Are words immaterial?

[Togo]

I certainly have no option but question for example Togo’s or Fast’s notion of "abstraction" because I think what they seem to mean doesn’t appear to exist at all. Why spend time considering what the notion of abstraction might be able to achieve if there is no reason to believe there is any abstract thing?

Ah, I should have been clearer. It's worth spending time on it because as a result we may conclude that a strictly physical representation of the universe is inadequate. That doesn't commit us to whether or not it's true - one can always postulate the existence of hitherto undiscovered mechanisms to make all apparently immaterial things material (or vice versa) - but it is relevant in deciding whether, given our present understanding and knowledge, it is more accurate to call the universe material, immaterial, or a mix of the two.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I certainly have no option but question for example Togo’s or Fast’s notion of "abstraction" because I think what they seem to mean doesn’t appear to exist at all. Why spend time considering what the notion of abstraction might be able to achieve if there is no reason to believe there is any abstract thing?

Ah, I should have been clearer. It's worth spending time on it because as a result we may conclude that a strictly physical representation of the universe is inadequate. That doesn't commit us to whether or not it's true - one can always postulate the existence of hitherto undiscovered mechanisms to make all apparently immaterial things material (or vice versa) - but it is relevant in deciding whether, given our present understanding and knowledge, it is more accurate to call the universe material, immaterial, or a mix of the two.

I agree entirely when it comes to the idea of things like qualia and subjective experience as potentially non-material. Usefulness is not an issue since we already know these things exist.
Where I am at a loss to explain is where this idea of abstract things (abstractions) comes from. I can understand the idea that something would exist outside time and space but purely as an idea that we couldn't possibly prove wrong but would serve no or very little purpose (used perhaps just to annoy somebody). I can't see how to relate these sorts of abstractions to our experience as experience seems to occur both in space and in time, although not necessarily the time and space of physicists.

Concepts are abstractions in the ordinary sense that we believe them to be formed by abstraction from our experience of the material world, but as such they are very much in space and in time. What is the use of speculating about concepts as abstractions in this other sense of being outside space and time? Russell seemed to have believed in them at some point but I don't think he explained himself. How could we possibly know of an abstraction in this sense? Or is this supposed to remain a mystery?
EB

 

[Togo]

Ah, I should have been clearer. It's worth spending time on it because as a result we may conclude that a strictly physical representation of the universe is inadequate. That doesn't commit us to whether or not it's true - one can always postulate the existence of hitherto undiscovered mechanisms to make all apparently immaterial things material (or vice versa) - but it is relevant in deciding whether, given our present understanding and knowledge, it is more accurate to call the universe material, immaterial, or a mix of the two.

I agree entirely when it comes to the idea of things like qualia and subjective experience as potentially non-material. Usefulness is not an issue since we already know these things exist.
Where I am at a loss to explain is where this idea of abstract things (abstractions) comes from. I can understand the idea that something would exist outside time and space but purely as an idea that we couldn't possibly prove wrong but would serve no or very little purpose (used perhaps just to annoy somebody). I can't see how to relate these sorts of abstractions to our experience as experience seems to occur both in space and in time, although not necessarily the time and space of physicists.

Concepts are abstractions in the ordinary sense that we believe them to be formed by abstraction from our experience of the material world, but as such they are very much in space and in time. What is the use of speculating about concepts as abstractions in this other sense of being outside space and time? Russell seemed to have believed in them at some point but I don't think he explained himself. How could we possibly know of an abstraction in this sense? Or is this supposed to remain a mystery?
EB

Not sure where you're getting the idea that an abstraction must exist outside space and time. It's an abstraction, in the ordinary sense that they are abstracted from our experience. (although you've added 'experience of the material world' and I'm not sure how you'd justify that qualification. We can abstract from mental models). What was being challenged was the idea that such an abstraction is somehow entirely the electrochemical configuration of the individual brain that is thinking about this abstraction. That can't be the case, because that would require the abstraction and the configuration to be the same on all points. Since the abstraction is the subject of multiple, non-identical configurations, (different people can think about the same abstraction) we know this is not the case.

I think the confusion is that you're thinking in terms of establishing the existence of some object, whereas this is a discussion about how to define the universe. To argue as I have above that an abstraction is not identical to a neural configuration is to argue that the neural configuration does not encompass what we mean by an abstraction. What we mean is not the same as a neural configuration, and thus the argument that a neural configuration somehow is the abstraction is false. That is not to say that an abstraction can not have a physical basis, nor to say that an abstraction necessarily has some kind of independent existence, but merely that an abstraction can not be reduced to a simple physical model of the brain of the person thinking about it.

