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Origins Of Christianity

As I said, you make an actuality claim. Below, you provide further confirmation.

Correct—my claim of actuality is about the letter’s observable rhetoric, not about the truth of Paul’s origin claim. Galatians itself publicly uses “not from man … through Jesus Christ” in a dispute, issues an anathema on contrary gospels, identifies rival teachers, and instructs the audience to reject them. Those are concrete, checkable features on the page. Recognizing that use is an empirical description of the text, not a verdict that the origin claim is true.
The viable emotive possibility alone, for so long as it is a viable possibility, is sufficient to preclude a determination that what you refer to as the (vituperative) polemic part of Paul’s expression is actual polemic.

That part of Paul’s letter which can seem or which can be interpreted as invective cannot be established as actual polemic rather than merely possible polemic for at least as long as the emotive possibility remains viable.

Emotive expression and polemic are not mutually exclusive categories. A text can be emotionally charged and polemical at once. “Polemical” names function, not mood: addressing identifiable opponents, advancing reasons against them, and urging a community to reject their position. Galatians does all of that in black-and-white: it names rival emissaries pressing circumcision, contrasts their “man-taught” gospel with Paul’s “through revelation,” declares a curse on contrary messages, recounts confrontations used as reasons, and directs the audience’s allegiance accordingly. Those functional markers are sufficient to classify portions of the letter as polemical regardless of the writer’s emotional state. The “emotive possibility” does not negate the publicly verifiable polemical function; it coexists with it.

Invective is a rhetorical device; polemic is a communicative aim. The presence of invective confirms neither psychology nor genre by itself, but Galatians goes far beyond tone: it frames opponents, states their demands, furnishes counter-arguments from experience and scripture, invokes revelatory authority against them, and commands the audience’s course of action. That package is precisely what “actual polemic” denotes. Because these features are publicly checkable in the text, their classification does not depend on speculating about Paul’s inner feelings. Thus, the letter’s polemical use of the origin claim is established by the text’s content and structure, while the truth of that origin claim remains unsubstantiated absent public discriminators.

NHC
 
About 15 years ago I was invited by an Evangelical to be a judge at a regional Christian hoe school debate tournament. I(t was a big 3 day event held at a school campus. Kids competed to go to a national tormentor in DC where they could win scholarships.

The family's daughter was home schooled,There is a national network for Christian home schoolers. She was headed to Wheaton, Billy Gram's alma mater.

There were two forms. An individual thesis and a one one on one pro con debate on an issue. The topics were not necessarily purely religious.

The kids were well mannered, well read, and good at debate weaving theology into general issues.

People raided in that kind of religious environment are not likely to consider alternative views as adults. They grow up speaking and hearing apologetics.

I was doing contract work for the Evangelic family. The guy had a shop in his garage. He had made money in software and was dabbling in high end audio and was in trouble. His wife said god had sent me to them.

An important trade show was coming up. They had a family prayer in the shop asking Jesus to make things go right, then they wet on vacation to Hawaii. Husband, wife, daughter, son.

True believers.

The guy told e about his conversion.

He was going to a state college and was sitting in the library. Someone sat next to him and began talking about Jesus and that started it for him. He transferred to a Christian college.

He tried to convert me of course. While we were working in his shop he raised his voice calling me to Jesus. I remained passive. He said it should have worked, he had to try. I said I know. We went back to work.

Atheists may not grasp that it is not just about belieff in a god and an afterlife, they are living it as a reality. It is very real to them.

Somebody like Pearl may not have the capacity to reason outside his apologetics and theology.
 
Emotive expression and polemic are not mutually exclusive categories.
Emotive and polemic do not have to be mutually exclusive.

They can both be possible together in the same context.

They can both be actual together in the same context.

However, if an expression which is actually polemic can be interpreted reasonably as being emotive, then, despite being an actuality, polemic can only be established as a possibility at least for so long as emotive is a viable possibility.
 
Emotive and polemic do not have to be mutually exclusive.

They can both be possible together in the same context.

They can both be actual together in the same context.

