A simple explanation of free will.

[DrZoidberg]

I think that it is far easier to come to the conclusion that free will exists if you are an idealist rather than a materialist. As an idealist I don't see myself as a product of a mindless (material) world, rather I see the world as a dream like experience .As it happens I see myself as that which is experiencing this particular life, a life without mindless material (there is only information)...it's a very simple explanation, unlike materialism which believes my ancestor was mindless material that mindlessly produced me.Materialism bind you to the silly concept that you do not exist as any kind of independent being...materialism goes against our most basic knowledge, the knowledge that we experience something from the perspective of the individual.

I don´t see it as one being wrong and the other right. These are two different perspectives to take to describe the world. They are both just as correct. They only differ in their usefulness as tools for how to describe the world in various contexts. I think idealism is less useful as a tool to describe the world. Modern neurology has been able to show that our sense of self is mostly illusory. So, "I think therefore I am", no longer applies. That makes idealism hard to use in any meaningful way. What could you possibly deduce from holding the perspective?

I believe that even materialists should concede that physical material and thoughts are different things (even though one may cause the other), and that our imaginations have a degree of freedom from the world as it is.It follows that if our imagination drives a part of our will then that will has a degree of freedom from the world as it is...it is a free will (to a degree).

The imagination isn´t free. You have to be able to imagine it. It has limits. It´s confined by a requirement to be discrete. Abstractions can only be manifested as materialistic metaphors (in the mind). There is a semantic to it. We have narrative patterns that repeat and are finite. Semantics are always adhered to. There´s actually quite a long list of limitations to our imagination. It´s freedom is illusory. For the obvious reason that from inside the mind it cannot imagine what it cannot imagine.

Calling the imagination free is like saying you can do anything in a computer game. No you can´t. The constructors of the game put in barriers that cannot be crossed. The game can only be played in the way it´s designers envisioned, even though it may have a high degree of freedom. Same with your mind and your thoughts.

If (in your theory) mistaken thoughts are a part of nature, surely that would demonstrate that such thoughts are not natural since nature does not make any other form of mistake?

Why would that follow?

 

[Speakpigeon]

To understand my posts you actually need to read and take into account the posts I'm responding to.

I agree that's exactly what you should do.

This is really lame as a rejoinder!

My question addressed your answer to arkick

Ok, you seem to say that free will doesn't exist at all. Yet we do have the idea of free will. So, we invented the idea of something that doesn't exist, i.e. free will. Yet, you also say we cannot trully invent anything

Suuure, you addressed my answer to arkick, bravo! But it was beside the point as to the substance of my post.

And of course, you are going to keep going on your own free will. Or is it "free wheel", I never know.

How is this getting at a simple explanation of free will?

Mr arkirk posted arguments, broadly purporting to deny the existence of free will. I responded by addressing the issue of the validity of his arguments.

As to free will itself, I remember suggesting a no-nonsense and straightforward definition a while back. I don't remember which thread it was but apparently you missed that boat.
EB

Yes, yes, yes.

At this point one should be able to expect you got the message.

But no, you didn't.

So did your straightforward definition come down to a conscious sense of agency?

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

Even if it didn't shouldn't your 'straightforward' definition have been your first input to this thread.

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

Should? I thought you had banned "shoulds".

I didn't know one had to reply to the OP first before engaging amiably with other posters.

I don't understand why one would have to go to another thread to get at what had been requested for this thread, unless of course, you are just playing games.

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

You're free to not go to any other thread. Alternatively, you could just try to remember stuff other people say.

Obviously arkick takes the position that there is no straightforward explanation for something that he insists doesn't exist. Are you trying to tell us that a (simple) straightforward explanation requires one to dispose of the position there is no free will.

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

So now we've moved effortlessly from me talking of a simple "definition" to you suggesting I was talking about some sort of "explanation"? Was I?

OK so I'm just as tedious as are you. Appropriate.

Being a good deal tedious is not nearly enough be appropriate.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Well, in the context of human behaviour self-control has come to mean something very similar to our notion of free will so here we want to steer away from that particular sense to avoide circularity.

So is the original, cybernetic, kind of self-control enough? A computer can be said to have self-control in that sense, albeit perhaps in a more limited sense than we do. So, what's the difference? Is it just the complexity of the human brain? Its unpredictability?

Also, ultimately, like computers, human beings are presumably the product of external processes (they are not self-made) so you probably also want to specify adequately the kind of self-control you have in mind.
EB

I think the best example of self control is when you force yourself to do something against your nature ,I don't see computers as an example of self control...there is no self, and they (computers) have no concept of morality (which is the greatest driver to self control imo).

