Compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism as Compatibilists define it to be . If the world is not deterministic, Compatibilism has no bearing on how the world works, which makes it practically irrelevant. The question then becomes, what is the nature of free will in relation to a non deterministic world, and how does this definition of free will relate to the workings of a non deterministic world with its random and/or probabilistic events.
This assumes that programmed responses are:Accepting the paradigm of Determinism as true (which is may well not be), Free Will would be impossible, because the pre-determined act of seeming to choose between illusory alternatives is not an exercise of will. It is simply a programmed response.
I don't agree. Condition (a) is certainly present for most human decisions, as I think you'll agree, and so is of little import; But condition (b) seems unweildy and arbitrary.Stated differently, the existence of Free Will in its pure form depends upon (a) the existence of true “options” or “alternatives,” and (b) humans being capable of thinking (and acting) in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside their control.
I am not seeing how indeterminism has any bearing at all on free will, though.If the world were not deterministic, then compatibilism would be irrelevant by definition. There is a sense in which we do live in a nondeterministic world--quantum indeterminism.