The Great Contradiction

[ruby sparks]

I think we're coming closer to appreciating that we shouldn't reward people for being lucky, and nor should we punish people for being unlucky. Our history has been to do just that, however, but we seem to be getting better.

I remember reading about observations of monkeys, how when they are more closely confined in a cage they change their behaviour to being more tolerant and accepting, much less willing to engage in violent behavior, at least so long as their basic needs are met. Maybe that's us too.

I think you're onto something there. And of course we are, in fact, apes.

So, I guess, if it's true that we human apes, are, at least in some circumstances (for example in educated, developed, modern, liberal societies) changing the way we see things in the way you and I describe, then how and why has that happened?

I reckon that would not be an easy question to answer because my guess is that there would have been numerous interacting reasons and factors operating and developing over a long period of time. Perhaps all we could hope to do is to try to identify some key ones.

I think that increased knowledge and understanding, as mostly provided (at least in the last few centuries) through science, might be a big factor.

Modern democracy might be another.

I hesitate before suggesting that a decline in religiosity (or at least certain types of it, most notably Christianity perhaps) is another, but my gut feeling is that it might indeed be. For example, strong beliefs in both free will and in retribution are arguably central components of Christianity. What is odd is that in a contradictory way, so are forgiveness and leniency. And it's not even as if we can say that the greater emphasis on the latter (forgiveness and leniency) was the start of a move away from the former (free will and retribution) because Christianity in fact arguably also beefed-up the emphasis on both of the former.

It has often been said that the arrival and spread of that particular religion interrupted and delayed what might have otherwise been an earlier 'enlightenment' derived in part from the Ancient Greeks. I'm never sure how true that is, but it seems possible, albeit it's probably a simplistic suggestion.

 

[Bomb#20]

The reasons for punishment: rehabilitation, isolation, deterrence, and vengeance. That last one, vengeance, isn't a legitimate function of government.

If you kill your rapist because you are angry, that may be acceptable, but government has no business hurting people based on irrational emotions.
...
We have an advocate of retribution in this thread. It makes no sense to me.

Suppose Sara accidentally kills Joe's daughter in a car wreck. And now suppose Joe wants to kill Sara's daughter retributively, because it's "fitting," because it "fits the crime," because it's "just."

... He's acting only in the belief that retribution is somehow good.

Does Joe have any rational motive at all? I'd say no. Joe isn't hoping to accomplish any good thing. No deterrence, no isolation, no rehabilitation, nor any other benefit. He just thinks symmetry is fitting and proper. He thinks retribution is good for nothing.

That is, he thinks retribution is good in spite of the fact that it has no benefits.

Joe wants to do a great harm, but he has no offsetting benefit as a justifying goal.

I'm not on Joe's side. I think he's irrational. I do not favor retribution.

Dude, that argument is fractally wrong -- wrong at every level you look at it.

1. To defeat an idea you have to refute the best case for it, not the worst case for it. You've presented the worst imaginable scenario for a retributive punishment. It was an accident. Retribution is for deliberate wrongdoing. And he wants to kill the perpetrator's daughter, not the perpetrator. Retribution is for perpetrators. Nobody you're arguing with is in favor of taking out our retributive urges on the accident prone or on proxies. What do you take us for, Christians, who think we all deserve Hell for Adam having eaten an apple? Sara's daughter didn't kill Joe's daughter; therefore Joe killing Sara's daughter is a first-strike. It's not a counterattack. It's not symmetry. I.e., it's not retribution.

2. Surely you knew that -- when have you ever heard anyone advocate retribution against innocent people? So why did you construct that example? Presumably, because you want your readers to think retribution is retribution, there are no relevant distinctions to be made within that category, and killing Sara's daughter for Sara accidentally killing Joe's daughter is morally on a level with killing Sara for Sara deliberately killing Joe's daughter. But if those scenarios really were no different, then what's your motivation for the switch? How did you know killing the innocent would pack more emotional punch than killing the guilty, unless you share the emotion? This implies you must understand at least on a subconscious level that bogus so-called "retribution" against the innocent really isn't the same thing as actual retribution against the guilty. So there appears to be a self-contradiction baked into your argument.

3. You're trying to arouse an emotional reaction against retribution, and that's fine -- all moral arguments are emotional arguments -- but you're doing it by making Joe some sort of primitive Bible-writing bronze-age goat-herding bigot who thinks children are property. Joe evidently thinks killing Sara's daughter for Sara killing his daughter is the same thing as smashing Sara's car if Sara smashed his car. That's a revolting characteristic of Joe that makes him unsympathetic, but it has nothing to do with his belief in retribution. You want to arouse emotions against retribution, arouse emotions against retribution, not against irrelevancies. There are legitimate forms of emotional argument but guilt-by-association isn't one of them.

4. This isn't really about Joe and his personal quest. After all, you said if you do it that may be okay; but you said it's not okay for the government. Well then, what's okay for the government? According to you, rehabilitation, isolation, and deterrence. But the historical fact is that thousands of governments have gone in for punishment by proxy -- making crimes punishable by killing a perpetrator's whole family or by selling his children into slavery or what have you -- and by-and-large, they didn't do it for the sake of retribution. They did it as a deterrent. Governments adopting a philosophy of retributive punishment was a massive step forward in civilized governmental behavior -- it meant that finally only the individual law-breaker was targeted to be punished. About bloody time. So trying to lay punishment-by-proxy at retribution's door instead of at deterrence's door is turning reality on its head.