The idea that we are natural beings seems to conflict with the idea that we can control ourselves, even if only partially. Maybe we only do whatever follows from our nature, deterministically?

What if even our self-control is just a product of nature?

To have an impression of free will is no proof of free will. What if even our impression of free will is just itself a product of nature?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I think idealism is less useful as a tool to describe the world. Modern neurology has been able to show that our sense of self is mostly illusory. So, "I think therefore I am", no longer applies. That makes idealism hard to use in any meaningful way. What could you possibly deduce from holding the perspective?

Me, I would so very much like to know how modern neurology could possibly make that "I think therefore I am" somehow "no longer applies". Could you make explicit what you mean here at all?
EB

 

[DrZoidberg]

I think idealism is less useful as a tool to describe the world. Modern neurology has been able to show that our sense of self is mostly illusory. So, "I think therefore I am", no longer applies. That makes idealism hard to use in any meaningful way. What could you possibly deduce from holding the perspective?

Me, I would so very much like to know how modern neurology could possibly make that "I think therefore I am" somehow "no longer applies". Could you make explicit what you mean here at all?
EB

The line is about Descartes reducing what is knowable until he´s left with only this single phrase. He has a sense of self and assert that as fact. But modern neurology shows that our sense of self is illusory. It´s not our consciousness that is in charge.... no matter whatever it is that is in charge. Sure, something is in charge in our brains, somehow. But we don´t know what. But we do know that whatever it is it, isn´t our sense of self. So the fact that Descartes can think proves nothing. It´s not even clear if anything thinks. It could simply be an expression we´ve given to a family of simple mechanism. We really don´t know. Either way, we can´t draw any conclusions from it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Me, I would so very much like to know how modern neurology could possibly make that "I think therefore I am" somehow "no longer applies". Could you make explicit what you mean here at all?
EB

The line is about Descartes reducing what is knowable until he´s left with only this single phrase. He has a sense of self and assert that as fact.

I'm not sure that's true depending on what you mean by "sense of self" and "fact". The Cogito only says "I think", not "I have a sense of self" or "It's a fact that I have a sense of self".

But modern neurology shows that our sense of self is illusory. It´s not our consciousness that is in charge....

The Cogito only says "I think, therefore I am". It doesn't mention any "sense of self" or any "consciousness". There is also no notion of "being in charge". Just "thinking".

no matter whatever it is that is in charge. Sure, something is in charge in our brains, somehow. But we don´t know what. But we do know that whatever it is it, isn´t our sense of self.

The Cogito doesn't say "I am in charge" or "My sense of self is in charge".

So the fact that Descartes can think proves nothing.

The Cogito doesn't say "Descartes thinks therefore he is.

So the fact that Descartes can think proves nothing. It´s not even clear if anything thinks. It could simply be an expression we´ve given to a family of simple mechanism. We really don´t know. Either way, we can´t draw any conclusions from it.

So when a scientist observes interferences on a screen, it proves nothing? He observes the interferences, the screen, the various conditions prevailing at the time of the observation. Yet, maybe "interference" is just a name given to a familly of simple mechanisms. Wait, even that couldn't prove anything. "Mechanism" maybe is just a name for something else. The whole of science proves nothing?



Descartes noticed that if he thought about himself thinking then the fact that he was thinking was pretty much a given. Sure "thinking" is just a name and as such it doesn't prove anything. However, he also believed that other people had the same experience of thinking, and could therefore understand the Cogito as applied to themselves.

It just baffles me that you should suggest that when thinking about yourself thinking as you are thinking, you are still not quite sure you are thinking.

I grant you that "thinking" is just a word but it refers to something. Descartes knowns he is experiencing something and he just calls it "thinking". The "I" here is in fact irrelevant. The "I" in Descartes' view is just the whatever it is that is doing the thinking. He calls it "the thinking thing". He says, "I am the thinking thing", meaning the "I" should be understood not as the person Descartes, or his self, whatever that is, but as the "thinking thing". That's what he explained, very clearly. So the "I am thinking" is really, as he says, undoubtable, at least when you are thinking.

I accept that we can have the illusion of seeing a pie in the sky or some impossible monster under our bed. But I don't quite see how it could ever be possible to have the illusion of thinking (in the sense of Descartes, where any kind of thinking qualifies).


