The Great Contradiction

[Angra Mainyu]

You seem to be saying that making someone suffer is justified if we have the justified belief that they should suffer (we justifiably believe they deserve to be punished retributively).

Not exactly. That is a necessary condition to justify making someone suffer. But it is not sufficient: I'm saying that we also need to assess other potential consequences. If, say, making them suffer as we rationally asses they deserve would result in civil war that would otherwise be avoided, than it would not be justified.

I struggle to see why desiring to see wrongdoers suffer does not justify retributive punishment but believing that wrongdoers deserve to suffer does justify retributive punishment.

What is the stumbling block?

First, I said it is not about whether we see them suffer; it is about whether they suffer.

Second, to have a desire to see a person (even if they happen to be a wrongdoer) suffer - or even to make them suffer, regardless of who sees it - is very different from having a justified belief that a particular individual engaged in a specific wrongdoing for which he deserves to be punished in such-and-such (of a number of fitting) way.

But let me try with an example, which perhaps will help:

Suppose that Joe accuses Magdalene of witchcraft. On the basis of the accusation, Adam - who desires to see wrongdoers suffer - reckons that Magdalene is a witch and deserves to be burned to death for trying to get people into Hell. He also reckons that watching Magdalene burn is an effective way of satisfying his desire. Adam correctly reckons that there are no further negative consequences for third parties (no civil war; Magdalene has no friends or family, etc.). So, he goes on and burns her to death, and enjoys as he watches her burn.

Joe's belief that Magdalene deserved to be burned to death is not warranted. In fact, the belief that she was in league with Lucifer, etc., was not justified, in the first place. Now, this is independent of whether Magdalene actually was a wrongdoer. If Magdalene was a serial killer but Adam had no idea, he still had no good reason to punish her.

Suppose now that Mary, Lisa, Rachel, and Jenny all say that Jack raped them for fun. Jack, by the way, does not even hide that. Rather, he goes around bragging about all of the women he raped for entertainment. Bob knows some of the victims, and knows there is no good reason to suspect they are making it up. Nor does he see any reason to suspect the various accounts that say that Jack brags about it. In fact, he follows Jack for a while to be sure, and there you go, he catches Jack in the act of bragging about his rapes. Based on all of that information, Bob has the justified belief that Jack behaved immorally in a way that warrants getting beaten up, with broken bones and all.

Assuming also that Bob properly reckons there would be no further consequences bad enough to make punitive measures unjustified - e.g., no law to which to turn, etc. -, he is justified in beating Jack up as described.

Now in most present-day settings (or many other past settings), there is a law, and the way to try to support just retribution is to support a law that has rules to punish people only when there is beyond a reasonable doubt evidence that they committed certain crime, and the range of punishments are fitting for the crime (plus other mechanisms to reduce the risk of mistakes, etc.).

It's no surprise that we've got an evolutionarily evolved natural desire for revenge. It's what's kept us safer in our evolutionary past. The desire for revenge is a natural and, virtually, automatic response. It's rationalised as justified retribution.

Yes, and it is part of our evolutionary evolved natural moral sense and moral motivation. The former allows us to make assessments as to who behaves in a morally impermissible, permissible, or praiseworthy manner, who deserves to be punished or rewarded and to what extent, etc.; latter motivates us to avoid wrongful behavior, and to punish those who engage in it, and so on. The making of moral judgments and our moral motivation are natural and virtually automatic response. But it would be a mistake to dismiss it as 'rationalized as moral' response, etc. Rather, that is what human morality is. Just retribution, and our motivation to bring it about, is a significant part of human morality. You are rejecting a significant part of human morality, but not the whole. Yet, I do not see why you reject that big part (see above).

All this can be achieved without a belief in pure retribution. All that's required is a belief that offenders deserve to be punished appropriately (i.e. the minimum necessary to improve societal safety and/or achieve restitution).

I am not sure what you mean by "All this" which can be achieved without a belief in pure retribution. It is not about how to achieve the goal of societal safety. Rather, I'm saying that a human moral sense is part of human psychology, and it includes assessments of desert (i.e., what they deserve in retribution for their actions, positive or negative) and a motivation to give people what they deserve (and I'm talking about retribution of course), just as it includes assessments about what is morally wrong and a motivation not to do morally wrong things (which of course competes with other motivations in many cases).

Now, maybe there are advanced aliens for whom it would be possible for some advanced alien species - for example - to have a safe society and achieve restitution without any sort of retribution. But they would not have morality. They would have some alien analog to morality, or none at all. I do not believe you can remove the belief that people deserve to be punished (of course, this is about retribution) from nearly all humans, barring genetic engineering on a massive scale...but then, that would not be human. For a number of reasons, I think ideology can cause damage to human normal moral retributive assessments, but not enough to destroy them as part of the general population. But even if this were possible, the fact would remain that a significant portion of morality would be left out. I reckon that that would be...unjust.

Incidentally, you have more than once said "pure" retribution. Do you believe in partial retribution? Or no retribution at all?

I asked because you implied that there was correct upper limit ("It's not okay to inflict punishment beyond what the wrongdoer deserves"). It seems to me there's no consensus among retributionists as to what offenders deserve.

Sure, there is a proper amount of retribution, which might be meted out in different ways (e.g., imprisonment or a beating). There is such thing as excessive punishment, as well as too little punishment. As to consensus, there is in many cases, but sure, in some cases, there is disagreement. More generally, there is no consensus among people who believe there is such thing as wrongdoing as to which actions are instances of wrongdoing, or how wrong they are - a litle, a lot, more than this other action, etc. -, though there is plenty of agreement in most cases.

