According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[The AntiChris]

Essentially compatibilism is simply the belief that free will is possible whether or not the universe is deterministic.

That is sheer, unmitigated non-sense.

It might seem that way to someone who doesn't understand the claims of compatibilism.

If what you say were true, then compatibilism would simply be the belief that free will were possible.

Yes, Compatibilist free will is the ability to act on one's own desires, motives, or will without external coercion or impediment and this ability exists regardless of the deterministic/indeterministic nature of the universe.

But, then, calling that belief compatibilism would be sheer and unmitigated non-sense in itself, because the very word compatibilism indicates a claimed compatibility, and, in this case, that would be a compatibility between free will and ... and ... what?

Your logic escapes me.

I can only think you believe the following claims are mutually exclusive

1) compatibilist free will is possible whether or not the universe is deterministic
and
2) Compatibilist free will is compatible with determinism

I have no idea why you have a problem with this.

 

[BSilvEsq]

I can only think you believe the following claims are mutually exclusive

1) compatibilist free will is possible whether or not the universe is deterministic
and
2) Compatibilist free will is compatible with determinism

I have no idea why you have a problem with this.

I do not see the two claims as being mutually exclusive. Rather, I see them as being complimentary. They also do not address the question of what is meant by the word "Determinism" -- which you elsewhere seem to contend to be irrelevant. Unless Compatibilist free will is defined as "that which is compatible with determinism [whatever determinism might mean]" the statements are devoid of meaning without a statement of the meaning of determinism as used in the statements. And if Compatibilist free will were defined to mean "that which is compatible with determinism [whatever determinism might mean]" the definition would be a mere tautology and fail to advance the debate.

 

[The AntiChris]

Or, are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?

Yes!!!

The free will that compatibilists subscribe to is not dependent on determinism/indeterminism.

The only reason compatibilism is defined as compatible with determinism is because it stands in opposition to the irrationality of those who insist that no one is free under determinism - the incompatibilists.

I am unable to follow the logic of this last exchange.

I take it from your reply that you contend that "Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be."

I've no idea where you got "anything else that might be true of the universe" from? I've solely been talking about the deterministic nature of the universe. And, yes, compatibilists believe free will is compatible with determinism 'without regard to how it is defined.

If you are saying that Free Will is compatible with the Determinism if Determinism is defined in the fatalistic sense, can you please explain what you mean by Free Will in that context - because I fail to understand how that can be.

That determinism is fatalistic is an interpretation of the nature of determinism usually advanced by incompatibilists in support of their insistence that there is no freedom in determinism. Compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism regardless of how critics of compatibilism might negatively interpret determinism.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Or, are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?

Yes!!!

The free will that compatibilists subscribe to is not dependent on determinism/indeterminism.

The only reason compatibilism is defined as compatible with determinism is because it stands in opposition to the irrationality of those who insist that no one is free under determinism - the incompatibilists.

I am unable to follow the logic of this last exchange.

I take it from your reply that you contend that "Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be."

I've no idea where you got "anything else that might be true of the universe" from? I've solely been talking about the deterministic nature of the universe. And, yes, compatibilists believe free will is compatible with determinism 'without regard to how it is defined.

Perhaps, you simply answered my prior question too quickly or too casually.

The words "anything else that might be true of the universe" were a part of the question I asked in the post to which you replied "Yes!!" This is shown in the quoted exchange above. There was no sleight of hand or substitution or addition of words on my part.

I take it from you most recent post that you withdraw the "Yes!!" that you provided in response to the question "are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?" If so, that is fine. That, is however, where the words came from about which you most recently wrote: "I've no idea where you got 'anything else that might be true of the universe' from?"

 

[The AntiChris]

if Compatibilist free will were defined to mean "that which is compatible with determinism [whatever determinism might mean]" the definition would be a mere tautology and fail to advance the debate.

You seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that "the debate" is about determinism. It's not. It's about what we mean by free will and moral responsibility.

 

[The AntiChris]

Perhaps, you simply answered my prior question too quickly or too casually.

The words "anything else that might be true of the universe" were a part of the question I asked in the post to which you replied "Yes!!" This is shown in the quoted exchange above. There was no sleight of hand or substitution or addition of words on my part.

