According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Jarhyn]

That is why I reject the use of "contingent" in what I wrote above

there is no contradiction within the assertion that all future activity is the necessary effect of antecedent activity

The problem is that you want to claim the antecedent activity as "necessitated". It's not; it's only necessitated UNDER the antecedent and seeing as the antecedent is different literally everywhere, no one part of that can be considered "necessary" in any objective sense.

Which is the whole fucking point: nothing is necessary except that which is shared across a system in general terms, and only under the general terms.

So while you might be able to make some statement that it is "necessary" due to DeMorgan's Law that when you say !(A||B) You get the same result as when you say (!A&&!B) (that the result is necessary either way), you end up being UNABLE to say that A or B is necessarily true or any guff like that.

By adding necessitation into a premise, you break logic, and it's not my fault that you don't understand this. Please go get some more education..

Of course, I don't think you are necessarily ignorant... You are only momentarily ignorant. It's up to you whether you continue with this

 

[Jarhyn]

Whatever happens was either the only thing that was ever possible, or not.*
It all depends simply upon what you accept as the definition of “possible”, not upon any actual characteristic of the universe.

Imagine for a moment a very early universe, not even minutes old, maybe a few nanoseconds, even.

If I were to pick two arbitrary parts of it, say the part that represents the microwave background on opposing poles of the sky.

Now, at that point in time, the "sphere" of each of these parts of the universe is not in any way part of the sphere of the other, at least not yet.

You might be able to imagine this state by imagining a bowl of marbles, but where each of the marbles' centers stay put but the marbles themselves grow, until they become "intersecting spheres".

Now, at this point in time, the two that we selected cannot actually see one another: those two spheres do not intersect yet.

So at this early point in time, we have two completely relatively separate universes that won't be the "same" universe for another 14 billion years.

This creates a question though: because neither of these reference frames are "preferred": which is the only one of the two that is "possible"?

Of course, eventually they will be part of the same universe, namely when we see the stuff that became the one come in on the edge of the other and becoming what it will be there...

But if we zoom out, say to a point where the universe we are in will NEVER see the edge, we can see that there are infinite parallel universes, infinite possibilities for how reality can express, all subtly divorced.

In fact if we try to look at it from the perspective of each, each particle itself hints at a slightly different universe, though not "parallel" but interlaced.

Each of these, every particle, every different way the universe can be, every way the universe is at every location, represents a "possibility" in this general sense, and "possibility" is revealed as just another word for "reference frame".

So, this is to me the fight between those who think there IS a preferred reference frame (a global one) and those who think the selection of a reference frame ends up being "an absurd choice".

I am on team "no preferred reference frame".

 

[Elixir]

Entertainment only.
No rules applied as the universe expanded at >C, there were no discrete “parts” from which to “pick” as there must necessarily be in your model if it is to remain consistent.
I suppose you could consider “dark matter” and its energy equivalent to be the “other universe” but is it a frame of reference? Not for us or for our devices. Yet.

 

[BSilvEsq]

The problem is that you want to claim the antecedent activity as "necessitated". It's not; it's only necessitated UNDER the antecedent and seeing as the antecedent is different literally everywhere, no one part of that can be considered "necessary" in any objective sense.

To begin, I appreciate your reply.

The substance of the words you emphasized in the quote above is possibly correct and possibly incorrect.

If your assertion is correct (i.e., it correlates to reality), then your rejection of a form of Determinism that includes the concept of necessity would be well taken -- and, again, would go only to the truth or falsehood of the construct, but not its logical relationship to Free Will.

If your assertion is incorrect (i.e., it does not correlate to reality), then your rejection of a form of Determinism that includes the concept of necessity would not necessarily be well taken -- and still would go only to the truth or falsehood of the construct, but not its logical relationship to Free Will.

I understand and appreciate that you believe the substance of the words you emphasized is factually correct based on your knowledge of science, math, physics, computer science, etc. The statement is true, however, only within a paradigm that accepts as true that which can be established inductively by experimentation or deductively from various axioms that science, math and physics dogmatically hold to be true. That approach has proved very useful to the advancement of mankind. It is, however, not necessarily an approach that correlates with reality -- just as many approaches in history that were long held to be valuable and correct have been cast aside in favor of subsequent approaches that were once thought to be heretical or nonsensical, and which, themselves, later yielded to approaches that seemed even more fantastical.

I don't ask you to accept a reality in which a fixed future is necessary, and I do not claim to be able to prove the existence of such a future, much less through math or science. I simply posit a reality in which a fixed future is necessary as a tool for testing different conceptualizations of Free Will.

