Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Copernicus]

...The choice of breakfast is a macro event that is not usually very strongly affected by random quantum effects. So in practice, you're 99.9999...% sure to have fish for breakfast tomorrow, even if you don't know it today, and only a very small chance of something else.

Unless you are a physicist who's rigged a machine to observe whether some radioactive isotope that has a roughly 50-50 chance of decaying, will actually decay, and then chooses his breakfast based on the result of the observation. But I would argue that most people are not hypothetical physicists trying to make a point, nor are most our choices by accident so on the fence that they'd be perturbed by quantum mechanical random events.

I'm not a physicist, but I know enough about science to know the difference between results and interpretation of those results. Interpretation is about supporting a causal model that predicts the observed results. The problem with quantum mechanics is that it is so weird that it drives scientists half mad trying to come up with coherent explanations of what is going on. ("Shut up and calculate!") So there are a number of competing interpretations out there that are more or less popular to explain quantum indeterminacy. When you start talking about "random events", you are jumping to the conclusion that they are truly random, as opposed to merely unpredictable. There are actually interpretations that are popular alternatives to the idea that the unpredictable behavior is indeed "random". My layman's reading of Everett's  Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is that there is no actual wave collapse at all and that quantum "indeterminacy" is actually the wrong interpretation of the results that we see from all of those seemingly random events. I don't pretend to be able to evaluate all of the competing interpretations of QM, but I do believe that there is a considerable difference of opinion on just how to approach the question of determinacy/indeterminacy from a philosophical perspective. What we should try to keep in mind is that all of those competing interpretations are more philosophical than scientific. Sometimes scientists are brilliant at what they do when it comes to experimentation, measurements, and observations, but that doesn't make them brilliant philosophers when trying to explain the results. Sometimes they get the science right and the metaphors wrong.

 

[Copernicus]

"Real future" seems like a contrivance, because it's just as imaginary as all the other futures until it's no longer the future.

Agreed. And it's probably no accident that linguistic expressions of time and tense reference tend to express past and present tense differently from future and other  irrealis moods. For example, English has some present and past tense suffixes on verb forms, but it has no future tense suffix. Instead, it uses a modal auxiliary verb ("will"/"shall"), just as other irrealis moods do. This kind of discrepancy is not just characteristic of English. Future tense expressions tend to be treated in an exceptional manner almost universally across human cultures. In our minds, we keep separate the distinction between what we consider real and what we consider imaginary, and that gets reflected in the grammatical structure of language.

 

[Jayjay]

...The choice of breakfast is a macro event that is not usually very strongly affected by random quantum effects. So in practice, you're 99.9999...% sure to have fish for breakfast tomorrow, even if you don't know it today, and only a very small chance of something else.

Unless you are a physicist who's rigged a machine to observe whether some radioactive isotope that has a roughly 50-50 chance of decaying, will actually decay, and then chooses his breakfast based on the result of the observation. But I would argue that most people are not hypothetical physicists trying to make a point, nor are most our choices by accident so on the fence that they'd be perturbed by quantum mechanical random events.

I'm not a physicist, but I know enough about science to know the difference between results and interpretation of those results. Interpretation is about supporting a causal model that predicts the observed results. The problem with quantum mechanics is that it is so weird that it drives scientists half mad trying to come up with coherent explanations of what is going on. ("Shut up and calculate!") So there are a number of competing interpretations out there that are more or less popular to explain quantum indeterminacy. When you start talking about "random events", you are jumping to the conclusion that they are truly random, as opposed to merely unpredictable. There are actually interpretations that are popular alternatives to the idea that the unpredictable behavior is indeed "random". My layman's reading of Everett's  Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is that there is no actual wave collapse at all and that quantum "indeterminacy" is actually the wrong interpretation of the results that we see from all of those seemingly random events. I don't pretend to be able to evaluate all of the competing interpretations of QM, but I do believe that there is a considerable difference of opinion on just how to approach the question of determinacy/indeterminacy from a philosophical perspective. What we should try to keep in mind is that all of those competing interpretations are more philosophical than scientific. Sometimes scientists are brilliant at what they do when it comes to experimentation, measurements, and observations, but that doesn't make them brilliant philosophers when trying to explain the results. Sometimes they get the science right and the metaphors wrong.

Indeed, it's about the metaphors that are used. Often in scifi or even popular science, the MWI is illustrated with an example like "in this world you have fish for breakfast, in that world you have bacon". But this is simply misleading, because what you have for breakfast is (typically) not a quantum mechanical event that could go one way or another, but a macro event that is deterministic and classical in nature, albeit chaotic.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Messed up the quote system, doubled up posts, multiple quotes, bah.

