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Eliminating Qualia

I'm not here for your stupid lectures about this "knowledge" you have but want to hide.

You have no position as far as I can see.

I have nothing to discuss with you.

I have many positions that I will and have explained and will defend.

These are not the first position I read somewhere and stopped reading.
 
Rationality is impossible anyway, so you can relax!

Admit to it and have a nervous breakdown.

If that was true, we could not get to any rational conclusion about it.

Anyway, if by any chance that was a serious point you would start a thread.

See? Problem solved!
EB

It was a serious point. Think about it, a rational creature would need an internally consistent belief set, would never cut corners and would get eaten by the first predator using sub optimal but fast heuristics to satisfied. We are, for want of a word, biorational; was loosely approximate rationality to whatever degree aids survival

All of these:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_bias

Are features, not bugs.

I’m not doing rationality here, because my tolerance for trolling has been reached, but Chris Cherniak’s lovely book ‘Minimal Rationality’ is a good primer.
 
Bullshit!

Nope.

I used color to do it but you simply made absurd claims and ran away.

Two nopes.

Three nopes in a row. Nice work!

You had as much substance then as now.

It has been explained to you.

You simply can't deal with the explanation.

Using energy making conversions for no rational purpose defies reason.

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The mind is not so easily done away with.

The brain creates "mind" much like a mathematician creates an algorithm.

That's poetry and probably not close to the truth.
 
untermensche said:
The mind is not so easily done away with.

The brain creates "mind" much like a mathematician creates an algorithm.

That's poetry and probably not close to the truth.

It’s undeniable that the brain creates “mind” (aka, the selves). We have evidence of this in dissociative identity disorder as well as various forms of dementia/Alzheimer’s, where trauma or decay correlates directly to the creation or destruction of selves. “Mind” is therefore nothing more than a product of brain, or, as someone else put it, “mind is what brains do.”
 
untermensche said:
That's poetry and probably not close to the truth.

It’s undeniable that the brain creates “mind” (aka, the selves). We have evidence of this in dissociative identity disorder as well as various forms of dementia/Alzheimer’s, where trauma or decay correlates directly to the creation or destruction of selves. “Mind” is therefore nothing more than a product of brain, or, as someone else put it, “mind is what brains do.”

It is a hypothesis the brain creates the mind.

But nobody knows what the mind is objectively.

It is true that brain damage can alter conscious reports so this is good evidence the brain is involved in some unknown way.

But it doesn't tell us what the mind is.

And human created algorithms are most likely not involved.
 
You think biological entities waste energy and make unneeded transformations.

Nope. I don't. Have another go. Go for six nopes in a row.

All you do is deny your position. You waste my time.

You have no reason for having a transformation.

I do.

Color is a presentation for something that is not a brain.
 
You think biological entities waste energy and make unneeded transformations.

Nope. I don't. Have another go. Go for six nopes in a row.

All you do is deny your position. You waste my time.

You have no reason for having a transformation.

I do.

Color is a presentation for something that is not a brain.

You can't even prove that colour exists objectively. Nor can you escape the stink of rotting, poorly misunderstood dualism. There's no need of presentation, information is shared and bound across the brain and that feels like something. That's the most parsimonious explanation. Yours, in as much as it even makes sense, is metaphysically extravagant with an added homuncular turtle or two.
 
Brains do not need presentations. They make presentations for things that need them.

Until you provide some logic to show why they would need one you have no position.

Which is why you have been reduced to a stutterer saying nothing

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All you do is deny your position. You waste my time.

You have no reason for having a transformation.

I do.

Color is a presentation for something that is not a brain.

You can't even prove that colour exists objectively. Nor can you escape the stink of rotting, poorly misunderstood dualism. There's no need of presentation, information is shared and bound across the brain and that feels like something. That's the most parsimonious explanation. Yours, in as much as it even makes sense, is metaphysically extravagant with an added homuncular turtle or two.

To be experienced requires existing.
 
untermensche said:
That's poetry and probably not close to the truth.

It’s undeniable that the brain creates “mind” (aka, the selves). We have evidence of this in dissociative identity disorder as well as various forms of dementia/Alzheimer’s, where trauma or decay correlates directly to the creation or destruction of selves. “Mind” is therefore nothing more than a product of brain, or, as someone else put it, “mind is what brains do.”

It is a hypothesis the brain creates the mind.

It’s an assertion that a “mind” exists at all, but aside from that fact, what else in the body could create it?

But nobody knows what the mind is objectively.

Then you should cease posting in declarative statements about it as if you do.

It is true that brain damage can alter conscious reports so this is good evidence the brain is involved in some unknown way.

It is a strong indication that it generates it entirely as the correlation is 1 to 1, particulalry in the case of catastrophic failure. We have literally billions upon billions of case studies wherein the catastrophic failure of the brain has resulted—without fail—in the total anhilation of any semblance of “mind” or “self,” never to return.

Likewise, we have billlions upon billions of case studies wherein the maturity of the brain corresponds 1 to 1 with the emergence and maturity of the “mind” or “self.”