Pointing out the limitations of this kind of reductionism doesn't make an exclusively physical universe impossible, just far less attractive. It doesn't stop you from defining everything and physical and coming up with a complicated hand-waving physical explanation for things that are more usually described as mental events, objects and processes. But it may well be simpler and easier (more parsimonious) to consider the universe as consisting of mental and physical objects.

 

[ryan]

If sensory experience is only electrochemical activity, then why is the visual image of a landscape so much different than the process required to give that vision?

The High Definition images on your TV or computer screen are entirely composed of electrical impulses, pixels, liquid crystal displays and so on. 3D gives the illusion of depth that is not actually there, but there are no immaterial elements necessary to explain the images on the screen they are generated by physical processes. The evidence suggests that the brain generates imagery, perhaps in the form patterns of firings within a 'global workspace' - nobody knows, but the process does appear to be physical.

The image that I am referring to is the image in the mind.

You obviously don't agree, but your non-material doesn't explain anything either. Even worse, there is no evidence for non-material input, or how explanation for how it might work. You'd be better off to say 'we don't know how the brain forms consciousness' and leave it at that.

For certain processes, sensory experience emerges.

But scientists analyzing a brain will see electrochemical activity while the brain has sensory experience. They do not seem to be the same thing.

You can observe a brain observing, but you can't observe what it's observing. Only the brain itself can do that because it requires the brain to do so.

Observing is the opposite of being observed. It is an immaterial difference.

The 'same thing?' The images on your screen are not exactly the same thing as the liquid crystal screen, the microchip processors and electrical impulses that happen to be shaping and form them. A complex process may be multifaceted, a range different aspects, attributes and functions depending on the structure, process and activity of the object. One facet of an active brain appears to be the ability to form internally generated imagery from an interaction of neurons, sensory input and memory function.

When you say process, I assume you mean the sensory experience is part of the it. That's why I say that they are not the same thing.

 

[DBT]

The High Definition images on your TV or computer screen are entirely composed of electrical impulses, pixels, liquid crystal displays and so on. 3D gives the illusion of depth that is not actually there, but there are no immaterial elements necessary to explain the images on the screen they are generated by physical processes. The evidence suggests that the brain generates imagery, perhaps in the form patterns of firings within a 'global workspace' - nobody knows, but the process does appear to be physical.

The image that I am referring to is the image in the mind.

That's what I was referring to. It was an analogy. Just because we don't know how the brain forms imagery, there is no need to think that the imagery it is a non material. As pixels form images, patterns of neural firings may form mental representations...somehow. We just don't know how.

This ''non material'' as an explanation is no explanation at all. What does 'non material' in terms of brain activity even mean? How does it work? You don't know anything more by invoking a non material aspect to consciousness than simply saying ''we don't know how the brain forms mental representations'' - after all, that is the position we are in.

When you say process, I assume you mean the sensory experience is part of the it. That's why I say that they are not the same thing.

Sensory experience is inseparable from it's neural correlates: the electrochemical activity that generates the experience. Add a chemical to that activity, say LSD, and the experience is radically altered by the mind altering substance. The world and self no longer appear the same, colours are brighter, geometric patterns form, the divide between dream and awake state breaks down and dreams can appear superimposed upon visual imagery, which constantly shifts and changes. Perception is clearly an electrochemical process of the brain, we just don't know how it's formed.

 

[Togo]

As pixels form images, patterns of neural firings may form mental representations...somehow. We just don't know how.

This ''non material'' as an explanation is no explanation at all.

So we're arguing between two placeholders, one of which is something physical, one of which is something mental, but neither of which actually explains anything?

I'm not convinced that it makes much difference whether we choose to explain the universe as a series of physical events that, through a complicated mechanism, somehow give apparently mental effects, or whether we choose to explain the universe as a series of mental and physical events. Both explanations still have to be coherent at both a mental and a physical level.

 

[ryan]

The image that I am referring to is the image in the mind.

That's what I was referring to. It was an analogy. Just because we don't know how the brain forms imagery, there is no need to think that the imagery it is a non material. As pixels form images, patterns of neural firings may form mental representations...somehow. We just don't know how.

This ''non material'' as an explanation is no explanation at all. What does 'non material' in terms of brain activity even mean? How does it work? You don't know anything more by invoking a non material aspect to consciousness than simply saying ''we don't know how the brain forms mental representations'' - after all, that is the position we are in.

When you say process, I assume you mean the sensory experience is part of the it. That's why I say that they are not the same thing.

Sensory experience is inseparable from it's neural correlates: the electrochemical activity that generates the experience. Add a chemical to that activity, say LSD, and the experience is radically altered by the mind altering substance. The world and self no longer appear the same, colours are brighter, geometric patterns form, the divide between dream and awake state breaks down and dreams can appear superimposed upon visual imagery, which constantly shifts and changes. Perception is clearly an electrochemical process of the brain, we just don't know how it's formed.

