DBT
Contributor
Double post.
I think most people would see these two comments as at the very least confusing, if not contradictory. This why I find our exchanges so frustrating.So if you say 'will can be free from coercion' (which it can)...
What I don't understand is your reason for unilaterally declaring that will that's free from deterministic causes is an instance of 'free will' but will that's free from coercion is not an instance of 'free will'.
I think there are coherent arguments that could be made for making this distinction but I'm afraid I haven't seen you make one on this thread.
I thought your position was that for will to be truly free it had to be free from deterministic causation and since the will is a product of a deterministic system it cannot be called 'free'. Am I mistaken?What I don't understand is your reason for unilaterally declaring that will that's free from deterministic causes is an instance of 'free will' but will that's free from coercion is not an instance of 'free will'.
I've never declared that '''will that's free from deterministic causes is an instance of 'free will' - I've always maintained the very opposite! Is there typo somewhere? Where does this come from?
By claiming its a 'semantic distinction', you're simply saying that's what you believe the words must mean. It's not a rational argument.I think there are coherent arguments that could be made for making this distinction but I'm afraid I haven't seen you make one on this thread.
The [semantic] distinction is abundantly clear, if you can't grasp it, that is your problem, not mine.
It's called a "belt and braces argument" - if one argument fails you can always fall back on the other one.
Did you not see what I said? The list of things that I outlined? - 'free will' as source of information on human nature, the nature of cognition, character, personality, how decisions are made, motivations, drivers, pathologies, lesions, chemical changes to the brain....?
In other words, the term 'free will' conveys no useful information in relation to the human condition. it just represents a certain ideology
No disagreement from me.
I have no belief whatsoever in libertarian acausal/contra-causal free will. In my view it's an incoherent concept.
The assumption you (DBT) make here is that free will in common usage (what most people usually mean when they use the term) entails freedom from 'necessity' (i.e. freedom from deterministic causality). This may well be the case (it should be empirically verifiable) but it needs to be argued for - you can't just assume it.
If you mean do I think there are better arguments, then yes. My interest here is in simply attempting to understand DBT's argument (I have no interest in arguing with proponents of libertarian free will for much the same reason I'm not particularly interested in arguing with committed theists).You've suggested that DBT's argument is not logically tight. Do you have an upgrade for this?
No, DBT and I may disagree about a number of things but I think we're on the same page as far as determinism and causality are concerned.I note that you appear to be using 'causality and 'deterministic causality' as interchangeable. I'd suggest that this needs to be argued for, since one only implies the other if you previously assume a deterministic universe.
DBT said:Where does this come from?
I thought your position was that for will to be truly free it had to be free from deterministic causation and since the will is a product of a deterministic system it cannot be called 'free'. Am I mistaken?
DBT
I thought your position was that for will to be truly free it had to be free from deterministic causation and since the will is a product of a deterministic system it cannot be called 'free'. Am I mistaken?
Ok, I understand now. Your position is that free will is incomptatible with both determinism and indeterminism. I'd mistakenly taken you to be making the standard hard determinist claim that [adequate] determinism is true and that it is incompatible with free will, and, therefore, free will does not exist. There was no intention to misrepresent you.
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I still don't understand your claim that free will cannot be free "by any of the given definitions of 'free'".
You gave three definitions of freedom ("absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint") said that "Consequently, the term Free Will is not applicable to the deterministic systems of a brain".
The problem is that determinism only rules out 'necessity'. You need a separate justification to rule out 'coercion or constraint' and it's this that I've been asking for.
This seems to be predominantly a restatement of your view of the deterministic nature of human decision making - none of which I disagree with.I still don't understand your claim that free will cannot be free "by any of the given definitions of 'free'".
You gave three definitions of freedom ("absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint") said that "Consequently, the term Free Will is not applicable to the deterministic systems of a brain".
The problem is that determinism only rules out 'necessity'. You need a separate justification to rule out 'coercion or constraint' and it's this that I've been asking for.
As I said, free will is eliminated by the very source that generates 'will' - the drive or impulse to act - and carries out decision making, with only some of this activity being represented in conscious form.
So it makes no difference whether there are elements/circumstances that put pressure in a certain direction (to act against one's wishes), or that decisions and will are free of coercion, because all decisions (and their associated will to act) are a consequence of the state of the system: the neural networks of a brain.
So, as I explained, a common phrase may be ''he acted according to his own free will'' - which does not take into account the nature of the brain/mind decision making process.
Which is why I used the analogy ''the sun is rising'' - casual appearances and common references are not necessarily composed of accurate representation of the article they refer to.
Though it appears to, The sun isn't actually rising.
He who was said to have 'acted according to his own free will' did indeed act on the basis of his will, uncoerced, but nevertheless his will is determined by the state of 'his' brain, which he, as a conscious entity ( a conscious representation of information by the agency of brain activity), did not choose, consequently, the will that he acted upon was not 'free' will - but simply 'will'
Consciousness/will itself does not think or decide, it has no autonomy, it is a reflection of the physical/information condition of a brain from moment to moment as it responds to its inputs (external and internal).
...it's not clear precisely what you're saying....a common phrase may be ''he acted according to his own free will'' - which does not take into account the nature of the brain/mind decision making process.