In other words, disagrement about deserved punishments is an instance of moral disagreement. It happens. Generally, though, we either agree or are close enough to reach some compromise that is close enough.

On the other hand, you seem to reject the use of our moral sense to ascertain what punishment they deserve.

What gave you that idea! I use my moral sense to reject retributivist notions of justice and to promote the value of punishments whose purpose is to make our society safer.

Pretty much everything you're saying. You use some part of your moral sense perhaps (or some philosophy theory you have come to accept) to reject a big chunk of the human moral sense. Making assessments about the punishments that people deserve (and yes, in the ordinary sense of the words, this is about retribution) is part of what a human moral sense ordinarily does. I would suggest to take a look at what humans 'in the wild' ordinarily do, how they make such assessments, and so on.

Perhaps, I can get a better grasp of the question if you tell me the sort of answers you're after. For example, if I asked you who should be the arbiter of the consequentialist goals and of the amount of non-retributive consequentialist instances of incarceration (or the measures you support, in general), what would you have in mind?

Elected governments must be the arbiters. However punishment policy should be driven by the objective of making society safer and not by appeasing retributive pressures.

Which one is it? Is it elected governments, or the objective of making society safer?

Elective governments, for example, may well goals other than safety. For example, freedom. Or justice - yes, retribution. This sort of policies may well be backed by the majority of the population.


That aside, I think I would stick to my previous answer, as I do not have an analogue for that one, and I think the previous one is much more just. Elective governments are often a way of achieving goals such as a more just society. Making people safer is also a worthy goal, but it has to be balanced with others. For example, one of them is freedom. Another one is again justice: if you think about making society safer, then there are questions such as: safer for whom, in case of conflict?

Muggers would be safer if left alone (as often they are here ) whereas the targets of muggers would be safer if the muggers are not left alone but put in prison. From a retributive perspective, imprisoning the muggers helps do justice, and it has the bonus of making society safer for their victims (though of course one needs to take some precautions to prevent crime in prisons, and the punishment must not exceed what they deserve in retribution for their actions).

Edited to Add:

Angra - I'm aware that I'm repeating myself a lot. This suggests that we've reached an impasse (we're just not going to agree). I'm happy to let you have the last word unless there's anything you feel really needs a response.

Okay, I tend to agree that we are not going to agree , though the discussion hopefully has been of interest to some of the readers.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I mean by universal morals that some sense of what it takes to operate as a social being requires certain constraints on behavioral execution among community members. If one argues as I do that universal human community is desirable and signalled by the direction humans are trending then there will only be such a community if that morality is constant among humans.

However I understand our social evolution is small group- family- tribe - and it adheres to an evolutionary metric requiring distinction and competition based on differences in capabilities and needs, niche formation.

Yet, anything other than universal morality will result in the breakdown of world society because of the pressure in individuals to make decisions based on differences.

Having these two opposing notions playing at the same time makes it highly unlikely that we'll ever have a consistent morality that applies to more than a few. Which in turn suggests morality is an unlikely glue to keep humans together. In conclusion this last fact means my answer to your assertion of a universal morality is patently false. The sense is not a sense. It is a non-existent fabricated thing which is killed by depending on situations and drives not present in living things.

Geez I'm looking downright Camus-like here.

A tribal morality isn't necessarily not a universal one. It can be that there are moral obligations first those closer to us than to everyone else. But that would not make the sense not universal. At any rate, are you not thinking there are universal morals when you talk about "controlling bad behavior." What is bad behavior, then, if there is no moral sense?

 

[ruby sparks]

What is that 'final analysis'?

That if there is full determinism, there is no wiggle room left for free will.

No, it's conclusive that they are not, since I'm writing of my own free will (see analysis before).

All you have demonstrated there is that you did something. You have not demonstrated that you did it with free will. You are only reporting to me that it subjectively feels like that to you.

No, they are not. Rather, they are similar in the trivial and in this context irrelevant sense that they are all causes, and that they together fully determine the outcome. But there are plenty of differences between them. Some of the causes of my typing this are the relevant ones: I thought about it and decided to do so, without coercion or compulsion. That is a relevant difference. Saying this is not so that because all causes are forces operating under natural law is like saying that all of the causes of something being green and all of the causes of something being red are the same because they're all forces operating under natural law, so red and green are the same. But no, they are not. One is red, one is green. And coerced behavior is not the same as free behavior: one is coerced, the other one is free.

I've answered this before. There are factors that are effectively the same as coercions that you just don't notice, that's all. Think of each one as a tiny little gun to every single part of your head at every instant. Think about the full implications of that as regards any instant or series of instants that you do anything at all.

Yes, of course I have the ability to not type this. I decided to do that, but also I would not have done it if I had chosen otherwise. It was my choice.

Choice, yes. Free will choice? I very much doubt it. Please stop giving me trivial examples. You are not necessarily demonstrating what you think you are. You do not even seem to be thinking about it thoroughly.

No, I'm not being fooled.

How would you even know?

I realize I could have acted differently if I had chosen to do so....

Believing that you could have freely willed to do that would appear to possibly be a delusion on your part.

....and no one and nothing coerced me or compelled my choice.

Under full determinism it would appear that you were fully compelled, it was just that you didn't notice and have not taken full account of all the tiny guns.

Not at all. I am choosing.

Choosing yes. Choosing with free will, I doubt it.

No, not at all.

