Compatibilism: What's that About?

[bilby]

It appears that one of the best contenders for rescuing determinism from quantum theory has now been falsified, as 'pilot wave theory' fails to correctly predict experimental results.

A century of increasingly complex hypotheses has so far failed to produce a deterministic model of reality that conforms with experimental observations.

https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/quantum-spookiness/

Interestingly, one of the experimental teams that demonstrated this is led by Tomas Bohr, who is the grandson of the famous Niels, and is currently a Professor of Fluid Physics at the Technical University of Denmark.

https://www.quantamagazine.org/famo...ve-alternative-to-quantum-weirdness-20181011/

 

[pood]

There are still MWI and superdeterminism, both of which agree with observed QM but reproduce a fully deterministic universe.

 

[steve_bank]

QM is a set of equations that are used to accomplish useful tasks in science and engineering.

You can fit any kind of interpterion philosophically that does not appear to conflict with the equations, that does not give any validity to a speculation.

People have used QM to validate ghosts and the paranormal.

Someone on the forum a ways back argued that an infinite mathematical number line inferred an infinite disembodied existence after death.

 

[DBT]

The choice is an illusion, determinism only allows a determined option to be realized. We have the impression of choosing, but in reality the outcome is a matter of necessity, not choice.

The notion that "determinism only allows" is an illusion. Determinism is not an entity that exists in the real world.

It's just a matter of wording. I didn't intend to suggest that determinism is a separate entity or factor that acts upon the world. I was referring, as usual, to the given definition of determinism as 'natural law' - this being the properties of matter/energy.

That the properties of matter/energy determine how things go, fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism: ''The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law''

That's all.

And in that case it is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's wording. Choosing those words is precisely what causes the problem, as I outlined here:

Error, By Tradition

“Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.” [5] (SEP)

In this formal definition from the SEP article, we now have determinism anthropomorphically appearing as an actor in the real world. And not just any actor, but one with the power to “govern” everything that happens. Even less attractive is the suggestion that it might also be viewed as a Svengali, holding everything “under its sway”.

In either case, we are given the impression that our destiny is no longer chosen by us, but is controlled by some power that is external to us. And that viewpoint is functionally equivalent to this:

“Fatalism is the thesis that all events (or in some versions, at least some events) are destined to occur no matter what we do. The source of the guarantee that those events will happen is located in the will of the gods, or their divine foreknowledge, or some intrinsic teleological aspect of the universe…” [6] (SEP)

The SEP article attempts to draw a distinction between determinism and fatalism, by attributing the external control in determinism to “natural law” rather than “the will of the gods”. But as long as the cause remains a force that is external to us, it is only “a distinction without a difference”.

A possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But we must first imagine a possible bridge before we can build an actual bridge. Possibilities are "real" only in that they are real mental events. And multiple possibilities will show up during mental operations like choosing. A real possibility is something that "can" happen if we choose to make it happen. But being a real possibility never implies that it actually "will" happen.

There are always at least two alternatives/options/possibilities at the beginning of every choosing operation. Choosing is a mental process carried out by the brain which inputs at least two options, applies some comparative criteria for evaluation, and based upon that evaluation outputs a single choice.

Each of these multiple, real, alternatives is a course of action that can be carried out in the physical world if we choose to do it. But none of them must happen in order to be real possibilities. The fact that a possibility never happens does not make it impossible. It only makes it something that could have happened if we chose to make it happen.

Countless possibilities exist in the world at any given instance in time, but only one possibility at a time is open to an individual, the determined option in that instance in time, which being determined, is not so much an option as a necessity.

Two things wrong there. First, possibilities do not exist "outside" in the world. Possibilities exist solely within our imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. On the other hand, we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. So, a "real" possibility is a mental plan for something that we could actually do, if we choose to do it.