I take it from you most recent post that you withdraw the "Yes!!" that you provided in response to the question "are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?" If so, that is fine. That, is however, where the words came from about which you most recently wrote: "I've no idea where you got 'anything else that might be true of the universe' from?"

I was aware that you'd used the phrase previously. When you used that phrase again it seemed you were making a point so I (over)reacted ! I'm still not clear why you interpreted my "determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant to compatibilists" as "without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe". They look like quite different claims to me.

 

[BSilvEsq]

if Compatibilist free will were defined to mean "that which is compatible with determinism [whatever determinism might mean]" the definition would be a mere tautology and fail to advance the debate.

You seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that "the debate" is about determinism. It's not. It's about what we mean by free will and moral responsibility.

Then you are engaging on a debate to define only half of the two things claimed to be compatible with one another. Without defining both sides of the equation, and then explained how they are compatible with one another there is no debate about the logical coherence of compatibilism. There is just an inquiry into what is meant by Free Will, which is a valid exercise, but begs the question of what is determinism and is free will (as you seek to define it) compatible with determinism. To simply declare it to be so goes nowhere



So be it.

 

[Elixir]

I'm still not clear why you interpreted my "determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant to compatibilists" as "without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe".

It's not a Truth Claim like "determinism is true" or "determinism is false". It's just another way to honor the indisputable FACT that it doesn't matter. From our viewpoint, from every viewpoint of realistic expectation regarding experiences humans can have as bioforms on a rock, measuring and confirming determinism or free will is not part of the set. Pray for a revelation from a god that free will exists ... if you get it, that may suffice for your purposes. Or refrain and experience the FOMO on the revelation!

 

[BSilvEsq]

if Compatibilist free will were defined to mean "that which is compatible with determinism [whatever determinism might mean]" the definition would be a mere tautology and fail to advance the debate.

You seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that "the debate" is about determinism. It's not. It's about what we mean by free will and moral responsibility.

I totally get it.

Liberum arbitrium sentis, ergo liberum arbitrium habes.

Moreover, because your feelings necessarily prove what you feel is real, there is no possibility that you lack free will so long as you continue to feel as if you have it.

In essence, although I doubt you will acknowledge it to be true, you take the existence of free will on faith.

Based on your faith, any theoretical concept that would, if true, deny free will is nonsensical because an absence of free will is impossible.

Accordingly, if there is such a thing as determinism, whatever that may be, it must be compatible with free will because you have faith that you have free will and determinism is either (i) true and compatible with free will, or (ii) a false construct.

I submit that this is not what Compatibilism means in philosophy, but I suppose there is no law that stops you from redefining the philosophical concept to fit your faith. By so doing, however, you render worthless the philosophical debate.

At least I now understand what you are saying. It does nothing for me, and feels like a cop-out. And, by your logic, because it feels that way to me, I suppose it must be true.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Perhaps, you simply answered my prior question too quickly or too casually.

The words "anything else that might be true of the universe" were a part of the question I asked in the post to which you replied "Yes!!" This is shown in the quoted exchange above. There was no sleight of hand or substitution or addition of words on my part.

I take it from you most recent post that you withdraw the "Yes!!" that you provided in response to the question "are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?" If so, that is fine. That, is however, where the words came from about which you most recently wrote: "I've no idea where you got 'anything else that might be true of the universe' from?"

I was aware that you'd used the phrase previously. When you used that phrase again it seemed you were making a point so I (over)reacted ! I'm still not clear why you interpreted my "determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant to compatibilists" as "without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe". They look like quite different claims to me.

I used precisely the same words twice to avoid being accused of redefining the point with which you had expressed agreement.

As I now understand your position, it is simply that Free Will does exist -- full stop. I still don't know what you mean by that other than that it is something you feel to be true based on your experience of feeling as though you freely make choices and decisions.

As I see it, you are simply making a claim of absolute truth, and you reject the logic of any argument that would refute your claim because there can be no valid argument that could possibly disprove that which you know to be true.

