As I think you know, I do conceive of it that way (though I qualify it with the brain imbuing the analogue with a sense of “free will” in that it has the capacity to act across maps), yet I don’t see the self as separate from the brain (or a “thing” for that matter). It’s a construct of the brain used initially for strategic, survival-based “role playing” if you will that has since been repurposed due to our extended life-spans; i.e, “leisure” orientation rather than hourly “survival” orientation.
Just as we find it helpful to discuss problems with each other for feedback, the brain creates analogues to help it solve problems. It’s merely a useful tool to help gain perspective, but it’s all ultimately the brain talking to itself, for lack of better terminology.
If there were ever a situation where a baby survived a crash landing on a deserted planet, I doubt it would ever develop much of a self for precisely that reason; it has no others to emulate/map. There have been many tales of “feral” children (and others that were kept in isolation throughout their childhood) that normally entail a lack of self identity.
Which is all just a long-winded way of saying, I still don’t see what UM is arguing for. Brain generates “mind.” I think everyone itt can agree with that assertion.
Yes, I think everyone agrees on that last thing.
I would rather not get into free will, 'free will', partial free will or elbow room, etc. Hopefully that quagmire won't necessarily have to pollute a thread which is not really about that if we use the word 'agency' and leave the free or otherwise aspects of it temporarily aside here.
Not blaming you for bringing it up, since I did that.
Anyhows, Untermensche, I think, has mind having autonomous agency. An analogy would be my computer, or some future more sophisticated computer or robot, developing a mind of its own and that mind essentially directing the computer or robot as to what to do next, at least some of the time, including 'when it (the mind) wants to'. Not barmy, of course. Impossible to disprove, I think, and certainly what it feels like, to us, a lot of the time. But not the only model in town, certainly not one of the popular ones among the relevant brain specialists in modern times as far as I know, and imo not as good a model as some others, for reasons previously given, including, among others, lack of parsimony (from having more 'things' and interactions between them) a potential infinite regress of experiencers, and various neuroscience/psychology experiments which cast at least some doubt on the role of conscious intent (free or otherwise) in our system's decision-making capacities.
I admit I also have trouble seeing, in principle, how a mind could be an autonomous agent, if it is continuously being produced by a brain. It's not as if the brain makes a mind and then the mind is free to go off and have fun all by itself being in charge for a while, because presumably if a mind at one instant is the product of brain processes, then an instant later, it is still the product of and is effectively sustained by (supervenes on) more, subsequent and continuous brain processes. Iow, is there likely any moment when the mind is
not created by the underlying/supporting brain processes? I would find it hard to explain. I'm fairly happy with 'mind is one of the things brains do'.
This doesn't rule out feedback or causality from mind to brain, but those aren't autonomy for a mind, since a mind would seem, at least in the main, to be more akin to the product than the manufacturer (or the Fat Controller) of the brain processes creating it at every given moment. 'Higher' and 'lower' processes may not even be a good way to think of it, for something that is continually in a state of revolving stochastic flux, with waves of neuronal activity sloshing around in all directions and feedback loops of awesome complexity looping all over the place*.
But to get back on the OP topic of qualia, Um has qualia as 'things that the mind perceives' not 'things the brain perceives', whereas I tend to think of mind
and qualia as being 'of the same kind/class of (mental) things' and both experienced by a brain. In addition, I do not discount another possibility (or model) in which both the brain and the mind are aspects of the same thing, a bit like two sides of a coin, which are, of course, in a way, 'different things', otherwise no football (soccer) match would ever have kicked off.
* ETA: That said, and on second thoughts, there might be a positive correlation between higher intensity of brain activity and consciousness, speaking generally.