• Welcome to the new Internet Infidels Discussion Board, formerly Talk Freethought.

Sam Harris' argument against free will (video lecture)

I don't think so...if you think so, which you apparently do, you need to explain your reasoning

How about an example:

2) Compatibalism is a failed argument
5) The term free will conveys no useful information <reason snipped>
How can you have an argument if the terms convey no useful information. I can understand you believing that an argument is unsound, and I can understand you believing that an argument has no content, but I don't see how you can have both.

Similarly:

1) Libertarian Free will is a fantasy
6) The term free will is irrelevant

How can something both be irrelevant and a fantasy?

And all four points presuppose that these terms in philosophy exist only for some utility or purpose. I can believe that you don't find them useful, but that says more about what you do and don't regard as useful than about the terms themselves. The claim that something is irrelevant can only be in reference to something it is relevant or irrelevant to. What is it relevant to, and why should our discourse be limited to that subject?

What I said was: the terms 'free will doesn't tell us anything about human behaviour or the nature and function of the brain. In other words, you cannot use the term 'free will' as source of information on human nature, cognition, character, individual sets of behaviours, or anything else.

Yes, but you also said 'The term free will is irrelevant', a far more general claim, and the one I specifically cited. Again, irrelevant to what?
It's called a "belt and braces argument" - if one argument fails you can always fall back on the other one. ;)
 
I don't think so...if you think so, which you apparently do, you need to explain your reasoning

How about an example:

2) Compatibalism is a failed argument
5) The term free will conveys no useful information <reason snipped>
How can you have an argument if the terms convey no useful information. I can understand you believing that an argument is unsound, and I can understand you believing that an argument has no content, but I don't see how you can have both.

Similarly:

1) Libertarian Free will is a fantasy
6) The term free will is irrelevant

How can something both be irrelevant and a fantasy?

Because fantasy worlds have little or no relationship to the real world and how it operates, our constructs of fantasy are irrelevant to the actual world (except as psychological escapism).

The world of Frodo, its physics and its inhabitants, and his magic ring bear no resemblance to the actual world and its physics its events and its problems are irrelevant to the physics and problems and events of the actual world....except of course, as a form of escapism and/or entertainment.

Yes, but you also said 'The term free will is irrelevant', a far more general claim, and the one I specifically cited. Again, irrelevant to what?

Did you not see what I said? The list of things that I outlined? - 'free will' as source of information on human nature, the nature of cognition, character, personality, how decisions are made, motivations, drivers, pathologies, lesions, chemical changes to the brain....?

In other words, the term 'free will' conveys no useful information in relation to the human condition. it just represents a certain ideology
 
It's called a "belt and braces argument" - if one argument fails you can always fall back on the other one. ;)

Wrong. ;)

The argument hasn't changed. Nor has any its points, which I've already provided numerous times.

Basically:
If both conscious and unconscious behaviors (human will) are driven by brain/neural networks (as the available evidence suggests) and the brain is a deterministic system - information processors (neurons) and their connections (dendrites, axons, etc) - all decisions and all actions are necessitated by deterministic processes.

So, by the given definition of 'freedom as being the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action' - human Will, whether conscious or unconscious, cannot be defined as being free - ie -as an absence of necessity.

Consequently, the term Free Will is not applicable to the deterministic systems of a brain.
 
Basically:
If both conscious and unconscious behaviors (human will) are driven by brain/neural networks (as the available evidence suggests) and the brain is a deterministic system - information processors (neurons) and their connections (dendrites, axons, etc) - all decisions and all actions are necessitated by deterministic processes.
No disagreement from me.

I have no belief whatsoever in libertarian acausal/contra-causal free will. In my view it's an incoherent concept.

So, by the given definition of 'freedom as being the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action' - human Will, whether conscious or unconscious, cannot be defined as being free - ie -as an absence of necessity.

Consequently, the term Free Will is not applicable to the deterministic systems of a brain.
The assumption you make here is that free will in common usage (what most people usually mean when they use the term) entails freedom from 'necessity' (i.e. freedom from deterministic causality). This may well be the case (it should be empirically verifiable) but it needs to be argued for - you can't just assume it.
 
The assumption you make here is that free will in common usage (what most people usually mean when they use the term) entails freedom from 'necessity' (i.e. freedom from deterministic causality). This may well be the case (it should be empirically verifiable) but it needs to be argued for - you can't just assume it.

It's not my assumption. Are you referring to compatibalism, that free will is compatible with determinism?
 
Last edited:
The assumption you make here is that free will in common usage (what most people usually mean when they use the term) entails freedom from 'necessity' (i.e. freedom from deterministic causality). This may well be the case (it should be empirically verifiable) but it needs to be argued for - you can't just assume it.

It's not my assumption. Are you referring to compatibalism, that free will is compatible with determinism?
No. My comment has nothing whatsoever to do with compatibilism.

I'll rephrase what I find problematic about the argument you give in post #63.