 

[fromderinside]

Head is spinning. How can so many make attribution statements when moral bases are differing within generations. Retribution needs a basis. IMHO there isn't a single one or even just a few. There are many bases for retribution depending on texture of moral landscape. When inclusiveness criteria are in vogue tribal criteria aren't. Mix that base with anger versus forgiveness and you've got moral stew.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

Head is spinning. How can so many make attribution statements when moral bases are differing within generations. Retribution needs a basis. IMHO there isn't a single one or even just a few. There are many bases for retribution depending on texture of moral landscape. When inclusiveness criteria are in vogue tribal criteria aren't. Mix that base with anger versus forgiveness and you've got moral stew.

I hate to say it but I understand what you are saying.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

You've subtly changed the subject.

I originally took issue with your use of the term "just retribution" (post #346). In response you asked me if I thought that "some people deserve to be punished?". I assumed you were still talking about retribution so of course I disagreed.It seems now that you're talking about punishment in its widest sense (not just retribution).


I'm content to accept "deserve" in the sense that some wrongdoers deserve to suffer the imposition of deterrence, incapacitation and/or restoration where appropriate - i.e. where it is believed future reoffending can be reduced and/or restitution made.

In short, I accept the need for consequentialist punishment (in some cases) but reject retributive punishment.

I have not changed the subject. You misunderstood my previous post. I mean punishment in the retributive sense. I find the use of 'deserve' in your reply above to be mistaken. That is not what 'deserve' means. It's about giving something to someone because of what they did - something good or bad - not about deterrence, rehabilitation, etc. While the things you mention - incapacitation, restoration, deterrence - are ordinarily connected with wrongdoing, but the connection is contingent, and it is not connected to what is deserved.

For example, if there are dangerous animals that are not moral agents (e.g., not primates, or anything similar enough), it might make sense to use incapacitation on them, or the use of means that make them less dangerous (e.g., captivity, castration, etc., depending on the case). Even deterrence is not out of the question. But it is not the case that they deserve to be so treated. It's a matter of security, protecting people, etc.

The same goes for, say, humans who are insane (and by that I mean they lost contact with reality, in the usual sense; people properly in mental institutions). It makes sense to apply measures to make them better if possible, or to isolate them otherwise. If there is no way of doing that - think times before there were technology to contain them -, it even made sense to use enough force to stop them. But it's not that they deserve it.

Also, as B20 pointed out, it would be effective for deterrence in some cases to, say, hurt the parents of perpetrators. Or the children. Or the spouse. Or the siblings. And so on. But it would be unjust because they do not deserve it. Granted, you say that it applies to wrongdoers. However, the connection to wrongdoing would be precisely that they deserve to be punished - i.e., they deserve to suffer retributively. That is what makes the cases of wrongdoers different from those of other examples. Otherwise, what is the difference? If they do not deserve retribution, what does it mean that they deserve to be treated in such-and-such way for deterrence?


What you propose is a partial moral error theory. In usual moral talk, when people talk about the punishment a perpetrator deserves, they are not talking about rehabilitating him, or isolating him to protect others, or deterring others. Rather, they are talking about what he deserves to suffer as retribution for what he has done. I provided examples in this post. Now, I'm not saying that when, say, people are demanding justice, they're not trying to also deter further perpetrators, or isolate a particular one. I'm saying that those are in general secondary goals. I suggest you take a look at how people demanding justice usually behave - at least, nearly always across history.

Given that your view is that no one deserves to be punished - i.e., no one deserves to be subject to a negative that is retribution for his actions -, then if your view is correct, a significant portion of human moral talk is completely misguided. It's not like, say, a mistake about whether abortion is immoral in such-and-such circumstances. Your theory doesn't take out particular moral beliefs about specific behaviors, but rather, it takes out a big chunk of human moral talk and behavior across societies and across time.

Do you agree with that? Or do you think that when humans ordinarily talk about doing justice, about what a murderer, rapist, robber, etc., deserve, and so on, they are not talking about retribution, in the vast majority of cases?
If the former (i.e., you agree you propose a partial moral error theory), I would like to ask you why you support it, and why in the particular case of what people deserve, but not in the case of, say, morally wrong behavior.
If the latter (i.e., you do not agree that what you propose entails a partial moral error theory), I'm listening to counterarguments if you like (i.e., if you think your theory, if correct, doesn't imply a big portion of human moral talk is widely misguided).

 

[The AntiChris]

You've subtly changed the subject.

I originally took issue with your use of the term "just retribution" (post #346). In response you asked me if I thought that "some people deserve to be punished?". I assumed you were still talking about retribution so of course I disagreed. It seems now that you're talking about punishment in its widest sense (not just retribution).


I'm content to accept "deserve" in the sense that some wrongdoers deserve to suffer the imposition of deterrence, incapacitation and/or restoration where appropriate - i.e. where it is believed future reoffending can be reduced and/or restitution made.

In short, I accept the need for consequentialist punishment (in some cases) but reject retributive punishment.

I have not changed the subject. You misunderstood my previous post. I mean punishment in the retributive sense.

