Physicalism

[fromderinside]

How about an interest rate? Surely that's not physical? Or Hogwarts?

The problem is what you allow ......

Physical things all of them. Constructs existing as products, outputs, produced through the process of thinking which is mental activity or physical-chemical processes in the nervous system.

The problem is if you allow the name to be the object you will wind up with a substance point of view for processes which just doesn't apply.

Has anyone with a well reasoning mind ever said the name is the thing. For instance, does anyone really think there is an actual mind's eye, the region where one is self aware of what one is about? Is self other than a reference to what one or others think about something about the one in question? Are we going to construct a fiction about ourselves so we can refer to substances that are actually no more that points of observation in processes?

 

[Togo]

Physical things all of them. Constructs existing as products, outputs, produced through the process of thinking which is mental activity or physical-chemical processes in the nervous system.

The problem is if you allow the name to be the object you will wind up with a substance point of view for processes which just doesn't apply.

Has anyone with a well reasoning mind ever said the name is the thing. For instance, does anyone really think there is an actual mind's eye, the region where one is self aware of what one is about? Is self other than a reference to what one or others think about something about the one in question? Are we going to construct a fiction about ourselves so we can refer to substances that are actually no more that points of observation in processes?

Can you manage mathematics without doing this? Or scientific theories?

 

[boneyard bill]

Nonetheless, the senses themselves are not physical.

How are the senses themselves not physical? Sense organs are physical structures made up of carbon molecules, proteins, etc. The architecture is in fact physical, prone to physical damage and deterioration, faults and flaws, both genetic and acquired.

If by 'senses' you mean sensory representation of information, something not done by the senses but the brain, the evidence supports the proposition that it is the electrochemical activity of the brain that generates this form of mental phenomena, including thoughts and emotions and motor response. What is not understood is exactly how the brain forms conscious representation of information. But there is no reason to claim non physical activity....whatever that is supposed to entail, or even mean.

Sense organs are physical. The senses are not. The act of seeing or feeling is not physical even if the objects seen and felt are.

How do you know this? What exactly is the nature of 'non physical senses?' How does this non physical thing you call ''senses'' interact with the physical world?

In philosophy of mind the response of materialists has been to do exactly what you are doing, which is simply to deny that there are any such senses or to claim that they are physical acts. But that hasn't convinced anyone who wasn't already a committed materialist. The problem has been even long before Descartes, but so far no one has been able to explain sense experience by reducing it to nothing but material processes.

I'm not denying anything that is supported by evidence. I am questioning claims that are apparently not supported by the evidence that is available. I'm not aware of descriptions of non physical things. Nor of non physical things that interact with the physical world on a macro scale...such as neural networks. If you have an explanation of consciousness in terms of non material processes, or non material activity, please provide it. I think you'd find it difficult to find much more than a tiny minority of neuroscientists who support dualism.

But the fact remains that the senses are not material no matter how much the physcialists insist that "they must be physical."

How is it a fact? When was this established? How was it established?

If sentient experience is material, you should be able to reduce it to material processes, but we are unable to do that. When you examine the physical processes you do not get any sentient experience. For example, you get electrical impulses in the brain, and then you get a report of a sentient experience by the subject being investigated. The electrical impulse is not the sentient experience. It may be the cause of the sentient experience, but it isn't the sentient experience itself. The physical processes do not reduce to sentient experience.

This is not true for information processing, for example, we can reduce the apparent "intelligence" of the computer to nothing more than the very rapid processing of its inputs. Intelligence, therefore, can be understood as nothing more than physical processes (whether or not this is sufficient of explain human intelligence might still be somewhat debatable), but at least we have a reduction of intelligence in principle to material processes.

Does this mean that sentient experience MUST necessarily NOT be physical? No. There is no logical support for the claim that sentient experience cannot possibly be material. In other words the claim that sentience is physical is not a logical contradiction. It is possible that it could be true. But after decades of research, no one has been able to prove it to be the case and consequently, intellectual opinion is turning in a different direction.

Let me make one more point to try to clarify further. Suppose I make the claim that the brain causes sentience. I further show this to be the case through various neuro-physiological experiments. Does this prove that sentience is physical? No. Showing that physical processes in the brain cause sentience doesn't prove that sentience is nothing but physical processes. Physical cause and effect does not REDUCE sentience to those physical processes.