You give give a definition of "freedom" which lists three different possible meanings: absence of necessity, absence of coercion, and absence of constraint.

You choose to take absence of necessity as the defining quality of 'free will' (you could have used coercion or constraint). You give no reason or argument in support of this - it's an assumption.

I'm not suggesting you're necessarily wrong. All I'm saying is that if you're interested in making a logically sound argument you need to justify (give reasons for) your claim that the freedom in 'free will' necessarily refers to absence of necessity rather than absence of coercion or constraint.
 
It's not my assumption. Are you referring to compatibalism, that free will is compatible with determinism?
No. My comment has nothing whatsoever to do with compatibilism.

I'll rephrase what I find problematic about the argument you give in post #63.

You give give a definition of "freedom" which lists three different possible meanings: absence of necessity, absence of coercion, and absence of constraint.

You choose to take absence of necessity as the defining quality of 'free will' (you could have used coercion or constraint). You give no reason or argument in support of this - it's an assumption.

I'm not suggesting you're necessarily wrong. All I'm saying is that if you're interested in making a logically sound argument you need to justify (give reasons for) your claim that the freedom in 'free will' necessarily refers to absence of necessity rather than absence of coercion or constraint.

It's not a case of 'rather' - nor do I exclude the other factors. I simply picked one for for the sake of brevity, as a definition that adequately represents the concept of freedom .

As I'd already given several definitions that represent various aspects of the concept of freedom, I feel no need to keep repeating each and every sentence each time I reply.

None are exclusive anyway, they all relate, they do not contradict each other.

Necessity represents a form of constraint, coercion places a constraint upon freedom, the information condition of neural networks constrains the decision making process and necessitates the shape and form that a decision takes.
 
No. My comment has nothing whatsoever to do with compatibilism.

I'll rephrase what I find problematic about the argument you give in post #63.

You give give a definition of "freedom" which lists three different possible meanings: absence of necessity, absence of coercion, and absence of constraint.

You choose to take absence of necessity as the defining quality of 'free will' (you could have used coercion or constraint). You give no reason or argument in support of this - it's an assumption.

I'm not suggesting you're necessarily wrong. All I'm saying is that if you're interested in making a logically sound argument you need to justify (give reasons for) your claim that the freedom in 'free will' necessarily refers to absence of necessity rather than absence of coercion or constraint.

It's not a case of 'rather' - nor do I exclude the other factors. I simply picked one for for the sake of brevity, as a definition that adequately represents the concept of freedom .
Ok. From this it seems you could have picked 'coercion' and you would have meant exactly the same thing (i.e. absence of deterministic causality). Is that right?
 
It's not a case of 'rather' - nor do I exclude the other factors. I simply picked one for for the sake of brevity, as a definition that adequately represents the concept of freedom .
Ok. From this it seems you could have picked 'coercion' and you would have meant exactly the same thing (i.e. absence of deterministic causality). Is that right?

The physical state of the brain is reflected in the state of the mind and all its attributes, abilities and features, self, self identity, thoughts, emotions and decisions....none of which are fixed, but neither are they free (by any of the given definitions of 'free') but adapt from moment to moment by an interaction of inputs, architecture and memory through the medium of electrochemical information processing. An intelligent, flexible, adaptive system, but not a 'free will' system, by any of the given definitions of 'free.' The brain does of course form 'will' - the impulse or drive to act.
 
The physical state of the brain is reflected in the state of the mind and all its attributes, abilities and features, self, self identity, thoughts, emotions and decisions....none of which are fixed, but neither are they free (by any of the given definitions of 'free')
It would follow from this, since absence of coercion was one of the definitions you provided (post #63), that you believe that "thoughts emotions and decisions" are never free from coercion.

Can you confirm that this is what you mean?
 
The physical state of the brain is reflected in the state of the mind and all its attributes, abilities and features, self, self identity, thoughts, emotions and decisions....none of which are fixed, but neither are they free (by any of the given definitions of 'free')
It would follow from this, since absence of coercion was one of the definitions you provided (post #63), that you believe that "thoughts emotions and decisions" are never free from coercion.

Can you confirm that this is what you mean?

Not in that context, the given definitions of 'free' may only apply to the context in which they are defined. The information state of a neural networks may place a constraint on ability, but this is obviously not 'coercion'

As I said earlier, the information condition of neural networks constrains the decision making process and necessitates the shape and form that a decision takes. Coercion is a matter a matter of external forces placing pressure on decision making.
 
It would follow from this, since absence of coercion was one of the definitions you provided (post #63), that you believe that "thoughts emotions and decisions" are never free from coercion.

Can you confirm that this is what you mean?

Not in that context, the given definitions of 'free' may only apply to the context in which they are defined. The information state of a neural networks may place a constraint on ability, but this is obviously not 'coercion'
Good. That makes sense.

So I take it you'd agree that 'will' can be free in the sense of absence of coercion but not free in the sense of absence of necessity?
 
