ruby sparks said:
Ok, but still I don't see Jarhyn advancing his case in quite the way you do though.
Of course not. As I pointed out, he makes plenty of errors that I don't make, he makes claims that fly on the face of ordinary human moral intuitions, raises accusations not remotely based on the available evidence, etc, whereas he fails to make the good points I make.
But that is not the point I was making in this part of my post. In fact, my point wes not about Jarhyn in particular. He was an example, because you do not raise the same charge against him. My point is that the objection you make against my moral assessments, if successful, would work against
any moral assessments made by any humans, under any circumstances. Why? For the same reason it applies to Jarhyn. But let me explain it again:
Suppose A says B behaved immorally when he did X.
1. If A uses her own moral sense to make the assessment, then her assessment falls within the scope of your 'naturalistic fallacy', because it does not logically follow from the fact that A's moral sense gives the verdict 'B's doing X was immoral', that B's doing X was immoral.
2. If A uses the moral sense of other humans, then the same holds.
3. If A derives her judgment from some moral premises P1, ...Pn , and some other premises Q, then the question is: How does A derive P1,..Pn.
As there is no infinite regress in A's argumentation or thought (she is human), then at some point A is basing her moral assessments on something that is not a moral premise. That falls afoul of your 'naturalistic fallacy', and taints the rest of the conclusions as they are based on an unwarranted starting point.
In other words, your standard , if correct, hits all human morality. If you prefer not to do that, then you would have to withdraw it and choose another way of criticizing my position (or stop criticizing it).