All I hear is Buzz Lightyear insisting he's not a toy.

I showed that I type of my own free will, and you have not provided a significant counter argument, evidence, etc.

No you didn't and yes I have.

I think we should stop discussing this. If you are not convinced, ok.

But I again recommend you go and do a LOT of reading regarding the relevant science, especially neuropsychology & neuroscience (though some genetics wouldn't go amiss), particularly regarding consciousness, non-conscious processes, self, free will, etc, and including reference to illusions among other things. After that, I think you would realise better how it all undermines a lot of the things you say. Mere subjective philosophical introspection will not suffice here. It is not the best tool for the job.



If you wish to offer a demonstration that you have free will, then do so by not replying to me again in this thread. You claim that you could do that. I'm predicting that you cannot avoid it.

 

[fromderinside]

I mean by universal morals that some sense of what it takes to operate as a social being requires certain constraints on behavioral execution among community members. If one argues as I do that universal human community is desirable and signalled by the direction humans are trending then there will only be such a community if that morality is constant among humans.

However I understand our social evolution is small group- family- tribe - and it adheres to an evolutionary metric requiring distinction and competition based on differences in capabilities and needs, niche formation.

Yet, anything other than universal morality will result in the breakdown of world society because of the pressure in individuals to make decisions based on differences.

Having these two opposing notions playing at the same time makes it highly unlikely that we'll ever have a consistent morality that applies to more than a few. Which in turn suggests morality is an unlikely glue to keep humans together. In conclusion this last fact means my answer to your assertion of a universal morality is patently false. The sense is not a sense. It is a non-existent fabricated thing which is killed by depending on situations and drives not present in living things.

Geez I'm looking downright Camus-like here.

A tribal morality isn't necessarily not a universal one. It can be that there are moral obligations first those closer to us than to everyone else. But that would not make the sense not universal. At any rate, are you not thinking there are universal morals when you talk about "controlling bad behavior." What is bad behavior, then, if there is no moral sense?

Makes no sense to associate universal with tribe. Tribe is segmenting universal is not. The distinction being for morality is that what is moral becomes situation to tribe and location of group of humans rather than across all humanity. What is moral for one tribe is not moral for another. The term sense as I would use it applies similarly to all humanity just as the sense of sight yields similar consequences as perceptions to all humans. What leads to differences in perceptions are differences in rules about behavior, for instance those perceptions as colored by such as tribal morality.

As I see it the problem is with applying morality in a way that leads to similar results across all humanity regardless of composition of other humans around a particular tribe. If one morally distinguishes between color, - one could say the same about language, height, sex, or any trait considered threatening to some - for instance, one builds roadblocks to a universal sense of morality. The same goes for different behaviors among tribes.

A relativistic morality isn't a morality is a prejudice. Ergo there is no way to get to a moral human sense that divides behaviors universally to humans who are the consequence of difference finding.

 

[ruby sparks]

In my opinion, it doesn't help compatibilism that some compatibilists will say that free will can be exercised non-consciously. Although I agree it is fair to say that most people don't really have a precise definition of what they mean when they say 'free will' (because most of them have not thought deeply about it) I think it would be fair to say that many people believe that free will is something they exercise consciously or at least involves conscious thought. Indeed the phrase, 'I have free will' includes non-just 'bare' consciousness, but also implies awareness of a self having the experience of consciousness.

When I say it doesn't help I mean that it seems to make no difference in the final analysis, but I do nonetheless find it interesting that at least some compatibilists do include non-conscious brain activity in what they call free will.

 

[The AntiChris]

Just a couple of clarifications.

Incidentally, you have more than once said "pure" retribution.

When I mention to friends/acquaintances that I'm not in favour of retributive puinishment, almost invariably, I get asked if I don't think we should protect society from dangerous offenders and/or if I don't believe in deterrence. Clearly these people believe there is a consequentialist component to retribution.

I've used the qualifier "pure" to make it clear to anyone who may be reading this exchange that I'm talking about a purely non-consequentialist notion of retributive punishment.

Do you believe in partial retribution? Or no retribution at all?

I'm not sure what you're getting at but I'll explain my position.

Everyone has retributive intuitions and probably always will. I accept there will always be retributive elements in criminal justice systems. All I'm arguing is that in, my view (I know you don't agree), by focussing on consequentialist punishment strategies (informed by empirical research) and reducing retributive infuences in our criminal justice systems, we have a better chance of reducing reoffending and making society safer.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

When I mention to friends/acquaintances that I'm not in favour of retributive puinishment, almost invariably, I get asked if I don't think we should protect society from dangerous offenders and/or if I don't believe in deterrence. Clearly these people believe there is a consequentialist component to retribution.

I would need to take a look at the actual exchanges, but from what you say, they seem to misunderstand what you mean by "retributive punishment" - but again without access to the exchanges, I can't really tell what's going on.

I've used the qualifier "pure" to make it clear to anyone who may be reading this exchange that I'm talking about a purely non-consequentialist notion of retributive punishment.

But "pure" may give the impression that you have in mind inflicting suffering at least in part as a means of retribution. Now I see it is not what you had in mind, but I suggest to just say that you don't believe people deserve to suffer in retribution for what they did, as it seems more clear.

Everyone has retributive intuitions and probably always will. I accept there will always be retributive elements in criminal justice systems. All I'm arguing is that in, my view (I know you don't agree), by focussing on consequentialist punishment strategies (informed by empirical research) and reducing retributive infuences in our criminal justice systems, we have a better chance of reducing reoffending and making society safer.