If physical processes produce something that is not itself physical, then that suggests something about the physical processes themselves. It suggests that the sentience is, itself, contained in those physical processes. This gives rise to what is called property dualism, and that is pretty much where philosophy of mind is currently headed although there are other possible solutions to the problem. So in some respects it comes down to what we conclude about the nature of matter itself.

 

[steve_bnk]

BB Says


'...If sentient experience is material,you should be able to reduce it to material processes, but we areunable to do that. When you examine the physical processes you do notget any sentient experience. For example, you get electrical impulsesin the brain, and then you get a report of a sentient experience bythe subject being investigated. The electrical impulse is not thesentient experience. It may be the cause of the sentient experience,but it isn't the sentient experience itself. The physical processesdo not reduce to sentient experience. ..'


I like the video analogy.

When you watch motion video on yourdisplay is it continuous motion or is it a series of still picturesupdated faster than the persistence of your eye?


'...For example, you get..'


What is this 'you' made reference to?The question that since the beginning of recorded human historylaunched a multitude of philosophies and religions.


Perhaps self is an illusion as is yourdisplay video?


We know drugs affect perception. Weknow brain damage in specific areas has specific effects. Someonewith advanced Alzheimer's who can't remember the way home from thegrocery store is the result of biological function in the brain.


Modern science has supersededmetaphysics and philosophy. Consciousness is not conceptuallyreducible because it is an arbitrary definition upon which peoplediffer.


Is a plant conscious? I watched aninteresting video rhat shows certain pants will limit root growth inthe presence of roots from the same plant species. In the presence ofcompeting plants they battle for below ground resources.

 

[DBT]

I'm not denying anything that is supported by evidence. I am questioning claims that are apparently not supported by the evidence that is available. I'm not aware of descriptions of non physical things.

How about an interest rate? Surely that's not physical? Or Hogwarts?

Concepts and ideas exist in the form of information. Firstly in mental form, which is physical storage and rearrangement of information which includes imaginary entities, followed by the physical media of print and digital information. Just as a brain interprates wavelength as colour, the brain interprates certain information as being a concept or an idea or an imaginary entity. Some of this information relates to actual changes in physical states, more money in your account due to interest, but some does not, middle Earth, Hobbits, etc.

The problem is what you allow as a 'thing'. Our world contains a great many concepts, ideas, sensations and so that are not physical. For physicalism to work, you need to reduce everything to physical processes without information being lost. Thus far, subjective experiences of various kinds, including sensations, have proved very difficult to reduce.

But ideas, etc, are the physical activity of a brain in the form of information processing. So an idea exists as a physical electrochemical arrangement of information within a neural network, if only for a brief instant.

 

[DBT]

Nonetheless, the senses themselves are not physical.

How are the senses themselves not physical? Sense organs are physical structures made up of carbon molecules, proteins, etc. The architecture is in fact physical, prone to physical damage and deterioration, faults and flaws, both genetic and acquired.

If by 'senses' you mean sensory representation of information, something not done by the senses but the brain, the evidence supports the proposition that it is the electrochemical activity of the brain that generates this form of mental phenomena, including thoughts and emotions and motor response. What is not understood is exactly how the brain forms conscious representation of information. But there is no reason to claim non physical activity....whatever that is supposed to entail, or even mean.

Sense organs are physical. The senses are not. The act of seeing or feeling is not physical even if the objects seen and felt are.

How do you know this? What exactly is the nature of 'non physical senses?' How does this non physical thing you call ''senses'' interact with the physical world?

In philosophy of mind the response of materialists has been to do exactly what you are doing, which is simply to deny that there are any such senses or to claim that they are physical acts. But that hasn't convinced anyone who wasn't already a committed materialist. The problem has been even long before Descartes, but so far no one has been able to explain sense experience by reducing it to nothing but material processes.

I'm not denying anything that is supported by evidence. I am questioning claims that are apparently not supported by the evidence that is available. I'm not aware of descriptions of non physical things. Nor of non physical things that interact with the physical world on a macro scale...such as neural networks. If you have an explanation of consciousness in terms of non material processes, or non material activity, please provide it. I think you'd find it difficult to find much more than a tiny minority of neuroscientists who support dualism.

