DBT
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Double post.
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Sam Harris' argument against free will (video lecture)
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DBT
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It's not contradictory, I was clearly referring to semantics and not actual states, common usage, common references. Coercion relating to certain conditions within the process but not the nature of the process itself.
You just need to construct a mental picture of neural agency. I even stated the distinction earlier, which you agreed made sense. Have you forgotten - ''Not in that context, the given definitions of 'free' may only apply to the context in which they are defined?''
Neural networks by necessity of cellular information exchange constrain response, this action rather than that action, which may be more rational.
An absence of coercion is not an instance of free will, because will, rather than being freely chosen, is determined by information state prior to conscious representation and regardless of the presence or absence of external pressures upon will.
Will doesn't become free because of an absence of pressure to conform or respond against one's will. Which is not a conscious choice anyway.
I've never declared that '''will that's free from deterministic causes is an instance of 'free will' - I've always maintained the very opposite! Is there typo somewhere? Where does this come from?
It always comes down to brain state, the brain being the sole agent of thought and response, etc. Actions that are free from external coercion are merely actions that are not forced by external forces, but still an instance of determined will (brain state/agency), therefore, not free will. Will that is not coerced, yet is determined, therefore constrained.
The [semantic] distinction is abundantly clear, if you can't grasp it, that is your problem, not mine.
The AntiChris
Senior Member
I thought your position was that for will to be truly free it had to be free from deterministic causation and since the will is a product of a deterministic system it cannot be called 'free'. Am I mistaken?
The opposite of my sentence above would be "will that's free from deterministic causes is not an instance of 'free will' ". Is this what you now say you mean?
By claiming its a 'semantic distinction', you're simply saying that's what you believe the words must mean. It's not a rational argument.
It's called a "belt and braces argument" - if one argument fails you can always fall back on the other one.
It takes the same form of such an argument, but from context (and DBT has since confirmed) that that isn't what he is presenting.
I saw. I just wasn't sure how you can confidently proclaim that free will does this and doesn't do that when, according to you, the sum total of useful information communicated by the concept is zero.
The argument you seem to be making seems a bit like this:
P1 Useful information on human behaviour can only come from an analysis of the brain
P2 Libertarian Free will does not refer to that source of information
Therefore -
C1 Libertarian Free will is irrelevant
The problem is that this is begging the question - you've rejected free will on the basis that it doesn't match your preferred analysis, not on logical grounds.
Given that LFW is the contention that human decision making is not determined, the only source of conflict is your assumption that the brain is determined - an assumption that goes well beyond the information available.
You've suggested that DBT's argument is not logically tight. Do you have an upgrade for this?
I don't see anything particularly incoherent about Libertarian Free Will. Trying to redefine it as acausal is simply inaccurate, presupposing elements of determinism a priori.
The topic was Sam Harris' argument, which was specifically directed at LFW rather than free will in general. I agree that Sam doesn't reliably distinguish between the two though.
I note that you appear to be using 'causality and 'deterministic causality' as interchangeable. I'd suggest that this needs to be argued for, since one only implies the other if you previously assume a deterministic universe.
The AntiChris
Senior Member
If you mean do I think there are better arguments, then yes. My interest here is in simply attempting to understand DBT's argument (I have no interest in arguing with proponents of libertarian free will for much the same reason I'm not particularly interested in arguing with committed theists).
No, DBT and I may disagree about a number of things but I think we're on the same page as far as determinism and causality are concerned.
The AntiChris
Senior Member
DBT
Ok, I understand now. Your position is that free will is incomptatible with both determinism and indeterminism. I'd mistakenly taken you to be making the standard hard determinist claim that [adequate] determinism is true and that it is incompatible with free will, and, therefore, free will does not exist. There was no intention to misrepresent you.
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I still don't understand your claim that free will cannot be free "by any of the given definitions of 'free'".
You gave three definitions of freedom ("absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint") said that "Consequently, the term Free Will is not applicable to the deterministic systems of a brain".
The problem is that determinism only rules out 'necessity'. You need a separate justification to rule out 'coercion or constraint' and it's this that I've been asking for.
Ok, I understand now. Your position is that free will is incomptatible with both determinism and indeterminism. I'd mistakenly taken you to be making the standard hard determinist claim that [adequate] determinism is true and that it is incompatible with free will, and, therefore, free will does not exist. There was no intention to misrepresent you.
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I still don't understand your claim that free will cannot be free "by any of the given definitions of 'free'".
You gave three definitions of freedom ("absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint") said that "Consequently, the term Free Will is not applicable to the deterministic systems of a brain".
The problem is that determinism only rules out 'necessity'. You need a separate justification to rule out 'coercion or constraint' and it's this that I've been asking for.
DBT
Contributor
As I said, free will is eliminated by the very source that generates 'will' - the drive or impulse to act - and carries out decision making, with only some of this activity being represented in conscious form.
So it makes no difference whether there are elements/circumstances that put pressure in a certain direction (to act against one's wishes), or that decisions and will are free of coercion, because all decisions (and their associated will to act) are a consequence of the state of the system: the neural networks of a brain.