I also don't profess to be a visionary or to hold the key to any hidden secrets of the universe. I just ask you to consider the fact that many of the most significant advancements have come from thinking outside the box and challenging axioms and concepts previously believed to be unassailably true. By refusing to so much as consider the possibility if such a reality for the limited purpose of evaluating whether Free Will could exist in that reality, you are artificially limiting a valid theoretical inquiry for reasons I cannot begin to understand.

Whether you see it this way or not, I offer this reply in an effort to find common ground, and not to debate, much less disparage, the belief system in which you operate in a day-to-day basis. I am just encouraging you to open your mind to the possibility (not an actuality and not even a probability) of a different reality for the sole purpose of engaging in a thought experiment.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Whatever happens was either the only thing that was ever possible, or not.*
It all depends simply upon what you accept as the definition of “possible”, not upon any actual characteristic of the universe.

Imagine for a moment a very early universe, not even minutes old, maybe a few nanoseconds, even.

If I were to pick two arbitrary parts of it, say the part that represents the microwave background on opposing poles of the sky.

Now, at that point in time, the "sphere" of each of these parts of the universe is not in any way part of the sphere of the other, at least not yet.

You might be able to imagine this state by imagining a bowl of marbles, but where each of the marbles' centers stay put but the marbles themselves grow, until they become "intersecting spheres".

Now, at this point in time, the two that we selected cannot actually see one another: those two spheres do not intersect yet.

So at this early point in time, we have two completely relatively separate universes that won't be the "same" universe for another 14 billion years.

This creates a question though: because neither of these reference frames are "preferred": which is the only one of the two that is "possible"?

Of course, eventually they will be part of the same universe, namely when we see the stuff that became the one come in on the edge of the other and becoming what it will be there...

But if we zoom out, say to a point where the universe we are in will NEVER see the edge, we can see that there are infinite parallel universes, infinite possibilities for how reality can express, all subtly divorced.

In fact if we try to look at it from the perspective of each, each particle itself hints at a slightly different universe, though not "parallel" but interlaced.

Each of these, every particle, every different way the universe can be, every way the universe is at every location, represents a "possibility" in this general sense, and "possibility" is revealed as just another word for "reference frame".

So, this is to me the fight between those who think there IS a preferred reference frame (a global one) and those who think the selection of a reference frame ends up being "an absurd choice".

I am on team "no preferred reference frame".

There are many stated and even more unstated assumptions about how the universe evolved in your post. They may be correct or they may be incorrect. If they are all correct, they might (i) support the possibility if an infinite (or, at least, bear infinite) number of possible universes with futures that are not fixed until they arise, and (ii) foreclose one and only one perfectly deterministic universe that precludes all but one future universe. Then again, one or more of the stated and unstated assumptions may be incorrect, and one and only one perfectly deterministic universe may not only be possible, but actually be.

Perhaps you hold the secrets of the universe to the point where you have perfect and infallible knowledge of what you speak. I do not profess to do so. I simply imagine possibilities, of which one is the existence of one and only one perfectly deterministic universe. I don't live my life as if that were the case, but my mind is open enough to contemplate it.

 

[The AntiChris]

First of all, I was not including you among the folks who have, as their foundation basis for Compatibilism, the tautological syllogism I spelled out. There are, however, some who do subscribe to that syllogism, whether they are able to see it or not -- and one of them is AntiChris.

Really? I'm afraid I can't let this go.

Here's the 'syllogism' you say I "subscribe to".

Premise 1: Free Will (whatever it means) does, in fact, exist.

Premise 2: Any philosophical construct, to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Therefore:

Conclusion: Determinism (whatever it means), to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

You're upset because I've picked obvious holes in your foolish pronouncements about compatibilism exposing your poor understanding of the subject. Your response is to accuse me of subscribing to your inane 'syllogism'.

For the record, nowhere on this thread have I argued that free will exists, neither have I argued or claimed that free will is compatible with determinism.

 

[BSilvEsq]

First of all, I was not including you among the folks who have, as their foundation basis for Compatibilism, the tautological syllogism I spelled out. There are, however, some who do subscribe to that syllogism, whether they are able to see it or not -- and one of them is AntiChris.

Really? I'm afraid I can't let this go.

Here's the 'syllogism' you say I "subscribe to".

Premise 1: Free Will (whatever it means) does, in fact, exist.