However, if an expression which is actually polemic can be interpreted reasonably as being emotive, then, despite being an actuality, polemic can only be established as a possibility at least for so long as emotive is a viable possibility.

Agreed. On that shared premise, nothing about the presence of emotion undermines identifying polemic where the text exhibits it.

Correct, and when the text shows the standard, publicly checkable markers of polemic—naming opponents, refuting them, and directing the audience against them—the polemic is not merely “possible”; it is instantiated in the document.

Exactly. If both can be actual, then establishing that the letter is emotive does not demote its polemical function to mere possibility. Co-actual states do not compete; they coexist.

That contradicts your prior concession. If polemic and emotive can both be actual, the viability of an emotive reading cannot logically reduce the status of the polemical function from actual to “only possible.” Classification follows observable function, not exclusivity of tone: Galatians explicitly identifies rival emissaries, contrasts their “man-taught” message with “through revelation,” pronounces an anathema on contrary gospels, recounts confrontations as reasons, and instructs the audience’s stance. Those are objective, on-page features of adversarial argument. They remain actual regardless of the writer’s affect, just as a sentence can be both imperative and angry without the anger making the imperative “only possible.” Your last sentence replaces evidence with a modal veto that your own premises disallow.

NHC
 
nothing about the presence of emotion undermines identifying polemic where the text exhibits it.
Paul's letter is reasonably interpreted as emotional, and that presents an emotive possibility which is sufficient to preclude establishing polemic actuality for so long as the emotive possibility remains viable.

when the text shows the standard, publicly checkable markers of polemic—naming opponents, refuting them, and directing the audience against them—the polemic is not merely “possible”; it is instantiated in the document.
Paul's letter is reasonably interpreted as emotive. The emotive can subsume the polemic. This means that the emotive is sufficient to preclude establishing the polemic as actual.

The emotive can subsume the polemic. This does not mean that the emotive itself is sufficient to preclude the polemic possibility.
 
Paul's letter is reasonably interpreted as emotional, and that presents an emotive possibility which is sufficient to preclude establishing polemic actuality for so long as the emotive possibility remains viable.

Emotion does not negate function. A document can be both emotional and polemical at once because tone and argumentative role are orthogonal. Galatians names rivals, contrasts their message with his own, issues a malediction on contrary gospels, recounts confrontations as reasons, and instructs the audience’s stance. Those are concrete, publicly checkable features of adversarial argument. Their presence makes the polemical function actual regardless of the writer’s affect. Saying “emotive is viable, therefore polemic cannot be actual” simply asserts exclusivity you already conceded does not hold.

Paul's letter is reasonably interpreted as emotive. The emotive can subsume the polemic. This means that the emotive is sufficient to preclude establishing the polemic as actual.

The emotive can subsume the polemic. This does not mean that the emotive itself is sufficient to preclude the polemic possibility.

You can’t make “emotive” a veto on “polemical” without contradicting your earlier admission that both can be actual together. “Subsume” is not an evidential operator; it doesn’t erase observable polemical acts on the page. If a text explicitly identifies opponents, argues against them, and directs recipients accordingly, that polemical layer is instantiated. Emotion may co-occur, amplify, or color it, but it does not downgrade an evidenced function to “mere possibility.”

This repeats the same error in softer form and remains self-contradictory. If “emotive” does not preclude polemic even as a possibility, it certainly does not preclude polemic as an actuality when the discriminating features of polemic are present. Your two claims—“emotive precludes establishing actuality” and “emotive does not preclude possibility”—cannot both stand. The text’s publicly checkable markers settle the functional question; the presence of emotion does not unsettle them.

NHC
 
You can’t make “emotive” a veto on “polemical” without contradicting your earlier admission that both can be actual together.
"Emotive" was NOT used as a veto.

I said, "The emotive can subsume the polemic."

Note the word can.

That means it is possible for the emotive to subsume the polemic; it does NOT mean that the emotive is itself sufficient to actually subsume the polemic.

This was made further evident when I said, "This does not mean that the emotive itself is sufficient to preclude the polemic possibility."

