmed responses are:

A) Simple; and
B) Lack freedom

A is certainly false, as any computer programmer can attest; B is highly questionable, and depends on what we mean by "freedom".

 

[bilby]

Stated differently, the existence of Free Will in its pure form depends upon (a) the existence of true “options” or “alternatives,” and (b) humans being capable of thinking (and acting) in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside their control.

I don't agree. Condition (a) is certainly present for most human decisions, as I think you'll agree, and so is of little import; But condition (b) seems unweildy and arbitrary.

Humans are quite capable of acting in a manner that is caused by prior activity that is entirely internal to themselves, and completely unpredictable in advance, even to themselves.

That may not be Free Will "in its pure form", but it waddles and quacks a lot like free will in its form as understood by, well, everybody.

 

[bilby]

If the world were not deterministic, then compatibilism would be irrelevant by definition. There is a sense in which we do live in a nondeterministic world--quantum indeterminism.

I am not seeing how indeterminism has any bearing at all on free will, though.

Free choices are not random, any more than they are forced upon us by the external universe.

Free choices are chosen, not random; And they are chosen by internal and highly complex chaotic systems that are fundamentally unpredictable, just like the weather.

The brain is not a kind of supercomputer; It is an electrochemical system, bathed in an endocrine system that interacts with it in myriad ways, some fairly local and others systemic, with both positive and negative feedbacks. And Bilby's Law of biology applies: All statements about biological systems can be made more accurate by adding "... but in reality, it's much more complicated than that".

 

[DBT]

Compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism as Compatibilists define it to be . If the world is not deterministic, Compatibilism has no bearing on how the world works, which makes it practically irrelevant. The question then becomes, what is the nature of free will in relation to a non deterministic world, and how does this definition of free will relate to the workings of a non deterministic world with its random and/or probabilistic events.

If the world were not deterministic, then compatibilism would be irrelevant by definition. There is a sense in which we do live in a nondeterministic world--quantum indeterminism. However, we interact with reality at a level of events in which experience tells us that causality works and we live in a deterministic world. Moreover, there are ways of interpreting quantum mechanics such that determinism makes sense (e.g. Everett's Many Worlds Interpretation).

Nothing much to disagree with....but, how would quantum indeterminism relate to free will? How would free will be defined in relation to a probabilistic or indeterministic word? How would it work? A version of Libertarian free will? A modified Compatibilist definition of free will?

 

[DBT]

Yeah, if hard determinism is true I had no choice to write what I wrote, and you had no choice to write what you wrote.

So?

Of course it is not true, so there is that.

The only difference between 'hard determinism' and 'soft determinism' is that one side claims that free will is not compatible with determinism, and the other claims it is compatible.

Otherwise, the given conditions of determinism, how it works, antecedents, past, present and future states of the system as it evolves, etc, is essentially the same for both sides.

 

[pood]

Rather than focus your responses on insulting the poster, it would be more productive if you would address the substance of the posts.

Again, you may have no choice but to write the way you do. If you do have such a choice, however, then your choices leaving something to be desired.

First, I deny having insulted you. But here again, you see, if you truly believed your position, you would not complain I am allegedly insulting you, because you would recognize I have no choice in the matter. Of course, perhaps you had no choice in your internally contradictory response — in which case we are both meat robots of the Big Bang which is how the biologist Jerry Coyne so charmingly describes humans.

You basically told me you identify with determinism, stoicism, and Buddhism because it works for you, it is congenial. If you believed your own position, you would have said, “I had no choice in the matter.”

Why did consciousness evolve in a hard deterministic world? What the hell is it good for? In such a world if we existed at all we should all be p zombies, and at least one poster on this board believes most or all of us are except for him.

 

[pood]

When downstream deterministic inputs hit me my brain and body work in tandem to choose to determine an output — choose, and determine, working together. Compatibilism!

 

[DBT]

Determinism, as defined by Compatibilists, permits no alternate actions or choice. Which means that the brain, inseparable from the system as it evolves without deviation, makes decisions, not choices. A choice involves the possibility of taking a different option at any given moment, while a deterministic progression of events permits no deviation and no alternate actions at any given moment. Which is why Compatibilists carefully defined their version of free will to circumvent the no choice consequence of a deterministic system.

 

[steve_bank]

The universe at bottom is quantum indeterministic, so there is that.

In an interview published at https://www.scientificamerican.com/...d-t-hooft-says-quantum-mechanics-is-nonsense/, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Gerard 't Hooft offers a compelling critique of the conventional interpretation of quantum mechanics.

't Hooft argues that accepting the theory as inherently probabilistic and ultimately mysterious is a limiting mindset. According to 't Hooft, the belief that quantum mechanics can never provide more than statistical answers has led science down a narrow path.