Thanks for the information, though that is not what I was getting at. Rather, I was asking for the reason I mentioned above, namely I wasn't sure whether you accepted the infliction of suffering at least partially as a means of retribution. But now I know by your previous paragraph that you do not.

With respect to your proposal above, I think that that raises questions like 'safer for whom?', and of course the question of how much injustice it is morally acceptable to trade for how much safety, since focussing on consequentialist punishment strategies and reducing retributive influences makes the system more unjust (as it goes against just retribution). It would be a case of safety (but as before, of whom?) vs. justice.

If it's about making society overall safer, it might be making society safer overall by means of making it far safer for those who deserve to suffer, so I would say that that sort of safety is pretty bad.

Then again, it might be the case that in order to make society safer, those with the intent of making society safer should (means-to-ends 'should') still support enforcing the retributive intent of those who want to inflict just punishment on those who deserve it. That might result in greater safety overall - but not for those who deserve to suffer for their actions! - by means of reducing the incidence of private retribution. On other other hand, it is also possible (I think it depends on the specific social conditions, the power in the hands of those opposed to just retribution, etc.) that that can be avoided by imposing severe penalties on private retribution, and that might result in an overall safer society. However, in that case wrongdoers would not only not be punished by the state as they deserve - in retribution for their actions -, but the state would actually inflict suffering on those rightfully attempting to do justice - as a means of deterring them from doing justice by themselves, while denying them state-sanctioned justice. My assessment is that that would be a vastly unjust system. Nevertheless, it is an empirical matter whether it would make society safer overall. Maybe it would under some social circumstances. But I think it would still be a bad thing in the context of realistic human societies - more overall safety, but at the cost of massive injustice.

That aside, I do agree with doing empirical research and figuring out strategies to make society safer for those who do not deserve to be punished. In particular, when it comes to choosing how to inflict retribution on the perpetrator, present-day societies are not limited to the forms of punishment available to more primitive ones - e.g., calling them on it, insults, beatings or other short-term non-lethal corporal punishments, forced labor, shunning, exile, execution, and others similar to one of the above, with more or less intensity -, but there is also the option of incarceration, with a lot of variants as to how to deal with the inmates. I think it would make sense to prefer - among two potential fitting punishments - that which protects other people better from dangerous offenders, all other things equal. It would also make sense to give them the chance to learn how to work and try to do something better after they've suffered as deserved. And so on. More generally, I'm in favor of using consequentialist criteria in order to choose between the just options - namely, are the punishments that are fitting for the crime, in a retributive sense of course.


On a different note, have you considered Bomb#20's questions?
Even if you reckon there is no more progress to be made in the exchange between you and me, maybe a discussion between you and him would go further.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

That if there is full determinism, there is no wiggle room left for free will.

That is a claim, not an analysis. To make it an analysis, you would have to consider the matter, and using deductive and/or inductive arguments, reach that conclusion. If you did that, I would ask for the arguments. I would also like to know whether it is a deductive argument, or some other kind.

All you have demonstrated there is that you did something. You have not demonstrated that you did it with free will. You are only reporting to me that it subjectively feels like that to you.

No, I did more. Let me try to explain the evidence again.

So, my assessment of the hypothesis that I'm writing this of my own accord is as follows:

It seems obvious, but let us take a closer look at potential problems. I have to check two things:

1. Lack of external threats, like someone pointing a gun to my head telling me to write.
2. Lack of internal compulsion, like a case of kleptomania, or perhaps a heroin addict.

I check 1. by looking around. It is beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no such threat. I can also see that other people are not desperately warning me about a gunman threatening me, though this piece of info is secondary. It's obvious that there is no external threat.

2. I check 1. mostly by introspection, as I do not feel compelled to write, and it is obvious that I can stop if I so choose. In fact, in order to test that, I just chose to stop - and I did. Then, I chose to resume writing, and that worked too. There is also another way in which I check that: other people are not warning me about unusual behavior. In particular, they do not treat me as they would treat a heroin addict, or a kleptomanica. Moreover, with respect to the drug thing, I can discard it in yet another way: namely, I do not take drugs, and the hypothesis that someone is drugging me secretly has an extremely low prior and an even lower posterior probability (as no behavior that might result from it is observed by me or others).

Also, taking some drugs tend to reduce freedom, but only partially, and often not that much, so a very powerful thing would be require to compromise it enough to say that I'm not doing something of my own free will - something perhaps like heroin. But such drugs - like heroin - do not cause a compulsion to write posts about free will, but rather, they tend to cause very different compulsions.

Sure, there are weird but logically consistent scenarios in which I'm not writing of my own accord. But they're (together) too improbable. They're like the sort of scenarios that say, for example, that Venus is full of life and all evidence to the contrary has been planted by a massive conspiracy, or things like that.

In short, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that I am writing this of my own accord/of my own free will.​

On the basis of that analysis, I reckon it is beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the information available to me that I am writing this of my own accord. I didn't actually need the analysis as it was already obvious, but anyway. On the basis of a similar analysis, you should reckon that you are writing your posts of your own free will. As to how you would assess that I am writing this of my own accord, actually, you should know that too, on the basis of the information that you have about humans, and the astronomically slim probability that I am being coerced or under compulsion. Drugs would not have the effect of compelling me to write this; e.g., if I were a heroin addict, I would be going for heroin, not for free will discussions! So, yes, on the basis of my account plus the general information that you have about humans (including drugs, internet debates, etc.) it is also beyond a reasonable doubt given the information available to you that I am writing this of my own free will. However, the amount of information is not the same, and the argument is slightly different. The probability I should assign to the hypothesis that I'm writing this of my own accord is higher than the probability that you should assign, though the latter is also high enough to make it beyond a reasonable doubt.