Second, determining the possibility that we will actualize is performed by us, within our own brains. It is our own thoughts that imagine the possibility, and that create a plan of action to actualize it, and that motivates and directs our body to carry out that plan. There is nothing else around that will do this for us. For example, if I'm an adult, then it will be up to me to decide what I will have for breakfast, whether it will be eggs or pancakes, and it will be up to me to prepare the meal, eat it, and clean up after.

What is determined must necessarily happen, ...

Correct. But it will be necessitated by my own thoughts and my own actions at that moment. This fact is not changed by the other fact that prior causes, including my own prior thoughts and actions, resulted in me being who I was at that moment, such that I had those specific thoughts and performed those specific actions. "That which determined what I would do" was all within me at the time.

No prior cause of me could participate in this choosing operation without first becoming an integral part of who and what I was at that moment.

... therefore what happens in any given instance in time is not a 'free will choice.' Nor is it an act of will, but a necessitated action.

Incorrect. A "free will choice" is the specific operation within my own brain that causally determines (necessitates) my will, and it is my will that in turn causally determines my actions.

Which, as pointed out, reduces compatibilism to label status. ...

Incorrect. What I've just laid out for you is not a matter of manipulating labels, but simply a better description of what is actually happening in the real world than what you have been describing. But it's not your fault. The notion of causation and determinism and the laws of nature, as external entities exerting force upon us, creates that illusion.

Please, at no point in time have I said that the laws of nature and determinism are external entities exerting force upon us.

I said as much in my last post.

Determinism is a matter of the properties of matter/energy, which we call the laws of nature, which entails matter energy events/information behaving deterministically rather than randomly.

The given definition of determinism does not entail external entities acting upon matter/energy.

Which is why our references to freedom must necessarily be conditional, and will, having no agency in relation to behaviour or choice cannot be free.

 

[steve_bank]

Rebel without a 'cause? '.. .could not pass up the opening.

 

[DBT]

The label is not the thing. Labels are sometimes applied to imaginary or fictional entities, God, gods, angels, demons, lady luck, free will, etc, because some folk find these things appealing, therefore meaningful: God is a creator, creation exists therefore God exists. We are able to act without impediment, to act without impediment is freedom, therefore free will. Labels supported by nothing more than semantics while ignoring that all determined actions proceed unimpeded through necessity, not freedom of will.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Please, at no point in time have I said that the laws of nature and determinism are external entities exerting force upon us.
I said as much in my last post.

Okay, let's see if that actually plays out:

Determinism is a matter of the properties of matter/energy, which we call the laws of nature, which entails matter energy events/information behaving deterministically rather than randomly.

We wake up in the morning as a physical object having all of the "properties of matter/energy", and we use that energy to break a couple of eggs to fix breakfast. As living organisms, we also embody the laws of nature. Biological drives to survive provide us with the goal of satisfying our hunger. As members of an intelligent species, we are equipped with a brain that allows us to make plans and choices. We take a grocery list to remind us to buy eggs so that we'll have them when we wake up hungry in the morning.

We are separate physical objects, separate packages of the laws of nature, and separate individuals within our species. While I am fixing eggs for breakfast, you may be fixing pancakes. Each of us makes our own choices, for our own reasons.

So, executive control is localized within each of us.

Executive control is not localized in determinism. Executive control is not localized in causal necessity. Executive control resides only in the objects that can choose what happens next.

Whenever you suggest that determinism does this or does that, or that necessity does this or does that, you are creating the delusion that executive control is external to us.

... our references to freedom must necessarily be conditional, and will, having no agency in relation to behaviour or choice cannot be free.

FREE OF WHAT?! Free of reliable cause and effect? Free from ourselves? Do you genuinely believe such freedoms are possible? And if you do not believe such freedoms are possible, why offer them up as a straw man for free will? The position is disingenuous.

 

[Copernicus]

The label is not the thing. Labels are sometimes applied to imaginary or fictional entities, God, gods, angels, demons, lady luck, free will, etc, because some folk find these things appealing, therefore meaningful: God is a creator, creation exists therefore God exists. We are able to act without impediment, to act without impediment is freedom, therefore free will. Labels supported by nothing more than semantics while ignoring that all determined actions proceed unimpeded through necessity, not freedom of will.