Premise 2: Any philosophical construct, to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Therefore:

Conclusion: Determinism (whatever it means), to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

You're upset because I've picked obvious holes in your foolish pronouncements about compatibilism exposing your poor understanding of the subject. Your response is to accuse me of subscribing to your inane 'syllogism'.

For the record, nowhere on this thread have I argued that free will exists, neither have I argued or claimed that free will is compatible with determinism.

I apologize if I mistook you for a different poster to which I was referring. I had thought it was you, but I am not above admitting to the possibility of a mistake.

I did conclude my post with a request that you "define Free Will in a manner that is compatible with a definition of Determinism in which (i) there is one and only one decision / thought / activity that can occur in any moment and which is fixed by antecedent activity, and (ii) the very act of thinking / deciding / acting is governed by the same laws of nature that eliminate all alternatives to the one decision / thought / activity that is fixed by antecedent activity." Are you able to do so? If so, can you please do so.

 

[The AntiChris]

First of all, I was not including you among the folks who have, as their foundation basis for Compatibilism, the tautological syllogism I spelled out. There are, however, some who do subscribe to that syllogism, whether they are able to see it or not -- and one of them is AntiChris.

Really? I'm afraid I can't let this go.

Here's the 'syllogism' you say I "subscribe to".

Premise 1: Free Will (whatever it means) does, in fact, exist.

Premise 2: Any philosophical construct, to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Therefore:

Conclusion: Determinism (whatever it means), to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

You're upset because I've picked obvious holes in your foolish pronouncements about compatibilism exposing your poor understanding of the subject. Your response is to accuse me of subscribing to your inane 'syllogism'.

For the record, nowhere on this thread have I argued that free will exists, neither have I argued or claimed that free will is compatible with determinism.

I apologize...

Apology accepted.

I did conclude my post with a request that you "define Free Will in a manner that is compatible with a definition of Determinism in which (i) there is one and only one decision / thought / activity that can occur in any moment and which is fixed by antecedent activity, and (ii) the very act of thinking / deciding / acting is governed by the same laws of nature that eliminate all alternatives to the one decision / thought / activity that is fixed by antecedent activity." Are you able to do so? If so, can you please do so.

No. I'm not here because I want to champion the cause of compatibilism and, in any event, my criticism of your arguments/claims doesn't stand or fall on my ability to provide you with a convincing case for compatibilism.

My sole reason for being here is to draw attention to the appalling quality of so many of the arguments constantly directed against compatibilism (either as a result of ignorance or just lazy assumptions). There are are reasonable objections (of varying plausibility) that could be levelled against compatibilism but they rarely surface in these threads.

 

[BSilvEsq]

First of all, I was not including you among the folks who have, as their foundation basis for Compatibilism, the tautological syllogism I spelled out. There are, however, some who do subscribe to that syllogism, whether they are able to see it or not -- and one of them is AntiChris.

Really? I'm afraid I can't let this go.

Here's the 'syllogism' you say I "subscribe to".

Premise 1: Free Will (whatever it means) does, in fact, exist.

Premise 2: Any philosophical construct, to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Therefore:

Conclusion: Determinism (whatever it means), to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

You're upset because I've picked obvious holes in your foolish pronouncements about compatibilism exposing your poor understanding of the subject. Your response is to accuse me of subscribing to your inane 'syllogism'.

For the record, nowhere on this thread have I argued that free will exists, neither have I argued or claimed that free will is compatible with determinism.

I apologize...

Apology accepted.

I did conclude my post with a request that you "define Free Will in a manner that is compatible with a definition of Determinism in which (i) there is one and only one decision / thought / activity that can occur in any moment and which is fixed by antecedent activity, and (ii) the very act of thinking / deciding / acting is governed by the same laws of nature that eliminate all alternatives to the one decision / thought / activity that is fixed by antecedent activity." Are you able to do so? If so, can you please do so.

No. I'm not here because I want to champion the cause of compatibilism and, in any event, my criticism of your arguments/claims doesn't stand or fall on my ability to provide you with a convincing case for compatibilism.

My sole reason for being here is to draw attention to the appalling quality of so many of the arguments constantly directed against compatibilism (either as a result of ignorance or just lazy assumptions). There are are reasonable objections (of varying plausibility) that could be levelled against compatibilism but they rarely surface in these threads.

Right. Let's go back to your Post No. 1,789.

In that post, you state that (i) Incompatibilism defines Free Will as "we only act freely if our choices are not determined by prior causes"; (ii) Compatibilism defines Free Will as "the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants"; and "so understood, free will is compatible with determinism since the truth of determinism does not entail that no agents ever do what they wish to do unencumbered." In support of all three quotes, you cite to SEP, which I generally view to be an authoritative source.