If “emotive” does not preclude polemic even as a possibility, it certainly does not preclude polemic as an actuality when the discriminating features of polemic are present.
The emotive itself - the emotive in and of itself - is NOT sufficient to preclude the polemic possibility.

The "features of polemic" are what makes polemic a possibility.

The "features of polemic" are not sufficient to transform polemic possibility to polemic actuality.

The emotive is sufficient to preclude transformation from polemic possibility to polemic actuality.

Your two claims—“emotive precludes establishing actuality” and “emotive does not preclude possibility”—cannot both stand.
My remarks above prove that you are wrong.
 
"Emotive" was NOT used as a veto.

I said, "The emotive can subsume the polemic."

Note the word can.

That means it is possible for the emotive to subsume the polemic; it does NOT mean that the emotive is itself sufficient to actually subsume the polemic.

This was made further evident when I said, "This does not mean that the emotive itself is sufficient to preclude the polemic possibility."

You did use it as a veto earlier when you wrote that the emotive reading “is sufficient to preclude establishing polemic actuality.” That is exactly a veto claim. If you now deny veto, then you concede the point I made: emotion does not block identifying polemic where the text exhibits it.

“Can subsume” is a bare possibility. Possibility does no evidential work against observed function. Galatians names rivals, refutes them, anathematizes contrary preaching, and directs its audience; those are public, text-level markers of polemic. A hypothetical subsumption does not erase instantiated features on the page.

Exactly. “Can” is modal caution, not evidence. Historical judgments turn on discriminators, not on what could be imagined. Unless you supply conditions under which emotion changes what the text is doing—conditions that would predict different, checkable features—“can” leaves the polemical function unaffected.

If emotion is not sufficient to displace polemic, then it is not sufficient to block recognizing polemic when the discriminating markers are present. The text still performs a public refutation and audience-direction; therefore the polemical layer is actual, regardless of tone.

Then we agree on the only point that matters for method: emotion does not preclude polemic. Once that is granted, your appeal to “emotive” has no bearing on the evidential question. In Galatians the polemical function is instantiated by the text’s observable operations; therefore Paul’s origin language, deployed within that polemic, is a public warrant-claim and must be assessed by public discriminators.

The emotive itself - the emotive in and of itself - is NOT sufficient to preclude the polemic possibility.

The "features of polemic" are what makes polemic a possibility.

The "features of polemic" are not sufficient to transform polemic possibility to polemic actuality.

The emotive is sufficient to preclude transformation from polemic possibility to polemic actuality.

Good; then emotion cannot be used to block recognizing polemic. You have now conceded the only premise I needed: “emotive” does not undercut identifying polemic where the text shows it.

That is backwards. In empirical classification and in rhetoric, discriminating features are what license attribution. When a text names opponents, refutes their position, curses rival messages, and directs an audience against them—as Galatians does (1:6–9; 2:4–5; 3:1–3; 5:2–12)—those operations instantiate polemic in that document. Features do not merely make polemic “possible”; they are the public criteria by which we call it actual, just as the presence of cross-examination, impeachment, and closing argument instantiate a trial’s adversarial phase, and the presence of prediction, test, and attempted refutation instantiate scientific dispute. You have offered no rule by which those same features, once observed, somehow fall short of actuality.

That claim collapses as soon as you state the method. If “polemical letter” is defined by its observable operations, then observing those operations satisfies the definition. To deny sufficiency after the features are present is to reject the very public criteria you’ve asked for. It confuses an epistemic hesitation with a factual classification: once the markers are there and not quoted or reported at second hand, the function is present in the text.

That directly contradicts your first sentence above and your earlier admission that emotive and polemical “can both be actual together.” If emotion is “sufficient to preclude” polemical actuality, then whenever strong emotion is present polemic cannot be actual; but you have already granted that both can be actual together. You cannot coherently hold both that (i) emotion is not sufficient to preclude even the possibility of polemic and (ii) emotion is sufficient to preclude the actuality of polemic, because actuality entails possibility. More simply: if the text already exhibits the discriminators of polemic, adding emotional tone does not erase those operations. It changes how the polemic is delivered, not whether it is there.


My remarks above prove that you are wrong.

