Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

Choice: an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities.

First I would argue the logic system isn't faced with a decision.

Then you are arguing nonsense. A decision here is just an event that goes one of "two or more possible ways" every time the same way in the same context, actually finding resolution

I do not accept your begged question in the second statement here. Thus we are at impasse.

No my analysis of what you call choice is correct. Just because one says there are two different interpretations in existence in the system does not mean there are two different interpretations available at one time. It is either this context or that context. That, at best, is superimposed forced choice. Clearly, you show there is either context A or context B, never both together since that creates a logical impossibility for the circuit which has only a single comparator. Yes, the system can produce two different outcomes at different times using different contexts. So what. They are both determined.

You state clearly it is either A or B depending on context. Context is an invention, an intervening variable, common to most philosophy and folk science. It is inserted as a 'reason' to assert choice when there is none. Context, multiple options, exist only to justify your 'hypothesis. There are never multiple directions of input (context) permitting multiple directions of output (choice) in a human in existence.

What is necessary for what humans pass as a choice is outside physical possibility. Presuming a complex being can transcend empirical scientific law because he is complex is just a modern Roman praying to his personal Jupiter. Hell, we have complex nervous systems so we must be able to get around physical constraints.

What you are saying is no different than saying humans are superior to apes because humans are smarter than apes or that humans are superior to four-legged mammals because we walk upright. Sure, humans are these, ignoring all the time that apes predate man by maybe 12 million years and four-legged mammals predate humans by up to 80 million years and they are still here.

Thanks Jarhyn. Your comments force me to concentrate on what we are actually trying to do which is to explain why some think choice is something beings actually perform as beings living in an obviously determined world.

I've always known mind, superiority, and choice are things that men use to distinguish themselves from other living beings and even from the material world. We are material beings in a material world. Live with it.

Why are rats run in Skinner boxes and forced to operate manipulanda for food and water? Not to understand them, but to demonstrate how mechanical they are.

Its amazing how similar are seeing and hearing to the operation of analogous electronic light and sound sensing circuits.

Two comments to frame from where I'm coming.

 

[The AntiChris]

What is necessary for what humans pass FDI passes as a choice is outside physical possibility.

FIFY

 

[Marvin Edwards]

As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.

 

[Jarhyn]

the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture

You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.

 

[fromderinside]

the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture

You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.

I respectfully agree with most of your analysis, but I disagree with the conclusions you draw for it.

To wit: an observer is presented with two intervals of exposure to a sound that may or may not be present in either interval. The protocol calls for her to choose the interval in which she sensed a physical sensory stimulus, a sound or light or taste. Dutifully she trains to and establishes competency in the method. We glibly name that procedure two-alternative forced choice.

The observer is not choosing the interval with the sound which may not be there she is reporting an interval in which she has evidence the stimuli is sufficient for her to distinguish from the other interval. We say she is "choosing the interval", actually just probabilistic reporting with a signal. We know whether there was a signal at any interval. She does not.

After thirty years of doing this stuff, I came to the conclusion we can be just as mechanical as the machine, that we are not choosing. Rather we are responding to satisfy a protocol that is designed to measure sensitivity to stimuli just as does a mindless circuit. It's not the other way around as your example is designed to suggest for the reasons I listed. In fact, the procedure was designed to accomplish a mechanistic response as close as any 'free-willed' human can mimic. We can take the 'human' element out of 'human' behavior.

Now if we generalize my analysis to common behavior it becomes clear the same mechanistic factors are in place when we claim choice.

I'm reporting this way because it is not the deterministic world but the messed up human who, with her lack of knowing is trying to justify what she is doing that leads them to the notion of choice as a consequence of 'free-will'. The physics is right the human interpretations are all fxxxxd up. Indeterminism is a human concocted fiction attempting to satisfy any 'splaining needed.

 

[fromderinside]

As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.

Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.

 

[fromderinside]

What is necessary for what humans pass FDI passes as a choice is outside physical possibility.

FIFY

Thanks for the attribution.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.

Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.

Determinism is the belief in causal necessity. Causal necessity is the notion that events are reliably caused by prior events. The prior events necessitate the current event. For example, if Babe Ruth hits the ball at the appropriate angle with sufficient force, then the ball will necessarily go over the outfield fence, scoring a home run.

