Sam Harris' argument against free will (video lecture)

[arkirk]

Fascinating stuff.

I've always felt that free will is an illusion for many of the reasons Harris states. If you rearranged all of my atoms to match those of Charles Manson at a certain point in his life, then replaced him with me at the appropriate point in the past, then I would have made all the same decisions he did.

At around 37:00, he brings up another point I've long agreed with: that determinism isn't the same thing as fatalism.

I don´t like how these types of talks are billed. Free will is a retarded subject.

What is it that is free?
What is it free from?
How is free?

Whenever anybody makes are argument on free will, they start off by defining the above three in a way so that they win. Everybody always wins a free will debate. No matter on what side they´re on.

Sam Harris must know this. As anybody who has read any amount of philosophy. It´s just a boring subject.

I couldn't agree with you more. Arguments about free will are always circular, boring and pointless. Once around the track is enough for a grown-up. Talking about free will frees him from having to explain a lot of egregious moral advice he doles out regularly on things like war and patriotism. He is on a lot safer ground when he talks about bullshit.

 

[DrZoidberg]

I agree with Dan Dennett to the extent that the free will debate generally boils down to a debate on the issue of whether the concept of moral responsibility is in some way (not necessarily as the popular concept of moral responsibility - whatever that is) a tenable concept worth salvaging.

In everyday life I could say - and I do - that "I intellectually know he's just a meat machine. But why can't I get angry with him? Anger is my birthright!" - That position is consistent with scepticism on moral responsibility. The position opposing scepticism - i.e. compatibilism (which Harris repudiates as changing the subject) - says that I can say something more on moral responsibility such that the concept of moral responsibility is worth salvaging. Dennett provides consequentialist reasons for salvaging the concept of moral responsibility, and I don't dispute that the concept helps society to function. But philosophically is that sufficient reason to salvage the concept of moral responsibility? - I'm not really convinced. It seems to depend on what is one's take on the concept of moral responsibility. What does the concept entail?

It´s arguments like this that make me hate Sartre. If it wasn´t for him nobody would make arguments like this. We´re emotional beings. We can´t, with our intellect, remove ourselves from our emotions and think objectively. Nobody is able to do that. Which Sartre even acknowledges. I hate it that anybody gave that phony any attention at all. The fact that people take him seriously at all has fucked up the entire debate on moral responsibility.

 

[Togo]

I'm really having trouble parsing this.

Can you explain how the example relates to your claim that the existence of will somehow contradicts free will, or vice versa. Or to put it another way, how the ability to carry out decisions somehow implies an inability to make them? I don't think the a and b in your two formulae are being used consistently.

Will requers consitent causation, free will requires inconsitent causation.

No, they don't.

More formally, there exists no definition of 'causation' such that both statements are true. Will requires only that will and action be linked with reasonable reliability. (Libertarian) Free will requires a lack of absolute determination. Calling both of these 'causation' is equivocation.

And I'm still trying to work out why you claim any of this is 'modern science'? Or is that an overstatement?

 

[Juma]

Will requers consitent causation, free will requires inconsitent causation.

No, they don't.

More formally, there exists no definition of 'causation' such that both statements are true. Will requires only that will and action be linked with reasonable reliability.

I can agree with "ressonable reliability" since that is vague enough to mean the same thing.

(Libertarian) Free will requires a lack of absolute determination..

Not enough. Free will requires that whatever can happen. Which is contradicting "reasonable reliability".

 

[fromderinside]

(Libertarian) Free will requires a lack of absolute determination..

Not enough. Free will requires that whatever can happen. Which is contradicting "reasonable reliability".

Frame it in the context of what a human can appreciate satisfys lack of absolute determination requirement for me and, I think, for any person.

 

[Perspicuo]

I agree with Dan Dennett to the extent that the free will debate generally boils down to a debate on the issue of whether the concept of moral responsibility is in some way (not necessarily as the popular concept of moral responsibility - whatever that is) a tenable concept worth salvaging.