You can hardly blame me. I used the word 'retribution' and you responded by asking about punishment which typically includes incapacitation, restoration and rehabilitation. You'd have made yourself clearer if you'd stuck with 'retribution'.

I find the use of 'deserve' in your reply above to be mistaken. That is not what 'deserve' means.

Here's the first definition that appeared in Google:

deserve

verb

do something or have or show qualities worthy of (a reaction which rewards or punishes as appropriate).

That looks perfectly consistent with what I said.

Also, as B20 pointed out, it would be effective for deterrence in some cases to, say, hurt the parents of perpetrators. Or the children. Or the spouse. Or the siblings. And so on. But it would be unjust because they do not deserve it. Granted, you say that it applies to wrongdoers. However, the connection to wrongdoing would be precisely that they deserve to be punished - i.e., they deserve to suffer retributively.

You're simply repeating your opinion. I accept that wrongdoers 'deserve' to be punished appropriately but I don't accept retribution as appropriate in any circumstances. You are of the opinion that wrongdoers only deserve to suffer retributively.

Given that your view is that no one deserves to be punished...

That's rather misleading. My view is that no one deserves to suffer retributively. Retribution is not the only form of punishment - I wish you'd stop implying they're synonymous.

if your view is correct, a significant portion of human moral talk is completely misguided.

Possibly. In my view anyone who believes wrongdoers only deserve to suffer retributively are misguided. However, I've given, I believe, a coherent account of deserved punishment which excludes retribution. So the use of deserved punishment isn't totally lost.

do you think that when humans ordinarily talk about doing justice, about what a murderer, rapist, robber, etc., deserve, and so on, they are not talking about retribution, in the vast majority of cases?

As I said earlier, the fact that many (probably most) do think in terms of retributive justice doesn't mean we simply accept it uncritically.

 

[ruby sparks]

What's the difference between 'retribution', and 'deserved punishment'?

I now think they're the exact same thing and that I might have had the wrong idea earlier.

I might even say that I'm now inclined to say that retribution and revenge are the same thing, or that perhaps the only difference is that the former term is usually used for punishments done with 'some authority' (eg by a state) and the latter is, usually at least, reserved for when an individual person does it (without 'authority'). Even that distinction seems iffy.

So, when someone says that revenge is not the business of the government, they are essentially wrong, and merely colloquially preferring not to use a word that may be seen to have baggage they don't like. In other words, state punishment is state retribution, is state revenge.

The only difference would then be in the appropriateness of the chosen method, the degree of proportionality, the level of emotional content, etc, not in the words themselves.

 

[ruby sparks]

Given that your view is that no one deserves to be punished - i.e., no one deserves to be subject to a negative that is retribution for his actions -, then if your view is correct, a significant portion of human moral talk is completely misguided.

I think I agree with almost all of what you said in that post.

Just on the snippet quoted above, as a free will skeptic, I suspect (without being sure) that it is true that no one, in the final, thorough analysis, actually deserves to be punished, morally-speaking (setting aside pragmatic and other reasons for punishments) well, no more than, say, a very sophisticated computer would deserve it, and that as such, yes, imo, a significant portion of human moral talk is misguided. I suspect that something which may be a relative (close or distant) of woo is involved in the typical human moral view. Understandably so, because for all the world it looks and feels as if 'normal' people could freely will themselves to do otherwise than what they in the end do.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

You can hardly blame me. I used the word 'retribution' and you responded by asking about punishment which typically includes incapacitation, restoration and rehabilitation. You'd have made yourself clearer if you'd stuck with 'retribution'.

I'm afraid I disagree with that, for the following reasons:

1. The most common use of the word 'punishment' is about, well, punishing someone. Trying to rehabilitate a person is not a punishment. Incapacitating someone - well, that depends on the case. If it's to confine them in order to protect others, that is what is done to dangerous insane people, or a lion on the loose. It is not a punishment. If it is used as a punishment, it is because it is used retributively. As for restoration, it is a punishment as far as the person is forced to give something to someone else, as a means of retribution at least partially, even if it's also as a means to restore whatever it is the victim needs restored. If it is merely to restore whatever the victim needs restored - for example -, the state can pay for that, or someone else can be forced to do the restoring.
There are broader usages of the term 'punish' perhaps, but they are uncommon comparatively speaking.

2. Even if I were mistaken about how common each usage is, in my response, I didn't ask only about punishment. I said about whether they deserved to be punished. In that context, it is about retribution. I think your reply misuses the word 'deserve'. In particular, you said:

I'm content to accept "deserve" in the sense that some wrongdoers deserve to suffer the imposition of deterrence, incapacitation and/or restoration where appropriate - i.e. where it is believed future reoffending can be reduced and/or restitution made.

That is only "deserve" in quotation marks. It is not what the word 'deserve' means. Some wrongdoers would only deserve to be punished with incapacitation if incapacitation were a proper retribution for their behavior, and sometimes it is, but that's not the issue.

3. Even if I were mistaken about the meanings of the words or how commonly they are used (i.e., about both 1. and 2.), in the post that you said contained a subtle change in the subject, I said this: :

The reason is that a person who deserves to be punished, is punished as deserved. The concept of what an agent deserves is a universal human moral concept. Attached we have the concept of just retribution - when a person is given what they deserve, and because they deserve it.

Even if those statements were in error, they make pretty clear what I mean.

verb

do something or have or show qualities worthy of (a reaction which rewards or punishes as appropriate).