I've answered this before. There are factors that are effectively the same as coercions that you just don't notice, that's all. Think of each one as a tiny little gun to every single part of your head at every instant. Think about the full implications of that as regards any instant or series of instants that you do anything at all.

No, you claim that those factors are "effectively the same as coercions". I just look at them when you mention them, and reckon that they are not, as they do not interfere at all with my ability to write of my own accord. The idea that they do prevent me from doing so is based on a mistaken theory about the meaning of the expression 'of one's own accord', and similar ones.

Choice, yes. Free will choice? I very much doubt it. Please stop giving me trivial examples. You are not necessarily demonstrating what you think you are. You do not even seem to be thinking about it thoroughly.

I am. What I'm doing is pointing out that this is pretty obvious, and you haven't raised a significant objection, which would need to be based on evidence about the meaning of the words, as used 'in the wild' by English speakers, not about brains, particles and the like.

How would you even know?

Well, it is pretty obvious, but I go as follows:

I have to check two things:

1. Lack of external threats, like someone pointing a gun to my head telling me to write.
2. Lack of internal compulsion, like a case of kleptomania, or perhaps a heroin addict.

The analysis continues as above (of course, someone could go the way of radical skepticism and it would be like asking how you would know that you're not being fooled by some powerful entity who puts memories in your head and makes you believe that you are over 2 days old, but I'm not talking about that) .

Believing that you could have freely willed to do that would appear to possibly be a delusion on your part.

Believing that that would appears to be a delusion on my part is a confusion on your part.
You continue to believe I believe something I do not believe, because you have a mistaken theory about what the words mean. Of course, I could have freely decided to do otherwise. That does not mean at all that given the exact same situation of the universe, it was not causally determined that I would do what I did (and no, I did not forget to write 'fully'; because that is what 'causally determined' means; the 'fully' would be superfluous, a repetition).

Just take a look at how people use the words. If a meteor crashes close to where they are, they might say 'I could have been killed', without suggesting that the meteor acts indeterministically. The same for a number of other cases, like 'you could have been infected', which does not suggest a virus acts indeterministically, or things like that.

You have a mistaken theory about the meaning of 'could have' in this context (and most contexts, it seems). You also have a mistaken theory about what I believe. Bomb#20 already called you on that, and so did I. But you continue to attribute to me beliefs I do not have at all, because you misconstrue what I say, because you have mistaken theories about the meaning of the words.

Choosing yes. Choosing with free will, I doubt it.

More than that, you deny it. But you have provided no good reason to suspect that I am not choosing of my own free will, I'm afraid.

All I hear is Buzz Lightyear insisting he's not a toy.

Well, you do hear it if you are reading, but you are not understanding it.

Under full determinism it would appear that you were fully compelled, it was just that you didn't notice and have not taken full account of all the tiny guns.

No. Under full determinism, I was fully caused. I noticed that there is no good reason to think that that would compel me.

I think we should stop discussing this. If you are not convinced, ok.

As you like. You can always choose to stop discussing, of your own free will. Of course, if you were correct and we are not writing of our own free will, then it is pointless: we are compelled to debate this until such time when we are compelled to debate something else. We have no say on the matter: we are forced.

But I again recommend you go and do a LOT of reading regarding the relevant science, especially neuropsychology & neuroscience (though some genetics wouldn't go amiss), particularly regarding consciousness, non-conscious processes, self, free will, etc, and including reference to illusions among other things. After that, I think you would realise better how it all undermines a lot of the things you say. Mere subjective philosophical introspection will not suffice here. It is not the best tool for the job.

I have read enough, when reading the arguments of incompatibilists. I also read those of compatibilists, and thought about the matter on my own. I realize that most of the science in question is irrelevant. Incompatibilists believe otherwise because they have a mistaken theory about the meaning of the expression 'of one's own free will' and similar ones. You may or may not have read more about the alledgedly relevant science than I have. But that's beside the point. I read more than enough incompatibilist arguments allegedly based on science to realize that they miss the point. The problem is that it's not about the science. It is about the meaning of the words.

If you wish to offer a demonstration that you have free will, then do so by not replying to me again in this thread. You claim that you could do that. I'm predicting that you cannot avoid it.

I'm afraid that you are not being consistent.

Not being able to fly would therefore merely be something that you realise is beyond you. Not being able to do other than what you do would merely be something you don't realise is beyond you. You would not be able to do either.

So, of course, if I were not to reply, to be consistent you should simply say that I am not being able to do other than what I do, in this case, other than not replying (if I hadn't!).

Additionally, you seem to be using an unfalsifiable hypothesis, as nothing I or anyone else might do would avoid your claim "Not being able to do other than what you do would merely be something you don't realise is beyond you".

On that note, I would like to ask you again to answer my question about what sort of theory it is that you are pushing. Are you saying that it is logically impossible under the hypothesis of full causal determinism that I write this on my own free will? Or are you saying it is an empirical question?

Some of your claims imply it is the former, but others the latter. For example, you said:

What I perhaps should better have said was that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, and thus their (supposed) compatibility is effectively a contradiction.