And to bury the horse, we have 0 case studies—over numerous millennia of keeping track—with a “mind” or “self” that exists without a brain generating it. Keeping in mind, if you will, that anecdotal accounts are insufficient for case study.

But it doesn't tell us what the mind is.

To use your fiat approach, the mind is what the brain does.

And human created algorithms are most likely not involved.

“Human”? That’s an odd qualification. Are you suggesting that there is some other species involved?
 
It is a hypothesis the brain creates the mind.

It’s an assertion that a “mind” exists at all, but aside from that fact, what else could create it?

"You" are using something that understands language and can shape ideas to make these comments.

The "mind" is just a label to describe that phenomena.

But nobody knows what the mind is objectively.

Then you should cease posting in declarative statements about it as if you do.

You need something specific here. What statements do you mean?

I do understand concepts. Like the concept "experience".

"Experience" includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience.

The "mind" is that thing that can experience.

My objective claim here is that experience takes place.
 
"You" are using something that understands language and can shape ideas to make these comments.

The "mind" is just a label to describe that phenomena.

And the “something” you are referring to is the brain, ultimately. It certainly isn’t the liver.

But nobody knows what the mind is objectively.

Then you should cease posting in declarative statements about it as if you do.

You need something specific here.

You have provided it:

"Experience" includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience. The “mind” is that thing that can experience.

You’ve declared that before (while ignoring the many objections that arise from its ambiguity and presumed objectivity), yet, as you noted, “nobody knows what the mind is objectively.”

My objective claim here is that experience takes place.

And that “the ‘mind’ is that thing that can experience.’” You have evidently convinced yourself that this is a valid conclusion derived from your syllogism, but it is non sequitur. Here, I can easily demonstrate:

“Experience” includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience.
The brain is that thing that can experience.​

Better still:

“Experience” includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience.
The toaster is that thing that can experience.​

You could literally plug in any “thing” as “that thing that can experience.” Here, we’ll do it again:

“Experience” includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience.
The table saw is that thing that can experience.​

Where “experience” means “to interract with” and “the things it can experience” means “wood or other materials that can be cut.”

Iow, it all hinges on equivocation of terms.

Plus, your first premise (if it can be called that) is fatally flawed, because it hinges on the word “includes.” “‘Experience’ includes some thing that can experience and the things it can experience.” But it need not. The thing that experiences can also experience itself and the “things it can experience” need not be external to it. Thus, the brain can be the thing and the thing the brain experiences.

Iow, it seems that you are attempting to mandate discreteness between “things” that need not be discrete; that can contain the “thing” you are attempting to separate out. The brain is not a monolithic, discrete unit. It is comprised of many different compartments that each have different functions.

So, for example, it could be that it is the neocortex that is one “thing that experiences” and the “things it can experience” are neuronal firings, which, depending upon their configuration allow the neocortex to map the external world. And then another “thing that experiences” could be the amygdala and the “things it can experience” are the electrochemical signals of your lover’s touch, which in turn are “experienced” as affection and safety and warmth. Etc., etc., etc.
 
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Color is a presentation for something that is not a brain.

First, you have no reliable or objective way of knowing if that's correct or not.

Second, your 'extra energy' objection, even if correct, would work against you anyway, because you have an extra, second 'thing' that supposedly has to be created. We already did this.

Hypothetically, if the brain both creates the redness and experiences it simultaneously, that is at least one less operation (and 'thing') than yours.

You cannot say that the brain would have no need to create redness because it would (you say) 'already understand' what red is. First, you don't know that and second 'understanding' red without the conscious experience could be incomplete. Perhaps the 'redness' (the qualia) are in some way useful to the brain. Ditto for pain. The point is not that I know, the point is that neither do you. Your model just has more 'things' and more transactions between them. You are the last person who should be bringing up potential issues of energy efficiency. We did this already.
 
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Colour is quite obviously a brain representation of wavelength (EMR), input via the eyes, optic nerve/ ion flow/impulses, visual cortex, distribution, conscious experience, recognition, etc, etc,etc......
 
I think I'm right in saying that the more accepted model is not that mind and redness (for example, or pain) are separate things, but that they are the same thing. In other words, qualia and consciousness are basically 'made of' the same thing. Experiencing is consciousness. A hypothetical 'quale' is analagous to a 'bit' of consciousness and is itself a basic or bare 'thought'. More sophisticated 'thoughts' are made up of very complex arrangements of qualia. 'British postbox', for example, involves 'redness' as a component, as does, 'I'll post this letter in that postbox'.

Suggesting the separate creation of an extra 'thing' (mind) to act as interpreter of (separately created) qualia and to act as controller of the (separate) brain is not only less parsimonious and potentially involving more energy 'transactions', it begs the questions, 'what is the mind made of in that model and how would we know, and how does the mind do the voluntary controlling'? So there's additional unanswered questions, as well as extra 'things' and transactions between them, which go beyond even substance dualism to substance triunalism (brain, mind and qualia) at least, depending on where you decide to stop regressing. Metaphysical clutter, in other words.

And as sub says, anomalous monism is arguably the most parsimonious model of all.
 
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