I'd be really interested if you could actually quote some respected and qualified scientist really stating unambiguously that the impression we have of thinking (when we are thinking) is an illusion, or something to the same effect, as long as it is unambiguous.
EB

 

[4321lynx]

Me, I would so very much like to know how modern neurology could possibly make that "I think therefore I am" somehow "no longer applies". Could you make explicit what you mean here at all?
EB

The line is about Descartes reducing what is knowable until he´s left with only this single phrase. He has a sense of self and assert that as fact. But modern neurology shows that our sense of self is illusory. It´s not our consciousness that is in charge.... no matter whatever it is that is in charge. Sure, something is in charge in our brains, somehow. But we don´t know what. But we do know that whatever it is it, isn´t our sense of self. So the fact that Descartes can think proves nothing. It´s not even clear if anything thinks. It could simply be an expression we´ve given to a family of simple mechanism. We really don´t know. Either way, we can´t draw any conclusions from it.

It seems to show that there is "something" that holds an illusion. That something is, in everyday ordinary speech, the "I" known as Descartes.

 

[apeman]

I don´t see it as one being wrong and the other right. These are two different perspectives to take to describe the world. They are both just as correct. They only differ in their usefulness as tools for how to describe the world in various contexts. I think idealism is less useful as a tool to describe the world. Modern neurology has been able to show that our sense of self is mostly illusory. So, "I think therefore I am", no longer applies. That makes idealism hard to use in any meaningful way. What could you possibly deduce from holding the perspective?

I believe that even materialists should concede that physical material and thoughts are different things (even though one may cause the other), and that our imaginations have a degree of freedom from the world as it is.It follows that if our imagination drives a part of our will then that will has a degree of freedom from the world as it is...it is a free will (to a degree).

The imagination isn´t free. You have to be able to imagine it. It has limits. It´s confined by a requirement to be discrete. Abstractions can only be manifested as materialistic metaphors (in the mind). There is a semantic to it. We have narrative patterns that repeat and are finite. Semantics are always adhered to. There´s actually quite a long list of limitations to our imagination. It´s freedom is illusory. For the obvious reason that from inside the mind it cannot imagine what it cannot imagine.

Calling the imagination free is like saying you can do anything in a computer game. No you can´t. The constructors of the game put in barriers that cannot be crossed. The game can only be played in the way it´s designers envisioned, even though it may have a high degree of freedom. Same with your mind and your thoughts.

If (in your theory) mistaken thoughts are a part of nature, surely that would demonstrate that such thoughts are not natural since nature does not make any other form of mistake?

Why would that follow?

I think that idealism is a simpler way of describing reality because it only requires that thought exists (and thought generated information) rather than thought and non-thought...after all we know that thought exists , we can only assume thought independent material exists.The gain with such a perspective is simplification.

There is a degree of freedom with imagination beyond the kind of freedom you have playing a computer game...our freedom is more akin to that of the game programmer.

It seems hard to believe that in the whole of the universe (from the perspective of the materialist) that there is a tiny, literally small beyond measure, part of the universe called the brain that is capable of producing mistakes...when nothing else in the entire universe (except brains) can generate mistakes.It seems to mark out brains as different to everything else...separate even.

 

[apeman]

I think the best example of self control is when you force yourself to do something against your nature ,I don't see computers as an example of self control...there is no self, and they (computers) have no concept of morality (which is the greatest driver to self control imo).

The idea that we are natural beings seems to conflict with the idea that we can control ourselves, even if only partially. Maybe we only do whatever follows from our nature, deterministically?

What if even our self-control is just a product of nature?

To have an impression of free will is no proof of free will. What if even our impression of free will is just itself a product of nature?
EB

I think that our instincts (natures) are different to our learned behaviours which have been shaped with self control which itself is shaped by imagination, for instance , the ability to envisage how the world might be better if we curbed particular instinctive drives.

 

[DrZoidberg]

I'd be really interested if you could actually quote some respected and qualified scientist really stating unambiguously that the impression we have of thinking (when we are thinking) is an illusion, or something to the same effect, as long as it is unambiguous.
EB

Hmm... That´s not really science. I´d say that´s more philosophy. Isn´t this just Searle´s Chinese Room? The same arguments and counter arguments apply.

As I see it, thinking and thought is just any mechanism in nature. It´s like water falling down a waterfall. I don´t understand the need to create a special category for it. To me it reeks of special pleading. It reminds me of the old adage, "the most important sexual organ is the brain, according to the brain". Since we´re using our thoughts to have this conversation we will be seduced into thinking that thoughts are super special and unique. Maybe they are. But probably not.