These issues are much more complicated than you think. All words have meaning (i.e. "semantics"), even if they don't refer to entities that actually exist. We all know what unicorns are, but they are not real animals. Reference is different from meaning, although there used to be referential theories of meaning that people took seriously back in the heyday of logical positivism. Labels are words, which have at least three very distinct properties--reference, meaning, and form. Conventional usage determines what the meaning is, but people make up new words and word senses all the time. The problem is convincing other people to buy into the proposed new usage.

People have pointed out to you quite frequently (and to no avail) that "free will" can have more than one meaning, but the most common meaning is the one that Marvin's definitions have pointed to. There is a secondary meaning that is associated with freedom from causal necessity in these debates on free will, and that is the one that you have insisted that everyone use. It isn't a very useful sense of the word, since nobody seriously thinks that free will is independent of causal necessity outside of these never-ending arguments over whether "free will" ought to be somehow eliminated, because some people want to define it as somehow being independent of causal necessity. And those aren't just eliminative materialists. There are also theologians who weigh in on the subject. Calvin comes to mind. Frankly, eliminative materialists sometimes come off to me as sort of "secular Calvinists", except that they don't carry around all of that God baggage.

 

[DBT]

The label is not the thing. Labels are sometimes applied to imaginary or fictional entities, God, gods, angels, demons, lady luck, free will, etc, because some folk find these things appealing, therefore meaningful: God is a creator, creation exists therefore God exists. We are able to act without impediment, to act without impediment is freedom, therefore free will. Labels supported by nothing more than semantics while ignoring that all determined actions proceed unimpeded through necessity, not freedom of will.

These issues are much more complicated than you think. All words have meaning (i.e. "semantics"), even if they don't refer to entities that actually exist. We all know what unicorns are, but they are not real animals. Reference is different from meaning, although there used to be referential theories of meaning that people took seriously back in the heyday of logical positivism. Labels are words, which have at least three very distinct properties--reference, meaning, and form. Conventional usage determines what the meaning is, but people make up new words and word senses all the time. The problem is convincing other people to buy into the proposed new usage.

People have pointed out to you quite frequently (and to no avail) that "free will" can have more than one meaning, but the most common meaning is the one that Marvin's definitions have pointed to. There is a secondary meaning that is associated with freedom from causal necessity in these debates on free will, and that is the one that you have insisted that everyone use. It isn't a very useful sense of the word, since nobody seriously thinks that free will is independent of causal necessity outside of these never-ending arguments over whether "free will" ought to be somehow eliminated, because some people want to define it as somehow being independent of causal necessity. And those aren't just eliminative materialists. There are also theologians who weigh in on the subject. Calvin comes to mind. Frankly, eliminative materialists sometimes come off to me as sort of "secular Calvinists", except that they don't carry around all of that God baggage.

The world is complicated. I doubt that anyone denies it. Yes, words have meanings, but this does not mean that what we use words in reference to is necessarily factual: God, gods, angels demons.....do they exist because we define and talk about them?

I know exactly what people have pointed out to me, which was nothing new to me then or now.... I in turn have pointed out that mere definitions do not establish the thing they seek to define.

There are two sides to this debate, compatibilism and incompatibilism.

In case you haven't noticed, not everyone is a compatibilist.

As pointed out numerous times - to no avail - defining free will semantically no more establishes the reality of free will that defining God, the given definition may be logically sound, but still does not mean that a God exists just because of the way it is being defined.