Clearly, here you claim there is a contradiction. I cannot provide evidence against a contradiction. And it is obvious - and I take it to you as well, given what you've said - that if I had not posted, that would not have provided evidence against determinism, either. So, when you said

If you wish to offer a demonstration that you have free will, then do so by not replying to me again in this thread.

you contradicted your previous position. Your reply here implies it is an empirical matter. So, you are being inconsistent about whether I'm not able to write of my own free will because it would be contradictory assuming determinism, or because of some empirical fact...unless, perhaps, you actually believe that if I had posted no reply to your post, that would have provided evidence against determinism, since that would seem to be the only way of providing evidence that I'm acting of my own accord under an assumption that determinism is logically incompatible with acting of one's own free will (no, I did not forget 'full'; the meaning of 'determinism' is such that 'full' would be repetitive, but add it if you like).

In my opinion, it doesn't help compatibilism that some compatibilists will say that free will can be exercised non-consciously. Although I agree it is fair to say that most people don't really have a precise definition of what they mean when they say 'free will' (because most of them have not thought deeply about it) I think it would be fair to say that many people believe that free will is something they exercise consciously or at least involves conscious thought.

I suspect that there is a misunderstanding, but do you have a link to cases of compatibilists saying we can exercise free will unconsciously?
It may well be something as simple as to say that we do things of our own free will without consciously thinking about the specifics. For example, I can choose to go to the supermarket of my own free will, and go, and the fact that I wasn't consciously aware of the movements of my feet at every step does not change the fact that I walked from my home to the supermarket of my own free will. If that is what they mean, they are correct, and the problem is a misunderstanding. But then again, maybe they meant something else, so a link would help me make an assessment.

Indeed the phrase, 'I have free will' includes non-just 'bare' consciousness, but also implies awareness of a self having the experience of consciousness.

I'm not sure, since "awareness of a self having the experience of consciousness" does not seem entirely clear to me. In any case, the usual and important expression (due to its moral relevance) is 'he acted of his own accord/free will' and similar ones. The sense of the expression 'I have free will' might depend more on the context; in philosophy contexts, it might be used in an incompatibilist sense.

When I say it doesn't help I mean that it seems to make no difference in the final analysis, but I do nonetheless find it interesting that at least some compatibilists do include non-conscious brain activity in what they call free will.

Do you have a link, please?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

ruby sparks,

Let me insist on a point that I think is very important: there is no empirical evidence against a contradiction. Well, sort of: if a competent mathematician tells me that an argument in which I found a contradiction is invalid, that provides some evidence that it's not a contradiction in the first place - how much it does depends on how carefully I checked the argument. But the point is that evidence against a contradiction is either directly logical argumentation (logical evidence, if you like, not empirical one) showing the argument against the contradiction to be flawed (if there was an argument at all), or at best empirical evidence about the logical evidence, like the mathematician example. But you cannot get evidence against a contradiction by empirical evidence about stuff so to speak, except indirectly as very weak indirect evidence in support of the hypothesis that there is an error in the argument deriving the contradiction.

Now, clearly you are not talking about this sort of empirical evidence as a form of indirect evidence about the logic of the matter. You said earlier:

If you wish to offer a demonstration that you have free will, then do so by not replying to me again in this thread. You claim that you could do that. I'm predicting that you cannot avoid it.

Also, you claimed:

Compatibilism, imo, is possibly a malaise of colloquialism affecting philosophers in modern times. Science seems to be chipping away at its foundations.

There, you also say that science is providing empirical evidence against the compatibility of determinism and acting of one's own free will. The AntiChris already asked you about this.

Here's more:

One can google and readily find articles, papers and videos discussing how both modern neuroscience and genetics are undermining the concept of free will.

Compatibilism says we have free will. That's what science is undermining.

And yet, you have said:

What I perhaps should better have said was that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, and thus their (supposed) compatibility is effectively a contradiction.

So, you have not been consistent. If you misspoke, I would like to ask you which is the claim you are pushing: Do you believe that there a contradiction that follows from the hypotheses that the universe is deterministic + the hypothesis that I'm writing of my own free will? If so, I would ask you to please derive the contradiction, including your implicit premises in the argument. If not, I would ask you to let me know that you do not believe that.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Makes no sense to associate universal with tribe. Tribe is segmenting universal is not.

It makes perfect sense, as there may well be a universal human moral sense that, where properly functioning, reckons people have an obligation to put their tribe above others all other things equal (for example).

The distinction being for morality is that what is moral becomes situation to tribe and location of group of humans rather than across all humanity. What is moral for one tribe is not moral for another. The term sense as I would use it applies similarly to all humanity just as the sense of sight yields similar consequences as perceptions to all humans. What leads to differences in perceptions are differences in rules about behavior, for instance those perceptions as colored by such as tribal morality.

As I see it the problem is with applying morality in a way that leads to similar results across all humanity regardless of composition of other humans around a particular tribe. If one morally distinguishes between color, - one could say the same about language, height, sex, or any trait considered threatening to some - for instance, one builds roadblocks to a universal sense of morality. The same goes for different behaviors among tribes.

A relativistic morality isn't a morality is a prejudice. Ergo there is no way to get to a moral human sense that divides behaviors universally to humans who are the consequence of difference finding.

Of course, what is morally acceptable in one tribe isn't always acceptable in another tribe. If your tribe has a rule 'drive on the right', and mine has a rule 'drive on the left', surely what is right is not the same in your region as in mine, in re. driving. But that aside, there is a question about what you mean by 'relativistic'. At any rate, if there is a human universal morality, surely what is morally acceptable, obligatory, etc., for an agent depends on the information available to the agent, so given that agents in different places and times have different pieces of information, it is unsurprising that they will have different obligations. Note that that is compatible - and to be expected - if there is a universal moral sense.