That looks perfectly consistent with what I said.

It doesn't as far as I can tell.

It says it's about what an agent is worthy of. That is a moral concept involving what is fitting (again, morally) for an agent to receive, due to some of the qualities of the mind of the agent, such as what the agent did or is doing. It is not about factors such as deterrence of others. It might involve rehabilitation: suppose Bob takes a big risk to save the lives of 10 people. As a result, he saves them but ends up with significant trauma, and incapacitated to walk. He deserves to be given proper treatment and rehabilitation (all other things equal). That actually is about retribution, of the positive kind. Similarly, incapacitation may well be what a person deserves, as a punishment, i.e., as retribution. Maybe for a serial rapist, a proper punishment (i.e., retribution) would be castration, which is a form of incapacitation. But then again, that is also not the way you were using it.

You're simply repeating your opinion. I accept that wrongdoers 'deserve' to be punished appropriately but I don't accept retribution as appropriate in any circumstances. You are of the opinion that wrongdoers only deserve to suffer retributively.

I am not just repeating my opinion. I am making the point that even when you talk about what wrongdoers deserve, you are making a distinction that implicitly is about retribution - and that is what you picked wrongdoers in the first place when it comes to deterrence. You do not support hurting the the parents of perpetrators. Or the children. Or the spouse. Or the siblings. But why not? After all, it can be good deterrence. But it would be unjust, because they do not deserve to suffer.

That's rather misleading. My view is that no one deserves to suffer retributively. Retribution is not the only form of punishment - I wish you'd stop implying they're synonymous.

But we have a disagreement about the meaning of the words. I use them as synonyms because I believe that they are (well, I intuitively use them as synonyms because that is how I grasp their meaning, but when I explicitly think about it, I reckon they are). In the most common usage of the term, 'punishment' is about retribution, so at least in that sense of the term 'punishment', they are synonyms (even if there are other, less common usages of the word 'punishment').

Moreover, in the specific use of the term 'punishment' in expressions just as 'just punishment', 'deserved punishment', 'punishment a person deserves', and so on, I think the only meaning is about just retribution, and you are misusing the word in this thread.

Possibly. In my view anyone who believes wrongdoers only deserve to suffer retributively are misguided. However, I've given, I believe, a coherent account of deserved punishment which excludes retribution. So the use of deserved punishment isn't totally lost.

I think that that would not be punishment, in the sense in which the word 'punishment' is used in most cases, and including all cases involving the expression 'deserved punishment' (save, perhaps, for attempts to change the meaning of the words). So, I think it would be totally lost.

As I said earlier, the fact that many (probably most) do think in terms of retributive justice doesn't mean we simply accept it uncritically.

Most people do accept ordinary terms and ordinary features of the human mind without even having the time to think about them as philosophers do, and I do not think it's inappropriate - after all, they do not have the time for this sort of analysis, or even for studying enough to even make this sort of analysis.

But that aside, sure, for those of us with enough time to study the matters, it's a good idea. I have studied error theories, both substantial and epistemic, both total and partial. I believe none of them is true, on the basis that the arguments for them are not strong and do not significantly undermine ordinary moral beliefs. But I would like to ask for your reasons to believe that no one deserves to suffer retribution for what they do, just as (if I'm interested in the discussion, have enough time, etc.) I would ask someone who says that nothing is morally wrong why they believe so (or the supporter of some other error theory about everyday concepts and basic human psychology, such as knowledge or color to name two common ones).

In particular, you mention not accepting them 'uncritically', so I take it you didn't reject the idea of just retribution uncritically but thought about it and/or read some theories, etc., so I would like to know whether your assessment is based on some known moral theory, or if it's yours, what is the theory?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

What's the difference between 'retribution', and 'deserved punishment'?

It depends on the context. They could mean the same, but 'retribution' might also not have a 'justice' component to it. I've been using the term 'just retribution' just to consider the usage of 'retribution' in a way that does not include a justice clause (more below).

I might even say that I'm now inclined to say that retribution and revenge are the same thing, or that perhaps the only difference is that the former term is usually used for punishments done with 'some authority' (eg by a state) and the latter is, usually at least, reserved for when an individual person does it (without 'authority'). Even that distinction seems iffy.

It's not about whether it's done by some authority, though often the word 'retribution' has an implicit justice component, whereas 'revenge' does not, and in fact it is often negatively loaded.
At any rate, it would be a matter of paying close attention to how a person is using the word, but what is very easy is to distinguish two very different concepts, namely that of revenge on one hand, and that of just retribution on the other (the word 'retribution' alone is often used to mean the same as 'just retribution', but not always, so I'll stick to 'just retribution' given that there's been some misunderstanding).

To distinguish the two - and leave aside any talk of a state or similar - suppose that there are 3 bands of hunter-gatherers, A, B and C.
Jack is a member of tribe A. For fun, he rapes Sarah, Mary and Magdalene, all members of tribe B. There is no treaty or supra-tribe authority to resort to.
Now, Sarah, Mary and Magdalene want to give Jack want to exact just retribution on Jack. So, they tell their parents and siblings, to get together and punish him. So, Bob, Frank, Jonny and Lou - brothers and fathers of the victims - go find Jack, and beat him up badly, breaking his jaw, a forearm, a few ribs and a couple of fingers (plus bruises all around), and leave him semi-conscious.

