Angra Mainyu
Veteran Member
Not exactly. That is a necessary condition to justify making someone suffer. But it is not sufficient: I'm saying that we also need to assess other potential consequences. If, say, making them suffer as we rationally asses they deserve would result in civil war that would otherwise be avoided, than it would not be justified.The AntiChris said:You seem to be saying that making someone suffer is justified if we have the justified belief that they should suffer (we justifiably believe they deserve to be punished retributively).
What is the stumbling block?The AntiChris said:I struggle to see why desiring to see wrongdoers suffer does not justify retributive punishment but believing that wrongdoers deserve to suffer does justify retributive punishment.
First, I said it is not about whether we see them suffer; it is about whether they suffer.
Second, to have a desire to see a person (even if they happen to be a wrongdoer) suffer - or even to make them suffer, regardless of who sees it - is very different from having a justified belief that a particular individual engaged in a specific wrongdoing for which he deserves to be punished in such-and-such (of a number of fitting) way.
But let me try with an example, which perhaps will help:
Suppose that Joe accuses Magdalene of witchcraft. On the basis of the accusation, Adam - who desires to see wrongdoers suffer - reckons that Magdalene is a witch and deserves to be burned to death for trying to get people into Hell. He also reckons that watching Magdalene burn is an effective way of satisfying his desire. Adam correctly reckons that there are no further negative consequences for third parties (no civil war; Magdalene has no friends or family, etc.). So, he goes on and burns her to death, and enjoys as he watches her burn.
Joe's belief that Magdalene deserved to be burned to death is not warranted. In fact, the belief that she was in league with Lucifer, etc., was not justified, in the first place. Now, this is independent of whether Magdalene actually was a wrongdoer. If Magdalene was a serial killer but Adam had no idea, he still had no good reason to punish her.
Suppose now that Mary, Lisa, Rachel, and Jenny all say that Jack raped them for fun. Jack, by the way, does not even hide that. Rather, he goes around bragging about all of the women he raped for entertainment. Bob knows some of the victims, and knows there is no good reason to suspect they are making it up. Nor does he see any reason to suspect the various accounts that say that Jack brags about it. In fact, he follows Jack for a while to be sure, and there you go, he catches Jack in the act of bragging about his rapes. Based on all of that information, Bob has the justified belief that Jack behaved immorally in a way that warrants getting beaten up, with broken bones and all.
Assuming also that Bob properly reckons there would be no further consequences bad enough to make punitive measures unjustified - e.g., no law to which to turn, etc. -, he is justified in beating Jack up as described.
Now in most present-day settings (or many other past settings), there is a law, and the way to try to support just retribution is to support a law that has rules to punish people only when there is beyond a reasonable doubt evidence that they committed certain crime, and the range of punishments are fitting for the crime (plus other mechanisms to reduce the risk of mistakes, etc.).
I am not sure what you mean by "All this" which can be achieved without a belief in pure retribution. It is not about how to achieve the goal of societal safety. Rather, I'm saying that a human moral sense is part of human psychology, and it includes assessments of desert (i.e., what they deserve in retribution for their actions, positive or negative) and a motivation to give people what they deserve (and I'm talking about retribution of course), just as it includes assessments about what is morally wrong and a motivation not to do morally wrong things (which of course competes with other motivations in many cases).The AntiChris said:All this can be achieved without a belief in pure retribution. All that's required is a belief that offenders deserve to be punished appropriately (i.e. the minimum necessary to improve societal safety and/or achieve restitution).Angra Mainyu said:Yes, and it is part of our evolutionary evolved natural moral sense and moral motivation. The former allows us to make assessments as to who behaves in a morally impermissible, permissible, or praiseworthy manner, who deserves to be punished or rewarded and to what extent, etc.; latter motivates us to avoid wrongful behavior, and to punish those who engage in it, and so on. The making of moral judgments and our moral motivation are natural and virtually automatic response. But it would be a mistake to dismiss it as 'rationalized as moral' response, etc. Rather, that is what human morality is. Just retribution, and our motivation to bring it about, is a significant part of human morality. You are rejecting a significant part of human morality, but not the whole. Yet, I do not see why you reject that big part (see above).The AntiChris said:It's no surprise that we've got an evolutionarily evolved natural desire for revenge. It's what's kept us safer in our evolutionary past. The desire for revenge is a natural and, virtually, automatic response. It's rationalised as justified retribution.