Compatibilism is simply word play, essentially, non-coerced actions defined/declared as free will regardless of the problems;

Essentially:

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

 

[Copernicus]

DBT, definitions are not meanings. They are concise heuristic statements that point readers to a major cluster of associations that form the meaning. You can do anything you want with words, but you don't determine common usage. The expression "free will" exists all over common usage, and that does establish it as conceptually useful to English speakers. Compatibilists are not actually defining its meaning. They are merely pointing out how people use the expression in everyday conversation. When you ask "Does free will exist?", most people will naturally think that you are referring to the everyday term, not one that you have gone out of your way to define in such a completely counterintuitive way that dismissing the term in that usage becomes trivial. So we can all violently agree that it doesn't exist in the meaning that you seem to want to impose on it (i.e. freedom from causal necessity). But the other sense of the term in its everyday usage continues to exist. People who do bad things of their own free will can still be held accountable for their actions. I don't see you calling for everyone to be let out of prisons because they never committed any crimes of their own free will. Hence, your entire argument reduces to an absurdity. Determinism is irrelevant to that sense of the expression. IOW, compatibilism makes sense. Attempts to eliminate it from the English language are nothing short of absurd.

 

[DBT]

Please, at no point in time have I said that the laws of nature and determinism are external entities exerting force upon us.
I said as much in my last post.

Okay, let's see if that actually plays out:

Determinism is a matter of the properties of matter/energy, which we call the laws of nature, which entails matter energy events/information behaving deterministically rather than randomly.

We wake up in the morning as a physical object having all of the "properties of matter/energy", and we use that energy to break a couple of eggs to fix breakfast. As living organisms, we also embody the laws of nature. Biological drives to survive provide us with the goal of satisfying our hunger. As members of an intelligent species, we are equipped with a brain that allows us to make plans and choices. We take a grocery list to remind us to buy eggs so that we'll have them when we wake up hungry in the morning.

We are separate physical objects, separate packages of the laws of nature, and separate individuals within our species. While I am fixing eggs for breakfast, you may be fixing pancakes. Each of us makes our own choices, for our own reasons.

So, executive control is localized within each of us.

Executive control is not localized in determinism. Executive control is not localized in causal necessity. Executive control resides only in the objects that can choose what happens next.

Whenever you suggest that determinism does this or does that, or that necessity does this or does that, you are creating the delusion that executive control is external to us.

Executive control implies that you have the ability to have done otherwise in any given instance in time. Which is compatibilism but Libertarian free will.

The brain processes information, producing thoughts, feeling and actions on the basis of its architecture, inputs and memory function, each moment of decision making representing the information condition in that instance in time, with no possibility of an alternate action in that moment in time. Consciousness being updated/refreshed by new information from moment to moment, allowing interaction with the external world.

Information and architecture, not will, not free will, being the agency of interaction.

And yes, nothing is separate within the intricate web of events of a determined system.

... our references to freedom must necessarily be conditional, and will, having no agency in relation to behaviour or choice cannot be free.

FREE OF WHAT?! Free of reliable cause and effect? Free from ourselves? Do you genuinely believe such freedoms are possible? And if you do not believe such freedoms are possible, why offer them up as a straw man for free will? The position is disingenuous.

Reliable cause and effect being an intricate necessitated web of events that are not willed or chosen.

Again: ''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

Necessitated actions - being determined - are by definition are not chosen, negotiable or alterable, these are events that form, proceed and unfold deterministically according to antecedent conditions and the laws of nature.

 

[DBT]

DBT, definitions are not meanings. They are concise heuristic statements that point readers to a major cluster of associations that form the meaning. You can do anything you want with words, but you don't determine common usage. The expression "free will" exists all over common usage, and that does establish it as conceptually useful to English speakers. Compatibilists are not actually defining its meaning. They are merely pointing out how people use the expression in everyday conversation. When you ask "Does free will exist?", most people will naturally think that you are referring to the everyday term, not one that you have gone out of your way to define in such a completely counterintuitive way that dismissing the term in that usage becomes trivial. So we can all violently agree that it doesn't exist in the meaning that you seem to want to impose on it. But the other sense of the term in its everyday usage continues to exist. People who do bad things of their own free will can still be held accountable for their actions. I don't see you calling for everyone to be let out of prisons because they never committed any crimes of their own free will. Hence, your entire argument reduces to an absurdity. Determinism is irrelevant to that sense of the expression. IOW, compatibilism makes sense. Attempts to eliminate it from the English language are nothing short of absurd.