What about my thought experiment about dying in a space capsule? The matter is conserved before and after, but something else is not. If it is not conserved, then it is not matter as we know it.

 

[Juma]

What about my thought experiment about dying in a space capsule? The matter is conserved before and after, but something else is not. If it is not conserved, then it is not matter as we know it.

Nobody says that the mind is matter. It is obvious that the mind is not an object like a billiard ball. The mind is processes and structure. And processes and structures are very material things.

 

[ryan]

What about my thought experiment about dying in a space capsule? The matter is conserved before and after, but something else is not. If it is not conserved, then it is not matter as we know it.

Nobody says that the mind is matter. It is obvious that the mind is not an object like a billiard ball. The mind is processes and structure. And processes and structures are very material things.

Aren't the material things made of matter?

 

[Juma]

Nobody says that the mind is matter. It is obvious that the mind is not an object like a billiard ball. The mind is processes and structure. And processes and structures are very material things.

Aren't the material things made of matter?

Is the wind made of matter?

 

[ryan]

Aren't the material things made of matter?

Is the wind made of matter?

If it isn't, then what is it made of?

Can we define matter as any elementary particle?

 

[Togo]

And processes and structures are very material things.

I'm not convinced that a process is a material thing. Can you elabourate?

As an example, take the marble run on my top shelf. When you put a marble in, the marble runs along the track, dropping through holes and going down ramps, until it reaches the end. I can see how the marbles are physical, and the track is phyiscal, but I can't see any reason to regards the process itself as physical. Is there one?

 

[fast]

And processes and structures are very material things.

I'm not convinced that a process is a material thing. Can you elabourate?

As an example, take the marble run on my top shelf. When you put a marble in, the marble runs along the track, dropping through holes and going down ramps, until it reaches the end. I can see how the marbles are physical, and the track is phyiscal, but I can't see any reason to regards the process itself as physical. Is there one?

The realization that there is no actual thing (called a process that you can physically touch) just might be the hangup in accepting that a process is a physical thing, and perhaps not all processes are physical things, but surely any such process that is a physical process is a process that includes physical things. Yes, I have slightly moved the goal post from the broader 'process' to the narrower 'physical process', and yes, there is no thing we can touch that is a physical process, but surely we can touch the physical things moving about or undergoing movement in a physical process, so yet again, is there no physicality to the process? Sure, but should we truly deny that the physical components of a physical process are physical? Of course not, and you're not; you're just hesitant that we should regard such a process as physical, and I've had hang ups over this too, but we shouldn't allow the devil in the language misguide us; after all, what else is it we're talking about in the physical process that isn't physical? The movement of physical parts? What then is moving? Physical parts. Awe, but what about movement? Is it not physical? Not movement in and of itself eh, well, suffice it to say that there is something very peculiar about language that seems to jolt our critical thinking skills--language isn't like a formula with the regiment of relentless exactness. Yes, the process is physical, not because there is some physical thing like a process or movement, as what it is to say of something that a process is physical isn't to say that there is a physical thing that is itself movement ... We should be a little more forgiving of the tool we use and remember that language lacks critical exactness. We should be more in tune with the actual meaning being expressed and not hung up on some minor failure that lurks within the language we use.

 

[DBT]

That's what I was referring to. It was an analogy. Just because we don't know how the brain forms imagery, there is no need to think that the imagery it is a non material. As pixels form images, patterns of neural firings may form mental representations...somehow. We just don't know how.

This ''non material'' as an explanation is no explanation at all. What does 'non material' in terms of brain activity even mean? How does it work? You don't know anything more by invoking a non material aspect to consciousness than simply saying ''we don't know how the brain forms mental representations'' - after all, that is the position we are in.

When you say process, I assume you mean the sensory experience is part of the it. That's why I say that they are not the same thing.

Sensory experience is inseparable from it's neural correlates: the electrochemical activity that generates the experience. Add a chemical to that activity, say LSD, and the experience is radically altered by the mind altering substance. The world and self no longer appear the same, colours are brighter, geometric patterns form, the divide between dream and awake state breaks down and dreams can appear superimposed upon visual imagery, which constantly shifts and changes. Perception is clearly an electrochemical process of the brain, we just don't know how it's formed.

What about my thought experiment about dying in a space capsule? The matter is conserved before and after, but something else is not. If it is not conserved, then it is not matter as we know it.

It probably is conserved in the normal way that information is stored by the brain, synaptic connections, dendrites, information in the form and shape of proteins, receptors vacant or occupied, etc, etc, all being 'frozen' at the point of brain death. The thing missing being electrical activity...which is a physical activity. So Ryan, what do you think happens to the physical electrochemical process when that ceases at the point of death? And how does your non physical element, not being composed of matter/energy, supposed interact with the physical components of the brain? Not being subject to natural laws of conservation of energy, where does it come from? Where does it go? How does it interact? How does it explain consciousness?