So, when the Distant Early Warning system set off the 'incoming nukes from Russia' alarm because it detected migrating geese over Canada, that meant the computers operating on the false assumptions that were not the reality, they had free will to sound the alarm?Freedom, in terms of freedom of will, is about our ability to function in a way that has a degree of separateness from the reality around ( and within us)...we clearly do this all the time ..we virtually constantly operate on false ideas (for example). So my will is free from the reality around me, it is free to come to the wrong decision for example.
This seems to be predominantly a restatement of your view of the deterministic nature of human decision making - none of which I disagree with.As I said, free will is eliminated by the very source that generates 'will' - the drive or impulse to act - and carries out decision making, with only some of this activity being represented in conscious form.
So it makes no difference whether there are elements/circumstances that put pressure in a certain direction (to act against one's wishes), or that decisions and will are free of coercion, because all decisions (and their associated will to act) are a consequence of the state of the system: the neural networks of a brain.
So, as I explained, a common phrase may be ''he acted according to his own free will'' - which does not take into account the nature of the brain/mind decision making process.
Which is why I used the analogy ''the sun is rising'' - casual appearances and common references are not necessarily composed of accurate representation of the article they refer to.
Though it appears to, The sun isn't actually rising.
He who was said to have 'acted according to his own free will' did indeed act on the basis of his will, uncoerced, but nevertheless his will is determined by the state of 'his' brain, which he, as a conscious entity ( a conscious representation of information by the agency of brain activity), did not choose, consequently, the will that he acted upon was not 'free' will - but simply 'will'
Consciousness/will itself does not think or decide, it has no autonomy, it is a reflection of the physical/information condition of a brain from moment to moment as it responds to its inputs (external and internal).
However I'm still struggling to see how this explains your claim that a will that is free of coercion cannot be an alternative version of 'free' will.
No. That doesn't follow.If you do agree that will is the expression of a deterministic system, then you must agree that will is not free
No. That doesn't follow.If you do agree that will is the expression of a deterministic system, then you must agree that will is not free
The only thing that logically follows from the [agreed] premise that the will is deterministic is that it is therefore not free from deterministic cause.
The only way your claim would make logical sense is if you are taking it as axiomatic that no deterministic system (not just human decision making) can ever be described as 'free'.
Is this your position?
Ok.Basically, no system that is 'under the sway' of determinism is free to alter its own progression of events.
It also depends on what you see as being freedom, we can lift our arms at will, run if we like, go out or stay in, freedom of action...but this is necessarily an expression of determined will.
The distinction between 'freedom' action and 'freedom of will' was made a long time ago.
Not that our Universe is fully determined, QM, etc, but neither is probability wave/particle position (soft, non fixed determinism) under our conscious control, consequently, we can no more alter our condition through an act of will than change the progression of events in a fully determined system.
''As far as human freedom is concerned, it doesn't matter whether physics is deterministic, as Newtonian physics was, or whether it allows for an indeterminacy at the level of particle physics, as contemporary quantum mechanics does. Indeterminism at the level of particles in physics is really no support at all to any doctrine of the freedom of the will; because first, the statistical indeterminacy at the level of particles does not show any indeterminacy at the level of the objects that matter to us – human bodies, for example. And secondly, even if there is an element of indeterminacy in the behaviour of physical particles – even if they are only statistically predictable – still, that by itself gives no scope for human freedom of the will; because it doesn't follow from the fact that particles are only statistically determined that the human mind can force the statistically-determined particles to swerve from their paths. Indeterminism is no evidence that there is or could be some mental energy of human freedom that can move molecules in directions that they were not otherwise going to move. So it really does look as if everything we know about physics forces us to some form of denial of human freedom.'' John Searle (Mind, Brains, and Science, 1984, pp.86-7)
1) You say the will cannot be free because it's deterministic.
2) I completely agree that this rules out libertarian free will, but I want to know why you believe determinism rules out any other versions of free will (such as freedom from coercion).
3) You reply by explaining at great length (with supporting quotes) that this is because free will is indisputably deterministic (I don't disagree).
The problem here is that you clearly don't understand that this response does not address my question and I've run out of ways of explaining to you that it does not follow logically from the agreed fact that the will is deterministic, that a will that is free from coercion is not "free will". (I want to make it clear, I'm not not making the case that freedom from coercion is necessarily a valid form of free will, I'm only saying that you haven't presented a coherent argument against the possibility).
You appear to be claiming that the word 'free' is synonymous with, and can only mean, 'undetermined' (this is logically entailed by your statement above)? Can you confirm this is what you are saying?In terms of logic, it's quite clear that something cannot be both determined and not determined. It's a contradiction.
If will is determined, which you appear to agree with, will is determined in every instance of formation and is not free under any circumstances or conditions.
You appear to be claiming that the word 'free' is synonymous with, and can only mean, 'undetermined' (this is logically entailed by your statement above)? Can you confirm this is what you are saying?In terms of logic, it's quite clear that something cannot be both determined and not determined. It's a contradiction.
If will is determined, which you appear to agree with, will is determined in every instance of formation and is not free under any circumstances or conditions.
Could you please give a clear and unambiguous answer.
I think you said "yes". Can you confirm?You appear to be claiming that the word 'free' is synonymous with, and can only mean, 'undetermined' (this is logically entailed by your statement above)? Can you confirm this is what you are saying?
Could you please give a clear and unambiguous answer.
I have already provided definitions of 'free' and 'freedom' and stated that freedom cannot exist within a determined system
I think you said "yes". Can you confirm?I have already provided definitions of 'free' and 'freedom' and stated that freedom cannot exist within a determined system