So, as I explained, a common phrase may be ''he acted according to his own free will'' - which does not take into account the nature of the brain/mind decision making process.
Which is why I used the analogy ''the sun is rising'' - casual appearances and common references are not necessarily composed of accurate representation of the article they refer to.
Though it appears to, The sun isn't actually rising.
He who was said to have 'acted according to his own free will' did indeed act on the basis of his will, uncoerced, but nevertheless his will is determined by the state of 'his' brain, which he, as a conscious entity ( a conscious representation of information by the agency of brain activity), did not choose, consequently, the will that he acted upon was not 'free' will - but simply 'will'
Consciousness/will itself does not think or decide, it has no autonomy, it is a reflection of the physical/information condition of a brain from moment to moment as it responds to its inputs (external and internal).
The AntiChris
Senior Member
This seems to be predominantly a restatement of your view of the deterministic nature of human decision making - none of which I disagree with.
However I'm still struggling to see how this explains your claim that a will that is free of coercion cannot be an alternative version of 'free' will.
When you said:
...it's not clear precisely what you're saying.
Are you saying the words "free will" can only mean free from deterministic causation and therefore any use of the term is mistaken?
What if some people use the phrase ''he acted according to his own free will'' to simply mean he acted free from coercion? Would those people be misusing the term? If so, this would imply that the words 'free will' have a meaning independent of usage which raises the question of how you derive the meaning of the term.
apeman
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I just thought I'd throw this in...
Freedom, in terms of freedom of will, is about our ability to function in a way that has a degree of separateness from the reality around ( and within us)...we clearly do this all the time ..we virtually constantly operate on false ideas (for example). So my will is free from the reality around me, it is free to come to the wrong decision for example.
Freedom of the will is freedom to be wrong.
Freedom, in terms of freedom of will, is about our ability to function in a way that has a degree of separateness from the reality around ( and within us)...we clearly do this all the time ..we virtually constantly operate on false ideas (for example). So my will is free from the reality around me, it is free to come to the wrong decision for example.
Freedom of the will is freedom to be wrong.
fromderinside
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Well you succeeded. Wrong again.
Keith&Co.
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So, when the Distant Early Warning system set off the 'incoming nukes from Russia' alarm because it detected migrating geese over Canada, that meant the computers operating on the false assumptions that were not the reality, they had free will to sound the alarm?
Wrong = free?
DBT
Contributor
I wasn't sure that you did agree, even though you said the words.
If you do agree that will is the expression of a deterministic system, then you must agree that will is not free, it is determined right from formation at the cellular level.
Given the initial conditions, there are no subsequent event that alter its status from determined will to free will...it's fully formed by cellular activity and represented in conscious form and acted upon by motor neuron actions.
Just because someone or something is forcing you to act contrary to your desires, doesn't change the means of production of will, it's simply an additional element for the brain to process and respond to. Essentially nothing different to many other options we are faced with, to go to work today, or stay home (rather stay home, but the money gained by going to work is necessary).
There practically always a conflict in interests involved in decision making, I'd rather do this, but that must be done, I have to do that.
An absence of coercion is simply an absence of undue pressure to act in a certain way, but nature of the mechanisms of the decision making process remain identical: a decision is determined by the physical/informational state of the system in the instance of a decision being made.
An absence of coercion is just that: an absence of coercion - ''he was not forced to go, he went of his own accord (volition).
Volition - the cognitive process by which an organism decides on and commits to a particular course of action.
Quote:
''Subjects in this test performed exactly as if their brains were subconsciously gathering information before reaching a confidence threshold, which was then reported to the conscious mind as a definite, sure answer. The subjects, however, were never aware of the complex computations going on''
The AntiChris
Senior Member
No. That doesn't follow.
The only thing that logically follows from the [agreed] premise that the will is deterministic is that it is therefore not free from deterministic cause.
The only way your claim would make logical sense is if you are taking it as axiomatic that no deterministic system (not just human decision making) can ever be described as 'free'.
Is this your position?
DBT
Contributor
It does follow, it follows because all the objects and events of the external world are not experienced directly, but interpreted and represented in virtual form as a subjective experience. We see the world through the filter of our preconceptions, some being reasonable, others flawed. A collection of both adaptive and maladaptive drives that develop throughout our lives.
An individual may believe/perceive himself to be under coercion when no such thing is happening, the situation is being misinterpreted (by the brain), yet the sense of coercion has real consequences.
The brain being the sole agent of perception and decision making and response, no perception, decision or response is free from its own production condition. A sense of coercion is just another input, its absence produces typical desire based behaviour generated by the filter of past pleasures and physical needs. Not chosen, but developed.
There is nothing left over...except the ability to act on our unchosen set of evolved proclivities.
Basically, no system that is 'under the sway' of determinism is free to alter its own progression of events.
It also depends on what you see as being freedom, we can lift our arms at will, run if we like, go out or stay in, freedom of action...but this is necessarily an expression of determined will.
The distinction between 'freedom' action and 'freedom of will' was made a long time ago.