Now, maybe there are advanced aliens for whom it would be possible for some advanced alien species - for example - to have a safe society and achieve restitution without any sort of retribution. But they would not have morality. They would have some alien analog to morality, or none at all. I do not believe you can remove the belief that people deserve to be punished (of course, this is about retribution) from nearly all humans, barring genetic engineering on a massive scale...but then, that would not be human. For a number of reasons, I think ideology can cause damage to human normal moral retributive assessments, but not enough to destroy them as part of the general population. But even if this were possible, the fact would remain that a significant portion of morality would be left out. I reckon that that would be...unjust.
Incidentally, you have more than once said "pure" retribution. Do you believe in partial retribution? Or no retribution at all?
Sure, there is a proper amount of retribution, which might be meted out in different ways (e.g., imprisonment or a beating). There is such thing as excessive punishment, as well as too little punishment. As to consensus, there is in many cases, but sure, in some cases, there is disagreement. More generally, there is no consensus among people who believe there is such thing as wrongdoing as to which actions are instances of wrongdoing, or how wrong they are - a litle, a lot, more than this other action, etc. -, though there is plenty of agreement in most cases.The AntiChris said:I asked because you implied that there was correct upper limit ("It's not okay to inflict punishment beyond what the wrongdoer deserves"). It seems to me there's no consensus among retributionists as to what offenders deserve.
In other words, disagrement about deserved punishments is an instance of moral disagreement. It happens. Generally, though, we either agree or are close enough to reach some compromise that is close enough.
Pretty much everything you're saying. You use some part of your moral sense perhaps (or some philosophy theory you have come to accept) to reject a big chunk of the human moral sense. Making assessments about the punishments that people deserve (and yes, in the ordinary sense of the words, this is about retribution) is part of what a human moral sense ordinarily does. I would suggest to take a look at what humans 'in the wild' ordinarily do, how they make such assessments, and so on.The AntiChris said:What gave you that idea! I use my moral sense to reject retributivist notions of justice and to promote the value of punishments whose purpose is to make our society safer.Angra Mainyu said:On the other hand, you seem to reject the use of our moral sense to ascertain what punishment they deserve.
The AntiChris said:Elected governments must be the arbiters. However punishment policy should be driven by the objective of making society safer and not by appeasing retributive pressures.Angra Mainyu said:Perhaps, I can get a better grasp of the question if you tell me the sort of answers you're after. For example, if I asked you who should be the arbiter of the consequentialist goals and of the amount of non-retributive consequentialist instances of incarceration (or the measures you support, in general), what would you have in mind?
Which one is it? Is it elected governments, or the objective of making society safer?
Elective governments, for example, may well goals other than safety. For example, freedom. Or justice - yes, retribution. This sort of policies may well be backed by the majority of the population.
That aside, I think I would stick to my previous answer, as I do not have an analogue for that one, and I think the previous one is much more just. Elective governments are often a way of achieving goals such as a more just society. Making people safer is also a worthy goal, but it has to be balanced with others. For example, one of them is freedom. Another one is again justice: if you think about making society safer, then there are questions such as: safer for whom, in case of conflict?
Muggers would be safer if left alone (as often they are here ) whereas the targets of muggers would be safer if the muggers are not left alone but put in prison. From a retributive perspective, imprisoning the muggers helps do justice, and it has the bonus of making society safer for their victims (though of course one needs to take some precautions to prevent crime in prisons, and the punishment must not exceed what they deserve in retribution for their actions).
Okay, I tend to agree that we are not going to agree , though the discussion hopefully has been of interest to some of the readers.The AntiChris said:Edited to Add:
Angra - I'm aware that I'm repeating myself a lot. This suggests that we've reached an impasse (we're just not going to agree). I'm happy to let you have the last word unless there's anything you feel really needs a response.