Define;

1. state or describe exactly the nature, scope, or meaning of.
   "the contract will seek to define the client's obligations"
   synonyms:
   explain · expound · interpret · elucidate · explicate · describe · clarify · give the meaning of · state precisely · spell out · put into words · express in words
   • give the meaning of (a word or phrase), especially in a dictionary.
     "the dictionary defines it as ‘a type of pasture’"
   • make up or establish the character or essence of.
     "for some, the football club defines their identity"
2. mark out the boundary or limits of. "the river defines the park's boundary"
   
   
   Compatibilism;
   ''Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do''
   
   
   

 

[Copernicus]

DBT, definitions are not meanings. They are concise heuristic statements that point readers to a major cluster of associations that form the meaning. You can do anything you want with words, but you don't determine common usage. The expression "free will" exists all over common usage, and that does establish it as conceptually useful to English speakers. Compatibilists are not actually defining its meaning. They are merely pointing out how people use the expression in everyday conversation. When you ask "Does free will exist?", most people will naturally think that you are referring to the everyday term, not one that you have gone out of your way to define in such a completely counterintuitive way that dismissing the term in that usage becomes trivial. So we can all violently agree that it doesn't exist in the meaning that you seem to want to impose on it. But the other sense of the term in its everyday usage continues to exist. People who do bad things of their own free will can still be held accountable for their actions. I don't see you calling for everyone to be let out of prisons because they never committed any crimes of their own free will. Hence, your entire argument reduces to an absurdity. Determinism is irrelevant to that sense of the expression. IOW, compatibilism makes sense. Attempts to eliminate it from the English language are nothing short of absurd.

Define;

1. state or describe exactly the nature, scope, or meaning of.
   "the contract will seek to define the client's obligations"
   synonyms:
   explain · expound · interpret · elucidate · explicate · describe · clarify · give the meaning of · state precisely · spell out · put into words · express in words
   • give the meaning of (a word or phrase), especially in a dictionary.
     "the dictionary defines it as ‘a type of pasture’"
   • make up or establish the character or essence of.
     "for some, the football club defines their identity"
2. mark out the boundary or limits of. "the river defines the park's boundary"
   
   
   Compatibilism;
   ''Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do''

That's a pretty awful definition for "define", but you did cut and paste from an online dictionary. The definition conflates some very different senses of the word with those bulleted items in the first entry, so most lexicographers would hold their noses the moment they saw that. (Of course, lexicographers tend to be brutal critics of the dictionaries that they help to compile. )

In any case, you need to think about what "give the meaning of" really means. What is a meaning? (Hint: I have defined it as a cluster of associations, but such clusters can be incredibly complex.) If you want to really know the difference between definitions and meanings, you need to consult a lexicologist or lexical semanticist. (I am actually a qualified lexicologist and have worked on dictionaries in the past.) Looking in a dictionary can point you in a lot of directions, but they aren't the proper place to get a sense of the difference. What I have told you is essentially what any competent lexicologist would tell you. Dictionary entries do not exhaustively describe meanings. They are meant to be as concise as possible, and it is something of an art to produce a good dictionary entry. Encyclopedias get deeper into the meanings of their entries.

 

[fromderinside]

My definitions re Determinism

The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of Natural Scientific law.