Hey, nobody's perfect. The message is still quite readable. So, you can respond to it or you can criticize the format. It's entirely up to you.

The 'selection' - how things go within a determined system- is not subject to freely willed regulation. If free will is the point, nothing is actually being freely willed. Desires are formed and acted upon according to the state of the system and the information acting upon it. To label this as 'free will' is absurd.

And, what if you have two conflicting desires, two things you want to do? For example, you can have the steak dinner or you can have the lobster dinner. What do you do then? You choose between them.

You know, "choosing". It's that mental operation that inputs two or more viable options, estimates the likely outcomes of choosing each, and based on that evaluation outputs a single choice, your "I will do this instead of that". Both were viable options. And you could have chosen either one. But given your current goals and reasons, one became the thing that you would do, and the other became the thing that you could have done, but didn't.

Trick Slattery's notion that you only had one viable option is false. The chef was able to fix you the lobster dinner. So, that option was viable. The chef was also able to fix you the steak dinner. So, that option was also viable. One plus one equals two. Two viable options. It is not possible to choose between a single viable option. So Trick's approach produces a logical absurdity.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Compatibilist wording is carefully phrased to give an impression of freedom within a determined system.

No. Compatibilists simply point out that free will does not mean "free from causal necessity", but instead means "free from coercion and undue influence". We only use this definition because it is the definition that everyone uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

No event is ever "free" of reliable cause and effect. So, the notion of "freedom from causal necessity" is an absurdity. It is not something that anyone can, or needs to be free of.

Decision making is an ability enabled by means of a brain. The brain just does what it does based on architecture, environment, inputs.

The most important inputs to that brain's decision making process happen to be our own goals and reasons, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, our own beliefs and values, our own thoughts and feelings, and any other things that make us uniquely who and what we are.

Declaring selfhood or ownership of the cognitive process, like ''My Choices'' - which is true in a sense, we are the sum total of body/brain/mind - which does not involve regulation through the agency of will or freedom of will.

But you've already granted agency to the brain. And that brain exists within a person (you know, that "body/brain/mind" thing that you just mentioned). The brain chooses the specific thing that we will do, from among multiple viable options, and this "deciding what will happen next" is "regulatory control".

Incompatibilists do not claim that determinism ''is controlling our behaviour.''

Well if it isn't determinism controlling my behavior, then it must be me.

It's not as if 'our behaviour' is somehow separate from the world and its objects and events, and our behaviour could have been different if it wasn't for that pesky, meddling thing called determinism. That's not how determinism works.

Right. Determinism performs no work. It has no causal agency. It is not an entity exercising regulatory control over our lives. Determinism simply asserts that whatever happens will be necessitated by a history of prior causes going all the way back to the Big Bang (or further, depending upon your cosmology). Determinism is merely a comment. It is descriptive and not causative.

So, that leaves us with the question of where regulatory control resides. I'm voting for "it resides in us". But let's see where you're going.

Nothing is separate.

That would be the pantheistic view, that it is not me, but rather the whole universe that is controlling what I do. But I would suggest that the whole universe has no interest in whether I have eggs or pancakes for breakfast.

Nothing is being forced against its will.

Well, most of the objects in the universe are inanimate, they have no will. They have no biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. They have no brain to imagine viable options, estimate the likely outcomes, and then choose what they will do.

As an intelligent species, we have regulatory control over what we do.

You may not like the way things go, but that is a matter of perception and desire, the desire for alternatives, that things could be different....if only.

It is always the case that things could have been different. It is never the case that things would have been different. Now, if the incompatibilists can ever manage to make the distinction, between what "can" happen and what "will" happen, then we will have the correct understanding and expression of determinism.

The fact is that regulatory control is found in us, and other intelligent species, and in no other objects within the physical universe. (Well, there's my thermostat, but he only does what I tell him to do).

 

[Copernicus]

...The choice of breakfast is a macro event that is not usually very strongly affected by random quantum effects. So in practice, you're 99.9999...% sure to have fish for breakfast tomorrow, even if you don't know it today, and only a very small chance of something else.

Unless you are a physicist who's rigged a machine to observe whether some radioactive isotope that has a roughly 50-50 chance of decaying, will actually decay, and then chooses his breakfast based on the result of the observation. But I would argue that most people are not hypothetical physicists trying to make a point, nor are most our choices by accident so on the fence that they'd be perturbed by quantum mechanical random events.