But the fact remains that the senses are not material no matter how much the physcialists insist that "they must be physical."

How is it a fact? When was this established? How was it established?

If sentient experience is material, you should be able to reduce it to material processes, but we are unable to do that. When you examine the physical processes you do not get any sentient experience. For example, you get electrical impulses in the brain, and then you get a report of a sentient experience by the subject being investigated. The electrical impulse is not the sentient experience. It may be the cause of the sentient experience, but it isn't the sentient experience itself. The physical processes do not reduce to sentient experience.

None of this indicates non material consciousness. It just indicates that our current understanding of the physical process is insufficient to reproduce conscious activity - something that brains have evolved over countless millions of years.

This is not true for information processing, for example, we can reduce the apparent "intelligence" of the computer to nothing more than the very rapid processing of its inputs. Intelligence, therefore, can be understood as nothing more than physical processes (whether or not this is sufficient of explain human intelligence might still be somewhat debatable), but at least we have a reduction of intelligence in principle to material processes.

Again, you are comparing a few decades of human information processing research and development to millions of years of evolution and claiming; look, consciousness must indeed be a non material phenomena.

This is not a reasonable analogy. We don't know how a brain forms conscious experience, but it is clear that conscious experience is the physical work of a brain. It is a clear relationship because specific well understood brain regions and states alter conscious experience in quite specific ways, neurotransmitters signal between nerve cells throughout the system, altering mood and thought and perception, in turn, altering conscious experience. This is all physical.

Does this mean that sentient experience MUST necessarily NOT be physical? No. There is no logical support for the claim that sentient experience cannot possibly be material. In other words the claim that sentience is physical is not a logical contradiction. It is possible that it could be true. But after decades of research, no one has been able to prove it to be the case and consequently, intellectual opinion is turning in a different direction.

What is sentience? A brain of sufficient complexity produces self awareness and intelligence, which we define as sentience. A less complex brain, insects, etc, are able to interact with the world through its senses but insufficient neural complexity does not allow introspection or a complex epistemology. Neural architecture determines cognitive attributes and abilities, and not some undefined quality of immaterial mind.

Let me make one more point to try to clarify further. Suppose I make the claim that the brain causes sentience. I further show this to be the case through various neuro-physiological experiments. Does this prove that sentience is physical? No. Showing that physical processes in the brain cause sentience doesn't prove that sentience is nothing but physical processes. Physical cause and effect does not REDUCE sentience to those physical processes.

It shows that sentience is directly related to the architecture and activity of a brain of sufficient complexity, and that sentience is not present under any other conditions. The reasonable assumption then becomes: it requires a brain of sufficient complexity in order for sentience to evolve. It is not reasonable to conclude that sentience must necessarily be a non material activity.

Again: what are the qualities of this non material consciousness? How does this non material mind interact with material processes?

If physical processes produce something that is not itself physical, then that suggests something about the physical processes themselves. It suggests that the sentience is, itself, contained in those physical processes. This gives rise to what is called property dualism, and that is pretty much where philosophy of mind is currently headed although there are other possible solutions to the problem. So in some respects it comes down to what we conclude about the nature of matter itself.

What is this 'non physical' activity? Can you describe it?

And this direction is currently supported and driven by whom? Can you provide sources?

 

[Underseer]

[...]

None of this indicates non material consciousness. It just indicates that our current understanding of the physical process is insufficient to reproduce conscious activity - something that brains have evolved over countless millions of years.

[...]

DBT, I don't think you understand how this works. Any time science can't explain something, that means we can make up any just-so story we like to explain the same thing, and that just-so story becomes automatically true. Don't you atheists learn that in those fancy logic classes you all take? Yeesh, do we have to explain every little thing to you?

 

[Underseer]

*sigh*

I guess I'm going to have to spell this one out to you dumb atheists. I really wish you guys would study logic or something. Look, it all works off of the teleological theorem, which all non-Satanic philosophers agrees is completely valid and true. So when we look at the question of consciousness, telelology teaches us that consciousness is proof of the non-physical thusly:

1. I don't understand how consciousness came into being.
2. Therefore, I know how consciousness came into being: a magical being magicked consciousness into being.
3. Since we know that the magical being in question is non-physical
4. Non-physical things therefore exist, and physicalism is definitely false

QEDuh.