 

[DrZoidberg]

I think that idealism is a simpler way of describing reality because it only requires that thought exists (and thought generated information) rather than thought and non-thought...after all we know that thought exists , we can only assume thought independent material exists.The gain with such a perspective is simplification.

I didn´t say it wasn´t simple. My problem isn´t with the simplicity of the concept. Sometimes simple is also shallow.

There is a degree of freedom with imagination beyond the kind of freedom you have playing a computer game...our freedom is more akin to that of the game programmer.

Dunning-Kruger paradox. How do you know? How could you possibly know? We know that our brains have evolved to judge the ripeness of fruit and to avoid getting bitten by snakes. That´s pretty much it. Just the absurdly slow rate if philosophical and scientific innovation, makes me wonder whether or not we´re all just complete morons. We like to think of ourselves as intelligent because all other life on Earth is dumber. But that´s just relative intelligence. In reality we´re dumb as hell and our imaginations suck.

It seems hard to believe that in the whole of the universe (from the perspective of the materialist) that there is a tiny, literally small beyond measure, part of the universe called the brain that is capable of producing mistakes...when nothing else in the entire universe (except brains) can generate mistakes.It seems to mark out brains as different to everything else...separate even.

Like I said in the previous comment. I think it is special pleading.

 

[fromderinside]

I agree that's exactly what you should do.

This is really lame as a rejoinder!

My question addressed your answer to arkick

Ok, you seem to say that free will doesn't exist at all. Yet we do have the idea of free will. So, we invented the idea of something that doesn't exist, i.e. free will. Yet, you also say we cannot trully invent anything

Suuure, you addressed my answer to arkick, bravo! But it was beside the point as to the substance of my post.

And of course, you are going to keep going on your own free will. Or is it "free wheel", I never know.

How is this getting at a simple explanation of free will?

Mr arkirk posted arguments, broadly purporting to deny the existence of free will. I responded by addressing the issue of the validity of his arguments.

As to free will itself, I remember suggesting a no-nonsense and straightforward definition a while back. I don't remember which thread it was but apparently you missed that boat.
EB

Yes, yes, yes.

At this point one should be able to expect you got the message.

But no, you didn't.

So did your straightforward definition come down to a conscious sense of agency?

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

Even if it didn't shouldn't your 'straightforward' definition have been your first input to this thread.

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

Should? I thought you had banned "shoulds".

I didn't know one had to reply to the OP first before engaging amiably with other posters.

I don't understand why one would have to go to another thread to get at what had been requested for this thread, unless of course, you are just playing games.

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

You're free to not go to any other thread. Alternatively, you could just try to remember stuff other people say.

Obviously arkick takes the position that there is no straightforward explanation for something that he insists doesn't exist. Are you trying to tell us that a (simple) straightforward explanation requires one to dispose of the position there is no free will.

Irrelevant to my answer to arkirk's post.

So now we've moved effortlessly from me talking of a simple "definition" to you suggesting I was talking about some sort of "explanation"? Was I?

OK so I'm just as tedious as are you. Appropriate.

Being a good deal tedious is not nearly enough be appropriate.
EB

Success. The grammar school equivalent is: "I made you look you dirty crook. You stole you brother's pocket book. You turned it here you turned it there you turned it into kraut aigre."

nm

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'd be really interested if you could actually quote some respected and qualified scientist really stating unambiguously that the impression we have of thinking (when we are thinking) is an illusion, or something to the same effect, as long as it is unambiguous.
EB

Hmm... That´s not really science. I´d say that´s more philosophy.

Sure it's more philosophy but you said "Modern neurology has been able to show that our sense of self is mostly illusory. So, "I think therefore I am", no longer applies" and I hoped you could backup your inference. So I guess it means you cannot.

Isn´t this just Searle´s Chinese Room? The same arguments and counter arguments apply.

???

As I see it, thinking and thought is just any mechanism in nature. It´s like water falling down a waterfall. I don´t understand the need to create a special category for it. To me it reeks of special pleading. It reminds me of the old adage, "the most important sexual organ is the brain, according to the brain". Since we´re using our thoughts to have this conversation we will be seduced into thinking that thoughts are super special and unique. Maybe they are. But probably not.