 

[Jarhyn]

Where we part ways is that I do not understand the self-contradiction you claim to have demonstrated from accepting as a theoretical foundational premise that every activity that has occurred in the past was inexorably necessitated

Do you accept last-thursdayism to be a non-disprovable premise?

Because if you do... It's not necessarily true that events last Thursday were strictly necessary.

If your premise contains an assumption that a not-disprovable premise is false, it seems a contradiction to disprove the disprovable.

 

[Jarhyn]

Where we part ways is that I do not understand the self-contradiction you claim to have demonstrated from accepting as a theoretical foundational premise that every activity that has occurred in the past was inexorably necessitated

Do you accept last-thursdayism to be a non-disprovable premise?

Because if you do... It's not necessarily true that events last Thursday were strictly necessary.

If your premise contains an assumption that a not-disprovable premise is false, it seems a contradiction to disprove the disprovable.

The fact is, pood covered the core of it, the easiest and most trivial exposure of the contradiction, some pages ago.

The reality is that I can only point out 'that which is limited to a context' is not inexorably true; truth is quite bound to where the context for it holds, and I can only say it so many times before my brain cooks and words start sounding made up and I start feeling hungry or tired.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Where we part ways is that I do not understand the self-contradiction you claim to have demonstrated from accepting as a theoretical foundational premise that every activity that has occurred in the past was inexorably necessitated

Do you accept last-thursdayism to be a non-disprovable premise?

Because if you do... It's not necessarily true that events last Thursday were strictly necessary.

If your premise contains an assumption that a not-disprovable premise is false, it seems a contradiction to disprove the disprovable.

I have no idea what last-thirsdayism is. If you were to define it for me, I could attempt to answer your question.

I also have no idea what the final paragraph of your comment means. Perhaps you can expound.

 

[The AntiChris]

if Compatibilist free will were defined to mean "that which is compatible with determinism [whatever determinism might mean]" the definition would be a mere tautology and fail to advance the debate.

You seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that "the debate" is about determinism. It's not. It's about what we mean by free will and moral responsibility.

Then you are engaging on a debate to define only half of the two things claimed to be compatible with one another.

Determinism/indeterminism is not the contentious issue in this dispute because, for compatibilists, the deterministic/indeterministic nature of the universe is irrelevant.

I don't normally like resorting to posting quotations in support of my argument but in light of your stubborn intransigence:

  Compatibilism

Compatibilists believe that freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.

To repeat, this dispute is about competing conceptions of free will.

 

[DBT]

''Human behavior is affected both by genetic inheritance and by experience. The ways in which people develop are shaped by social experience and circumstances within the context of their inherited genetic potential. The scientific question is just how experience and hereditary potential interact in producing human behavior.

Ignoring for a moment the repetition of a variety of mistakes you make, this is incorrect.

The mistakes are yours. Your mistakes stem from your unwillingness or inability to understand the implications of determinism in relation to how the brain works, processes information and generates thoughts and actions.....and that is not through the agency of free will.

Human behavior is shaped by genetic inheritance, yes, and by external experience yes, but also by experience of the behavior of the human themselves.

For heavens sake, the ''experience of past behaviour' is determined by the past events and the ability of the brain to retain and use that information, enabling recognition and an understanding of our environment.

That is not free will. If determinism is true, that mental process proceeds as determined, not freely willed.

You are acting and pretending as if humans cannot modify their own "future behavior", the internal mechanisms which determine how they will act according to various inputs, despite the fact we can just reconnect our experience to our imaginations rather than external reality and test them.

You fail to grasp that nobody is saying that humans can't learn and adapt. Any animal with a sufficiently developed brain can do that.

A functional brain, not free will, is what enables pattern recognition and adaption.

And it is, as pointed out numerous times, it is the non-chosen condition of a brain in the instance of decision making that determines the decision that is made in that instance.

Brain condition is not a matter of free will.

We have gone many pages of you bloviating about what you think humans can't do and why and ignoring all the actual counter-examples to those claims which indicate there is something severely wrong with your analysis.

Well, there are too many pages of pointing out the basics of determinism and its implications for thought and the decision making, and you have yet to grasp how it works according to how you define determinism.