In everyday life I could say - and I do - that "I intellectually know he's just a meat machine. But why can't I get angry with him? Anger is my birthright!" - That position is consistent with scepticism on moral responsibility. The position opposing scepticism - i.e. compatibilism (which Harris repudiates as changing the subject) - says that I can say something more on moral responsibility such that the concept of moral responsibility is worth salvaging. Dennett provides consequentialist reasons for salvaging the concept of moral responsibility, and I don't dispute that the concept helps society to function. But philosophically is that sufficient reason to salvage the concept of moral responsibility? - I'm not really convinced. It seems to depend on what is one's take on the concept of moral responsibility. What does the concept entail?

"Free will" and "moral responsibility" are terms that rely on the concept of revenge. "You did it --take this!". A more modern view would be to conceive citizen responsibility as ability to learn, because we want wrongdoers to be reformed, and revenge is pointless.

Free will is a concept that seems plausible for people who believe that hell, eternal damnation, is acceptable.

 

[PyramidHead]

I agree with Dan Dennett to the extent that the free will debate generally boils down to a debate on the issue of whether the concept of moral responsibility is in some way (not necessarily as the popular concept of moral responsibility - whatever that is) a tenable concept worth salvaging.

In everyday life I could say - and I do - that "I intellectually know he's just a meat machine. But why can't I get angry with him? Anger is my birthright!" - That position is consistent with scepticism on moral responsibility. The position opposing scepticism - i.e. compatibilism (which Harris repudiates as changing the subject) - says that I can say something more on moral responsibility such that the concept of moral responsibility is worth salvaging. Dennett provides consequentialist reasons for salvaging the concept of moral responsibility, and I don't dispute that the concept helps society to function. But philosophically is that sufficient reason to salvage the concept of moral responsibility? - I'm not really convinced. It seems to depend on what is one's take on the concept of moral responsibility. What does the concept entail?

"Free will" and "moral responsibility" are terms that rely on the concept of revenge. "You did it --take this!". A more modern view would be to conceive citizen responsibility as ability to learn, because we want wrongdoers to be reformed, and revenge is pointless.

Free will is a concept that seems plausible for people who believe that hell, eternal damnation, is acceptable.

Too broad a brush, I think. People often forget that moral responsibility is just as much (if not more) about people wanting to be responsible for the good things they do, as it is about wanting to blame others for the bad things they do. The kind of moral responsibility that is vulnerable to arguments about free will does not only concern culpability for misdeeds. It also contains pride in one's achievements, even if they are not of a classically moral nature: for example, becoming an Olympic medalist after years of practice is not the kind of thing people usually call a moral act, but without free will it would not make sense to say the medalist was largely responsible for her accomplishment. Even if she had always practiced alone with no coaching or outside influence, it could not be said that she was ultimately responsible for winning the medal if there is no such thing as free will. She was simply the lucky embodiment of a constellation of neurophysiological events that occurred in the appropriate sequence to result in her victory over less lucky competitors.

People want to feel like they deserve admiration for their talents, especially if they sacrificed a lot to become proficient at whatever they do. Without a concept of agent-centered responsibility, our praise of a Michael Jordan or a Bruce Lee should be no different from the detached appreciation of natural scenery, like a pretty waterfall or a mountain range. If there is no free will, Bruce Lee no more chose to invent and become a master of Jeet Kune Do than Angel Falls decided to make a photogenic vista for the postcard industry. But when people read about Bruce Lee or watch his films, they sometimes become inspired to push themselves beyond their limits, to actively pursue and maximize their full potential. That doesn't make sense if Bruce Lee was, at best, lucky to be the person to whom inventing and mastering Jeet Kune Do was determined to happen. I don't know what my position is on the topic of free will anymore, but I think the idea is more than just a haven for the bloodthirsty, as your post implies.

 

[DBT]

1)Libertarian free will is a fantasy.
2)Compatibalism is a failed argument.
3)Determinism doesn't allow freedom of any shape or form.
4)Quantum uncertainty doesn't allows neither decision making or so called 'free will' (which is not decision making).
5)The term free will conveys no useful information in regard to the nature (neural mechanisms) of human decision making (which is not free will) or human behaviour, be it adaptive or maladaptive.
6) The term 'free will' is irrelevant.