I'm not a physicist, but I know enough about science to know the difference between results and interpretation of those results. Interpretation is about supporting a causal model that predicts the observed results. The problem with quantum mechanics is that it is so weird that it drives scientists half mad trying to come up with coherent explanations of what is going on. ("Shut up and calculate!") So there are a number of competing interpretations out there that are more or less popular to explain quantum indeterminacy. When you start talking about "random events", you are jumping to the conclusion that they are truly random, as opposed to merely unpredictable. There are actually interpretations that are popular alternatives to the idea that the unpredictable behavior is indeed "random". My layman's reading of Everett's  Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is that there is no actual wave collapse at all and that quantum "indeterminacy" is actually the wrong interpretation of the results that we see from all of those seemingly random events. I don't pretend to be able to evaluate all of the competing interpretations of QM, but I do believe that there is a considerable difference of opinion on just how to approach the question of determinacy/indeterminacy from a philosophical perspective. What we should try to keep in mind is that all of those competing interpretations are more philosophical than scientific. Sometimes scientists are brilliant at what they do when it comes to experimentation, measurements, and observations, but that doesn't make them brilliant philosophers when trying to explain the results. Sometimes they get the science right and the metaphors wrong.

Indeed, it's about the metaphors that are used. Often in scifi or even popular science, the MWI is illustrated with an example like "in this world you have fish for breakfast, in that world you have bacon". But this is simply misleading, because what you have for breakfast is (typically) not a quantum mechanical event that could go one way or another, but a macro event that is deterministic and classical in nature, albeit chaotic.

The last book I read on the subject was from Sean M Carroll ( Something Deeply Hidden), in which he advocated for MWI as the most reasonable interpretation of all the competing ones. He saw entanglement as a key to understanding how that particular interpretation would work. If entanglement is a process that spreads at the speed of light from each quantum interaction, then essentially all macro objects would be quantum objects. For example, in the double slit experiments, the measuring device could be considered entangled with the particle it was recording at the moment of detection. Caveat: I'm not really prepared to provide an extensive defense of his approach to QM, but I think it's worth the trouble to read his book and draw one's own conclusions.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... We develop aptitudes and capabilities IAC with demands or we cease to exist.

Okay. I had to lookup IAC in Wikipedia, and scroll through the various uses for that abbreviation until I came across something called "Infrastructure As Code". My impression is that it is a system development methodology that is highly adaptive and easily modified.

We use those aptitudes and capabilities to remain living.

And you're suggesting that IAC is an analogy for the evolved intelligence we possess that allows us to adapt to many environments and their challenges, a human feature that gives us a survival advantage in evolution.

Deciding isn't a thing, it's a conceit.

Okay, that's a bit subtle for me. But deciding is a practical mental operation that can be performed alone or in groups.

We do what we co IAC with demands for getting by. We congregate around systems and beliefs as social means to persist because group processing works better than individual processing most of the time.

Ah, Psych 414 Group Dynamics. Right. A varied group of non-experts can come close to the opinion of an expert. And such a group that includes the expert will have better decisions than the expert alone. So, yes we often form groups to tackle problems.

We are rational only to the extent that we can resist urges such a fight or flight or take or share. Mass impulses sometimes override individual governors putting groups at risk which suggests having more than one group is baked into our genetics as well.

Especially when dealing with would-be oligarchs like Trump.

What we do within in groups or between individuals is mostly driven by ceremony so 'decisions' are devices for moving forward within a pairing or group. They are effects of weighted arbitration among existing options not actions.

Groups are also useful for brainstorming to produce new options. One person's contribution often triggers a new idea from another. After non-judgmental brainstorming you get to prioritizing, evaluating, and choosing which solutions to tackle first.

We may ride a horse because we've developed the capacity to control certain aspects of horse behavior in return for giving the horse certain benefits with regard to shelter, cleaning, and feeding. We don't command the horse. The horse behaves as a horse with rider not as a ridden animal.

And yet horses are "broken in", and dogs are "house broken". So, there is a negotiation for control. Sometimes you eat the bear, sometimes the bear eats you.

Those sensibilities you cite are basically learned social ritual and procedures IAC with the culture and groups in which we function. Most can be worked out IAC stochastic functions. Just arbitration and rationalizing with a social reference component. In your terms its explaining (rationalizing) not deciding. It's certainly constrained by expectations and capabilities.