Not that our Universe is fully determined, QM, etc, but neither is probability wave/particle position (soft, non fixed determinism) under our conscious control, consequently, we can no more alter our condition through an act of will than change the progression of events in a fully determined system.
''As far as human freedom is concerned, it doesn't matter whether physics is deterministic, as Newtonian physics was, or whether it allows for an indeterminacy at the level of particle physics, as contemporary quantum mechanics does. Indeterminism at the level of particles in physics is really no support at all to any doctrine of the freedom of the will; because first, the statistical indeterminacy at the level of particles does not show any indeterminacy at the level of the objects that matter to us – human bodies, for example. And secondly, even if there is an element of indeterminacy in the behaviour of physical particles – even if they are only statistically predictable – still, that by itself gives no scope for human freedom of the will; because it doesn't follow from the fact that particles are only statistically determined that the human mind can force the statistically-determined particles to swerve from their paths. Indeterminism is no evidence that there is or could be some mental energy of human freedom that can move molecules in directions that they were not otherwise going to move. So it really does look as if everything we know about physics forces us to some form of denial of human freedom.'' John Searle (Mind, Brains, and Science, 1984, pp.86-7)
The AntiChris
Senior Member
Ok.
1) You say the will cannot be free because it's deterministic.
2) I completely agree that this rules out libertarian free will, but I want to know why you believe determinism rules out any other versions of free will (such as freedom from coercion).
3) You reply by explaining at great length (with supporting quotes) that this is because free will is indisputably deterministic (I don't disagree).
The problem here is that you clearly don't understand that this response does not address my question and I've run out of ways of explaining to you that it does not follow logically from the agreed fact that the will is deterministic, that a will that is free from coercion is not "free will". (I want to make it clear, I'm not not making the case that freedom from coercion is necessarily a valid form of free will, I'm only saying that you haven't presented a coherent argument against the possibility).
DBT
Contributor
Because anything else presents a contradiction in logic: Will is not free because it is determined, and at the same time, will is free in a certain context...a context which does not actually free it from determinism.
It remains determined under all conditions because that is the consequence a deterministic system.
To propose that will becomes free because will is not being coerced ignores that will is determined regardless of the presence or absence of coercion.
You appear to want it both ways, both determined and not determined, somehow, inexplicably, set free by an absence of a single factor -----will is not free because it is the product of a deterministic system/will is free if it is not coerced.
How does an absence of coercion negate the deterministic work of neural networks?
How an absence of coercion alter the fundamental nature of determined will is inexplicable, other than a semantic construct such as 'the sun is rising' example.
You say you don't disagree, but in practice do appear to disagree. Or else you haven't grasped the nature of causal determinism, namely that something determined can't be undetermined and set 'free' merely through the absence of a certain class of information that happens to be present in the system.
I think that what I've said clearly does address your question, but not being fully grasped.
In terms of logic, it's quite clear that something cannot be both determined and not determined. It's a contradiction.
If will is determined, which you appear to agree with, will is determined in every instance of formation and is not free under any circumstances or conditions.
Being determined in every instance of formation (brain state) will cannot be defined as 'free will' in any instance of manifestation.
Consequently, any reference to 'free will' is simply a semantic construct, and not an accurate reference to the actual condition of determined/not free will (the sun is rising).
The AntiChris
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DBT
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I have already provided definitions of 'free' and 'freedom' and stated that freedom cannot exist within a determined system - ''Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature'' - and went on to say that, although QM rules out hard determinism, neither does it allow conscious or willed manipulation of particle position, or alter probabilistic outcomes, ie, freedom of will.
The AntiChris
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DBT
Contributor
Yes, of course.
When I said that Libertarian free will is absurd and compatibalism is a failed argument, the default position should be incompatibility, that freedom is incompatible with determinism. Which is what I'm arguing.
This is nothing new:
''The classic problem of free will is to reconcile an element of freedom with the apparent determinism in a world of causes and effects, a world of events in a great causal chain.
Determinists deny any such freedom.
Compatibilists redefine freedom. Although our will is determined by prior events in the causal chain, it is in turn causing and determining our actions. Compatibilists say that determinism by our will allows us to take moral responsibility for our actions.
Libertarians think the will is free when a choice can be made that is not determined or necessitated by prior events. The will is free when alternative choices could have been made with the same pre-existing conditions.
Freedom of the will allows us to say, "I could have chosen (and done) otherwise."
In a deterministic world, everything that happens follows ineluctably from natural or divine laws. There is but one possible future. ''
Of course it becomes more complicated with a QM model of probabilistic determinism (a softer version, which I think is a more accurate representation of the World/matter/energy), that the future is not absolutely fixed, but nevertheless is not chosen through means of 'free will' - the brain being a sufficiently deterministic system (QM/Classical transition) to discount freedom of will....unless one is a compatibalist.
But then, compatibalism is a failed argument, as I've pointed out in numerous threads on the subject (FRDB), as is the 'ability to do otherwise' in the instance of a decision being made (that being the state of the brain in that moment in time).