Scientific laws or laws of science are statements, based on repeated experiments or observations, that describe or predict a range of natural phenomena. The term law has diverse usage in many cases (approximate, accurate, broad, or narrow) across all fields of natural science (physics, chemistry, astronomy, geoscience, biology). Laws are developed from data and can be further developed through mathematics; in all cases

 

[DBT]

DBT, definitions are not meanings. They are concise heuristic statements that point readers to a major cluster of associations that form the meaning. You can do anything you want with words, but you don't determine common usage. The expression "free will" exists all over common usage, and that does establish it as conceptually useful to English speakers. Compatibilists are not actually defining its meaning. They are merely pointing out how people use the expression in everyday conversation. When you ask "Does free will exist?", most people will naturally think that you are referring to the everyday term, not one that you have gone out of your way to define in such a completely counterintuitive way that dismissing the term in that usage becomes trivial. So we can all violently agree that it doesn't exist in the meaning that you seem to want to impose on it. But the other sense of the term in its everyday usage continues to exist. People who do bad things of their own free will can still be held accountable for their actions. I don't see you calling for everyone to be let out of prisons because they never committed any crimes of their own free will. Hence, your entire argument reduces to an absurdity. Determinism is irrelevant to that sense of the expression. IOW, compatibilism makes sense. Attempts to eliminate it from the English language are nothing short of absurd.

Define;

1. state or describe exactly the nature, scope, or meaning of.
   "the contract will seek to define the client's obligations"
   synonyms:
   explain · expound · interpret · elucidate · explicate · describe · clarify · give the meaning of · state precisely · spell out · put into words · express in words
   • give the meaning of (a word or phrase), especially in a dictionary.
     "the dictionary defines it as ‘a type of pasture’"
   • make up or establish the character or essence of.
     "for some, the football club defines their identity"
2. mark out the boundary or limits of. "the river defines the park's boundary"
   
   
   Compatibilism;
   ''Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do''

That's a pretty awful definition for "define", but you did cut and paste from an online dictionary. The definition conflates some very different senses of the word with those bulleted items in the first entry, so most lexicographers would hold their noses the moment they saw that. (Of course, lexicographers tend to be brutal critics of the dictionaries that they help to compile. )

In any case, you need to think about what "give the meaning of" really means. What is a meaning? (Hint: I have defined it as a cluster of associations, but such clusters can be incredibly complex.) If you want to really know the difference between definitions and meanings, you need to consult a lexicologist or lexical semanticist. (I am actually a qualified lexicologist and have worked on dictionaries in the past.) Looking in a dictionary can point you in a lot of directions, but they aren't the proper place to get a sense of the difference. What I have told you is essentially what any competent lexicologist would tell you. Dictionary entries do not exhaustively describe meanings. They are meant to be as concise as possible, and it is something of an art to produce a good dictionary entry. Encyclopedias get deeper into the meanings of their entries.

The meaning of the word "define" is not hard to grasp. The dictionary quote I posted more than adequately explains its meaning.

Your objections miss the point. You ignore flaws in the compatibilist definition, only to focus on trivialities.

I guess that's the only option available for those engaged in the futile defense of a failed argument that is based on word play.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Executive control implies that you have the ability to have done otherwise in any given instance in time. ...

To have done something that we didn't do is a logical absurdity. If we must choose between A and B, and we choose A, then it will always be the case that we will not have chosen B. And, given determinism, every time the same person is in the same circumstances with the same options, they once again will not choose B. So, it will always be the case that they would not have done otherwise.

But that's not our question. The question is whether or not the statement "we could have chosen B" is true or false. Common usage suggests to us that "I chose A, but I could have chosen B" is true, in both its parts. "I chose A" is true, and, "I could have chosen B" is also true.

This follows logically from the fact that, at the beginning of the choosing operation, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true statements. If they were not both true, then choosing could not proceed. If both were false, then we would have no options to choose from. If "I can choose A" were false, or, if "I can choose B" were false, then we would only have a single option, and choosing requires at least two options. So, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true statements at the beginning of the choosing operation.

And this logical requirement, that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must both be true, embodies the notion of "the ability to do otherwise" right up front, at the beginning of every choosing operation. Because, if at any time "I can choose B" was true, then at any subsequent time, "I could have chosen B" will also be a true statement, because "I could have" is merely the past tense of "I can".