 

[Kharakov]

Is the wind made of matter?

If it isn't, then what is it made of?

Can we define matter as any elementary particle?

Isn't the proper response "blow me"?

 

[Juma]

And processes and structures are very material things.

I'm not convinced that a process is a material thing. Can you elabourate?

As an example, take the marble run on my top shelf. When you put a marble in, the marble runs along the track, dropping through holes and going down ramps, until it reaches the end. I can see how the marbles are physical, and the track is phyiscal, but I can't see any reason to regards the process itself as physical. Is there one?

Atoms are processes. Arent they physical?
Particles thenselves vibrate in time and therefore some of there properties could be said to be processes.

 

[Togo]

Atoms are processes. Arent they physical?
Particles themselves vibrate in time and therefore some of there properties could be said to be processes.

Particles undergo a process called vibration. Again, not convinced the process itself is physical.

I'm not convinced that a process is a material thing. Can you elaborate?

As an example, take the marble run on my top shelf. When you put a marble in, the marble runs along the track, dropping through holes and going down ramps, until it reaches the end. I can see how the marbles are physical, and the track is physical, but I can't see any reason to regards the process itself as physical. Is there one?

The realization that there is no actual thing (called a process that you can physically touch) just might be the hang-up in accepting that a process is a physical thing, and perhaps not all processes are physical things, but surely any such process that is a physical process is a process that includes physical things.

I agree that a process that includes physical things would have an element of physicality to it. But I'd say that the only reason why the process was being considered as physical is because it includes physical things. If the process doesn't, say in a mathematical model, then it's not clear to me that the process would be considered physical. Which suggests that processes themselves aren't physical at all.

...after all, what else is it we're talking about in the physical process that isn't physical?

The physics and mathematics of the interactions.

...suffice it to say that there is something very peculiar about language that seems to jolt our critical thinking skills--language isn't like a formula with the regiment of relentless exactness. Yes, the process is physical, not because there is some physical thing like a process or movement, as what it is to say of something that a process is physical isn't to say that there is a physical thing that is itself movement ... We should be a little more forgiving of the tool we use and remember that language lacks critical exactness. We should be more in tune with the actual meaning being expressed and not hung up on some minor failure that lurks within the language we use.

I'm not sure it is a language failure. We regularly extract the process itself from the physical things whenever we build a model. We regularly extract the number of things from the things themselves to get arithmetic, to the point of modelling mathematical relationships that can't occur between physical objects. Extracting (or as I said before 'abstracting') the process itself from the physical objects is not just a fluke of linguistics, it's fundamental to building a mental model, and much of our present level of civilisation and technology rests on it.

And maybe that gives us a clue as to what referring to something as immaterial, or more properly aphysical, can usefully mean.

 

[Speakpigeon]

What about my thought experiment about dying in a space capsule? The matter is conserved before and after, but something else is not. If it is not conserved, then it is not matter as we know it.

Nobody says that the mind is matter. It is obvious that the mind is not an object like a billiard ball. The mind is processes and structure. And processes and structures are very material things.

It all depends on how you define the mind. If the mind is defined as whatever the brain is doing, or some specific part of it, then it seems reasonable to assume that the mind is essentially processes and structure.

If however one defines the mind as the immediate contents of subjective experience I don't see why we would have to assume it is essentially processes and structure. Blueness, pain or the idea of Santa Claus as I may have in mind now doesn't appear to be essentially processes and structure.

Come to think of it, it would be something if we suddenly and so late in the day realised that the problem of the mind was only due to our collective overlooking of this simple fact that the material world is made not only of matter but also of processes and structure and, oh, by the way, mind too is precisely made of processes and structure.

Of course, some are just happy defining the mind as whatever the brain is doing. So, all is well.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Is the wind made of matter?

If it isn't, then what is it made of?

Can we define matter as any elementary particle?

Isn't the proper response "blow me"?

No, wait! You just dismally misread Juma. He just meant to ask whether THE MIND, not the wind, was made of matter. Makes more sense, yes?

Can't you recognise a typo for a typo man?

And, asking about "the wind" would have been a patent derail.

Something just to blow the thread off-course.
EB

 

[Juma]

Is the wind made of matter?

If it isn't, then what is it made of?

Can we define matter as any elementary particle?

Isn't the proper response "blow me"?

No, wait! You just dismally misread Juma. He just meant to ask whether THE MIND, not the wind, was made of matter. Makes more sense, yes?

Can't you recognise a typo for a typo man?

And, asking about "the wind" would have been a patent derail.

Something just to blow the thread off-course.
EB

Not at all. The wind was the intended word. It is a perfect example of something physical.