You have had more experience with him than I, but it doesn't seem like he's just trying to backdoor a god. Certainly nothing in what he's written so far allows for any such nonsense.
No, despite apparent similarities to god-type stuff, I don't think he's trying to backdoor a god. But substance dualism (or even his trinulaism, if 3 is the number of 'completely different things' that his model even stops at, which it may not be) doesn't have to be backdooring a god either, I suppose. There could be aspects and concepts which are hangovers from theism or religious thinking though.
Arguably the biggest issue with the model, at the moment, is, I think, subject to being corrected if I'm wrong, the internal logic.
If (according to the theory) in order for there to be an experience, there must be both an experiencer and something (separate) experienced, then who or what experiences mind (or self or what have you)? Self can't experience itself, because nothing can, according to the model, and if it were not experienced, it would surely not be known to exist. An infinite regress of experiencers follows, which he says is absurd, so his model is therefore apparently absurd, it would seem at this point. Being absurd would be a significant flaw in any argument.
This does not seem to me to be the case if the experiencer (of all mental stuff) is the brain, because nothing experiences the brain and the buck stops, as I see it.
There are other issues, such as how a mind could have autonomy and control if it is continuously being generated by a brain, and so on. Some 'thing 2' (mind, with very vague properties indeed) supposedly being in control of some other 'thing 1' (brain, with observable and measurable properties) with ' thing 2' (and at the same time 'things 3', the qualia to be perceived by 'thing 2') simultaneously/continuously being brought into existence by 'thing 1' may in fact get close to effectively being a duality contradiction.
There is arguably also a lack of parsimony, though of course that's no guarantee of anything. There is also the lack of an effective rebuttal of other models in which the brain could be the experiencer, so that remains an alternative option, not to mention anomalous monism, where brain and mind are essentially two sides of the same coin. And clinical science casts doubt on the idea that the conscious mind actually does control what we do in the way it feels like it does. And there is his claim of knowing stuff it is not possible to know for sure. And a reliance on introspection ('what things seem like') which science and philosophy have shown to be an unreliable method.
I would also mention in passing the not bothering to read or address the many scientific and philosophical papers offered, the clearly erroneous statements about biology and the inconsistency of asking for standards of evidence or proof that he himself does not have. Oh and the insults.