 

[Togo]

No, they don't.

More formally, there exists no definition of 'causation' such that both statements are true. Will requires only that will and action be linked with reasonable reliability.

I can agree with "ressonable reliability" since that is vague enough to mean the same thing.

(Libertarian) Free will requires a lack of absolute determination..

Not enough. Free will requires that whatever can happen.

No, it doesn't.

Can you give an example of something considered to be free will that would require this 'whatever'?

And can I get a response on how any of this is 'modern science'? Or was that an overstatement?

 

[Juma]

I can agree with "ressonable reliability" since that is vague enough to mean the same thing.

(Libertarian) Free will requires a lack of absolute determination..

Not enough. Free will requires that whatever can happen.

No, it doesn't.

Of course it does. Otherwise it wouldnt be free, just following by "law".

 

[Togo]

1)Libertarian free will is a fantasy.
2)Compatibalism is a failed argument.
3)Determinism doesn't allow freedom of any shape or form.
4)Quantum uncertainty doesn't allows neither decision making or so called 'free will' (which is not decision making).
5)The term free will conveys no useful information in regard to the nature (neural mechanisms) of human decision making (which is not free will) or human behaviour, be it adaptive or maladaptive.
6) The term 'free will' is irrelevant.

5 & 6 would appear to contradict 1 & 2.

And all four points presuppose that these terms in philosophy exist only for some utility or purpose. I can believe that you don't find them useful, but that says more about what you do and don't regard as useful than about the terms themselves. The claim that something is irrelevant can only be in reference to something it is relevant or irrelevant to. What is it relevant to, and why should our discourse be limited to that subject?

 

[DBT]

1)Libertarian free will is a fantasy.
2)Compatibalism is a failed argument.
3)Determinism doesn't allow freedom of any shape or form.
4)Quantum uncertainty doesn't allows neither decision making or so called 'free will' (which is not decision making).
5)The term free will conveys no useful information in regard to the nature (neural mechanisms) of human decision making (which is not free will) or human behaviour, be it adaptive or maladaptive.
6) The term 'free will' is irrelevant.

5 & 6 would appear to contradict 1 & 2.

I don't think so...if you think so, which you apparently do, you need to explain your reasoning in some detail.

[
And all four points presuppose that these terms in philosophy exist only for some utility or purpose. I can believe that you don't find them useful, but that says more about what you do and don't regard as useful than about the terms themselves. The claim that something is irrelevant can only be in reference to something it is relevant or irrelevant to. What is it relevant to, and why should our discourse be limited to that subject?

What I said was: the terms 'free will doesn't tell us anything about human behaviour or the nature and function of the brain. In other words, you cannot use the term 'free will' as source of information on human nature, cognition, character, individual sets of behaviours, or anything else.

The term 'free will' has no useful function.

Given its irrelevancy in terms of conveying useful information, it is probably, for some, a form of ideology.

 

[apeman]

"I am." is the simplest way of describing free will. "I am. " means to take personal responsibility, to claim actions for oneself.

You are free to claim , or not to claim ,your actions...that is a clear choice that you are free to make .

 

[Juma]

"I am." is the simplest way of describing free will. "I am. " means to take personal responsibility, to claim actions for oneself.

You are free to claim , or not to claim ,your actions...that is a clear choice that you are free to make .

You can claim that, yes. But what is "free" supposed to add?

 

[DBT]

"I am." is the simplest way of describing free will. "I am. " means to take personal responsibility, to claim actions for oneself.

You are free to claim , or not to claim ,your actions...that is a clear choice that you are free to make .

You are what your brain is doing in terms of information processing and conscious representation of information.

Except it is not 'your' brain. 'You' - conscious self awareness - being something the brain itself is generating.

There is no autonomous self, me, I, 'I do this,' 'I do that' who orchestrates neural activity (narrative function)... basically the reason why the term 'free will' conveys no useful information about self, thought or behaviour.