As I previously have pointed out:

the SEP discussion goes on to explain that Classic Compatibilism "fails" to overcome the fact that acceptance of Determinism logically precludes the any agent from ever doing what they wish to do unencumbered -- which is the very point that DBT and I repeatedly have been making. Specifically, SEP states, among other things, as follows:

Despite the classical compatibilists’ ingenuity, their analysis of could have done otherwise failed decisively. The classical compatibilists wanted to show their incompatibilist interlocutors that when one asserted that a freely willing agent had alternatives available to her—that is, when it was asserted that she could have done otherwise—that assertion could be analyzed as a conditional statement, a statement that is perspicuously compatible with determinism. But as it turned out, the analysis was refuted when it was shown that the conditional statements sometimes yielded the improper result that a person was able to do otherwise even though it was clear that at the time the person acted, she had no such alternative and therefore was not able to do otherwise in the pertinent sense (Chisholm 1964, in Watson (ed.) 1982, pp.26–7; or van Inwagen 1983, pp. 114–9).

and

So even if an unencumbered agent does what she wants, if she is determined, at least as the incompatibilist maintains, she could not have done otherwise. Since, as the objection goes, freedom of will requires freedom involving alternative possibilities, classical compatibilist freedom falls.

and

The SEP discussion of Classical Compatibilism concludes with the following observation:

The classical compatibilists failed to answer the Classical Incompatibilist Argument. What they attempted to do by way of the conditional analysis was deny the claim that if determinism is true, no one can do otherwise. But, given their failure, it was incumbent upon them to respond to the argument in some manner. It is only dialectically fair to acknowledge that determinism does pose a prima facie threat to free will when free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. The Classical Incompatibilist Argument is merely a codification of this natural thought. In light of the failure of the classical compatibilists’ conditional analysis, the burden of proof rests squarely on the compatibilists.

Based on the foregoing, I concede that I was mistaken when I said previously that you had not set forth two different definitions of Free Will used by Incompatibilism and Compatibilism. You have, in fact, done so.

The reason for my confusion (as best I can tell) is that I had thought that you were contending that Compatibilism relies upon a definition of Free Will that is sufficiently different from the definition understood by Incompatibilists such that the Compatibilist definition of Free Will supports the Compatibilist insistence that Determinism and Free Will are compatible. I now understand that you were not advancing that contention - not expressly and not implicitly.

Moreover, and as explained by SEP, Incompatibilism is sufficiently robust to accept the definition of Free Will you identify as the different definition employed by Compatibilism, and still come out on the right side of the logical divide. As such, while Incompatibilism and Compatibilism may have started off with different definitions of Free Will, Incompatibilism evolved to accept and defeat the definition of Free Will offered by Compatibilism.

As further noted by SEP, Compatibilism has further evolved to develop other definitions of Free Will in an effort to counter Incompatibilism. SEP identifies the flaws of some of these newer definitions and concludes that the debate is unresolved as to some others. For my part, I fail to see the logic the claim that any of the Compatibilism definitions of Free Will is compatible with Determinism without also redefining Determinism in a manner that opens the door to indeterminate activity.

I was hoping that you might provide such a definition along with an explanation of how that definition sustains the possibility of Free Will if Determinism is true. I now understand that the only Compatibilist definition of Free Will you have offered is the one that SEP clearly and expressly states to fail the effort to establish compatibility with Determinism. I also now understand that you decline to provide any other definition of Free Will that you claim to be employed by Compatibilists -- which is your prerogative. As such, I am left with no definition of Free Will to ponder its arguable compatibility with Determinism.

You may find the quality of the arguments against Compatibilism stated in this thread to be appalling, but I beg to differ. In fact, I find that Michael Pearl's argument in Post No. 1,444 to be stated as well as I have seen it stated anywhere else. Michael writes:

t seems that the issue boils down to or starts with the question of whether determinism is such that determinists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness. That sort of indeterminateness is what persons think they experience when they decide/select/choose, and that sort of indeterminateness is actual as logical possibility even if that indeterminateness is not actual as physical possibility.

At the macrophysical level, if the descriptive laws of physicalism physics are as sufficient as physicalists presume them to be, then that is just a way of saying that there never are the assortment of physical possibilities which humans think they experience as being non-subjectively (or not strictly subjectively) actual.

