their definition of free will is flawed. That it is flawed because it does not account for how will is generated by a brain in the context of a deterministic system
As long as will is generated by a brain, it
is the will of the individual whose brain generates it.
It's not enough. Using that criteria, it could be said that computers have free will, as Jarhyn claims.
So? Do you have any evidence or reasoning that leads to the conclusion "computers cannot have free will"?
If so, I would like to see it. If not, this is just the logical fallacy of Argument from Consequences, leavened with the assumption that nobody wants (or believes) that a computer could ever have free will.
Simple organisms have will, the drive to eat, procreate, etc, yet without the ability to reason, are not seen as moral agents.
Indeed. So what? That doesn't mean that complex organisms cannot be moral agents. Indeed, my entire point rests on the understanding that complexity leads to a whole that differs from its parts - that we should
expect complexity to be a necessary condition for moral agency.
The brain generates will according to its neural architecture and condition, be it functional or dysfunctional.
Yes. We do not disagree on this, and I wonder why you feel the need to repeat it so often.
Neural architecture and non-chosen condition does not equate to freedom of will.
No, of course not. Those two things are not required for freedom of will; Nor do they prevent it.
Which may be asserted, but not demonstrated.
That seems to be a fragment of a sentence; I am not sure what it relates to here.
Nor does the flawed compatibilist definition, acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced help establish freedom of will.
Of course it does. Freedom of will has acting without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced as a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite.
If someone has a gun to my head, I lack freedom to choose not to give them my wallet; But a rock has no freedom to choose anything, even if nobody points a gun at it.
The non chosen condition of a brain does far more than 'unduly influence' will and action, it determines it. It fixes will and action in any given instance of decision making.
The brain is deterministic, as are all physical systems (we assume for the sake of argument - obviously this may be untrue); But that doesn't imply that its "condition" is unchosen. The conditions of its components are, for sure; But the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Brains are massively parallel processors of information, with huge numbers of feedback loops - our choices, made just now, form part of the starting conditions for our next decisions.
You are thinking at the wrong scale here. Your complaint is exactly analogous to: "the components of a wristwatch - the cogwheels and spindles and springs - cannot measure time; Therefore nor can a wristwatch".
That is not a matter of free will, just information processing and related response.
What more is needed for free will?
A brain that made indeterministic choices would be insane. "I chose to eat a big lunch because I skipped breakfast" is a choice, made by me, even if I am a set of entirely deterministic physical interactions. If my actions were not deterministic, my choice would look more like "I chose to play a game of chess because I skipped breakfast", or "I chose to eat a big lunch because I saw an oddly shaped cloud".
Determinism is foundational - anything more than a tiny amount of randomness in our choices would be literal insanity; Zero randomness is what we should expect from a sane decision maker.
Complexity and unpredictability don't require randomness. Just just information processing and related response, from a sufficiently complex system (eg a human brain).