There is no need to choose in the sense of select - there is no choice or selection to be made - if there is only one possibility
But we just went over this: those actual material artifacts are the possibilities. They are the actual compiled, tested algorithms that accomplish various outcomes given a configuration of space around them.
Their possible-ness has been guaranteed according to the fidelity of my ability to recreate important elements of physics.
There is only one outcome between them as a result of the process of choosing (elements of which I also chose) sure... But the outcome still only exists only because of the interplay between the considerations of each; if one of the unselected options weren't there, for example it may be that the selected option would not have won, such that it's existence as a possibility was necessary in rendering the "live" result.
They are as real as a forked road along which "people could go either way", and validated by the fact that members of the set "people" do go both ways, sometimes the same person on different days, and one time different halves of the same person at the same time each way. In a very important way when I myself consider which way I will go, I went each way before I ended up going A way in the most important way.
Then, as a result of all the experiences of that journey through the possibilities of the "self" under the context, with that journey itself having changed me and made me consider which option to take, do I choose.
Some decisions end up owing to a far more trivial example, like a dwarf whose decision on any given moment amount to a completely incomprehensible dice roll. Perhaps you would consider this macro-scale indeterminateness?
Maybe the idea of an unstable equilibrium such as a ball balanced on a hill?
But I don't see that as a matter of "mindful will" unless you capture the ball there with chock blocks and put a sensor on either side that if a road runner steps on it. The mindful part is in fact that which constrains the options to particular outcomes.
It's willful in the least abstract way when it occurs according to some design or intent, and merely "insane" when it is not.
The more "according to dice rolls" behavior becomes, the less "willful" it is.
Freedoms come, however, not from the process of selection or the "dice" rolled upon, but the presence of the selectable elements - which we conveniently validate at least often enough to be reasonably successful - through simulation.
Only once we have identified what (thing in place) can do, then we decide what (thing does in places generally, or that place specifically), even if the thing evaluating this is the thing about to be transformed.
Whatever metaphysical quality is shared by these such that some other thing is gatekeeping some outcome over them, such are "freedoms" or "possibilities".
But
reducing indeterminateness then is exactly what forms more meaningful and sensible wills and more deliberate minds capable of understanding and identifying more and more importantly
better possibilities. We
expect deliberation and good sense to be applied in reaching certain decisions. When that doesn't happen, you're still responsible, but for being an "idiot" rather than malicious.
That these will only end up in one way as the result of one context combined with one agent does not invalidate that possibility is not illusory. The illusion is that possibilities would have to exist in the same place and time or be selected in a particular situation to have been such.