I couldn't possibly make it any simpler for you atheists to understand. If you need further explanation from here, I'm afraid that you're all beyond my help. [/lampoon]

 

[Togo]

I'm not denying anything that is supported by evidence. I am questioning claims that are apparently not supported by the evidence that is available. I'm not aware of descriptions of non physical things.

How about an interest rate? Surely that's not physical? Or Hogwarts?

Concepts and ideas exist in the form of information. Firstly in mental form, which is physical storage and rearrangement of information which includes imaginary entities, followed by the physical media of print and digital information.

No, they don't.

There isn't an arrangement of physical storage that is the concept of Hogwarts.
There are descriptions of Hogwarts - countless numbers of them. Each description is made up of arrangements of information that share common conceptual themes, but the information stored does not have common physical properties - the common themes exist only at the conceptual level.
Similarly two scientific experiments may test the same theory, despite having no physical components or arrangements in common.
Similarly two arrays of physical matter may both consist of three objects, despite having no physical similarities between them. (Say three ducks on a pond versus three pimples on my nose)

But ideas, etc, are the physical activity of a brain in the form of information processing. So an idea exists as a physical electrochemical arrangement of information within a neural network, if only for a brief instant.

And if someone else has the same idea, their electrochemical arrangement will be different. Which suggests that the idea is not the electrochemical arrangement.

 

[Keith&Co.]

if someone else has the same idea, their electrochemical arrangement will be different. Which suggests that the idea is not the electrochemical arrangement.

It does? If i'm reading this post on a laptop, and someone else is reading it on their smartphone, the software is different.
But the post is clearly software residing on one or more computers.

Is there any place that the post exists that is not an electromagnetic arrangement preserved on a physical device?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Truth can only be absolute or it's not truth at all, exactly like knowledge.

but that is no news. no one has knowledge or truth in that meaning. We have more or less well grounded information and can only validate it by how well it conforms with other information.

Of course we have knowledge in the absolute sense! We have no knowledge about the material world or about God but we have knowledge, in its absolute sense, of our subjective experience at the moment that we have it. At least I certainly do. I know pain whenever I am in pain.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Never heard "absolute knowledge" used that way. By anybody.

Look at FRDB's archives.

In science, nothing is ever regarded as true in the 100% sense. Not one single thing.

Yes, I agree, but people, including scientists, still talk of scientific knowledge.

The idea that the Earth orbits the Sun is true, but if sentient beings did not exist, then that idea would not exist. The whole context of truth is meaningless in that case.

I'm not sure what qualifies as a sentient being but a robot could try to establish the truth of the Earth orbiting the Sun without having a mind like ours.

That's an internal observation. Unless you happen to be hooked up to the appropriate machine that can peer inside your body and at which parts of your brain are active, then I only have your word that you are in pain. Sure, you know that you are in pain, but those kinds of internal observations are largely meaningless except to people who are serious about meditation and certain kinds of neuroscientists.

As long as you accept that I know pain when I am in pain, you accept that knowledge exists in the absolute sense that what you know exists as you know it. It certainly works for me but I would also expect it works for other people, no?

What's meaningless about pain and knowing the pain you are in? Especially since you seem to accept that there is nothing other than pain and the rest of our subjective experience that we really know?
EB

 

[Underseer]

[...]
As long as you accept that I know pain when I am in pain, you accept that knowledge exists in the absolute sense that what you know exists as you know it. It certainly works for me but I would also expect it works for other people, no?

What's meaningless about pain and knowing the pain you are in? Especially since you seem to accept that there is nothing other than pain and the rest of our subjective experience that we really know?
EB

It's an internal observation. You know that you feel pain at certain times, but I have to take your word on the matter.

Yes, I could hook you up to a machine and then use the readings of the machine to verify when you are in pain, but then we're back to all of the inherent problems of evidence-based epistemologies. And why are we so focused on pain? If you wanted to try and use an internal observation as proof of "absolute truth," why not "I know for certain I am not omnipotent" or "I know for certain I am sentient." Why pain?

 

[Juma]

I'm not denying anything that is supported by evidence. I am questioning claims that are apparently not supported by the evidence that is available. I'm not aware of descriptions of non physical things.

How about an interest rate? Surely that's not physical? Or Hogwarts?