The definition of determinism suggested in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) reads like this: "Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

Causal necessity simply asserts that every event is the reliable effect of prior events. The term "natural law" is a metaphor for that reliability. It is AS IF the objects were following a set of rules. But in actuality the rules are derived from observing reliable patterns of behavior in the objects and forces themselves. Neither natural law nor scientific law ever causes anything to happen. Only the objects and forces can actually cause events.

 

[Jarhyn]

the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture

You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.

I respectfully agree with most of your analysis, but I disagree with the conclusions you draw for it.

To wit: an observer is presented with two intervals of exposure to a sound that may or may not be present in either interval. The protocol calls for her to choose the interval in which she sensed a physical sensory stimulus, a sound or light or taste. Dutifully she trains to and establishes competency in the method. We glibly name that procedure two-alternative forced choice.

The observer is not choosing the interval with the sound which may not be there she is reporting an interval in which she has evidence the stimuli is sufficient for her to distinguish from the other interval. We say she is "choosing the interval", actually just probabilistic reporting with a signal. We know whether there was a signal at any interval. She does not.

After thirty years of doing this stuff, I came to the conclusion we can be just as mechanical as the machine, that we are not choosing. Rather we are responding to satisfy a protocol that is designed to measure sensitivity to stimuli just as does a mindless circuit. It's not the other way around as your example is designed to suggest for the reasons I listed. In fact, the procedure was designed to accomplish a mechanistic response as close as any 'free-willed' human can mimic. We can take the 'human' element out of 'human' behavior.

Now if we generalize my analysis to common behavior it becomes clear the same mechanistic factors are in place when we claim choice.

I'm reporting this way because it is not the deterministic world but the messed up human who, with her lack of knowing is trying to justify what she is doing that leads them to the notion of choice as a consequence of 'free-will'. The physics is right the human interpretations are all fxxxxd up. Indeterminism is a human concocted fiction attempting to satisfy any 'splaining needed.

You are glibly forgetting that for me, CHOOSING IS THE VERY NATURE OF MECHANISM!

There are situations right now wherein your reference frame has an indeterminate future in it's locality.

The most fucked up thing in this conversation is that our universe on the quantum level is not clearly deterministic: it is probabilistic.

Deterministic behavior only arises from statistical trends in the probabilistic layer combined with fixed patterns of motion within the fields that occur as a result of the probabilistic events!

The nature of an indeterministic universe... Is deterministic layers forming out of the indeterministic ones.

 

[fromderinside]

the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture

You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.

I respectfully agree with most of your analysis, but I disagree with the conclusions you draw for it.

To wit: an observer is presented with two intervals of exposure to a sound that may or may not be present in either interval. The protocol calls for her to choose the interval in which she sensed a physical sensory stimulus, a sound or light or taste. Dutifully she trains to and establishes competency in the method. We glibly name that procedure two-alternative forced choice.

The observer is not choosing the interval with the sound which may not be there she is reporting an interval in which she has evidence the stimuli is sufficient for her to distinguish from the other interval. We say she is "choosing the interval", actually just probabilistic reporting with a signal. We know whether there was a signal at any interval. She does not.

After thirty years of doing this stuff, I came to the conclusion we can be just as mechanical as the machine, that we are not choosing. Rather we are responding to satisfy a protocol that is designed to measure sensitivity to stimuli just as does a mindless circuit. It's not the other way around as your example is designed to suggest for the reasons I listed. In fact, the procedure was designed to accomplish a mechanistic response as close as any 'free-willed' human can mimic. We can take the 'human' element out of 'human' behavior.

Now if we generalize my analysis to common behavior it becomes clear the same mechanistic factors are in place when we claim choice.

I'm reporting this way because it is not the deterministic world but the messed up human who, with her lack of knowing is trying to justify what she is doing that leads them to the notion of choice as a consequence of 'free-will'. The physics is right the human interpretations are all fxxxxd up. Indeterminism is a human concocted fiction attempting to satisfy any 'splaining needed.

You are glibly forgetting that for me, CHOOSING IS THE VERY NATURE OF MECHANISM!

There are situations right now wherein your reference frame has an indeterminate future in it's locality.

The most fucked up thing in this conversation is that our universe on the quantum level is not clearly deterministic: it is probabilistic.

Deterministic behavior only arises from statistical trends in the probabilistic layer combined with fixed patterns of motion within the fields that occur as a result of the probabilistic events!

The nature of an indeterministic universe... Is deterministic layers forming out of the indeterministic ones.

Right. A combination of things, molecules, circuits, etc. are by agreement mechanisms. Operationalization is the method by which we understand mechanisms. Macrostructure is a basis. Subsequent to agreement we insert an intervening variables, cause and effect - because Oh, shit - the world is deterministic. Now we're trying to play God. First cause are U shitting me.