I can only conclude that your attachment to the idea of free will is too strong for you to even consider questioning your own assumptions.

All you need to be disproven is ONE counter example.

I have presented you with boxes that manipulate their own states and humans that manipulate the script of "what will I do in the future" based on the present state.

If you didn't understand, these are concrete disproofs of your claim of a lack of regulatory control.

You have presented nothing more than unwillingness to consider how determinism is defined in relation to how compatibilists define free will.

Never mind that you keep invoking elements of Libertarian free will, which is not compatible with determinism.

It's a mess.

If the mechanisms of control, the prefrontal cortex is damaged or underdeveloped, there is little or no self control.

So I find this part interesting in that it directly accepts, fully and tacitly, that there IS self control happening when that prefrontal cortex is functional.

When I talk about "self control" though, I usually add this caveat: it is hard and takes work.

The fact that some people have a harder time of it, or need to reconstruct the machine, or need to ask someone else to do some abstract stuff to augment the will of the person with the desire to impart self control does not wave away the self control as an available and attainable mechanism "across" reality. It only means it happens to be absent or lacking in that ONE place for that ONE reason.

It is a "momentary" rather than "utter" lack of self control within the context of physics as happens in our observable reality.

The self control necessary for responsibility is right there.

That self control is hard and needs work has nothing to do with free will.

As the brain is modular, there are numerous different inputs into behaviour, habits or addictions, needs, wants, fears, etc, each competing for attention....one desire or need in conflict with another. At times the addiction may takes control, other times the desire to change may be powerful enough (training, therapy, adaptive neural architecture) to overcome undesirable behaviour.

Some people are good with 'self control' while others struggle. One has no more free will than the other, simple a matter of how their brain is wired and life experiences, training, help received, etc...

Consider the irrelevancy of the notion of free will, for instance;
''We ought to think about decision making in terms of neurological control, not because this is some sort of eternal absolute truth, but because among the options on the table currently, it shows the most promise of coherently unifying the scientific, ethical, judicial, and personal realms of our experience, and because it has the best chance of improving our understanding of ourselves and one another. Research in neuroscience is already well underway, and we can manipulate control across species using conditioning, drugs, and lesions. 4
Just as we have learned to consider our decisions as “free choices,” we can shift our introspection toward our varying levels of control. A man forced to choose between a hamburger and heroin might be acutely aware that his control is being compromised by an addiction. Insisting that he has (or lacks) free will ads nothing to our understanding of his behavior. Nor does it provide any useful suggestions of what we as a society ought do with him legally. An understanding of the problems that opiate addiction creates for one's self-control and how best to treat these difficulties, along with a knowledge of the user's history, would help a judge or jury make informed decisions based on the likely outcomes of various incarceration and rehabilitation programs.''

 

[The AntiChris]

Moreover, because your feelings necessarily prove what you feel is real, there is no possibility that you lack free will so long as you continue to feel as if you have it.

In essence, although I doubt you will acknowledge it to be true, you take the existence of free will on faith.

Based on your faith, any theoretical concept that would, if true, deny free will is nonsensical because an absence of free will is impossible.

You seem to be allowing your deeply felt animus to compatibilism to cloud your thinking.

Absolutely nothing I've posted could possibly justify the personal disparagement above.

Just to be clear, in my interactions with you I haven't once attempted to justify compatibilism. My only reason for engaging with you on this thread is simply to disabuse you of your misunderstanding of compatibilism. (You really ought to make the effort to understand the thing you're so anxious to criticise)

 

[The AntiChris]

As I now understand your position. . . . it is something you feel to be true based on your experience of feeling as though you freely make choices and decisions.

I haven't taken a position and I've made no such claim.

As I see it, you are simply making a claim of absolute truth,

I haven't, and wouldn't, make any such claim.

 

[Jarhyn]

Where we part ways is that I do not understand the self-contradiction you claim to have demonstrated from accepting as a theoretical foundational premise that every activity that has occurred in the past was inexorably necessitated

Do you accept last-thursdayism to be a non-disprovable premise?

Because if you do... It's not necessarily true that events last Thursday were strictly necessary.