Instead, 't Hooft urges researchers to take a philosophical and intellectual step back—to question the assumptions underlying modern physics and imagine what the fundamental laws of nature might look like without starting from quantum mechanics. "We will understand," he insists, rejecting the idea that the quantum world is forever beyond our full comprehension. In that regard, 't Hooft calls for a deeper reexamination of what quantum mechanics actually is, rather than treating it as an unshakable foundation.

This is consistent with the fact that Quantum Theory, like every other attempt to explain the working if the universe is a metaphysical paradigm -- a modern version of Greek and Roman mythology, which similarly were believed to reflect a grand and true understanding of the universe until they were no longer viewed that way.

The key word is interpretation.

That someone with science credentials makes an interpretation or philosophical commentary does not carry any special weight.

In the end all there is a repeatable experiment.

As I pointed out QM is not the only phenomena that to us is statistical.

Queuing Theory and Markov Chains

When customers enter or leave a store is not predictable. A model for a store can be developed that predicts the probability of entering or leaving at a time of day.

A lot of reality to us humans appears statistical regardless of determinism being true or not.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Determinism, as defined by Compatibilists, permits no alternate actions or choice. Which means that the brain, inseparable from the system as it evolves without deviation, makes decisions, not choices. A choice involves the possibility of taking a different option at any given moment, while a deterministic progression of events permits no deviation and no alternate actions at any given moment. Which is why Compatibilists carefully defined their version of free will to circumvent the no choice consequence of a deterministic system.

Even the term "decisions" is a misnomer in a truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic universe, as all brain activity would be as equally determined as everything else.

A good way to look is the following:

If the universe is truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic, a person who arrives at a fork in the road is determined by all antecedent activity of the universe to continue walking in one of the two directions and not the other. This is so before the person even began walking down the road, and has nothing to do with any "choice" or "decision" made by the person. If that is so (and it would not be the case of the universe is not truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic), assuming that the person's brain is capable of selecting either of the two directions without regard to the direction that the body is compelled to travel would often produce a situation where a person selects one direction but is unable to go that way despite their exercise of free will. If that were the case, people regularly would experience cognitive dissonance, because their brain would tell them to do one thing, and the universe would compel them to do another thing. Since that does not happen, if the universe is truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic (which, again, may well not be the case), then (i) even brain function would not be free in any way, or (ii) it would be an exquisite coincidence that people would consistently select freely the very action that the universe compels them to perform.

Again, I am not advocating that the universe is, in fact, truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic (as some posters mistakenly have asserted). Rather, I am simply exploring the logical ramifications of such a state of affairs in order to demonstrate the fallacy of Compatibilism, which accepts that human activity is fully determined by antecedent activity, but insists that people still ha e free will to choose as they please, nonetheless.

 

[bilby]

Even the term "decisions" is a misnomer in a truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic universe, as all brain activity would be as equally determined as everything else.

And yet, even a very simple computer can make decisions. It doesn't even require consciousness.

Such decisions are entirely deterministic (as are all decisions, if hard determinism is true), but so what? They are still, observably, decisions.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Even the term "decisions" is a misnomer in a truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic universe, as all brain activity would be as equally determined as everything else.

And yet, even a very simple computer can make decisions. It doesn't even require consciousness.

Such decisions are entirely deterministic (as are all decisions, if hard determinism is true), but so what? They are still, observably, decisions.

A computer does not make a decision, it simply executes a formula it is programmed to execute. If you want to call that a decision, then people would make decisions in a truly, entirely, and perfectly Deterministic universe, but it would not mean very much, and would not help the argument for illogical Compatibilism.

 

[DBT]

Determinism, as defined by Compatibilists, permits no alternate actions or choice. Which means that the brain, inseparable from the system as it evolves without deviation, makes decisions, not choices. A choice involves the possibility of taking a different option at any given moment, while a deterministic progression of events permits no deviation and no alternate actions at any given moment. Which is why Compatibilists carefully defined their version of free will to circumvent the no choice consequence of a deterministic system.

Even the term "decisions" is a misnomer in a truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic universe, as all brain activity would be as equally determined as everything else.

A good way to look is the following:

If the universe is truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic, a person who arrives at a fork in the road is determined by all antecedent activity of the universe to continue walking in one of the two directions and not the other. This is so before the person even began walking down the road, and has nothing to do with any "choice" or "decision" made by the person. If that is so (and it would not be the case of the universe is not truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic), assuming that the person's brain is capable of selecting either of the two directions without regard to the direction that the body is compelled to travel would often produce a situation where a person selects one direction but is unable to go that way despite their exercise of free will. If that were the case, people regularly would experience cognitive dissonance, because their brain would tell them to do one thing, and the universe would compel them to do another thing. Since that does not happen, if the universe is truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic (which, again, may well not be the case), then (i) even brain function would not be free in any way, or (ii) it would be an exquisite coincidence that people would consistently select freely the very action that the universe compels them to perform.