 

[fromderinside]

At any rate, if there is a human universal morality, surely what is morally acceptable, obligatory, etc., for an agent depends on the information available to the agent, so given that agents in different places and times have different pieces of information, it is unsurprising that they will have different obligations. Note that that is compatible - and to be expected - if there is a universal moral sense.

Humans are of time and place and are the result of difference finding evolutionary driving. Both of those factors militate against a universal sense of morality ever arising. My caveat there is that we have evolved to the point where we can interrelate with any human anywhere so that pressure may be building toward an expansion of whatever social moderating senses we have in the direction of more commonality. However the evolutionary heritage for discrimination goes all the way back to first living things suggesting any morality will be only serve to enforce among whatever is deemed same.

I see no possibility of either a sense of morality in humans nor a sense in humans that can possibly be universal. I need to repeat that any discrimination toward differences in others is a pejorative discrimination which can never be seen as moral.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Humans are of time and place and are the result of difference finding evolutionary driving. Both of those factors militate against a universal sense of morality ever arising.

I'm not sure I follow. There are plenty of universal human traits, so why not a sense of morality?

My caveat there is that we have evolved to the point where we can interrelate with any human anywhere so that pressure may be building toward an expansion of whatever social moderating senses we have in the direction of more commonality.

Do you mean evolutionary pressure?

However the evolutionary heritage for discrimination goes all the way back to first living things suggesting any morality will be only serve to enforce among whatever is deemed same.

But if that is the case, then enforcing that would be a good thing, as that would be morality.

I see no possibility of either a sense of morality in humans nor a sense in humans that can possibly be universal. I need to repeat that any discrimination toward differences in others is a pejorative discrimination which can never be seen as moral.

Here you say "which can never be seen as moral". If you make that assessment using your own moral sense and there is a universal moral sense, then great! Let us say your assessment is correct. Then, that discrimination is bad, but you are mistaken in your assessment that there is no universal moral sense.
If, on the other hand, there is no universal moral sense, then maybe it can never be seen as moral by you, but others might see differently, and - given no universal moral sense - then it seems almost certain that either there is no fact of the matter as to whether said discrimination is morally wrong, or there is a fact of the matter: nothing is morally wrong, as a substantive moral error theory obtains. Another, far less probable option under that assumption is that an epistemic moral error theory obtains, but in that case, we do not know whether that discrimination is morally wrong (then there are some other, absurdly improbable variants, but they're too improbable).

At any rate, the point is that if you are correct about there not being a universal human moral sense, either there is no fact of the matter as to whether that discrimination is unethical, or there is but you do not know it, or it is not unethical as nothing is.

 

[The AntiChris]

I would need to take a look at the actual exchanges, but from what you say, they seem to misunderstand what you mean by "retributive punishment"....

Well, this was precisely my point. In my experience (in real life and online), many people have confused notions about retributive punishment.

On a different note, have you considered Bomb#20's questions?
Even if you reckon there is no more progress to be made in the exchange between you and me, maybe a discussion between you and him would go further.

I've been through this with him before. I don't find his argument (that rejecting retributive punishment necessarily means one rejects the notion of not hurting the innocent because they don't deserve it) at all persuasive and I have no desire to rehash it.

 

[ruby sparks]

Regarding the possibility of being psychologically fooled....

How would you even know?

Well, it is pretty obvious...

Actually, that's exactly what it is not, but do carry on.

I have to check two things:

1. Lack of external threats, like someone pointing a gun to my head telling me to write.
2. Lack of internal compulsion, like a case of kleptomania, or perhaps a heroin addict.

The analysis continues as above (of course, someone could go the way of radical skepticism and it would be like asking how you would know that you're not being fooled by some powerful entity who puts memories in your head and makes you believe that you are over 2 days old, but I'm not talking about that) .

If you really, actually think that's all you need to consider before working out whether you are effectively being psychologically fooled about something then all I can say is that it is incredibly naive, lacking in even philosophical thoroughness, folk-psychological, incomplete, and uninformed by the copious amounts of available scientific evidence. And it also makes your case for free will all of those things.

As I said before, I really think it would help if you read up on the science about all this.

Worryingly though, on the subject of scientific evidence, if I recall correctly, when I cited one piece of evidence from a study (the one where the subject of the experiment thinks they moved a cursor onto an object on a screen when in fact it was someone else who did it) it was you who tried to first say (a) that it had nothing to do with the free will issue and then (b) that it didn't suggest anything significant. Quite honestly, based on that response, I would have limited confidence that you would properly consider the scientific evidence in general even if you did study it.

Sorry, but I think you and I are done on this particular subject.

 

[ruby sparks]

There are plenty of universal human traits, so why not a sense of morality?

Why don't we segue onto this topic instead? It seems to me to be (a) a topic on which we don't fundamentally disagree (yet, lol) and (b) a topic where you seem to be much more familiar than me with the relevant considerations.

So can I first ask you what sorts of things you would consider universal human traits, perhaps especially traits that you feel can be set beside morality for comparison?

For example, if we say that having language is a universal human trait, that seems true (I'm going to assume exceptions are allowed in such matters) but there are lots of different languages.

Also, what would be your definition of "a universal (sense of) morality"?

I should clarify that at this time I have no strong views on whether there is a universal morality or not, or even a universal sense of morality. I think it would be fair to say that I tend to think not, but I'm fairly sure I have not thought about it as deeply or looked into it as fully as you. I have discussed the subject before, quite a while ago, but not extensively, and I don't think I remember everything about those discussions.