Why not? They are represented by processes in the brain. Processes that are clearly physical.

T

 

[boneyard bill]

DBT writes:

None of this indicates non material consciousness. It just indicates that our current understanding of the physical process is insufficient to reproduce conscious activity - something that brains have evolved over countless millions of years.

Well, you have consciousness and you cannot reduce it to material processes so what is it? The inability to reduce it to material substances certainly IS and indication of non material consciousness.

Of course, maybe someday science will come up with the answer. But to make that claim is to argue from faith not science or reason. As I've already noted (several times, I think), the inability of science or even philosophy to come up with a solution to the problem, even in principle, is what has led theorists in the philosophy of mind to look to other alternatives which may prove to be more fruitful.

Again, you are comparing a few decades of human information processing research and development to millions of years of evolution and claiming; look, consciousness must indeed be a non material phenomena.

You've got the cart before the horse. Why should we assume that it is physical? Only if you are committed to a materialist position in the first place, would you make that assumption. We have no evidence that consciousness is physical so the idea that it might be physical is only one option among many that we could consider.

If we go where science and reason leads us, it does not, at the present state of our knowledge, leads us to the conclusion that consciousness is physical.

What is sentience? A brain of sufficient complexity produces self awareness and intelligence, which we define as sentience. A less complex brain, insects, etc, are able to interact with the world through its senses but insufficient neural complexity does not allow introspection or a complex epistemology. Neural architecture determines cognitive attributes and abilities, and not some undefined quality of immaterial mind.

This is exactly why I have used the term "sentience" rather than "consciousness." Consciousness can mean a whole lot of things. Humans are sentient and insects are sentient, and we have not evidence that that sentience is material. If we get into discussions of consciousness, all kinds of definitions soon become required.

It shows that sentience is directly related to the architecture and activity of a brain of sufficient complexity, and that sentience is not present under any other conditions. The reasonable assumption then becomes: it requires a brain of sufficient complexity in order for sentience to evolve. It is not reasonable to conclude that sentience must necessarily be a non material activity.

You've not said anything that I haven't said already. We cannot prove that consciousness is not material. But you can't conclude that it IS without presupposing a materialist metaphysic.

Again: what are the qualities of this non material consciousness? How does this non material mind interact with material processes?

You know those qualities because, psychologically speaking, you ARE those qualities. How many times do I have to point out what should be the obvious thing in the universe to a human being? Without sentience, you would be less than a vegetable.

I don't know in any detail how sentience interacts with the mind, but I assume that neurophysiologists could tell you a whole lot about it. Can they tell you everything about it? Of course not.

What is this 'non physical' activity? Can you describe it?

My thoughts are non-physical activity, and so are yours. The fact that they can be associated with physical activities in the brain does not make them physical. But, of course, all of your senses are non-physical activities as I've been pointing out all along. Your knowledge is non-physical activity.

And this direction is currently supported and driven by whom? Can you provide sources?

I don't know what you're trying to ask here? Are you asking who in philosophy of mind is questioning physicalism? David Chalmers comes to mind as one of the first. I think the latest to publish a significant book on the subject is Thomas Nagel.

 

[DBT]

*sigh*

I guess I'm going to have to spell this one out to you dumb atheists. I really wish you guys would study logic or something. Look, it all works off of the teleological theorem, which all non-Satanic philosophers agrees is completely valid and true. So when we look at the question of consciousness, telelology teaches us that consciousness is proof of the non-physical thusly:

1. I don't understand how consciousness came into being.
2. Therefore, I know how consciousness came into being: a magical being magicked consciousness into being.
3. Since we know that the magical being in question is non-physical
4. Non-physical things therefore exist, and physicalism is definitely false

QEDuh.

I couldn't possibly make it any simpler for you atheists to understand. If you need further explanation from here, I'm afraid that you're all beyond my help. [/lampoon]

Perfect. Nobody could have said it better.

 

[DBT]

I'm not denying anything that is supported by evidence. I am questioning claims that are apparently not supported by the evidence that is available. I'm not aware of descriptions of non physical things.

How about an interest rate? Surely that's not physical? Or Hogwarts?

Concepts and ideas exist in the form of information. Firstly in mental form, which is physical storage and rearrangement of information which includes imaginary entities, followed by the physical media of print and digital information.