Again, I am not advocating that the universe is, in fact, truly, entirely, and perfectly deterministic (as some posters mistakenly have asserted). Rather, I am simply exploring the logical ramifications of such a state of affairs in order to demonstrate the fallacy of Compatibilism, which accepts that human activity is fully determined by antecedent activity, but insists that people still ha e free will to choose as they please, nonetheless.

I mean decisions made in a relative sense, what is done in context of the system in general, where many things happen, where someone decides to go to work, while another takes a sick day, for instance.

Obviously, given determinism, each and every decision could not have been different.

It's a matter of relative decision making, the brain acquires, stores and processes information and produces thoughts and actions.

 

[steve_bank]

It's a matter of relative decision making, the brain acquires, stores and processes information and produces thoughts and actions.

Look up the Turing Test.

Other than thoughts your definition covers both computers and brain. At the neuron level the brain is logic.

neurons perform logic but they are far more complex and flexible than traditional computer logic gates. They can perform sophisticated logic operations, especially through their dendritic trees, but their function is not purely binary and is heavily influenced by context, adaptation, and the continuous nature of electrochemical signal

Like it or not he brain is a bio-electrical computer. A biological machine.

One of the first application of artificial neural nets based on the brain was to mimic human vision and pattern detection. Neural nets are not programed in a conventional programming sense they learn.

The more advanced version is AI. When AI makes a decision like human brains where and exactly how the decision is made can not be localized.

 

[DBT]

It's a matter of relative decision making, the brain acquires, stores and processes information and produces thoughts and actions.

Look up the Turing Test.

Other than thoughts your definition covers both computers and brain. At the neuron level the brain is logic.

neurons perform logic but they are far more complex and flexible than traditional computer logic gates. They can perform sophisticated logic operations, especially through their dendritic trees, but their function is not purely binary and is heavily influenced by context, adaptation, and the continuous nature of electrochemical signal

Like it or not he brain is a bio-electrical computer. A biological machine.

One of the first application of artificial neural nets based on the brain was to mimic human vision and pattern detection. Neural nets are not programed in a conventional programming sense they learn.

The more advanced version is AI. When AI makes a decision like human brains where and exactly how the decision is made can not be localized.

Decision making as in a selection of an option based on a set of criteria, with the brain as the processor, where all the elements come together to produce a given decision or action. If determinism is true, the decided action is inevitable. A process of selection that may be defined as a decision, but not as a matter of choice.

 

[Copernicus]

Compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism as Compatibilists define it to be . If the world is not deterministic, Compatibilism has no bearing on how the world works, which makes it practically irrelevant. The question then becomes, what is the nature of free will in relation to a non deterministic world, and how does this definition of free will relate to the workings of a non deterministic world with its random and/or probabilistic events.

If the world were not deterministic, then compatibilism would be irrelevant by definition. There is a sense in which we do live in a nondeterministic world--quantum indeterminism. However, we interact with reality at a level of events in which experience tells us that causality works and we live in a deterministic world. Moreover, there are ways of interpreting quantum mechanics such that determinism makes sense (e.g. Everett's Many Worlds Interpretation).

Nothing much to disagree with....but, how would quantum indeterminism relate to free will? How would free will be defined in relation to a probabilistic or indeterministic word? How would it work? A version of Libertarian free will? A modified Compatibilist definition of free will?

Quantum indeterminism has nothing to do with free will. I was just saying that there is a sense in which reality is indeterminate, but that has to do with the way scientists analyze measurements of certain physically recorded events.

Humans interact with events under a condition of uncertainty--not knowing all outcomes. Therefore, they have to make predictions about outcomes in order to survive as a species. Hence, their choices are "free" in the sense that actions are chosen when an array of predicted outcomes are being weighed against possible actions to bring them about. Godlike knowledge of future outcomes would preclude free choice, but people don't have Godlike knowledge. So we can imagine having chosen differently in the past and learn from that experience to make better predictions in the future. People need to be held accountable for their actions, because accountability--fear of the consequences of making the wrong choice--is part of the deterministic chain of events that agents use to calculate actions. All too often, advocates for the "no free will" conclusion think that people ought not to be held accountable for what they have no control over, but people really do have control over the past in their imagination, just not in reality. It is the uncertainty that makes our choices free.