The Cogito doesn't create a different category for thinking as you just defined it. It refers to something which may or may not be different from what you mean by "thinking" by taking the problem from a different perspective, i.e. the subjective experience, which no amount of science could possibly prove to be an illusion, and define thinking as whatever is (obviously) going on within that perspective. It's still apparently a mystery as to whether this kind of thinking has anything to do with the kind of thinking you seem to be talking about. But you can't copy and past on the Cogito's concept of thinking thing whatever science, or maybe just some scientists, may say about the kind of thinking you are talking about.
EB

 

[DrZoidberg]

Hmm... That´s not really science. I´d say that´s more philosophy.

Sure it's more philosophy but you said "Modern neurology has been able to show that our sense of self is mostly illusory. So, "I think therefore I am", no longer applies" and I hoped you could backup your inference. So I guess it means you cannot.

I thought I did?

Isn´t this just Searle´s Chinese Room? The same arguments and counter arguments apply.

???

How do we know that we´re not just automatons responding to stimuli in predefine and preprogrammed patterns? Answer: We can´t possibly know. If we were automatons we´d still experience the world as if we weren´t. We´d have the subjective experience of free thought no matter what.

As I see it, thinking and thought is just any mechanism in nature. It´s like water falling down a waterfall. I don´t understand the need to create a special category for it. To me it reeks of special pleading. It reminds me of the old adage, "the most important sexual organ is the brain, according to the brain". Since we´re using our thoughts to have this conversation we will be seduced into thinking that thoughts are super special and unique. Maybe they are. But probably not.

The Cogito doesn't create a different category for thinking as you just defined it. It refers to something which may or may not be different from what you mean by "thinking" by taking the problem from a different perspective, i.e. the subjective experience, which no amount of science could possibly prove to be an illusion, and define thinking as whatever is (obviously) going on within that perspective. It's still apparently a mystery as to whether this kind of thinking has anything to do with the kind of thinking you seem to be talking about. But you can't copy and past on the Cogito's concept of thinking thing whatever science, or maybe just some scientists, may say about the kind of thinking you are talking about.
EB

I think you´re wrong. Cogito Ergo Sum was about Descartes reducing epistomology down to the only thing that he can know a priori is true. Modern neurology casts doubt even on that. Unhelpfully enough, all knowledge is subjective. All knowledge isn´t equally as subjective. Some knowledge is less subjective than others. But pretty much everything knowable is up in the air, even the idea that we can know for a fact that we are thinking.

 

[PyramidHead]

How do we know that we´re not just automatons responding to stimuli in predefine and preprogrammed patterns? Answer: We can´t possibly know. If we were automatons we´d still experience the world as if we weren´t. We´d have the subjective experience of free thought no matter what.

That being the case, can't we at least be 100% sure that "we have the subjective experience of free thought"? Couldn't the Cogito be reasonably interpreted to convey that statement?

 

[DrZoidberg]

How do we know that we´re not just automatons responding to stimuli in predefine and preprogrammed patterns? Answer: We can´t possibly know. If we were automatons we´d still experience the world as if we weren´t. We´d have the subjective experience of free thought no matter what.

That being the case, can't we at least be 100% sure that "we have the subjective experience of free thought"? Couldn't the Cogito be reasonably interpreted to convey that statement?

Not really. Because it implies some sort of top level consciousness in charge. But it´s not there. For whatever reason our consciousness is fed data that is uses to construct a fiction regarding the process of us taking a decision. In this case, forming a subjective experience. But it wasn´t necessarily the subjective experience that reached our consciousness that was the same subjective experience that was the basis for taking the decision. Decision-making seems to be distributed in the brain. There is on-going debate regarding what consciousness is for. But it isn´t "in charge", so therefore it´s subjective experience doesn´t really matter.

 

[Togo]

I think you´re wrong. Cogito Ergo Sum was about Descartes reducing epistomology down to the only thing that he can know a priori is true. Modern neurology casts doubt even on that.

eh... Not really. Modern neurology briefly suggested that some forms of conscious awareness of decision making may take place only after most of the work had been done on those decisions. It didn't reduce the role of consciousness to zero (hence Libet's free won't), it didn't suggest anything about decisions that involved conscious processing, which stubbornly retain performance characteristics correlated with observed patterns in conscious thought, and it certainly doesn't do anything to suggest that Descartes wasn't subjectively experiencing something. Whether that thing being experienced is an illusion or not is something Descartes actively considers later on in his work, so I don't see how the possibility that it is illusory in some way would invalidate the basic premise.

But pretty much everything knowable is up in the air, even the idea that we can know for a fact that we are thinking.

It doesn't need to be a (external) fact for the Cogito.