Yes, it is reasoning and explaining, but only up to the point where the group takes a vote to decide the matter. If nothing is decided, then nothing will be done. The decision sets the groups intentions, and those intentions then motivate and direct their subsequent actions.

All of this is called coercion. It's not done freely.

No. Social cooperation and negotiation is not coercion! Cooperation is mutually beneficial. Coercion is where one side threatens physical harm to force the other side to do as they are told. Terrorism is a form of coercion. It is the opposite of cooperation.

 

[fromderinside]

... We develop aptitudes and capabilities IAC with demands or we cease to exist.

Okay. I had to lookup IAC in Wikipedia, and scroll through the various uses for that abbreviation until I came across something called "Infrastructure As Code". My impression is that it is a system development methodology that is highly adaptive and easily modified.

We use those aptitudes and capabilities to remain living.

And you're suggesting that IAC is an analogy for the evolved intelligence we possess that allows us to adapt to many environments and their challenges, a human feature that gives us a survival advantage in evolution.

Deciding isn't a thing, it's a conceit.

Okay, that's a bit subtle for me. But deciding is a practical mental operation that can be performed alone or in groups.

We do what we co IAC with demands for getting by. We congregate around systems and beliefs as social means to persist because group processing works better than individual processing most of the time.

Ah, Psych 414 Group Dynamics. Right. A varied group of non-experts can come close to the opinion of an expert. And such a group that includes the expert will have better decisions than the expert alone. So, yes we often form groups to tackle problems.

We are rational only to the extent that we can resist urges such a fight or flight or take or share. Mass impulses sometimes override individual governors putting groups at risk which suggests having more than one group is baked into our genetics as well.

Especially when dealing with would-be oligarchs like Trump.

What we do within in groups or between individuals is mostly driven by ceremony so 'decisions' are devices for moving forward within a pairing or group. They are effects of weighted arbitration among existing options not actions.

Groups are also useful for brainstorming to produce new options. One person's contribution often triggers a new idea from another. After non-judgmental brainstorming you get to prioritizing, evaluating, and choosing which solutions to tackle first.

We may ride a horse because we've developed the capacity to control certain aspects of horse behavior in return for giving the horse certain benefits with regard to shelter, cleaning, and feeding. We don't command the horse. The horse behaves as a horse with rider not as a ridden animal.

And yet horses are "broken in", and dogs are "house broken". So, there is a negotiation for control. Sometimes you eat the bear, sometimes the bear eats you.

Those sensibilities you cite are basically learned social ritual and procedures IAC with the culture and groups in which we function. Most can be worked out IAC stochastic functions. Just arbitration and rationalizing with a social reference component. In your terms its explaining (rationalizing) not deciding. It's certainly constrained by expectations and capabilities.

Yes, it is reasoning and explaining, but only up to the point where the group takes a vote to decide the matter. If nothing is decided, then nothing will be done. The decision sets the groups intentions, and those intentions then motivate and direct their subsequent actions.

All of this is called coercion. It's not done freely.

No. Social cooperation and negotiation is not coercion! Cooperation is mutually beneficial. Coercion is where one side threatens physical harm to force the other side to do as they are told. Terrorism is a form of coercion. It is the opposite of cooperation.

Those sensibilities you cite are basically learned social ritual and procedures IAW with the culture and groups in which we function. Most can be worked out IAW stochastic functions. Just arbitration and rationalizing with a social reference component. In your terms its explaining (rationalizing) not deciding. It's certainly constrained by expectations and capabilities.

I post the above to put the record straight and correct something I've been misusing for sometime which is "In Accordance with".

One for me and one for you. Social behavior in accordance with demands of the group otherwise known as conditioning is in no way cooperative. Social behavior is never where the group takes a vote. It's where an individual learns to get in line with group preferred behavior. Anything that is out of line with group expectations is called rebellion. You see the meaning in regard to horses but you insist it's a vote when humans conform? Do you feel the bite of the bit now?

 

[DBT]

Messed up the quote system, doubled up posts, multiple quotes, bah.

Hey, nobody's perfect. The message is still quite readable. So, you can respond to it or you can criticize the format. It's entirely up to you.

The 'selection' - how things go within a determined system- is not subject to freely willed regulation. If free will is the point, nothing is actually being freely willed. Desires are formed and acted upon according to the state of the system and the information acting upon it. To label this as 'free will' is absurd.

And, what if you have two conflicting desires, two things you want to do? For example, you can have the steak dinner or you can have the lobster dinner. What do you do then? You choose between them.