In another, not connected event Joseph - also from tribe A - rapes June and Sally, from tribe C (also no treaty, etc.), just for fun. June and Sally tell their parents and siblings. Now the fathers of the two, Luke and John, together with their brothers Mark and Matthew, decide to take revenge. So, they kidnap Linda and Jenny - Joseph's two daughters - and rape them repeatedly, because they reckon (correctly) that that will seriously damage Joseph's reputation in his community, and make him lose money either, as his daughters would no longer be considered for marriage by most in tribe A.

Mark, Matthew, Luke and John engaged in an act of revenge, not in just retribution. Their actions were unjust, heinous actually. Linda and Jenny did not deserve to be raped of course, and the fact that his father was a rapist is not relevant. On the other hand, Bob, Frank, Jonny and Lou gave Jack what he deserved (i.e., one of many possible proper punishments). They inflicted just punishment/retribution on him for what he did. Their behavior was just, and morally acceptable, all other things equal ("all other things equal" include that they properly reckoned there were no significant chances of war they would lose, they previously consulted with the authorities of their own tribe if that is what the rules of their tribe prescribed or there was non-negligible risk to others, and so on. Moreover, even if - say - they had failed to take into account the consequences of a potential revenge against their tribe, their actions would be wrong for that reason, not for intending to punish Jack as they did, and the punishment would still have been deserved).

I hope the difference between the concepts is clear, regardless of what words we use: one of the actions is (all other things equal) just, and the person who suffers deserved to be so punished. The other action is not just.

 

[ruby sparks]

I hope the difference between the concepts is clear, regardless of what words we use: one of the actions is (all other things equal) just, and the person who suffers deserved to be so punished. The other action is not just.

Thanks.

The difference between just/moral and unjust/immoral is clear, but punishment, retribution and revenge are currently all (now) looking like synonyms, to me.

So for example in your first case, I think we could say that Bob, Frank, Johnny & Lou enacted a just revenge on Jack.

I wouldn't mind accepting that that is possibly not common parlance nowadays.

 

[The AntiChris]

I used the word 'retribution' and you responded by asking about punishment which typically includes incapacitation, restoration and rehabilitation.

I'm afraid I disagree with that....

You're free to use words in any way you wish but here you'd be out of step with the rest of the world. Don't take my word for it - just Google "Kinds of punishment".

Here's the first definition (of deserve) that appeared in Google:

deserve

verb

do something or have or show qualities worthy of (a reaction which rewards or punishes as appropriate).

That looks perfectly consistent with what I said.

It doesn't as far as I can tell.

It looks fine to me. I guess we'll have to agree to disagree.

I am making the point that even when you talk about what wrongdoers deserve, you are making a distinction that implicitly is about retribution

This assumes the very thing that is in dispute. I reject the retributive notion of moral desert. I'm suggesting there is a pragmatic element to desert claims (and in doing so I'm attempting to salvage the idea of deserved punishment)..

If you told someone that you didn't think wrongdoers ever deserved to be punished, you'd almost certainly be asked how you'd protect society. If you ask people the purpose of imposing retributive punishment they'll almost certainly talk about protecting society and deterring future offending. You shouldn't assume that everyone agrees with your purist view of deserved punishment.

But we have a disagreement about the meaning of the words. I use them as synonyms because I believe that they are….

As I explained earlier, retribution is one form of punishment but, in common usage, 'punishment' can mean many things which might or might not include retribution. (don't take my word for it - Google 'kinds of punishment')

As I said earlier, the fact that many (probably most) do think in terms of retributive justice doesn't mean we simply accept it uncritically.

sure, for those of us with enough time to study the matters, it's a good idea.

I'm pleased we agree.

I would ask someone who says that nothing is morally wrong why they believe so

Just to be clear, I haven't claimed that "nothing is morally wrong".

In particular, you mention not accepting them 'uncritically', so I take it you didn't reject the idea of just retribution uncritically but thought about it and/or read some theories, etc., so I would like to know whether your assessment is based on some known moral theory, or if it's yours, what is the theory?

That comes across as a little patronising. Of course I've thought long and hard about this subject.

My assessment is not based on any moral theory - it's a conclusion I arrived at by looking critically at the concept of retributive punishment.

Basically, retributive punishment is the imposition of a penalty on wrongdoers solely to satisfy a desire to see wrongdoers suffer in the name of 'justice'. It serves no other purpose than to assuage our desire to see those who have wronged us suffer.

The question for me is whether retributive desires should be resisted/discouraged. We don't, as a rule, accept anything without scrutiny simply on the basis that it is desired (least of all the imposition of suffering on another person). It seems to me if we are going to make someone suffer we'd better have a pretty good reason to do so and the mere satisfaction of a desire to see wrongdoers suffer doesn't qualify even if we label it 'justice'.

 

[Bomb#20]

It seems to me if we are going to make someone suffer we'd better have a pretty good reason to do so and the mere satisfaction of a desire to see wrongdoers suffer doesn't qualify even if we label it 'justice'.

Well then, what is a pretty good reason to make someone suffer?

(If your answer contains more than one item, is each item in your list a pretty good reason all on its own, or does it take some combination of reasons to add up to "pretty good"?)