Therefore, whenever a choosing operation takes place, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true, even though "I would have done otherwise" will always be false. This is because the notion of "can" and "will" are distinct, and they must not be conflated or confused with each other.

The brain processes information, producing thoughts, feeling and actions on the basis of its architecture, inputs and memory function, each moment of decision making representing the information condition in that instance in time, with no possibility of an alternate action in that moment in time.

Yes. But here's the kicker: Among those causally necessary mental events, events that must take place with no possibility of an alternate event in that moment of time, will be the notion of A as a possibility and the notion of B as an alternate possibility.

The notion of "A as a real possibility" will appear in the brain and be stored as one option, something that I can choose. Then
the notion of "B as a real possibility" will appear in the brain and be stored as a second option, something that I also can choose.

These mental events are guaranteed by causal necessity, with no possibility of any alternate mental event displacing them from their place in the causal chain.

... Information and architecture, not will, not free will, being the agency of interaction. And yes, nothing is separate within the intricate web of events of a determined system

The information and architecture determines our will, usually through a choosing operation, where we have two different things that we can do, and must decide which of them we will do.

And the information that the architecture uses will include whether or not a man is holding a gun to our head and telling us what we must do. When the architecture is not threatened, then it is free to decide for itself what it will do. But when there is such a threat, then the architecture will allow the man holding the gun to control what we do, subjugating our architecture to his architecture.

Reliable cause and effect being an intricate necessitated web of events that are not willed or chosen. ...

Yes, except that this intricate necessitated web of events includes people encountering issues that require them to choose what they will do!

Necessitated actions - being determined - are by definition are not chosen, ...

NO! Choosing is a necessitated action! And choosing necessitates subsequent actions! And causal necessity guarantees that there is no possibility of something other than choosing happening at that moment in time!

 

[pood]

Back to the crux of the matter: the hard determinist’s refusal to distinguish between “can” and “will,” a confusion known as the modal fallacy, which I have described.,

 

[Bomb#20]

It appears that one of the best contenders for rescuing determinism from quantum theory has now been falsified, as 'pilot wave theory' fails to correctly predict experimental results.

A century of increasingly complex hypotheses has so far failed to produce a deterministic model of reality that conforms with experimental observations.

https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/quantum-spookiness/

Interestingly, one of the experimental teams that demonstrated this is led by Tomas Bohr, who is the grandson of the famous Niels, and is currently a Professor of Fluid Physics at the Technical University of Denmark.

https://www.quantamagazine.org/famo...ve-alternative-to-quantum-weirdness-20181011/

Science "journalists".

No, pilot wave theory has not been falsified by these experiments. Where to start?

(1) You can't falsify a quantum theory with a classical experiment -- all a failure does is prove your classical system isn't an accurate model of whatever quantum system it was proposed as analogous to. Which in this case we already knew: about the only thing this journalist got right was "the particle itself doesn’t affect the wavefunction in any way". Obviously the oil droplet affects the waves of oil guiding it, since they're classical objects and for every action there's an equal and opposite reaction. So obviously the equation of motion in the oil drop experiment is not the same equation as Bohmian mechanics.

(2) "Its only distinct prediction was just falsified." is bosh. Bohmian mechanics makes no prediction distinct from conventional QM. It's an interpretation, not a competing theory. It was derived from the Schroedinger equation by algebra. It's an alternate way of thinking about the same calculations.