[/QUOTE]

The choice is an illusion, determinism only allows a determined option to be realized. We have the impression of choosing, but in reality the outcome is a matter of necessity, not choice.

You know, "choosing". It's that mental operation that inputs two or more viable options, estimates the likely outcomes of choosing each, and based on that evaluation outputs a single choice, your "I will do this instead of that". Both were viable options. And you could have chosen either one. But given your current goals and reasons, one became the thing that you would do, and the other became the thing that you could have done, but didn't.

Trick Slattery's notion that you only had one viable option is false. The chef was able to fix you the lobster dinner. So, that option was viable. The chef was also able to fix you the steak dinner. So, that option was also viable. One plus one equals two. Two viable options. It is not possible to choose between a single viable option. So Trick's approach produces a logical absurdity.

The mental operation can only go one way in any instance. Whatever happens within neural activity is unconscious and determined by information exchange. There are no alternatives at any point in time. What you can't do in this instance may be done in the next...not because you willed it but because new information acted upon 'your' neural networks.

Abilities and actions not being willed, are not freely willed. Free will - agency, conscious regulatory control - is an illusion formed from limited perspective. We don't have access to the means of production.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilist wording is carefully phrased to give an impression of freedom within a determined system.

No. Compatibilists simply point out that free will does not mean "free from causal necessity", but instead means "free from coercion and undue influence". We only use this definition because it is the definition that everyone uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

No event is ever "free" of reliable cause and effect. So, the notion of "freedom from causal necessity" is an absurdity. It is not something that anyone can, or needs to be free of.

That is exactly why compatibilism, by merely applying a label, does not establish freedom of will. Words are not the thing they refer to, descriptions do not necessarily represent the objects, abilities or events they meant to represent.

Again; ''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Social behavior in accordance with demands of the group otherwise known as conditioning is in no way cooperative. Social behavior is never where the group takes a vote. It's where an individual learns to get in line with group preferred behavior. Anything that is out of line with group expectations is called rebellion. ...

Sure. There are social norms and expectations that we acquire from our community. We are taught to believe certain things and to act certain ways which may differ from one culture to another. But our parents are seldom as organized and deliberate as B. F. Skinner. A lot of parenting is flying by the seat of our pants. And children tend to have a mind of their own. They test the limits. Some even throw in with subcultures, like street gangs, that run the neighborhood and impose their own expectations, or perhaps a little less dire, college fraternities.

Ironically, the more thorough the gang's control over individual choices, and the more habitual the behavior becomes, the more difficult it may be to correct this behavior through rehabilitation. So, rather than these influences being an excuse for the behavior, it may require taking them off the streets for a longer time.

 

[fromderinside]

... Social behavior in accordance with demands of the group otherwise known as conditioning is in no way cooperative. Social behavior is never where the group takes a vote. It's where an individual learns to get in line with group preferred behavior. Anything that is out of line with group expectations is called rebellion. ...

Sure. There are social norms and expectations that we acquire from our community. We are taught to believe certain things and to act certain ways which may differ from one culture to another. But our parents are seldom as organized and deliberate as B. F. Skinner. A lot of parenting is flying by the seat of our pants. And children tend to have a mind of their own. They test the limits. Some even throw in with subcultures, like street gangs, that run the neighborhood and impose their own expectations, or perhaps a little less dire, college fraternities.

Ironically, the more thorough the gang's control over individual choices, and the more habitual the behavior becomes, the more difficult it may be to correct this behavior through rehabilitation. So, rather than these influences being an excuse for the behavior, it may require taking them off the streets for a longer time.

So why choose Skinner rather than Bridgman as operational example. is it because I specifically pointed out he was not correct on Operationalism, or are you just pulling my leg.

A mind of their own. From what galaxy far away did that come? Not from Dr.  William Shockley I hope. There was a person who about physics was so smart he attributed behavior directly to genes. Why use time or a reason to explain behavioral patterns when one's got flawed genetics and statistics to wave about. It must have been his being immaculately conceived over the course of three years before his history begins in CA. After all he was co-inventor of the transistor..

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The choice is an illusion, determinism only allows a determined option to be realized. We have the impression of choosing, but in reality the outcome is a matter of necessity, not choice.

The notion that "determinism only allows" is an illusion. Determinism is not an entity that exists in the real world.

Hard determinists have "the impression of" determinism as a causal agent, "but in reality" the choosing operation itself is what causally necessitates the specific choice.

That the choosing operation occurs when and where it does, is causally necessary. But it is not necessitated by "causal necessity". It is necessitated by its own actual prior causes. For example, it's morning and I'm hungry, so I must decide what I will have for breakfast.