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory. That same practice arrived at a deterministic relativistic model of things combined with a probabilistic quantum theory only results in determined models which goes a long way to explaining what, why, and how. Probabilistic quantum theory is not indeterministic.

Quantum theory may be non-deterministic where there is space for symmetry. Why are there no positrons? There should be positrons, there are when certain collisions take place. But they aren't anywhere to be found. This is true for many anti-particles. I'm not saying there aren't winners and losers. There may be other universes where other combinations of fundamental things are extant. We will probably never know that.

I'm just angry firing at will here. It is very difficult to communicate with people who interpose variables in order to explain. Choosing is something humans believe they do, it cannot be consistently operationalized.

 

[fromderinside]

As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.

Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.

Determinism is the belief in causal necessity. Causal necessity is the notion that events are reliably caused by prior events. The prior events necessitate the current event. For example, if Babe Ruth hits the ball at the appropriate angle with sufficient force, then the ball will necessarily go over the outfield fence, scoring a home run.

The definition of determinism suggested in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) reads like this: "Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

Causal necessity simply asserts that every event is the reliable effect of prior events. The term "natural law" is a metaphor for that reliability. It is AS IF the objects were following a set of rules. But in actuality the rules are derived from observing reliable patterns of behavior in the objects and forces themselves. Neither natural law nor scientific law ever causes anything to happen. Only the objects and forces can actually cause events.

Scientific method depends on testable, empirical, explanations. Determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments. Scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests.

Now if what you propose cannot be operationalized, measured, contrasted empirically it cannot be science. Nor can it be any part of determinism. The next time anyone spouts causal necessity they need empirically demonstrate the theoretical utility of their spout. From the above one needs to operationalize the terms reliable, effect, event. I doubt the general consensus about the definition of Natural Law would stand up to such tests.

 

[DBT]

...
If you work in the field of artificial intelligence, you should know that free will is not a factor. That processing information and selecting an option according to sets of criteria has nothing to do with free will.

You really should be more cautious in making blanket statements about a field that you have no expertise in. The usefulness free will in robotics has long been an open question, and it is a popular topic in AI. Here is a well-known 1999 paper by AI pioneer, John McCarthy: FREE WILL-EVEN FOR ROBOTS

I can't access the page. Not that it matters. Unless there has been some miraculous breakthrough, AI has yet to achieve consciousness, yet alone 'free will' - something that has been debated for centuries, two sides to the argument, compatibilism and incompatibilism.

If the issue hasn't been resolved in humans....good luck with computers that possess neither consciousness or will, only mechanical function.

Are you using the argument from authority? John McCarthy says this , therefore it is so?

No, I'm using it as evidence that free will is a research topic in AI. In fact, it comes up a lot at conferences, because the overarching goal of AI is to replicate intelligent behavior in machines. It is of particular interest in the field of robotics, because robots have all the same problems that humans do in navigating in uncertain environments. They have to make the same kind of choices, and we model their behavior on human and animal behavior.

Intelligent behaviour in mechanical systems is not willed behaviour. There is no 'will' involved, just function. Function that is determined by circuitry and software.

To conflate intelligence with will is a category error. They are two different things. An animal may not be considered intelligence, yet have both will and the ability to act in accordance to its will.

It would also be a mistake to conflate plain will with free will. We have will, but it is not free will.

Both the will of the animal and the actions that follow are necessitated by antecedents beyond the control of the animal.

I think you believe that you have, but you don't show much evidence of understanding what definitions do or how they work.

I know exactly what definitions are. Just as I know exactly why compatibilists, given the nature of determinism and the nature of brain function, decision making, action initiation, etc, must define free will in the way they do.

They don't actually prescribe how words ought to be used. They describe how words are used. So you need to focus on how English speakers actually use the expression to mean something, not how philosophers think it ought to mean something in the context of a deterministic universe. The philosophical discussion, not surprisingly, comes out of theological discussions concerning whether a god that knows the future can judge the actions of beings that don't know the future. Philosophers and theologicans have nothing to do with what expressions like "will" and "free will" mean.

Irrelevant to my point.