Not in that context, the given definitions of 'free' may only apply to the context in which they are defined. The information state of a neural networks may place a constraint on ability, but this is obviously not 'coercion'
Good. That makes sense.

So I take it you'd agree that 'will' can be free in the sense of absence of coercion but not free in the sense of absence of necessity?

An absence of coercion refers to an absence of pressure to do something that goes against one's will - to do what you want to do rather than what you are being pressured to do by external circumstances, yet what you 'want to do' is not a matter of 'free will' but a brain response, an information processor responding to external circumstances, stimuli, according to its collection of of both inherit and developed needs and wants (remembered pleasures) shaping and forming conscious will: the drive, desire or impulse to act. The term 'free will' is irrelevant. Decisions may or may not be coerced by external circumstances, but are always shaped (restricted) by neural architecture and immediate information state.


''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.'' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.
 
Good. That makes sense.

So I take it you'd agree that 'will' can be free in the sense of absence of coercion but not free in the sense of absence of necessity?

An absence of coercion refers to an absence of pressure to do something that goes against one's will - to do what you want to do rather than what you are being pressured to do by external circumstances, yet what you 'want to do' is not a matter of 'free will' but a brain response, an information processor responding to external circumstances, stimuli, according to its collection of of both inherit and developed needs and wants (remembered pleasures) shaping and forming conscious will: the drive, desire or impulse to act. The term 'free will' is irrelevant. Decisions may or may not be coerced by external circumstances, but are always shaped (restricted) by neural architecture and immediate information state.
Was that a "yes" or a "no"? :confused:
 
Was that a "yes" or a "no"? :confused:

It's a 'will cannot be defined as being 'free' under any circcumstances' - even though some use the phrase 'he acted acording to his own free will' as a casual remark. A remark that just means 'he acted according to his own will' - will that he himself as a conscious identity did not choose.
 
It's a 'will cannot be defined as being 'free' under any circumstances'
Why? This is an extraordinary claim.

What law of nature/linguistics/logic prevents me from saying that will cannot be free from deterministic causation but it can be free of coercion?

Semantics....just like when folks say 'the sun is rising' - it is not the sun that is rising, but the Earth rotating on its axis.

It's just a convenient figure of speech, which does not accurately represent the mechanics of the process that it is used in reference to.

Common usage, convenient, etc but not accurate.

''He acted on his own free will'' may be rephrased as ''his own volition'' or just 'his own will'' - we, of course, are quite able to act on the basis of our own will...which is formed in response to a given situation.
 
Why? This is an extraordinary claim.

What law of nature/linguistics/logic prevents me from saying that will cannot be free from deterministic causation but it can be free of coercion?

Semantics....just like when folks say 'the sun is rising' - it is not the sun that is rising, but the Earth rotating on its axis.

It's just a convenient figure of speech, which does not accurately represent the mechanics of the process that it is used in reference to.

Common usage, convenient, etc but not accurate.

''He acted on his own free will'' may be rephrased as ''his own volition'' or just 'his own will'' - we, of course, are quite able to act on the basis of our own will...which is formed in response to a given situation.
Ok. I'm clearly not going to get a coherent logical argument from you so I'll leave it there. Thanks.
 
Semantics....just like when folks say 'the sun is rising' - it is not the sun that is rising, but the Earth rotating on its axis.

It's just a convenient figure of speech, which does not accurately represent the mechanics of the process that it is used in reference to.

Common usage, convenient, etc but not accurate.

''He acted on his own free will'' may be rephrased as ''his own volition'' or just 'his own will'' - we, of course, are quite able to act on the basis of our own will...which is formed in response to a given situation.
Ok. I'm clearly not going to get a coherent logical argument from you so I'll leave it there. Thanks.

Pointing out a problem with semantics in relation to the concept of free will is logical and reasonable.

As you happened to ask - ''What law of nature/linguistics/logic prevents me from saying that will cannot be free from deterministic causation but it can be free of coercion?'' - I pointed out that there is nothing in terms of linguistics to stop you from saying whatever takes your fancy, ie, the sun is rising, etc, but without an accurate relationship between what you say, or claim, to the object being referred to, you only have rhetoric.

So if you say 'will can be free from coercion' (which it can), what you have (will cannot be free from deterministic causation) is will that is free from coercion, but not an instance of 'free will'....if you can see the distinction.
 
'will cannot be defined as being 'free' under any circcumstances'
So if you say 'will can be free from coercion' (which it can)...
I think most people would see these two comments as at the very least confusing, if not contradictory.

This why I find our exchanges so frustrating.

what you have (will cannot be free from deterministic causation) is will that is free from coercion, but not an instance of 'free will'....if you can see the distinction.
Of course I can see the distinction between a will that's free from deterministic causes and a will that's free from coercion.

What I don't understand is your reason for unilaterally declaring that will that's free from deterministic causes is an instance of 'free will' but will that's free from coercion is not an instance of 'free will'.

I think there are coherent arguments that could be made for making this distinction but I'm afraid I haven't seen you make one on this thread.
 
Back
Top Bottom