They do not. You asserted four things that cannot be jointly maintained: you conceded emotion cannot preclude polemic’s possibility; you reduced publicly checkable polemical features to mere “possibility”; you denied those features are sufficient for actuality; and then you claimed emotion is sufficient to preclude actuality. That is a logical tangle, not a proof. By ordinary public criteria—the same kind used in historical method, legal classification, and rhetorical analysis—the presence of polemical operations in Galatians makes the polemical function actual in the document. Since Paul’s revelation language is deployed inside that polemic, it is a public warrant-claim and must answer to public discriminators. Emotion does not, and cannot, cancel that.

NHC
 
I asked the mods to split you two off to another thread. More appropriate for philosophy.

The repetitious back and forth is going nowhere and is unrelated to the OP title.

One of you can start another thread. 'Interpreting Paul or 'Divine Inspiration'?
 
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You did use it as a veto earlier when you wrote that the emotive reading “is sufficient to preclude establishing polemic actuality.”
I did not veto the possibility-to-actuality transformation. I guess you could say that logic vetoes it.

If you now deny veto, then you concede the point I made: emotion does not block identifying polemic where the text exhibits it.
Logically, emotion (viable emotive possibility) does not block identifying polemic possibility where the text exhibits it.

Given your claim of there being polemic actuality wherein that claim - by your own admission - does not take account of the viable emotive possibility, logically, the viable emotive possibility is sufficient logically to block the transformation of polemic possibility to polemic actuality.

“Can subsume” is a bare possibility. Possibility does no evidential work against observed function.
Possibility does conceptual work. The conceptual precedes the evidential, and the conceptual provides space for the evidential.

Since the viable emotive possibility (concept) precludes transformation from the polemic possibility (concept) to the polemic actuality (concept), there is no space for the evidence which would be sufficient for establishing the polemic possibility to do any transformative work between the possibly polemic and the actually polemic (or from the polemic possibility to the polemic actuality) - for so long as the emotive possibility is viable.

If emotion is not sufficient to displace polemic, then it is not sufficient to block recognizing polemic when the discriminating markers are present.
The "when the discriminating markers are [actually sufficiently] present" is enough (sufficient) to establish polemic possibility. The viable emotive possibility in and of itself is not sufficient to "displace" that polemic possibility.

However, when you claim that the polemic is not merely a possibility but is, instead, an actuality, then the viable emotive possibility is sufficient for establishing that your actuality claim is false.

By your own admission, your "discriminating markers" do not include consideration of the viable emotive possibility. Yet, your claim is that the evidence/reasons you have taken into account are sufficient to establish polemic actuality. But the viable emotive possibility is sufficient to preclude your actuality claim and would have been sufficient reason - had you taken the viable emotive possibility into account - for you to withhold your actuality claim so as to avoid the logic error which you, in fact, did commit.

Proving your claim to be false (by virtue of your logic error) does not prove that there is no polemic possibility. This proving of your claim to be false only proves that you have not presented either sufficient reason or evidence to establish the actuality of the polemic.

You failed to take sufficient account of the relevant possibilities.

emotion cannot be used to block recognizing polemic.
Viable emotive possibility is not sufficient "to block" polemic possibility.

“emotive” does not undercut identifying polemic where the text shows it.
Viable emotive possibility ABSOLUTELY MOST DEFINITELY UNDERCUTS your claim for polemic actuality. Viable emotive possibility does NOT undercut a claim for polemic possibility.

you denied [that publicly checkable] features are sufficient for actuality
The "publicly checkable" features which are sufficient for polemic possibility are NOT sufficient to establish polemic actuality given a context in which there is viable emotive possibility.

This relates to the fact that - by your own admission - your "discriminating markers" do not include consideration of the viable emotive possibility.

Consequently, your approach and your claim fail to have taken sufficient account of relevant possibilities.

Your claim is false by virtue of being immodestly expressed.
 
I did not veto the possibility-to-actuality transformation. I guess you could say that logic vetoes it.