We've discussed Pereboom's Manipulation Argument in the past, and it has more to do with problems inherent in assigning moral responsibility than in actual free will. We judge the behavior of others because we are all expected to adhere to a moral code. However, that has more to do with moral philosophy than what it means to choose from a set of alternative acts of will. What does it mean to be responsible for one's actions? His article was very influential among philosophers, but it attracted as much criticism as praise. Although moral responsibility is often associated with free will, it doesn't actually define it. People may not always be held accountable for their actions, just as we don't hold animals accountable for theirs. Lacking a proper sense of moral responsibility does not mean that one lacks free will.

Moral responsibility is related to free will. As is the nature of cognition, decision making and action initiation.

Another way of putting it being:

Abstract​

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Scientific method depends on testable, empirical, explanations. Determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments. Scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests.

So, does your statement that "determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments" pass your own test, "scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests"? What is the empirical test for determinism?

 

[DBT]

The argument is that the compatibilist definition of free will is not sufficient to prove the proposition.

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The compatibilist definition is inadequate because unimpeded actions necessarily follow from necessitated decisions.

Freedom demands causal power in agents, the ability to regulate decision making and access or initiate alternate action, to have done otherwise;

Necessity;
If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false

The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

Relative abilities and unimpeded action necessitated by antecedent events that an agent has no access to, or control over, are not instances of 'free will' - they are necessitated actions freely performed. Not only freely performed, but necessarily performed.

Actions that follow from necessitated decisions are not free will actions, they are necessitated actions.

Definitions alone do not prove the proposition.

To claim that necessitated action, which are necessarily unimpeded or unrestricted by the very token of being determined is false labelling.

Yes, and it was that same determinism that assured it would be that individual, personally, and no other object in the universe, that would choose to drop our of school.

Determinism does not change anything. Determinism itself never determines anything. It has no regulatory control. To believe that it is a causal agent that removes our freedom, our control, or our responsibility, is an illusion.

Sure, determinism enables a reliable, predictable world. It's simply that actions inevitably following antecedents makes freedom of will incompatible with determinism.

In other words. ''determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way.”

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Abstract​

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

Premise #2, "If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers", is not only false, but is clearly paradoxical. If there are no powers, then how is any event ever necessitated? Force, such as the force of gravity, causally necessitates the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Without that force, the Earth would fly off into space. So, gravity has the power to keep the Earth orbiting the Sun. Gravity exercises this power without choosing to do so, so gravity has no free will. But it definitely has the power to necessitate planetary orbits and necessitate objects falling to the ground when dropped, etc.

Premise #1 is correct, a priori, by definition. Determinism is the belief that all events are necessitated by prior events.
Premise #3 is almost correct, but it only applies to the agent's specific power to choose for itself what the agent will do.

Because premises #1 and #3 do not contradict each other, we must conclude that compatibilism is true.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The compatibilist definition is inadequate because unimpeded actions necessarily follow from necessitated decisions.

I've just demonstrated a proof of compatibility and you have not questioned any of the premises, so I believe you are stuck with the conclusion: The notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Freedom demands causal power in agents, the ability to regulate decision making and access or initiate alternate action, to have done otherwise;

And the agent, when sitting in the restaurant and reading the menu, has the power to choose any item on the menu. If you wish to empirically test for this power, then order the first item on the menu today. Come again tomorrow and order the second item from the menu. Continue this testing until you've ordered each item on the menu.

Your power to order any item off of the menu can be empirically demonstrated, very easily.

Perhaps you had some other notion of power? Perhaps you were thinking that one must be able to choose to become someone else? Or, perhaps you were thinking one must be free of prior causes in order to be the meaningful and relevant cause of their own actions? Those are kind of silly, don't you agree?

Necessity;
If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:
1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated
2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers
3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers
Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false

Well, don't depend upon what others have come up with unless you're ready to defend it. Going by the abstract, the authors of that article have seriously blundered. Here's why:

Premise #2, "If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers", is not only false, but is clearly paradoxical. If there are no powers, then how is any event ever necessitated? Force, such as the force of gravity, causally necessitates the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Without that force, the Earth would fly off into space. So, gravity has the power to keep the Earth orbiting the Sun. Gravity exercises this power without choosing to do so, so gravity has no free will. But it definitely has the power to necessitate planetary orbits and necessitate objects falling to the ground when dropped, etc.

Premise #1 is correct, a priori, by definition. Determinism is the belief that all events are necessitated by prior events.
Premise #3 is almost correct, but it only applies to the agent's specific power to choose for themselves what they will do.

Because premises #1 and #3 do not contradict each other, we must conclude that compatibilism is true.