 

[apeman]

"I am." is the simplest way of describing free will. "I am. " means to take personal responsibility, to claim actions for oneself.

You are free to claim , or not to claim ,your actions...that is a clear choice that you are free to make .

You can claim that, yes. But what is "free" supposed to add?

It means that when you take a degree of responsibility for your action(s) that you are free from complete external compulsion, that you exist as a partially autonomous being .

So free to choose between available options, and free from complete external control.

 

[apeman]

"I am." is the simplest way of describing free will. "I am. " means to take personal responsibility, to claim actions for oneself.

You are free to claim , or not to claim ,your actions...that is a clear choice that you are free to make .

You are what your brain is doing in terms of information processing and conscious representation of information.

Except it is not 'your' brain. 'You' - conscious self awareness - being something the brain itself is generating.

There is no autonomous self, me, I, 'I do this,' 'I do that' who orchestrates neural activity (narrative function)... basically the reason why the term 'free will' conveys no useful information about self, thought or behaviour.

Maybe you are just "dreaming" that you have this brain thing ? The problem with the materialist clockwork universe theory is that it is built on an unprovable premise that there is a thing called mind independence.

I have good reason for believing that I have free will...I sense myself choosing...it's the same sense with which I know reality to exist, so if I discount this sense that I have of choosing (freely within reason) then I should also discount this sense I have of there actually being a universe at all.

Do you think that the universe is thinking through me in a way to delude me into thinking that I exist?

 

[Juma]

You can claim that, yes. But what is "free" supposed to add?

It means that when you take a degree of responsibility for your action(s) that you are free from complete external compulsion, that you exist as a partially autonomous being .

So free to choose between available options, and free from complete external control.

Then it is the actions that are free. Not the will.

 

[DBT]

Maybe you are just "dreaming" that you have this brain thing ? The problem with the materialist clockwork universe theory is that it is built on an unprovable premise that there is a thing called mind independence.

I have good reason for believing that I have free will...I sense myself choosing...it's the same sense with which I know reality to exist, so if I discount this sense that I have of choosing (freely within reason) then I should also discount this sense I have of there actually being a universe at all.

Nobody is arguing that the brain cannot process information and make selections, generating sets of both beneficial (adaptive) and irrational (maladaptive) decisions, it can and it does.

It's not that we don't have ability to make decisions or selections, but how the decision making process functions that is the issue. The ability to make decisions is an example of a rational system, but not necessarily an example of 'free will.''

It is the physical state of the system that determines the decisions that 'you' make (brain makes), and not what you as conscious self feel you are making, that makes the term free will irrelevant.

Do you think that the universe is thinking through me in a way to delude me into thinking that I exist?

It is the brain that thinks, forms conscious self identity, feels and decides...all according to neural architecture, information input and memory function.

Remove any of these factors and you no longer function as a conscious entity, or in the worse case, cease to exist.

 

[Togo]

5 & 6 would appear to contradict 1 & 2.

I don't think so...if you think so, which you apparently do, you need to explain your reasoning

How about an example:

2) Compatibalism is a failed argument
5) The term free will conveys no useful information <reason snipped>
How can you have an argument if the terms convey no useful information. I can understand you believing that an argument is unsound, and I can understand you believing that an argument has no content, but I don't see how you can have both.

Similarly:

1) Libertarian Free will is a fantasy
6) The term free will is irrelevant

How can something both be irrelevant and a fantasy?

And all four points presuppose that these terms in philosophy exist only for some utility or purpose. I can believe that you don't find them useful, but that says more about what you do and don't regard as useful than about the terms themselves. The claim that something is irrelevant can only be in reference to something it is relevant or irrelevant to. What is it relevant to, and why should our discourse be limited to that subject?

What I said was: the terms 'free will doesn't tell us anything about human behaviour or the nature and function of the brain. In other words, you cannot use the term 'free will' as source of information on human nature, cognition, character, individual sets of behaviours, or anything else.

Yes, but you also said 'The term free will is irrelevant', a far more general claim, and the one I specifically cited. Again, irrelevant to what?