 

[Bomb#20]

So, now that we've established that the answers you gave to Angra Mainyu's questions weren't any good, are you willing to take another stab at them?

I haven't read through your recent posts thoroughly yet, but at this point I strongly suspect that 'we' haven't established that yet, or that it has in fact been established.

No problemo. I said "we" because both you and I established it. Here's where you established it:

Good catch. It seems I did use the same definition as remez. On reflection I think I was inaccurate and incorrect. The opposite of determinism is indeterminism.

If that was something other than you admitting that the answers you gave to Angra Mainyu's questions weren't any good, then what the bejesus was it? How can free will not be the opposite of determinism, while simultaneously, "Because freely-willed and determined (constrained) are effectively opposites. Premise 1: X is up. Conclusion: X is not down." be an answer that's any good?

I need to work now. I'll try to get back to you at some point. If something has been conclusively demonstrated, I'll admit it. At this point, consider me somewhat skeptical about that.

What I said had been "conclusively" established was that you have been using "free will" inconsistently -- using it for more than one concept. If you disagree with that, follow the logic, step by step:

You established that you were using "free will" to mean indeterminism in post #162, where you wrote "Because freely-willed and determined (constrained) are effectively opposites. Premise 1: X is up. Conclusion: X is not down."

You established that you were using it for something other than indeterminism in post #228, where you quoted Wiploc saying "Randomness is the opposite of determinism. Nobody thinks free will and randomness are the same." and replied "Indeed.", and in post #236, where you wrote "On reflection I think I was inaccurate and incorrect. The opposite of determinism is indeterminism." You have stipulated that randomness is the opposite of determinism and also that indeterminism is the opposite of determinism. Therefore randomness is the same thing as indeterminism, yes? You are one of the people excluded by "Nobody"; therefore you have stipulated that you don't think free will and indeterminism are the same.

Therefore you have been using "free will" for more than one concept.

What I perhaps should better have said was that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, and thus their (supposed) compatibility is effectively a contradiction.

Perhaps you perceived that as "taking another stab" at Angra Mainyu's questions. But it's not an argument; it's just a bald assertion. Why are they mutually exclusive? You've stipulated that "free will" does not mean "indeterminism"; therefore it takes some intermediate steps to get from "determinism" to "not free will".

In other posts, you've tried to explain why they're mutually exclusive, but you've never explained it. You just post circular argument after circular argument. Over and over, you go from "determinism" to "not free will" in one step.

 

[ruby sparks]

At some stage, I can only hope that eventually, someone is going to stop faffing around and just try to explain what compatibilist free will is and how it's supposed to not be a fudge.

 

[ruby sparks]

 Robert_Sapolsky is a neuroendocrinologist at Stanford with a fairly large footprint on Youtube. Here is his very brief (3 min) presentation on Free Will (he's not a beiiever):

[youtube]SthfBxQ0vZ0[/youtube]

Make sense.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I hope the difference between the concepts is clear, regardless of what words we use: one of the actions is (all other things equal) just, and the person who suffers deserved to be so punished. The other action is not just.

Thanks.

The difference between just/moral and unjust/immoral is clear, but punishment, retribution and revenge are currently all (now) looking like synonyms, to me.

So for example in your first case, I think we could say that Bob, Frank, Johnny & Lou enacted a just revenge on Jack.

I wouldn't mind accepting that that is possibly not common parlance nowadays.

Words often have more than one meaning (depending on context), and there is a meaning of 'revenge' that does not have a built-in negative implication, so sure, that would be just revenge in that sense. However, given the prevalence of the negative meaning, that would sound odd to people not used to a neutral usage. I think 'just retribution' is less likely to cause that trouble, so it's generally better. Other than that, the important part is the conceptual distinction above.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

At some stage, I can only hope that eventually, someone is going to stop faffing around and just try to explain what compatibilist free will is and how it's supposed to not be a fudge.

I'm afraid we have already done that, in detail (see Bomb#20's replies on the subject, and mine). Compatibilism is the theory that our ability to act of our own accord is compatible with determinism.
How do I reckon I can type this of my own accord?

I already explained it, for example, here.

Now, I can only hope that at some point you explain how whether determinism is true is even related to whether I can type this of my own accord (i.e., of my own free will). In particular, take a look at our previous exchange, and this post by Bomb#20, and the previous questions of mine that he mentions.

In particular, Bomb#20 points out:

What reason do you have for believing that? Now that we're in agreement that proving it by using remez's definition is not a good reason to believe it, what else have you got? Now that you're prepared to no longer use "free will" to mean "the opposite of determinism", just what is it that you do mean by "free will"?

In your reply, you say:

In a nutshell, and to repeat myself, if everything you do is the result of all the deterministic factors up to when you did it, and if because of that you could literally not have freely-willed to do otherwise, because you were fully constrained by prior determinism at every possible instant, even without you (your system) realising it, then it's clearly and obviously not free will in any actual sense. Hume fudged it, by only considering certain, 'obvious' and/or 'external' deterministic factors and not others, internal and less obvious (I don't think Hume even knew that neurons existed so his understanding of the relevant processes was very limited). Compatibilism does the same, so it's a fudge too.

First, that we are causally determined does not assume we are fully constrained. The word 'constrain' has a meaning. When I say I'm writing this free of any constraints, I'm not suggesting that there are no causes, but rather that there is no coercion or compulsion.