About freedom:
To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

... Actions that follow from necessitated decisions are not free will actions, they are necessitated actions.

Case A: If my own goals, my own reasons, and my own interests causally necessitated my choice, then I was free to choose for myself what I would do. This is referred to as a freely chosen will, or simply free will.

Case B: If a guy was holding a gun to my head, and it was his goals, his reasons, and his interests that causally necessitated my choice, then I was not free to choose for myself what I would do.

Both are examples of causally necessitated actions. In Case A, it was causally necessary that I was free to choose for myself. In Case B, I was forced to submit my will to his.

Causal necessity holds true in both cases. Free will holds true in Case A, where I was free to choose for myself what I would do. But coercion, and not free will, holds true in Case B.

The fact of causal necessity does not contradict the fact of free will in Case A, nor does it contradict the fact of coercion in Case B.

Definitions alone do not prove the proposition.

Well, that's why I presented you with a formal proof again at the top of this comment.

To claim that necessitated action, which are necessarily unimpeded or unrestricted by the very token of being determined is false labelling.

As to whether the labelling is true or false will depend entirely upon the definition:
Free will is a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
Determinism is the belief that all events are causally necessitated by prior events.
There is no contradiction at all between these two definitions.

If you are unhappy with these definitions, then present an argument for some other definition.

It's simply that actions inevitably following antecedents makes freedom of will incompatible with determinism. In other words. ''determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way.”

Apparently, that claim of incompatibility is false. The fact that our choice is inevitable entails that it was also inevitable that we, and no other object in the physical universe, would be doing the choosing. We remain the most meaningful and relevant cause that necessitated that choice, when free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

 

[Jarhyn]

So, I'm just gonna go and snip all the places you just kind of went off on weird lexical diarrhea storms of shit I didn't bring up and don't care about..

A combination of things, molecules, circuits, etc. are by agreement mechanisms. Operationalization is the method by which we understand mechanisms. Macrostructure is a basis. Subsequent to agreement we insert an intervening variables, cause and effect - because Oh, shit - the world is deterministic.

Ok, so, now we are beyond the point where you accept that there IS in fact an indeterminant element to our universe...

We cannot treat this cause and effect as singular, either.

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory

Yes, and while it is fun to recognize that there are many things science is blind to, because they only ever happen once...

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory. That same practice arrived at a deterministic relativistic model of things combined with a probabilistic quantum theory only results in determined models which goes a long way to explaining what, why, and how. Probabilistic quantum theory is not indeterministic

Probabilistic systems are, by definition "non-deterministic".

You ask a mathematician especially in the field of discrete mathematics "hey man, is snakes and ladders a deterministic game?" They will say "oh hell no, it's purely probabilistic."

"What about the card game 'war'"

"Oh that's purely probabilistic too; if you want a deterministic game, maybe consider a nice game of Tic Tac Toe, or Chess, or Go."

You may not like that very much, but that is the way this language works.

Choosing is something a transistor does. Choosing is something a processor core does.

Trying to find something so complicated that YOU as an individual can not wrap their head around the sheer scale of the graph that is doing this particular choice is no excuse to ignore that it is doing the same thing as the transistor, as the processor core:

Creating a juncture to which there is an indeterminate input, on which a differential outcome will occur on the basis of that input.

This input is indeterminate, with respect to the choosing reference frame, because of the property of LOCALITY.

 

[fromderinside]

As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.

Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.

Determinism is the belief in causal necessity. Causal necessity is the notion that events are reliably caused by prior events. The prior events necessitate the current event. For example, if Babe Ruth hits the ball at the appropriate angle with sufficient force, then the ball will necessarily go over the outfield fence, scoring a home run.

The definition of determinism suggested in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) reads like this: "Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

Causal necessity simply asserts that every event is the reliable effect of prior events. The term "natural law" is a metaphor for that reliability. It is AS IF the objects were following a set of rules. But in actuality the rules are derived from observing reliable patterns of behavior in the objects and forces themselves. Neither natural law nor scientific law ever causes anything to happen. Only the objects and forces can actually cause events.

BS

Example why

Scientific method depends on testable, empirical, explanations. Determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments. Scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests.

So, does your statement that "determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments" pass your own test, "scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests"? What is the empirical test for determinism?

Love it, "the empirical test". Every procedure testing energy or information in operationally defined elements would be an empirical test for/of determinism. We normally call it the scientific method.