If the macrophysical is such that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness, then the macrophysical is always determinate. If the macrophysical is always determinate and devoid of macrophysical indeterminateness, then any and all macrophysical states are eternally states of utter macrophysical determinateness. Eternal utter macrophysical determinateness is incompatible with there being any constituent macrophysical indeterminateness. And that is to say that given any macrophysical determinate state and its incompatibility with macrophysical indeterminateness, there is only one possible physical state to follow sequentially.

Do compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness?

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

If compatibilists do not deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is a sense in which compatibilists are not determinists.

I think this is essentially what the incompatibilist determinists are trying to convey in discussions with compatibilist determinists.

Personally, I believe I also have presented the argument in a logical manner. If you and some others here disagree, so be it. We can just agree to disagree.

 

[Jarhyn]

The substance of the words you emphasized in the quote above is possibly correct and possibly incorrect.

No. Assuming your conclusions is always incorrect and that's what necessitation outside of the absurdity of an assumption equates to.

This is proven under the demonstration of Godel: a system that states truth of an axiom "proves anything".

I don't even need to demonstrate that myself; Godel did it.

If you don't understand why Godel demonstrates this, please take more education.

 

[BSilvEsq]

The substance of the words you emphasized in the quote above is possibly correct and possibly incorrect.

No. Assuming your conclusions is always incorrect and that's what necessitation outside of the absurdity of an assumption equates to.

This is proven under the demonstration of Godel: a system that states truth of an axiom "proves anything".

I don't even need to demonstrate that myself; Godel did it.

If you don't understand why Godel demonstrates this, please take more education.

I have not asserted the truth of any axiom. Indeed, I have not asserted the truth of anything, whatsoever. By contrast, you assume the truth of multiple matters in most every post you write on this subject. Then, you commit the modal fallacy of reasoning from your assumed truth, which is no more than a possibility, to conclusions you claim to have truth and disprove hypothetical premises asserted by others. The fact that you are incapable of seeing this is sad. Rather than constantly recommend that others obtain further education, you would be well served to obtain an education in philosophy and in formal logic.

 

[Jarhyn]

I have not asserted the truth of any axiom

Assertion of necessitation absent contingence is the axiomatic assertion of truth.

 

[DBT]

I will note that DBT is yet again committing a modal fallacy: that you do not in the present have power over the facts of the past is not necessary for the you of the past to have had power over the present and the future.

People in the present have power over future facts.

Or does not need to go the other way.

The facts of the past entailed this power over the present and the future.

You were right there in the past making decisions about the future. You do not need power over the past for that to be true.

All you need for freedom is relative autonomy in any given present moment from other actions of that present moment in making those decisions so as for those decisions to be made there, on that time, by you, the autonomous thing.

Free will doesn't require power over the past in the first place.

I would invite him to take a software engineering course and learn the hard logic of debugging and identifying responsibilities for failures in logic?

Not at all. All terms and conditions are provided by compatibilists, and the given definition of determinism is not controversial.

The error is yours. Your error lies in a failure to either understand the implications of determinism, that it does not permit alternate choices or actions, or an unwillingness to accept the implications.

But whatever, your rather lame defence does not alter the terms and conditions of determinism, or its implications.

Quite simply;

determinism
noun
''the theory that everything that happens must happen as it does and could not have happened any other way''

Your ow error aside, compatibilism fails because it's definition of free will sidesteps the nature of the means and mechanisms by which actions are taken.

You simple have no case to make. Never have, never will. Your protests are of no consequence.

 

[DBT]

I have a choice between Coke or Pepsi. (I keep using this example because it is convenient; in reality I rarely if ever drink either, but that is my choice!)

What are the options here?

I can choose one or the other or refrain from choosing either.

Hard determinism, as a first premise, defines WHATEVER I choose or refrain from choosing as pre-determined.

From this we can see that hard determinism is actually the question-begging argument, and not compatibilism.

Given determinism, the action you took in that instance was determined, and in that instance, or any instance, could not been otherwise.

That is how determinism is defined, and if it's true that the world is deterministic, that is how the world works.

Descriptive refers to how the system works, it isn't a loophole that permits any choice at any time.

You can't have it both ways.

You are arguing for Libertarian free will, not compatibilism - two different ideas of free will.

You can't have both free choice, any option at any time, and determinism.

 

[Jarhyn]

Seriously, all of these are reflections off of the same crack in logic, and it pops up no matter where you want to squeeze it to, or what direction you want to look at it from, because it's a flawed idea from the ground up.