(3) Pilot wave theory in its existing form was already falsified by quantum experiments: it's false for the same reason the Schroedinger equation itself is false: because it ignores relativity. Any experiment involving near-light speeds or antimatter annihilation falsifies basic quantum mechanics and requires you to use "Quantum Field Theory" to get the right answer. There is no complete pilot wave version of quantum field theory. Bohm spent forty-odd years trying to create one but was only ever able to get it to work on bosons (integer-spin particles like photons and gluons.) Fermions (half-integer-spin particles like electrons and protons) were still a work in progress when Bohm died. So to talk of falsifying pilot wave theory at this point means one of two things: either you prove it's mathematically impossible to construct a version of it that handles both relativity and fermions, or else you succeed where Bohm failed, you make a full-blown pilot-wave version of QFT, you derive a prediction from it about antimatter or relativistic speeds that's different from what standard QFT predicts, and then you carry out that undoubtedly highly sophisticated QFT experiment. A vanilla double-slit experiment is not even in the ballpark -- you don't need QFT for double slits.

 

[DBT]

Executive control implies that you have the ability to have done otherwise in any given instance in time. ...

To have done something that we didn't do is a logical absurdity. If we must choose between A and B, and we choose A, then it will always be the case that we will not have chosen B. And, given determinism, every time the same person is in the same circumstances with the same options, they once again will not choose B. So, it will always be the case that they would not have done otherwise.

Whatever we do, if the world is determined, is determined. If option A is determined, option B doesn't exist for you and was never an option or a realizable choice in that moment in time.

But that's not our question. The question is whether or not the statement "we could have chosen B" is true or false. Common usage suggests to us that "I chose A, but I could have chosen B" is true, in both its parts. "I chose A" is true, and, "I could have chosen B" is also true.

This follows logically from the fact that, at the beginning of the choosing operation, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true statements. If they were not both true, then choosing could not proceed. If both were false, then we would have no options to choose from. If "I can choose A" were false, or, if "I can choose B" were false, then we would only have a single option, and choosing requires at least two options. So, both "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must be true statements at the beginning of the choosing operation.

And this logical requirement, that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must both be true, embodies the notion of "the ability to do otherwise" right up front, at the beginning of every choosing operation. Because, if at any time "I can choose B" was true, then at any subsequent time, "I could have chosen B" will also be a true statement, because "I could have" is merely the past tense of "I can".

Therefore, whenever a choosing operation takes place, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true, even though "I would have done otherwise" will always be false. This is because the notion of "can" and "will" are distinct, and they must not be conflated or confused with each other.

We have the false impression of ''I could have chosen B'' - false because choosing B was never a possibility if action A is determined.

The brain processes information, producing thoughts, feeling and actions on the basis of its architecture, inputs and memory function, each moment of decision making representing the information condition in that instance in time, with no possibility of an alternate action in that moment in time.

Yes. But here's the kicker: Among those causally necessary mental events, events that must take place with no possibility of an alternate event in that moment of time, will be the notion of A as a possibility and the notion of B as an alternate possibility.

The notion of "A as a real possibility" will appear in the brain and be stored as one option, something that I can choose. Then
the notion of "B as a real possibility" will appear in the brain and be stored as a second option, something that I also can choose.

These mental events are guaranteed by causal necessity, with no possibility of any alternate mental event displacing them from their place in the causal chain.

The brain as an information processor is able to recognize multiple possible paths, but can only take the action that its information state enables. Information state is not willed.

NO! Choosing is a necessitated action! And choosing necessitates subsequent actions! And causal necessity guarantees that there is no possibility of something other than choosing happening at that moment in time!

As choosing is indeed a necessitated action within a determined system, there is no ''choosing.'' Nothing is chosen because to choose implies the real possibility of 'could have done otherwise,' but of course there is no 'could have done otherwise' within a determined system. Actions proceed deterministically without the possibility of real choice (to have done otherwise). A determined system is a tightly woven web of events that don't allow alternate possibilities (except Many worlds/string theory).

 

[DBT]

Back to the crux of the matter: the hard determinist’s refusal to distinguish between “can” and “will,” a confusion known as the modal fallacy, which I have described.,

The issue is freedom within a determined system. Freedom means the possibility of doing otherwise. Determinism allows no 'could have done otherwise.'


''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

Compatibilists insist - regardless - that non coerced actions are free will actions.


Compatibilism;
''Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do''