Second, and similarly, you say "it's clearly and obviously not free will in any actual sense". Well, actually, that is the extraordinary claim you would need to back up. How would the fact that there are causes that fully determine that I write this prevents me from doing it of my own accord? Words have meaning. Meaning is given by usage. The expressions 'of one's own free will', or 'of one's own accord' mean the same. And their meaning as far as I can tell is not such that causation would prevent anyone from doing things of their own accord.

You say Hume fudged it. Well, I say you are the one with a mistaken theory about the meaning of the words. Why should I believe that the words mean what you say they mean?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

You're free to use words in any way you wish but here you'd be out of step with the rest of the world. Don't take my word for it - just Google "Kinds of punishment".

That would be the wrong thing to Google. First, I said that

1. The most common use of the word 'punishment' is about, well, punishing someone. Trying to rehabilitate a person is not a punishment. Incapacitating someone - well, that depends on the case. If it's to confine them in order to protect others, that is what is done to dangerous insane people, or a lion on the loose. It is not a punishment. If it is used as a punishment, it is because it is used retributively. As for restoration, it is a punishment as far as the person is forced to give something to someone else, as a means of retribution at least partially, even if it's also as a means to restore whatever it is the victim needs restored. If it is merely to restore whatever the victim needs restored - for example -, the state can pay for that, or someone else can be forced to do the restoring.
There are broader usages of the term 'punish' perhaps, but they are uncommon comparatively speaking.

Note that this is about the most common usage, not the only usage. Googling "Kinds of Punishment" will not tell you which usage is more frequent. Not that it would matter, since I also said:

2. Even if I were mistaken about how common each usage is, in my response, I didn't ask only about punishment. I said about whether they deserved to be punished. In that context, it is about retribution. I think your reply misuses the word 'deserve'. In particular, you said:

I'm content to accept "deserve" in the sense that some wrongdoers deserve to suffer the imposition of deterrence, incapacitation and/or restoration where appropriate - i.e. where it is believed future reoffending can be reduced and/or restitution made.

That is only "deserve" in quotation marks. It is not what the word 'deserve' means. Some wrongdoers would only deserve to be punished with incapacitation if incapacitation were a proper retribution for their behavior, and sometimes it is, but that's not the issue.

Googling "Kinds of Punishment" would not address this matter at all. The point is about whether they deserve to be punished. You are misusing the words here. Don't take my word for it. Take a look at how people use the words (Google the relevant terms, look them up, etc.)

At any rate, as I pointed out before, even if I were mistaken in my assessment about what the words mean, in the post that you said contained a subtle change in the subject, I said this:

The reason is that a person who deserves to be punished, is punished as deserved. The concept of what an agent deserves is a universal human moral concept. Attached we have the concept of just retribution - when a person is given what they deserve, and because they deserve it.

So, I made it pretty clear that I was talking about just retribution. Your misunderstanding of my post is not on me.

It looks fine to me. I guess we'll have to agree to disagree.

As you like, but I explained why it is not fine.

This assumes the very thing that is in dispute. I reject the retributive notion of moral desert. I'm suggesting there is a pragmatic element to desert claims (and in doing so I'm attempting to salvage the idea of deserved punishment)..

No, it does not assume that at all. Rather I point out that when you say that some people "deserve" to suffer the imposition of deterrence, incapacitation and/or restoration where appropriate, you still make it about wrongdoers.

If you told someone that you didn't think wrongdoers ever deserved to be punished, you'd almost certainly be asked how you'd protect society.

It depends on the person, but that would be one of the issues that would be raised. But it is not the biggest hurdle, as you could say that you could incarcerate those who wrongfully behave in manners that threaten social stability, or whatever. You just wouldn't do it as a punishment, but as a measure of defense - just as dangerous insane people can be locked up, though that is not a punishment.

If you ask people the purpose of imposing retributive punishment they'll almost certainly talk about protecting society and deterring future offending.

That depends on whom you ask. It is a loaded and ambiguous question, and it depends on how the person reads it. It is loaded because it assumes there is a purpose of imposing retribution other than retribution itself, which does not need to be the case if the retribution is proper. Indeed, just retribution is an instance of doing justice, and doing justice is not - or not merely - a means to an end, but an end itself.

It's ambiguous because it can easily be understood in different manners, for example as asking for purposes other than doing justice. And yes, factors like deterrence may be secondary reasons, once the main one - namely to do justice - is met. Also, neutralizing dangerous individuals can be another reason. For example, if someone has to decide how to allocate limited resources to punish only some of those who deserve it - because there are no resources so find and punish them all -, then going after the most dangerous ones (if one can assess that) makes sense. But that is not the main purpose.

You shouldn't assume that everyone agrees with your purist view of deserved punishment.

It's not a "purist" view, nor an assumption. I use the words intuitively - like everyone else -, but when challenged, I also take a look about how people use the words. When they say that someone deserves to be punished in such-and-such manner, they are talking about what sort of negative retribution they deserve - except, perhaps, for those who are applying a false philosophical theory rather than using the words intuitively. But take a look at how people usually use the words.