Fatalism seems just a less "honest" version of theism, and it's supporters seem a more "atheist" version of apologism.

Autonomy is a simple thing: relative independence of one element of a moving system from another element of a moving system means the one element one element is relatively autonomous from another, and this can and should for most reasonable people seem a fairly strong basis for understanding freedom.

the given definition of determinism is not controversial.

Yes, it is. It is clearly controversial because the whole thread has ended up to be about that controversy.

Your error lies in a failure to either understand the implications of determinism, that it does not permit alternate choices or actions

Determinism doesn't "permit" or "not-permit" anything. It's a description, not a prescription.

The deterministic state is prescriptive, but you are a part of that, so you end up participating in the actual prescriptive bit due to your autonomy.

"Otherwise can be elsewhere and still be otherwise".

 

[steve_bank]

Modal fallacy, is tat like putting the cart before the horse?

 

[Jarhyn]

Modal fallacy, is tat like putting the cart before the horse?

More like mistaking an implication for a equivalence, or inverting the direction of the implication, when discussing member and set.

I suppose "cart before horse" is a fair enough characterization.

 

[DBT]

Seriously, all of these are reflections off of the same crack in logic, and it pops up no matter where you want to squeeze it to, or what direction you want to look at it from, because it's a flawed idea from the ground up.

The crack in logic is yours, where you neglect to account for how determinism is defined by compatibilists, and the implications of its terms and conditions.

You can complain and try to deflect all you like, but you can't circumvent the given definition or it its implications.

So you are left with complaining and trying to deflect.

Fatalism seems just a less "honest" version of theism, and it's supporters seem a more "atheist" version of apologism.

Autonomy is a simple thing: relative independence of one element of a moving system from another element of a moving system means the one element one element is relatively autonomous from another, and this can and should for most reasonable people seem a fairly strong basis for understanding freedom.

the given definition of determinism is not controversial.

Yes, it is. It is clearly controversial because the whole thread has ended up to be about that controversy.

Yet it is the definition of determinism given by not only compatibilists, but you, yourself;

Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

You don't have a leg to stand on, and you know it....yet double down regardless.

Your error lies in a failure to either understand the implications of determinism, that it does not permit alternate choices or actions

Determinism doesn't "permit" or "not-permit" anything. It's a description, not a prescription.

You may be starting to understand. Yes it is a description. A description of how the world works if it is deterministic.

A description that excludes the possibility of making alternate choices or taking alternate actions.

Playing semantics won't help you.

The deterministic state is prescriptive, but you are a part of that, so you end up participating in the actual prescriptive bit due to your autonomy.

"Otherwise can be elsewhere and still be otherwise".

You are an inseparable aspect of the system, so you don't get to do something contrary to how the system - no matter how complex or chaotic - evolves.


Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

 

[steve_bank]

If the debate over definitions.

The definition of deterministic system is a lttle hazy.

In a deterministic system of say three variables knowing any 2 of the 3 the variable is deterministically defined.

a = b + c for integers is a deterministic function or system.

The problem in terms of modern views is that Newtonian scale physical systems are a special case of a quantum system.

In electronic system variables are often treated as deterministic knowing they are quantum variables with randomness/probabilities. The variables are often treated as deterministic when quantum effects are negligible. The voltage on a battery.

If you go by demonstrated quantum mechanics then to us in physical systems there are no strictly deterministic systems.

That being said the long running debate over whether quantum randomness is a limit of our ability to measure and see deeper, or if rad mess is a component of reality.

Differing philosophical interpretation of QM..

 

[The AntiChris]

You may find the quality of the arguments against Compatibilism stated in this thread to be appalling, but I beg to differ. In fact, I find that Michael Pearl's argument in Post No. 1,444 to be stated as well as I have seen it stated anywhere else.

Yes, I can see why. He shares your erroneous assumption that compatibilists mean exactly the same thing as incompatibilists when they speak of 'free will'. Do you find Michael's gratuitous and unnecessary use of "macrophysical" impressive?

Here's the nub of what Michael is claiming:

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

What he's saying is that a compatibilist who believes the world is genuinely deterministic must, in some "obvious sense", be an incompatibilist. In other words if you believe the world is truly deterministic it necessarily follows that you cannot believe we have free will.

As it stands the conclusion does not follow from the premise. There's a hidden (unstated) premise. The unstated premise is that free will cannot exist in a truly deterministic universe.

This is a straightforward and clear example of the logical fallacy of begging the question - Michael (and you) assume the truth of the very thing that is in dispute.