No, logic does not “veto” actuality here. If a category is defined by observable operations in a text, then observing those operations licenses the classification. In Galatians the text names rivals, contrasts messages, refutes them, and anathematizes alternatives; those are the constitutive operations of polemic. Once those operations are present, the polemical function is actual in the document. Invoking “logic” as a blanket veto adds nothing; to block the classification you would need a rule that the presence of emotion defeats polemical operations, and you have already denied such a rule exists.

Logically, emotion (viable emotive possibility) does not block identifying polemic possibility where the text exhibits it.

Given your claim of there being polemic actuality wherein that claim - by your own admission - does not take account of the viable emotive possibility, logically, the viable emotive possibility is sufficient logically to block the transformation of polemic possibility to polemic actuality.

You keep retreating to “possibility,” but the dispute is about actual function. Admitting that the text exhibits polemical features already concedes the point: those features are the public discriminators by which we classify the function as actual, not mere potential. Just as a courtroom exchange remains adversarial even if the lawyers are angry, and a scientific paper remains a rebuttal even if its tone is sharp, Galatians remains polemical when it performs polemical moves. Emotion doesn’t demote what is observed to “possibility.”

Possibility does conceptual work. The conceptual precedes the evidential, and the conceptual provides space for the evidential.

Since the viable emotive possibility (concept) precludes transformation from the polemic possibility (concept) to the polemic actuality (concept), there is no space for the evidence which would be sufficient for establishing the polemic possibility to do any transformative work between the possibly polemic and the actually polemic (or from the polemic possibility to the polemic actuality)

Concepts do frame inquiry, but in public analysis they don’t suspend it. Once a concept is fixed—here, “polemical” defined by observable operations such as naming rivals, refuting them, and directing an audience against them—evidence adjudicates whether those operations are present. In Galatians, they are present. That satisfies the concept’s own entry conditions. Invoking abstract “conceptual space” after the discriminators are observed does not erase the observed function.

The "when the discriminating markers are [actually sufficiently] present" is enough (sufficient) to establish polemic possibility. The viable emotive possibility in and of itself is not sufficient to "displace" that polemic possibility.

However, when you claim that the polemic is not merely a possibility but is, instead, an actuality, then the viable emotive possibility is sufficient for establishing that your actuality claim is false.

By your own admission, your "discriminating markers" do not include consideration of the viable emotive possibility. Yet, your claim is that the evidence/reasons you have taken into account are sufficient to establish polemic actuality. But the viable emotive possibility is sufficient to preclude your actuality claim and would have been sufficient reason - had you taken the viable emotive possibility into account - for you to withhold your actuality claim so as to avoid the logic error which you, in fact, did commit.

Proving your claim to be false (by virtue of your logic error) does not prove that there is no polemic possibility. This proving of your claim to be false only proves that you have not presented either sufficient reason or evidence to establish the actuality of the polemic.

You failed to take sufficient account of the relevant possibilities.

If the discriminating markers for P are sufficiently present, they do more than license “possibility”; they license classification. That’s how feature-based identification works in every public discipline. A legal brief remains a brief even when passionate; a rebuttal article remains a rebuttal even when sharply worded. The category is fixed by operations performed, not by the author’s affect.

False. To defeat an actuality claim based on observed features, you must show those features are misidentified or insufficient for the category, not merely that another compatible description is “viable.” Compatibility is not defeater. Your argument equivocates between “also true” and “instead of.” Emotion being also true does not make polemic not true.

That misstates my claim. I have repeatedly acknowledged the emotive register and have said explicitly it does not exclude polemic. The discriminators for polemic are positive textual operations; they do not need to negate emotion to count. Your “preclusion” assertion again assumes exclusivity you have elsewhere denied.

The sufficient reason is the text’s own operations: identification and censure of rivals, argument against their position, and boundary-setting curses on contrary “gospels.” Those are the standard, publicly checkable markers of polemical discourse. They are observed in the document; therefore the function is actual in the document. No “logic error” occurs in recognizing what the text demonstrably does.
Viable emotive possibility is not sufficient "to block" polemic possibility.