 

[ruby sparks]

ruby sparks,

Let me insist on a point that I think is very important: there is no empirical evidence against a contradiction. Well, sort of: if a competent mathematician tells me that an argument in which I found a contradiction is invalid, that provides some evidence that it's not a contradiction in the first place - how much it does depends on how carefully I checked the argument. But the point is that evidence against a contradiction is either directly logical argumentation (logical evidence, if you like, not empirical one) showing the argument against the contradiction to be flawed (if there was an argument at all), or at best empirical evidence about the logical evidence, like the mathematician example. But you cannot get evidence against a contradiction by empirical evidence about stuff so to speak, except indirectly as very weak indirect evidence in support of the hypothesis that there is an error in the argument deriving the contradiction.

Now, clearly you are not talking about this sort of empirical evidence as a form of indirect evidence about the logic of the matter. You said earlier:




Also, you claimed:



There, you also say that science is providing empirical evidence against the compatibility of determinism and acting of one's own free will. The AntiChris already asked you about this.

Here's more:

One can google and readily find articles, papers and videos discussing how both modern neuroscience and genetics are undermining the concept of free will.

Compatibilism says we have free will. That's what science is undermining.

And yet, you have said:

What I perhaps should better have said was that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, and thus their (supposed) compatibility is effectively a contradiction.

So, you have not been consistent. If you misspoke, I would like to ask you which is the claim you are pushing: Do you believe that there a contradiction that follows from the hypotheses that the universe is deterministic + the hypothesis that I'm writing of my own free will? If so, I would ask you to please derive the contradiction, including your implicit premises in the argument. If not, I would ask you to let me know that you do not believe that.

Sorry, I missed this. Just for thoroughness, I'm going to answer, but I would like you to understand that I am not at this point keen to continue discussing this with you, partly for reasons given in my previous post.

It might be possible to say that there is no contradiction between saying 'there is full determinism' and what you are calling free will, but that would only be because what you are calling free will is not in fact free will at all. You are only counting the obvious determinants and omitting the literally vast number of non-obvious ones. It is in some ways analogous to someone saying that an iceberg is a big lump of ice that sticks up above the surface of the sea. So using that definition there then would be no contradiction between saying, 'there are icebergs' and, 'all of an iceberg sticks up above the surface of the sea'. But that would be incorrect because that is not what an iceberg actually is.

Regarding what people mean when they say they have free will, I can't stop them from saying that any more than I can stop someone from using the word iceberg to describe what is actually only the tip of the iceberg.

 

[Bomb#20]

When I mention to friends/acquaintances that I'm not in favour of retributive puinishment, almost invariably, I get asked if I don't think we should protect society from dangerous offenders and/or if I don't believe in deterrence. Clearly these people believe there is a consequentialist component to retribution.

That's an invalid inference. There are two more probable alternative explanations for why you'd get asked that.

1. These people are surprised by your self-description, because it is abnormal psychology, and they are motivated by natural curiosity to explore the depths of your abnormality.

2. These people are alarmed by your self-description, because it makes them fear you are not to be relied on as an ally in mankind's everlasting battle against evil, so they are tempting you with an alternative motivation for fulfilling your obligations to your fellow humans.

 

[The AntiChris]

When I mention to friends/acquaintances that I'm not in favour of retributive puinishment, almost invariably, I get asked if I don't think we should protect society from dangerous offenders and/or if I don't believe in deterrence. Clearly these people believe there is a consequentialist component to retribution.

That's an invalid inference. There are two more probable alternative explanations for why you'd get asked that.

1. These people are surprised by your self-description, because it is abnormal psychology, and they are motivated by natural curiosity to explore the depths of your abnormality.

2. These people are alarmed by your self-description, because it makes them fear you are not to be relied on as an ally in mankind's everlasting battle against evil, so they are tempting you with an alternative motivation for fulfilling your obligations to your fellow humans.

Of course, it's possible I'm mistaken.

It's possible that no one is mistaken about retributivism. Or maybe I really haven't encountered anyone who doesn't fully understand retributivism.

I'm not convinced.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I've been through this with him before. I don't find his argument (that rejecting retributive punishment necessarily means one rejects the notion of not hurting the innocent because they don't deserve it) at all persuasive and I have no desire to rehash it.

I'm pretty sure he has a few pretty good arguments, but anyway, do you have a link to any of those previous exchanges?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Worryingly though, on the subject of scientific evidence, if I recall correctly, when I cited one piece of evidence from a study (the one where the subject of the experiment thinks they moved a cursor onto an object on a screen when in fact it was someone else who did it) it was you who tried to first say (a) that it had nothing to do with the free will issue and then (b) that it didn't suggest anything significant. Quite honestly, based on that response, I would have limited confidence that you would properly consider the scientific evidence in general even if you did study it.

First, you incur contradiction once more. In some claims, you say it's an empirical matter, whereas in other claims, you say the combination of determinism (yes, that means full determination) and the hypotheses that I'm writing of my own accord (or similar ones) is contradictory.

In other words, you say there is relevant scientific evidence, and then in other posts, you imply that it is a contradiction, so there is no relevant scientific evidence at all. See this post for more details.

Second, I explained that those studies are in fact not relevant, because the problem is that incompatibilists have a mistaken theory about the meaning of the words. This isn't about neuroscience. It's about the meaning of expressions such as 'of one's own free will'.