"You" are using something that understands language and can shape ideas to make these comments.
The "mind" is just a label to describe that phenomena.
And the “something” you are referring to is the brain, ultimately. It certainly isn’t the liver.
But nobody knows what the mind is objectively.
Then you should cease posting in declarative statements about it as if you do.
You need something specific here.
You have provided it:
"Experience" includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience. The “mind” is that thing that can experience.
You’ve declared that before (while ignoring the many objections that arise from its ambiguity and presumed objectivity), yet, as you noted, “nobody knows what the mind is objectively.”
My objective claim here is that experience takes place.
And that “the ‘mind’ is that thing that can experience.’” You have evidently convinced yourself that this is a valid conclusion derived from your syllogism, but it is non sequitur. Here, I can easily demonstrate:
“Experience” includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience.
The brain is that thing that can experience.
Better still:
“Experience” includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience.
The toaster is that thing that can experience.
You could literally plug in any “thing” as “that thing that can experience.” Here, we’ll do it again:
“Experience” includes some thing that can experience, and the things it can experience.
The table saw is that thing that can experience.
Where “experience” means “to interract with” and “the things it can experience” means “wood or other materials that can be cut.”
Iow, it all hinges on equivocation of terms.
Plus, your first premise (if it can be called that) is fatally flawed, because it hinges on the word “includes.” “‘Experience’ includes some thing that can experience and the things it can experience.” But it need not. The thing that experiences can also experience itself and the “things it can experience” need not be external to it. Thus, the brain can be the thing
and the thing the brain experiences.
Iow, it seems that you are attempting to mandate discreteness between “things” that need not be discrete; that can contain the “thing” you are attempting to separate out. The brain is not a monolithic, discrete unit. It is comprised of many different compartments that each have different functions.
So, for example, it
could be that it is the neocortex that is
one “thing that experiences” and the “things it can experience” are neuronal firings, which, depending upon their configuration allow the neocortex to map the external world. And then another “thing that experiences”
could be the amygdala and the “things it can experience” are the electrochemical signals of your lover’s touch, which in turn are “experienced” as affection and safety and warmth. Etc., etc., etc.