 

[fromderinside]

So, I'm just gonna go and snip all the places you just kind of went off on weird lexical diarrhea storms of shit I didn't bring up and don't care about..

A combination of things, molecules, circuits, etc. are by agreement mechanisms. Operationalization is the method by which we understand mechanisms. Macrostructure is a basis. Subsequent to agreement we insert an intervening variables, cause and effect - because Oh, shit - the world is deterministic.

Ok, so, now we are beyond the point where you accept that there IS in fact an indeterminant element to our universe...

We cannot treat this cause and effect as singular, either.

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory

Yes, and while it is fun to recognize that there are many things science is blind to, because they only ever happen once...

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory. That same practice arrived at a deterministic relativistic model of things combined with a probabilistic quantum theory only results in determined models which goes a long way to explaining what, why, and how. Probabilistic quantum theory is not indeterministic

Probabilistic systems are, by definition "non-deterministic".

You ask a mathematician especially in the field of discrete mathematics "hey man, is snakes and ladders a deterministic game?" They will say "oh hell no, it's purely probabilistic."

"What about the card game 'war'"

"Oh that's purely probabilistic too; if you want a deterministic game, maybe consider a nice game of Tic Tac Toe, or Chess, or Go."

You may not like that very much, but that is the way this language works.

Choosing is something a transistor does. Choosing is something a processor core does.

Trying to find something so complicated that YOU as an individual can not wrap their head around the sheer scale of the graph that is doing this particular choice is no excuse to ignore that it is doing the same thing as the transistor, as the processor core:

Creating a juncture to which there is an indeterminate input, on which a differential outcome will occur on the basis of that input.

This input is indeterminate, with respect to the choosing reference frame, because of the property of LOCALITY.

Locality comes out of deterministic scientific theory. Even Einstein saw It as a subcategory of determinism, it is not indeterministic.

Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments​

Excerpts:

Does a physical reality exist independent of our ability to observe it? To Bohr and his followers, such questions were meaningless. All that we can know are the results of measurements and observations. It makes no sense to speculate about an ultimate reality that exists beyond our perceptions.[6]: 460–461 

In the EPR thought experiment, however, Bohr had to admit that "there is no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation." On the other hand, he noted that the two particles were one system described by one quantum function. Furthermore, the EPR paper did nothing to dispel the uncertainty principle.[12]: 454–457  [note 19]

So stood the situation for nearly 30 years. Then, in 1964, John Stewart Bell made the groundbreaking discovery that Einstein's local realist world view made experimentally verifiable predictions that would be in conflict with those of quantum mechanics. Bell's discovery shifted the Einstein–Bohr debate from philosophy to the realm of experimental physics. Bell's theorem showed that, for any local realist formalism, there exist limits on the predicted correlations between pairs of particles in an experimental realization of the EPR thought experiment. In 1972, the first experimental tests were carried out. Successive experiments improved the accuracy of observation and closed loopholes. To date, it is virtually certain that local realist theories have been falsified.[49]

The EPR paper did not prove quantum mechanics to be incorrect. What it did prove was that quantum mechanics, with its "spooky action at a distance," is completely incompatible with commonsense understanding.[51] Furthermore, the effect predicted by the EPR paper, quantum entanglement, has inspired approaches to quantum mechanics different from the Copenhagen interpretation, and has been at the forefront of major technological advances in quantum computing, quantum encryption, and quantum information theory.[52]

So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Every procedure testing energy or information in operationally defined elements would be an empirical test for/of determinism. We normally call it the scientific method.

The choosing operation inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. We can objectively observe people walking into the restaurant, sitting at a table, browsing a literal menu of options, and placing their orders. We hear them telling the waiter, "I will have this, please" or "I will have that, please". We observe the waiters bringing the meals to the customers along with a bill for their meal, holding each responsible for their deliberate act of placing the order.

If you want objective measurements we can count the customers, grouping them by gender and age. We can count the meals served broken down into the ratios of "this's" versus "that's" ordered. We can also survey the customers as to why they chose "this" meal rather than "that" meal, and classify their motives into different categories. We can do an economic analysis of the profit margins for each meal, and figure out what that restaurant owes their local and state government in meal taxes, and the share of the owner's profits that will go to her income taxes.

So, I think we can demonstrate, through empirical scientific methods, that choosing happened, why the choices were made, and the effects of that choosing upon the real world, in terms of the economic consequences that were causally necessitated by those choosing operations.

What we cannot do, given the empirical scientific data, is make any kind of metaphysical claim that the choosing operation did not happen.