No, they don't.

There isn't an arrangement of physical storage that is the concept of Hogwarts.

Of course there is. It is called memory function.

Memory function not only deals with recall and recognition, but ideas, concepts and imagination.

There are descriptions of Hogwarts - countless numbers of them. Each description is made up of arrangements of information that share common conceptual themes, but the information stored does not have common physical properties - the common themes exist only at the conceptual level.
Similarly two scientific experiments may test the same theory, despite having no physical components or arrangements in common.
Similarly two arrays of physical matter may both consist of three objects, despite having no physical similarities between them. (Say three ducks on a pond versus three pimples on my nose)

How do you think memory works? Do you too believe that memory is laid down in non physical form? Neurons, connections, synapses, etc, retain memories. It is a physical process.

And if someone else has the same idea, their electrochemical arrangement will be different. Which suggests that the idea is not the electrochemical arrangement.

What is that supposed to mean? Of course every brain is different. Environment and life events, and so on. How an individual brain interprets and envisions its information is governed by a multitude of factors.

 

[DBT]

DBT writes:



Well, you have consciousness and you cannot reduce it to material processes so what is it? The inability to reduce it to material substances certainly IS and indication of non material consciousness.

I am not 'reducing' anything. The available evidence supports the proposition that it is the brain that is the sole author of conscious experience. This is not reductionism. It is a broad outline of our current understanding.

What is not supported is the proposition of non material elements at work within the brain, where the proposition of a non material element is not required as an explanation for brain function.

And again: what exactly is the nature of this non material substance?

Of course, maybe someday science will come up with the answer. But to make that claim is to argue from faith not science or reason. As I've already noted (several times, I think), the inability of science or even philosophy to come up with a solution to the problem, even in principle, is what has led theorists in the philosophy of mind to look to other alternatives which may prove to be more fruitful.

No, science may or may not crack the mechanism of consciousness, but meantime it is poor practice to propose a 'solution' - a non material entity - where non is required.

As its been pointed out, this is another version of god of the gaps.

You've got the cart before the horse. Why should we assume that it is physical? Only if you are committed to a materialist position in the first place, would you make that assumption. We have no evidence that consciousness is physical so the idea that it might be physical is only one option among many that we could consider.

We assume that it is physical because a brain is a complex physical structure that processes physical information through physical means, ion flow, chemical markers, modifiers, etc, and responds through physical means.

There is nothing that even suggests the presence of a non physical element.

Again: what is the nature of something non physical? What does it explain? What do we know about it?

There is your god of the gaps.

If we go where science and reason leads us, it does not, at the present state of our knowledge, leads us to the conclusion that consciousness is physical.

Please provide an argument for your proposition.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It's an internal observation. You know that you feel pain at certain times, but I have to take your word on the matter.

I'm not asking you to pretend you know that I know pain. I agree you wouldn't know that. My point is that I do know pain, when in pain, and I expect (belief) other people to know pain too when they are in pain.

Now, irrespective of what is the case as far as other people are concerned, the fact that I know pain is an example of knowledge in the absolute sense of the word. If other people also know pain, they should understand this point. The consequence is that there are instances of knowledge, in the absolute sense, even though science itself is not knowledge in this sense.

Yes, I could hook you up to a machine and then use the readings of the machine to verify when you are in pain, but then we're back to all of the inherent problems of evidence-based epistemologies.

Possibly but not in the case of anybody who knows pain when he is in pain. Each one can see for himself.

And why are we so focused on pain? If you wanted to try and use an internal observation as proof of "absolute truth," why not "I know for certain I am not omnipotent" or "I know for certain I am sentient." Why pain?

Sure there is quite an extensive list of things I know. Pain is just a good, straightforward example (although some people deny that we know pain when we are in pain).

I'm not sure about the examples you give as they depend on what you mean by "sentient" and "omnipotent". I think they are problematic.
EB

 

[ryan]

I'm not denying anything that is supported by evidence. I am questioning claims that are apparently not supported by the evidence that is available. I'm not aware of descriptions of non physical things.

How about an interest rate? Surely that's not physical? Or Hogwarts?

Why not? They are represented by processes in the brain. Processes that are clearly physical.

T

Please define "physical" in as much detail as you understand the term to be.