Every event is reliably caused by prior events. Our having to make choices, and actually making those choices ourselves, is as causally necessary as any other event. In the real world, without illusions, it is really us, and we are really doing the choosing ourselves.

The mental operation can only go one way in any instance.

The mental operation of choosing will only go one way in any instance. Determinism is not about what "can" happen. Determinism is about what certainly "will" happen.

Whatever happens within neural activity is unconscious and determined by information exchange.

Conscious experience is included within our neural activity. Conscious intent motivates and directs subsequent neural activity. For example, the subjects in the Libet experiments each chose to volunteer. That deliberate choice motivated them to listen to and follow the researcher's instructions and to do their best to carry them out.

There are no alternatives at any point in time.

A possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But we must first imagine a possible bridge before we can build an actual bridge. Possibilities are "real" only in that they are real mental events. And multiple possibilities will show up during mental operations like choosing. A real possibility is something that "can" happen if we choose to make it happen. But being a real possibility never implies that it actually "will" happen.

There are always at least two alternatives/options/possibilities at the beginning of every choosing operation. Choosing is a mental process carried out by the brain which inputs at least two options, applies some comparative criteria for evaluation, and based upon that evaluation outputs a single choice.

Each of these multiple, real, alternatives is a course of action that can be carried out in the physical world if we choose to do it. But none of them must happen in order to be real possibilities. The fact that a possibility never happens does not make it impossible. It only makes it something that could have happened if we chose to make it happen.

What you can't do in this instance may be done in the next...not because you willed it but because new information acted upon 'your' neural networks.

Choosing happens. It happens on the neural networks of our brains. We choose our intention to do something specific. That intent then motivates and directs our subsequent mental and physical actions until we've accomplished that intent.

When this choosing is free of coercion and other undue influences, it is literally a freely chosen "I will", and it is called "free will".

Abilities and actions not being willed, are not freely willed. Free will - agency, conscious regulatory control - is an illusion formed from limited perspective. We don't have access to the means of production.

An ability is a specific power to do something, like walk, or eat, or brush your teeth, or choose to walk, or choose to eat, or choose to brush your teeth. We observe ourselves and others doing these things. So, there is no illusion. "Did you go for a walk?" "What will you have for dinner?" "Did you brush your teeth?" All of these questions assume these abilities to be real, and not illusions.

And most people these days make these assumptions with the knowledge that their own brain and body are the source of these abilities.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So why choose Skinner rather than Bridgman as operational example. is it because I specifically pointed out he was not correct on Operationalism, or are you just pulling my leg.

I've never heard of Bridgman. And I was too involved in student government in college to get even a bachelor degree in Psych.

Fortunately, resolving the free will "versus" determinism paradox does not require an academic background. I had settled the matter in my own head around the age of 15 after spending time browsing the philosophy section in the public library. I've read a lot since then, of course.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Again; ''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

Responsibility is assigned to the most meaningful and relevant causes of an event. For example, a drunk driver proceeds through a stop sign and injures a pedestrian. What caused the accident? Who is responsible for the pedestrian's injuries? As a community, we are responsible for creating laws that prevent pedestrians from getting injured by cars. To prevent drunk drivers from repeatedly causing harm, we hold individuals responsible when they break these laws, and we are entitled to take steps to correct their future behavior in order to prevent future harm.

Do we ever hold determinism or causal necessity responsible? Of course not. There is nothing we can do about reliable cause and effect, other than to be, ourselves, the specific cause of our own specific effects. We pass laws against drunk driving. We enforce these laws by arresting the offender, holding a trial, and imposing a penalty.

So, what does the offender "basically deserve" for his crime? The victim deserves to have her medical bills paid. The offender deserves an opportunity for rehabilitation, to cure his alcohol addiction, and to restore his ability to refuse to drink and drive. Until his behavior is corrected, society deserves to be safe from his behavior, either by removing his license to drive or by securing him in prison.

The offender is never penalized for having free will. He is not penalized for having the ability to make choices. He is penalized because his deliberate choices have caused harm to someone else. It is the harm that justifies the penalty, not free will.

One of the problems in the free will debate has been the confusion over what causes the harm. Causal necessity doesn't actually cause anything. It simply reminds us that each cause has its own causes. When looking to correct harmful behavior we should look at contributing factors, such as a community that is plagued by unemployment, racism, failing schools, and poverty, and the community's social norms, such as a toleration for drunk driving. These are political issues, that require people to choose to do something about them. They are not issues that the judge can address from the bench.