Agreed—and it also isn’t sufficient to block polemic actuality. “Emotive” and “polemical” are compatible predicates. If the text performs polemical operations—naming opponents, refuting their position, directing the audience against them—then polemic is instantiated, regardless of tone. Emotion can co-occur; it cannot negate acts already present in the document.

Viable emotive possibility ABSOLUTELY MOST DEFINITELY UNDERCUTS your claim for polemic actuality. Viable emotive possibility does NOT undercut a claim for polemic possibility.

That’s a contradiction in method. If emotion does not undercut identifying polemic as a live category in principle, it cannot undercut its actuality when the category’s defining operations are observed. To defeat an actuality claim you must show the operations are misidentified or insufficient for the category, not merely assert a parallel, compatible description. Compatibility is not a defeater.

The "publicly checkable" features which are sufficient for polemic possibility are NOT sufficient to establish polemic actuality given a context in which there is viable emotive possibility.

This relates to the fact that - by your own admission - your "discriminating markers" do not include consideration of the viable emotive possibility.

Consequently, your approach and your claim fail to have taken sufficient account of relevant possibilities.

Your claim is false by virtue of being immodestly expressed.

Publicly checkable features are exactly what fix actuality in historical classification. A legal brief remains a brief even if it’s heated; a refutation remains a refutation even if it’s anguished. In Galatians the text executes polemical moves: it names and denounces rival emissaries, argues their program should be rejected, and anathematizes contrary “gospels.” Those operations are present; therefore the polemical function is actual in the letter. Emotion does not erase those operations.

Correct, because emotion is orthogonal to the classification. Discriminators track what the text does, not how the author felt. “Emotive” is a tonal label; “polemical” is a functional label. The functional label is fixed by the operations performed, and those are publicly checkable in the text. Excluding tone from the polemic criteria is not an omission; it’s correct operationalization.

A possibility is “relevant” only if, were it true, it would change what we should expect to observe. Whether the author is upset does not change whether the document contains identification of rivals, arguments against them, audience direction, and curses on contrary preaching. Since those observations remain the same under “emotive” and “non-emotive” readings, emotion is not evidentially relevant to the polemic classification.

That is rhetoric, not a counterargument. The claim stands or falls on the text’s exhibited operations. Either those operations are there, or they are not; either they suffice for the category as defined, or they do not. In Galatians they are there and they do suffice. Reasserting that emotion is “viable” does not alter the publicly checkable facts already in the document.

NHC
 
About 15 years ago I was invited by an Evangelical to be a judge at a regional Christian hoe school debate tournament.
It's nice to see the Christian scools concentrate on vocational training for professions their graduates are most likely to qualify in.
 
No, logic does not “veto” actuality here. If a category is defined by observable operations in a text, then observing those operations licenses the classification.
Yes it does. Figuratively speaking. It is just that you do not understand the relation between compartment-thinking, logic, and actuality.

If the only factors under consideration are restricted so as to confine considerations to a constricted context which is in effect being ASSUMED for the sake of study as all there is to actuality, then logic works under those restricted and constricted conditions, but any valid result/conclusion is only possible - and is not sufficient to establish actuality - in any reality which relevantly exceeds the restrictions and constrictions under which the study is conducted.

The viable emotive possibility relevantly exceeds - is outside - the restricted context you use for your text analysis.

Therefore, the (presumably) valid conclusion produced by your analysis is merely a possibility in the broader reality context which includes the viable emotive possibility.

Admitting that the text exhibits polemical features already concedes the point: those features are the public discriminators by which we classify the function as actual, not mere potential.
False.

But it would be legitimate to say "those restricted and constricted features which (whoever are the) we use when (whoever are the) we perform text analysis provide for a valid conclusion but only within the restricted context which (whoever are the) we use. (Whoever are the) we recognize that additional features (such as the noted viable emotive possibility) applied from a broader context can affect the applicability of the restricted context conclusion such that the restricted context conclusion might only at best be a possibility in the broader context rather than a broader context established actuality."

In brief, your move from possibility to actuality is invalid in the broader context which has a demonstrably (and demonstrated) viable emotive possibility.
 