 

[fromderinside]

eh... Not really. Modern neurology briefly suggested that some forms of conscious awareness of decision making may take place after most of the work had been done on those decisions. It didn't reduce the role of consciousness to zero (hence Libet's free won't), it didn't suggest anything about decisions that involved conscious processing, which stubbornly retain performance characteristics correlated with observed patterns in conscious thought, and it certainly doesn't do anything to suggest that Descartes wasn't subjectively experiencing something. Whether that thing being experienced is an illusion or not is something Descartes actively considers later on in his work, so I don't see how the possibility that it is illusory in some way would invalidate the basic premise.

But pretty much everything knowable is up in the air, even the idea that we can know for a fact that we are thinking.

It doesn't need to be a (external) fact for the Cogito.

Where to start. I know. Evolutionary Neuroscience. Awareness probably arose with the advent of spatial perception of boundaries (vision, audition, tactile senses. etc accomplished in the first vestiges of mid-brain.

As put in The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3790330/#!po=25.4717

In our view, the lamprey has all the neural requisites and is likely the simplest extant vertebrate with sensory consciousness and qualia. Genes that pattern the proposed elements of consciousness (isomorphism, neural crest, placodes) have been identified in all vertebrates. Thus, consciousness is in the genes, some of which are already known.

 

[PyramidHead]

That being the case, can't we at least be 100% sure that "we have the subjective experience of free thought"? Couldn't the Cogito be reasonably interpreted to convey that statement?

Not really. Because it implies some sort of top level consciousness in charge. But it´s not there. For whatever reason our consciousness is fed data that is uses to construct a fiction regarding the process of us taking a decision. In this case, forming a subjective experience. But it wasn´t necessarily the subjective experience that reached our consciousness that was the same subjective experience that was the basis for taking the decision. Decision-making seems to be distributed in the brain. There is on-going debate regarding what consciousness is for. But it isn´t "in charge", so therefore it´s subjective experience doesn´t really matter.

So, isn't it then beyond dispute that, for whatever reason, it seems as though I am thinking?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Sure it's more philosophy but you said "Modern neurology has been able to show that our sense of self is mostly illusory. So, "I think therefore I am", no longer applies" and I hoped you could backup your inference. So I guess it means you cannot.

I thought I did?

You certainly didn't as far as I know and it's just a couple of posts. Could you remind me exactly where you did?

Isn´t this just Searle´s Chinese Room? The same arguments and counter arguments apply.

???

How do we know that we´re not just automatons responding to stimuli in predefine and preprogrammed patterns? Answer: We can´t possibly know. If we were automatons we´d still experience the world as if we weren´t. We´d have the subjective experience of free thought no matter what.

Ok, yes, so I fail to see what being any sort of automaton would change anything to the thinking thing thinking "I think" and being true about that. The fact is, it does think. The "I think" of the Cogito doesn't implies that the thinking thing is free to think and to think whatever it likes. In this respect, the automaton idea does not add anything to the idea of a deterministic universe. In such a universe, the thinking thing may still come to think, "I think", and that would be true.

As I see it, thinking and thought is just any mechanism in nature. It´s like water falling down a waterfall. I don´t understand the need to create a special category for it. To me it reeks of special pleading. It reminds me of the old adage, "the most important sexual organ is the brain, according to the brain". Since we´re using our thoughts to have this conversation we will be seduced into thinking that thoughts are super special and unique. Maybe they are. But probably not.

The Cogito doesn't create a different category for thinking as you just defined it. It refers to something which may or may not be different from what you mean by "thinking" by taking the problem from a different perspective, i.e. the subjective experience, which no amount of science could possibly prove to be an illusion, and define thinking as whatever is (obviously) going on within that perspective. It's still apparently a mystery as to whether this kind of thinking has anything to do with the kind of thinking you seem to be talking about. But you can't copy and past on the Cogito's concept of thinking thing whatever science, or maybe just some scientists, may say about the kind of thinking you are talking about.
EB

I think you´re wrong. Cogito Ergo Sum was about Descartes reducing epistomology down to the only thing that he can know a priori is true. Modern neurology casts doubt even on that.

I haven't seen any indication of that from you, and for that matter, of anybody else.

Unhelpfully enough, all knowledge is subjective. All knowledge isn´t equally as subjective. Some knowledge is less subjective than others. But pretty much everything knowable is up in the air, even the idea that we can know for a fact that we are thinking.

Beats me.

Anyway, it doesn't matter. I thought (oops, sorry) for a moment you might have some quirky but interesting argument. I'm satisfied you don't.
EB