Anyway, that's how responsibility and what people basically deserve works.

Questions?

 

[bilby]

At a previous job, we had a safety training course, where a detailed scenario that resulted in an injury was presented to the class, who then had to answer questions about ways to prevent that injury.

The first question was "What two things do you believe were significant causes of this incident?"

I was bored, so I suggested "The laws of physics, and the initial starting conditions of the universe".

If you can see why that's just a joke, then you are on the way to seeing the problem with the "determinism means no freedom of will" school of thought.

 

[pood]

That‘s pretty funny.

 

[DBT]

The choice is an illusion, determinism only allows a determined option to be realized. We have the impression of choosing, but in reality the outcome is a matter of necessity, not choice.

The notion that "determinism only allows" is an illusion. Determinism is not an entity that exists in the real world.

It's just a matter of wording. I didn't intend to suggest that determinism is a separate entity or factor that acts upon the world. I was referring, as usual, to the given definition of determinism as 'natural law' - this being the properties of matter/energy.

That the properties of matter/energy determine how things go, fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism: ''The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law''

That's all.

A possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But we must first imagine a possible bridge before we can build an actual bridge. Possibilities are "real" only in that they are real mental events. And multiple possibilities will show up during mental operations like choosing. A real possibility is something that "can" happen if we choose to make it happen. But being a real possibility never implies that it actually "will" happen.

There are always at least two alternatives/options/possibilities at the beginning of every choosing operation. Choosing is a mental process carried out by the brain which inputs at least two options, applies some comparative criteria for evaluation, and based upon that evaluation outputs a single choice.

Each of these multiple, real, alternatives is a course of action that can be carried out in the physical world if we choose to do it. But none of them must happen in order to be real possibilities. The fact that a possibility never happens does not make it impossible. It only makes it something that could have happened if we chose to make it happen.

Countless possibilities exist in the world at any given instance in time, but only one possibility at a time is open to an individual, the determined option in that instance in time, which being determined, is not so much an option as a necessity.

What is determined must necessarily happen, therefore what happens in any given instance in time is not a 'free will choice.' Nor is it an act of will, but a necessitated action.

Which, as pointed out, reduces compatibilism to label status.

A label is applied to select, shallow conditions and declared that this is free will, that free will is compatible with determinism.

Thereby the compatibilist argument as a mere label fails to establish freedom of will.

 

[DBT]

Again; ''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

Responsibility is assigned to the most meaningful and relevant causes of an event. For example, a drunk driver proceeds through a stop sign and injures a pedestrian. What caused the accident? Who is responsible for the pedestrian's injuries? As a community, we are responsible for creating laws that prevent pedestrians from getting injured by cars. To prevent drunk drivers from repeatedly causing harm, we hold individuals responsible when they break these laws, and we are entitled to take steps to correct their future behavior in order to prevent future harm.

Do we ever hold determinism or causal necessity responsible? Of course not. There is nothing we can do about reliable cause and effect, other than to be, ourselves, the specific cause of our own specific effects. We pass laws against drunk driving. We enforce these laws by arresting the offender, holding a trial, and imposing a penalty.

So, what does the offender "basically deserve" for his crime? The victim deserves to have her medical bills paid. The offender deserves an opportunity for rehabilitation, to cure his alcohol addiction, and to restore his ability to refuse to drink and drive. Until his behavior is corrected, society deserves to be safe from his behavior, either by removing his license to drive or by securing him in prison.

The offender is never penalized for having free will. He is not penalized for having the ability to make choices. He is penalized because his deliberate choices have caused harm to someone else. It is the harm that justifies the penalty, not free will.

One of the problems in the free will debate has been the confusion over what causes the harm. Causal necessity doesn't actually cause anything. It simply reminds us that each cause has its own causes. When looking to correct harmful behavior we should look at contributing factors, such as a community that is plagued by unemployment, racism, failing schools, and poverty, and the community's social norms, such as a toleration for drunk driving. These are political issues, that require people to choose to do something about them. They are not issues that the judge can address from the bench.

Anyway, that's how responsibility and what people basically deserve works.

Questions?

It's not a matter of 'free will.'

If determinism is true, the conditions of the world cause (necessitation) some people to act in maladaptive or destructive ways. Who as a child plan to be a murderer, a thief, a rapist? Who as a child, looking for lifestyle, decides to end up in prison for life or death row? Offenders are punished because consequences act as a deterrent and may modify the behaviour of some but not all offenders.