Yes it does. Figuratively speaking. It is just that you do not understand the relation between compartment-thinking, logic, and actuality.

If the only factors under consideration are restricted so as to confine considerations to a constricted context which is in effect being ASSUMED for the sake of study as all there is to actuality, then logic works under those restricted and constricted conditions, but any valid result/conclusion is only possible - and is not sufficient to establish actuality - in any reality which relevantly exceeds the restrictions and constrictions under which the study is conducted.

The viable emotive possibility relevantly exceeds - is outside - the restricted context you use for your text analysis.

Therefore, the (presumably) valid conclusion produced by your analysis is merely a possibility in the broader reality context which includes the viable emotive possibility.

No, Micheal. When a category is defined by operations that can be checked on the surface of a text—naming opponents, refuting them, directing an audience against them—observing those operations licenses the classification for that artifact. That is not “compartment-thinking”; it is how classification works in every public method: you state the rule by observable features and you apply it. The “figuratively speaking” hedge concedes the point. Logic doesn’t “veto” an actuality that is defined operationally and then observed; it recognizes it under the stated criterion.

Historical classification is explicitly scoped to the artifact and the evidence domain that bears on it. Saying “Galatians functions polemically” is a claim about the document’s observable operations in its literary and social setting, not a metaphysical claim about “all there is to actuality.” Within that domain, “actual” means “satisfied by the text under the method’s criteria.” That’s how grammar is identified in linguistics, how genres are identified in rhetoric, and how courts characterize filings as pleadings, motions, or briefs. Defeasible does not mean “mere possibility.” It means “actually warranted on the public record and revisable with stronger counter-evidence.” You keep attacking a claim I’m not making.

Emotion is not “outside” the analysis; it is part of it. Polemic and emotion are not exclusive sets. A text can be angry and still be polemical if it performs the polemical operations. The presence of emotive language doesn’t erase the named opponents, the refutations, and the audience-directing imperatives; it often heightens them. If you want emotion to displace the polemical function, you need a discriminator that the emotive reading would predict which the polemical reading would not. You have offered none, and you’ve been told this before. Reasserting “emotive possibility” without a contrary predictor is repetition, not refutation.
False.

But it would be legitimate to say "those restricted and constricted features which (whoever are the) we use when (whoever are the) we perform text analysis provide for a valid conclusion but only within the restricted context which (whoever are the) we use. (Whoever are the) we recognize that additional features (such as the noted viable emotive possibility) applied from a broader context can affect the applicability of the restricted context conclusion such that the restricted context conclusion might only at best be a possibility in the broader context rather than a broader context established actuality."

In brief, your move from possibility to actuality is invalid in the broader context which has a demonstrably (and demonstrated) viable emotive possibility.

You’ve denied, not shown. Earlier you already conceded the text exhibits the very operations that define polemic—naming rivals, rebutting them, directing the audience against them. Under any public method, when a category is defined by observable operations and those operations are present in the artifact, the function is instantiated for that artifact. That is all “actual” means at the level of textual classification. Nothing about that collapses into “mere potential.”

This is the same move you’ve made repeatedly, and it still misfires. Historical-linguistic classification is domain-scoped by design. “Actual” here means “satisfied by the text under stated, public criteria.” Bringing in a vaguer, larger “broader context” does not dissolve an instantiated function unless you can point to a contrary discriminator—some publicly checkable feature the polemical reading would not predict but your alternative would. “Emotive possibility” is not such a discriminator because emotion and polemic are not exclusive: the letter can be emotionally charged and polemical at once, and in Galatians it plainly is. The observable operations that license the polemical classification remain: Paul names and anathematizes competing messengers (1:8–9), asserts an origin claim to overrule “from men” teaching (1:11–12), narrates confrontation to discredit a rival practice (2:11–14), and urges the audience to reject the rival line (5:2–4, 5:12). Those are public discriminators. Your “broader context” objection supplies none that overturn them.