As I explained earlier, retribution is one form of punishment but, in common usage, 'punishment' can mean many things which might or might not include retribution. (don't take my word for it - Google 'kinds of punishment')

As I explained earlier, that is not relevant, because they are synonyms in the meaning that I am using here, and it's the meaning involved in claims about 'deserved punishment', 'punishment a person desert', 'just punishment', and so on.
And no, Googling 'kinds of punishment' would be out of place. Again, I am not claiming it's the only meaning of the word 'punishment'. It is however the meaning in the context of 'deserved punishment', 'punishment a person desert', 'just punishment', etc. Do not take my word for it. Look at how humans in the wild use the word.

Just to be clear, I haven't claimed that "nothing is morally wrong".

True. In fact, I pointed out that you haven't, and that your error theory is partial, not total.

That comes across as a little patronising. Of course I've thought long and hard about this subject.

I didn't mean to patronize, but I was trying to make the point that the burden is on the claimant so to speak. In other words, it is reasonable to accept everyday concepts unless one has a good reason to suspect them.
Also, I wanted to ask whether it's a known theory (e.g., you read the theory of some philosopher, and you were persuaded by his argument), or it is your own - I now see it's the latter.

My assessment is not based on any moral theory - it's a conclusion I arrived at by looking critically at the concept of retributive punishment.

Fair enough.

Basically, retributive punishment is the imposition of a penalty on wrongdoers solely to satisfy a desire to see wrongdoers suffer in the name of 'justice'. It serves no other purpose than to assuage our desire to see those who have wronged us suffer.

It's not in the name of justice. It is justice. And they do not have to have wronged us. It is just to punish wrongdoers who have killed all of their victims, so they have not wronged us or anyone else left alive (for example).

The question for me is whether retributive desires should be resisted/discouraged. We don't, as a rule, accept anything without scrutiny simply on the basis that it is desired (least of all the imposition of suffering on another person).

Right, and the scrutiny is moral scrutiny. So we can classify desires as follows:

D1:={Desires that is morally impermissible to satisfy}.

D2:={Desires that is morally obligatory to satisfy}.

D3:={Desires that is morally praiseworthy but not morally obligatory to satisfy}.

D4:= {Desires that is morally permissible but not morally praiseworthy to satisfy}.

Side note: if we want more precision, what is morally permissible, praiseworthy, etc., is not the satisfaction of the desires in question, but the attempt to satisfy them, but I'll speak a bit loosely to make it shorter; I'll make it longer if that proves to be necessary later.

Now, the imposition of just punishment on those who deserve it can be considered in this light. And of course, we have our own moral sense to assess on which category a desire falls, including this particular desire. Generally, I reckon (using my own moral sense, of course) that it is sometimes permissible. It is not always permissible. For example, there are considerations such as the rule of law, social peace, and the like. Perhaps, the family of the victim should not retaliate and should call the police instead, when that is an option, given some predictable negative consequences of applying just retribution directly. It's a matter to be considered on a case by case basis, of course - as is generally the case with moral assessments.

But again, generally speaking, I reckon it is permissible in principle, and I haven't seen any good reason to think my moral sense (and that of nearly everyone else for that matter) got it wrong.

It seems to me if we are going to make someone suffer we'd better have a pretty good reason to do so and the mere satisfaction of a desire to see wrongdoers suffer doesn't qualify even if we label it 'justice'.

Of course, given that you think they do not deserve retribution for what they did, it is to be expected that you think that the "mere satisfaction" of a desire to see wrongdoers suffer does not qualify as a good reason. But again, that does not explain why you think they do not deserve retribution for what they did. Ordinarily, humans reckon that wrongdoers do deserve retribution for their wrongful. actions (take a look at how people behave). So, why is the human moral sense so wrong on this?

That aside, I reckon the good reason is that the suffering is deserved. They deserve it as retribution because of their actions. Now, if the suffering is not deserved, then the desire is of course not a good reason, even if the person is a wrongdoer. It's not okay to inflict punishment beyond what the wrongdoer deserves, even if the victim or someone else might desire so. So, in a sense, the mere desire does not qualify.

 

[ruby sparks]

First, that we are causally determined does not assume we are fully constrained.

You are merely, and I think this may be a key point, possibly THE key point in all of this, omitting the word fully in the first part.

A particular causally determined factor would be a constraint, yes?

Therefore, if we are fully causally determined (which it seems we are, temporarily setting aside the possibility of randomness) then that does seem to mean we are fully constrained. How could it not follow?

The word 'constrain' has a meaning.

Indeed it does. A constraint is a limitation or restriction. Fully causally determined would be fully restricted. How are you, like everything else in the universe, not that?

When I say I'm writing this free of any constraints, I'm not suggesting that there are no causes, but rather that there is no coercion or compulsion.

You only mean, as Hume did, no obvious and/or external coercion or compulsion. Again I think you are omitting a crucial 'fully'.

Once you include all the internal and non-obvious ones, as you surely should, because they are operating on your system, you are in fact, it seems (absent any alternative explanation) fully constrained, and as such you can never freely will to do otherwise than what you do. There is no wiggle room at all. It just doesn't feel like that to you. It's an illusion. You have no free will at all, it would seem. How could it actually be otherwise?

As the saying goes, if the moon could think to itself, it might tell itself that it was steering itself around the earth, because it would not be aware that it wasn't doing that.

But, I hear you say, the hypothetically thinking moon is fully constrained. It just doesn't realise it.

But so are you!

Or please tell me how you could even possibly not be.