Once again;

On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

Quote;
''Because most behavior is driven by brain networks we do not consciously control, the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior. In the light of modern neuroscience, it no longer makes sense to ask "was it his fault, or his biology's fault, or the fault of his background?", because these issues can never be disentangled. Instead, the only sensible question can be "what do we do from here?" -- in terms of customized sentencing, tailored rehabilition, and refined incentive structuring.''

''Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The choice is an illusion, determinism only allows a determined option to be realized. We have the impression of choosing, but in reality the outcome is a matter of necessity, not choice.

The notion that "determinism only allows" is an illusion. Determinism is not an entity that exists in the real world.

It's just a matter of wording. I didn't intend to suggest that determinism is a separate entity or factor that acts upon the world. I was referring, as usual, to the given definition of determinism as 'natural law' - this being the properties of matter/energy.

That the properties of matter/energy determine how things go, fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism: ''The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law''

That's all.

And in that case it is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's wording. Choosing those words is precisely what causes the problem, as I outlined here:

Error, By Tradition

“Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.” [5] (SEP)

In this formal definition from the SEP article, we now have determinism anthropomorphically appearing as an actor in the real world. And not just any actor, but one with the power to “govern” everything that happens. Even less attractive is the suggestion that it might also be viewed as a Svengali, holding everything “under its sway”.

In either case, we are given the impression that our destiny is no longer chosen by us, but is controlled by some power that is external to us. And that viewpoint is functionally equivalent to this:

“Fatalism is the thesis that all events (or in some versions, at least some events) are destined to occur no matter what we do. The source of the guarantee that those events will happen is located in the will of the gods, or their divine foreknowledge, or some intrinsic teleological aspect of the universe…” [6] (SEP)

The SEP article attempts to draw a distinction between determinism and fatalism, by attributing the external control in determinism to “natural law” rather than “the will of the gods”. But as long as the cause remains a force that is external to us, it is only “a distinction without a difference”.

A possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But we must first imagine a possible bridge before we can build an actual bridge. Possibilities are "real" only in that they are real mental events. And multiple possibilities will show up during mental operations like choosing. A real possibility is something that "can" happen if we choose to make it happen. But being a real possibility never implies that it actually "will" happen.

There are always at least two alternatives/options/possibilities at the beginning of every choosing operation. Choosing is a mental process carried out by the brain which inputs at least two options, applies some comparative criteria for evaluation, and based upon that evaluation outputs a single choice.

Each of these multiple, real, alternatives is a course of action that can be carried out in the physical world if we choose to do it. But none of them must happen in order to be real possibilities. The fact that a possibility never happens does not make it impossible. It only makes it something that could have happened if we chose to make it happen.

Countless possibilities exist in the world at any given instance in time, but only one possibility at a time is open to an individual, the determined option in that instance in time, which being determined, is not so much an option as a necessity.

Two things wrong there. First, possibilities do not exist "outside" in the world. Possibilities exist solely within our imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. On the other hand, we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. So, a "real" possibility is a mental plan for something that we could actually do, if we choose to do it.

Second, determining the possibility that we will actualize is performed by us, within our own brains. It is our own thoughts that imagine the possibility, and that create a plan of action to actualize it, and that motivates and directs our body to carry out that plan. There is nothing else around that will do this for us. For example, if I'm an adult, then it will be up to me to decide what I will have for breakfast, whether it will be eggs or pancakes, and it will be up to me to prepare the meal, eat it, and clean up after.

What is determined must necessarily happen, ...

Correct. But it will be necessitated by my own thoughts and my own actions at that moment. This fact is not changed by the other fact that prior causes, including my own prior thoughts and actions, resulted in me being who I was at that moment, such that I had those specific thoughts and performed those specific actions. "That which determined what I would do" was all within me at the time.

No prior cause of me could participate in this choosing operation without first becoming an integral part of who and what I was at that moment.

... therefore what happens in any given instance in time is not a 'free will choice.' Nor is it an act of will, but a necessitated action.

Incorrect. A "free will choice" is the specific operation within my own brain that causally determines (necessitates) my will, and it is my will that in turn causally determines my actions.

Which, as pointed out, reduces compatibilism to label status. ...

Incorrect. What I've just laid out for you is not a matter of manipulating labels, but simply a better description of what is actually happening in the real world than what you have been describing. But it's not your fault. The notion of causation and determinism and the laws of nature, as external entities exerting force upon us, creates that illusion.