No. You’re treating “actual in this method’s domain” as if it claimed exclusivity across all conceivable contexts. It doesn’t. It claims, and shows, that in this document the polemical function is present by the method’s own public criteria. Your “emotive possibility” neither contradicts those observations nor explains them better, so it does no defeating work. And once you admit that Paul deploys the origin claim inside that polemical frame, the claim is being used as a public warrant against rivals and is answerable to public discriminators. That is the evidential point you keep trying to evade, and it stands.

NHC
 
Emotion is not “outside” the analysis; it is part of it.
Emotive possibility was never included in your list of considered factors.

Now you apparently feel the need to include it as if it were always there.

Here is your problem: it is possible that the emotive possibility fully accounts for the very manner of expression that you refer to as polemic.

Before your polemic possibility can be validly transformed to polemic actuality, you first have to be rid of the emotive possibility.

You have not and cannot do so.

Therefore, your polemic is valid only as possibility.
 
Emotive possibility was never included in your list of considered factors.

Now you apparently feel the need to include it as if it were always there.

Here is your problem: it is possible that the emotive possibility fully accounts for the very manner of expression that you refer to as polemic.

Before your polemic possibility can be validly transformed to polemic actuality, you first have to be rid of the emotive possibility.

You have not and cannot do so.

Therefore, your polemic is valid only as possibility.

It was, and repeatedly. I’ve said more than once that emotion and polemic are not exclusive and can be concurrent in the same document. In any case, emotional tone is a standard part of historical–rhetorical analysis; it isn’t an afterthought and it doesn’t displace functional classification when the text exhibits the public operations that define that function.

It has always been there. What changed is not the evidence but your framing. I’ve consistently treated the letter’s heat as data; I’ve also shown that heat does not cancel the presence of polemical operations. Both can be actual together, and in Galatians they are.

A bare “possibly” does no adjudicative work. To “fully account” for the passage as emotive-only, you would need discriminators that the polemical reading would not predict but an emotive-only reading would. You have supplied none. The letter names specific rivals, rebuts their position point by point, issues audience-directed imperatives against that position, and fronts a source-of-authority claim in that contest. Those are the publicly checkable speech-acts by which texts are classified as polemical. An emotive lament or appeal can be intense without doing those things; Galatians does them.

That is a false modal requirement. Functional classifications in texts are not exclusive slots. The presence of a polemical function does not require eliminating other co-present functions such as emotive expression. Actuality in this domain means “the text instantiates the defining operations of the category.” It does. Emotion doesn’t veto that; it often accompanies it.

Elimination is unnecessary. The relevant question is whether the polemical discriminators are present. They are. Therefore the polemical function is actual for this text, regardless of concurrent emotional tone.

Non sequitur. You have not produced a single public discriminator that defeats the observed polemical operations or explains them better under an emotive-only model. Consequently, “polemical” remains the correct actual classification for that function in Galatians. And once that is established, the evidential point you keep circling back to avoid is unavoidable: because Paul uses a “not of man … through revelation” origin claim inside that public polemic, he has put that claim forward as warrant in public space. Claims used that way are answerable to public discriminators. Emotion does not change that, and repeating this “possible emotive” detour doesn’t either—we’ve addressed it already, and it still doesn’t overturn the publicly checkable features on the page.

NHC
 
I’ve said more than once that emotion and polemic are not exclusive and can be concurrent in the same document.
That is why your polemic is a possibility so long as the emotive possibility is not established as fully accounting for the manner of expression which you refer to as polemic.
 
That is why your polemic is a possibility so long as the emotive possibility is not established as fully accounting for the manner of expression which you refer to as polemic.

No. You are smuggling in a veto you already conceded doesn’t exist. “Emotive” is not an alternative that must “fully account” for the text before any other function can be actual; it is a co-present register. In textual analysis, functions are classified by the public operations a text performs. When a letter names opponents, refutes their position, instructs its audience against them, and deploys an authority claim in that contest, the polemical function is instantiated. That remains true whether the tone is cool, heated, or grieving. An “emotive-only” model would need a discriminator that explains those opponent-directed refutations and audience-facing injunctions without them being polemic; you have provided none. Because you have no such discriminator, “emotive” cannot demote polemic from actual to merely possible. The observed speech-acts fix the classification.

NHC
 
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