If your premise contains an assumption that a not-disprovable premise is false, it seems a contradiction to disprove the disprovable.

I have no idea what last-thirsdayism is. If you were to define it for me, I could attempt to answer your question.

I also have no idea what the final paragraph of your comment means. Perhaps you can expound.

Last Thursdayism is, quite simply, the proposition that the universe was created, as is, "Last Thursday".

Usually it's considered a useless belief, but I've found purposes for it in the past; it's something you cannot disprove, an eminently "possible" set of worlds, of improbable, all metaphysically valid, and none of which were "inexhorably" necessitated by the past, as the past can be divorced from a moment.

Ironically enough, in such worlds the initial event is MUCH closer to directly penning the Bible, but in any case where it does not accidentally do so, the intervening time is seen involving humans doing the writing, so humans seem more necessary in the majority of non-trivial writings of the Bible than the big bang.

Pood provided a second post discussing much more mundane approaches though you seem to have entirely blown past it, specifically accounting for the modal fallacy injected into the sea battle, "ascribing necessity outside of context."

It's a subtle error but it is the error of assigning truth outside the contexts of that truth; metaphysical truth only holds to the context of that provides for it, where the preconditions for it are maintained, where the requirements are met.

The only thing that MUST occur, and must occur everywhere we can see, and is true at all times we experience, is as follows:



... And it's not even true of all possible worlds, just this particular one and a family of related worlds.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

I have seen you spit so many modal fallacies now that I'm beginning to lose faith in your desire to root them out.

I am aware and have long been aware that you exhibit no facility for coming to understand others. A tool that is useful for developing an aptitude for understanding others is an actual, genuine realization that modal logic is relevantly applied in actual engagement with others; application is not the same as accusation.

In order to understand others, one applies modal analysis to one's own understanding of what an other person expresses. In order to understand others, one investigates whether one's own interpretation of what an other says is the only possible understanding.

What I have tried to get you to recognize is that the word eternal can be used in a way that does not include necessitation. You repeatedly commit the modal fallacy with your insistence that eternal always includes necessitation.

 

[Jarhyn]

What I have tried to get you to recognize is that the word eternal can be used in a way that does not include necessitation

You want to say it is true without respect to time that there is a sea battle with respect to some position in time. If you can't see the contradiction there, you would have to be quite blind. There are only a few words there, and the clauses of both "with" and "without" appear.

Eternal is a statement, fundamentally, about positionlessness. Specifically the positionlessness of some events or set of events or some fact.

Without respecting position at all, I gave you an example of something is true of every position in the universe without respect to where, and it does not say that there will be a sea battle; it just says stuff changes.

Eternal means always or unconditionally (necessarily) with respect to time.

Time here is just another position, though, when viewing a block. This means that it is part of a coordinate, and it's still a part of a coordinate after you start regarding it continuously in ranges.

These truths are quite pointedly NOT without respect to the condition of time.

If we are talking about the penchant for physics to create sea battles from certain preconditions, then, that truth is not universal or timeless in all utter regards; it is still contextual to that constraint.

Therefore they are NOT eternal; they are not unconditionally true, especially when they come already presenting the conditions around which it is selectively true or false.

The sea battle is not eternal. The facts about sea battles are not 'eternal'. They are contextual and bound to some quality of time, even if abstract.

I think maybe the issue here is that you and I MIGHT see the very idea of time in a different way.

I see time as a dimension of change, specifically a dimension of functional rather than relational change, and ANY such dimension in a system can be applied, selectively, as the "time" variable.

This is why I switch from "eternal" to "positionless" as a word, because "eternal" makes this inappropriate assumption that not viewing something as a time dimension makes the dimensional context go away?

So instead of seeing it as "true about a time" I see it as "true about a place".

It is not true of all places that there will be a sea battle tomorrow because tomorrow is not in all places, and does not speak to all places; it only speaks to places specifically with 'the qualities of tomorrow', so exactly tomorrow, therefore it is only true of tomorrow that there shall be a sea battle tomorrow, and it is not "eternally" true, it is made momentarily true only by the positionless or open-context truth as follows, and even that is only true within the positions of this space: