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A simple explanation of free will.

So you're saying its not really relevant what the brain does because we've got this imaginary bone, consciousness, to chew on.
I'm not saying that, no.

I'm saying that until such a time I'll become convinced some smart ass has proved the brain is relevant to our subjective perspective on consciousness then I'll give it a pass.

Seems to me that if what the brain does in inconsistent with what you are talking about maybe you should go back to the drawing board and re-establish some relationship with reality other that that comes from one's impulses about what it is. Really. Further, what the fuck (pardon my french translation) is a subjective perspective of a fiction?
The simple answer is that it's not a fiction. You may want to say it is and I understand how the guy who worked all his life in the scientific line of business could have a hard time getting some perspective on his life-long and well-paid outlook on reality. Your attitude is profoundly rational, absolutely. But very many people who talk nonsense also have a very rational and well-paid outlook on reality.

More worrying for you, it seems to me that if you had half a brain you should be in a position to realise that what you just said here if pure nonsense. But you don't, do you?

Clearly you don't seem to realise that if I'm still alive now then my own outlook on life can't be too problematic. If you knew me, you'd also know I did remarkably well considering the circumstances. My views clearly don't adversely affect the odds of my survival in the world I live in, they may even improve them a bit. I don't waste time praying to any god, I don't have bad habits, I am a rational agent as far as money is concerned, I'm appropriately circonspect when dealing with human beings in particular, my last blood tests are excellent, in fact they are better than ever before, and probably better than most people on this board. My moral is excellent, I exercise regularly, I eat reasonably, I sleep like a baby and I don't take shit. What's wrong with me do you think?

Aren't you getting tired of trying to give life to a 70 years-dead-man's notions of something he invented to explain hysteria in women? At least update yourself to Berne.
You're being really too ha-ha funny for me, I've got to be careful not to shake those old bones too hard. My views have really absolutely nothing to do with this guy's views, whatever their respective merit.
EB
 
I have a nice anecdote about this: one morning back when "age of empire" was new I had been playing for hours at a friend and was on my way home when i reslized something weird: all greenery: trees, bushes etc, looked exactly like the texture pattern used for trees and bushes in the game! A perfect example of how much the brain constructs what we experience from what it knows things look like since our actual input is not enough to support the illusion of experience everything within sight.
And that's funny too. :p
EB
 
I think the key problem with this kind of discussion is that often people are not willing to move away (even if only conceptually) from their foundational assumptions. So I think (for instance) it becomes almost inconceivable for a materialist to believe that we can have a degree of free will. The materialist believes that the brain is the cause of thoughts and that the brain is a small intrinsic part of the world and that therefore the brain's thoughts can never be free from the material world.

I do not assume that the materialist view is correct (though it may be), for instance I believe that it is possible that the world may only consist of mind and its product... that there may be no mind independence whatsoever. This idealist view is a simplification over the materialist view (mind +mind independence vs. mind).This idealist view is that this existence is more akin to a dream event, where (for instance) you dream that the brain causes the mind... there is only correlation between the brain and mind.The whole free will debate is wiped out by idealism...and the fact that we can imagine things that do not exist or have not yet happened backs up the idealist view, whereas such imaginings undermine the materialist clockwork universe view.


I'll just add that this particular idealist view does not undermine science in anyway, there are still rules/laws to discover and make use of.
 
It's not that ''the materialist believes that the brain is the cause of thoughts and that the brain is a small intrinsic part of the world and that therefore the brain's thoughts can never be free from the material world'' without good sound reasons. All of the available evidence supports the proposition that it is the neural architecture/electrochemical activity of a brain that generates conscious experience (all experience being conscious by default), with no evidence to the contrary.

Of course 'quantum consciousness' has been proposed, but this is not only contentious, but has no apparent evidence to support the idea. Some tenuous link between the observer effect on wave collapse/particle position, where once observed, a particle is in a definite state for all observers.

While some of this is supported by QM experiments, it does not support free will because particle position is not a matter of choice even if wave function is collapsed by the act of observation.
 
I think the key problem with this kind of discussion is that often people are not willing to move away (even if only conceptually) from their foundational assumptions. So I think (for instance) it becomes almost inconceivable for a materialist to believe that we can have a degree of free will. The materialist believes that the brain is the cause of thoughts and that the brain is a small intrinsic part of the world and that therefore the brain's thoughts can never be free from the material world.

I do not assume that the materialist view is correct (though it may be), for instance I believe that it is possible that the world may only consist of mind and its product... that there may be no mind independence whatsoever. This idealist view is a simplification over the materialist view (mind +mind independence vs. mind).This idealist view is that this existence is more akin to a dream event, where (for instance) you dream that the brain causes the mind... there is only correlation between the brain and mind.The whole free will debate is wiped out by idealism...and the fact that we can imagine things that do not exist or have not yet happened backs up the idealist view, whereas such imaginings undermine the materialist clockwork universe view.


I'll just add that this particular idealist view does not undermine science in anyway, there are still rules/laws to discover and make use of.

The problem isn´t intransigence of materialist. It´s the vagaries of your position. No the idealist does not necessarily undermine science. But it could. Depending on what you mean.
 
It's not that ''the materialist believes that the brain is the cause of thoughts and that the brain is a small intrinsic part of the world and that therefore the brain's thoughts can never be free from the material world'' without good sound reasons. All of the available evidence supports the proposition that it is the neural architecture/electrochemical activity of a brain that generates conscious experience (all experience being conscious by default), with no evidence to the contrary.

Of course 'quantum consciousness' has been proposed, but this is not only contentious, but has no apparent evidence to support the idea. Some tenuous link between the observer effect on wave collapse/particle position, where once observed, a particle is in a definite state for all observers.

While some of this is supported by QM experiments, it does not support free will because particle position is not a matter of choice even if wave function is collapsed by the act of observation.

There is certainly correlation between brain and thoughts, but obviously that's all it may be. Correlation is not proof of causation...we all know that don't we ?:)
 
I think the key problem with this kind of discussion is that often people are not willing to move away (even if only conceptually) from their foundational assumptions. So I think (for instance) it becomes almost inconceivable for a materialist to believe that we can have a degree of free will. The materialist believes that the brain is the cause of thoughts and that the brain is a small intrinsic part of the world and that therefore the brain's thoughts can never be free from the material world.

I do not assume that the materialist view is correct (though it may be), for instance I believe that it is possible that the world may only consist of mind and its product... that there may be no mind independence whatsoever. This idealist view is a simplification over the materialist view (mind +mind independence vs. mind).This idealist view is that this existence is more akin to a dream event, where (for instance) you dream that the brain causes the mind... there is only correlation between the brain and mind.The whole free will debate is wiped out by idealism...and the fact that we can imagine things that do not exist or have not yet happened backs up the idealist view, whereas such imaginings undermine the materialist clockwork universe view.


I'll just add that this particular idealist view does not undermine science in anyway, there are still rules/laws to discover and make use of.

The problem isn´t intransigence of materialist. It´s the vagaries of your position. No the idealist does not necessarily undermine science. But it could. Depending on what you mean.

There are no vagaries about my theory...at it's simplest it means that the universe is mind think rather than mindless thing.
 
The problem isn´t intransigence of materialist. It´s the vagaries of your position. No the idealist does not necessarily undermine science. But it could. Depending on what you mean.

There are no vagaries about my theory...at it's simplest it means that the universe is mind think rather than mindless thing.

All models are simplifcations to better undersatand the world. No model is a correct interpretation of it. I think it´s better to think of models in terms of how helpful they are rather than if they are right or wrong.

Materialism has lots of explanatory power. Idealism... hm... what conclusions can you draw from it? Just because of model is internally logically consistent doesn´t make it useful.
 
It's not that ''the materialist believes that the brain is the cause of thoughts and that the brain is a small intrinsic part of the world and that therefore the brain's thoughts can never be free from the material world'' without good sound reasons. All of the available evidence supports the proposition that it is the neural architecture/electrochemical activity of a brain that generates conscious experience (all experience being conscious by default), with no evidence to the contrary.

Of course 'quantum consciousness' has been proposed, but this is not only contentious, but has no apparent evidence to support the idea. Some tenuous link between the observer effect on wave collapse/particle position, where once observed, a particle is in a definite state for all observers.

While some of this is supported by QM experiments, it does not support free will because particle position is not a matter of choice even if wave function is collapsed by the act of observation.

There is certainly correlation between brain and thoughts, but obviously that's all it may be. Correlation is not proof of causation...we all know that don't we ?:)


It is more than mere correlation. There is not a single instance of, or example of a display of conscious behaviour outside of, or external to, the presence and electrochemical information gathering and processing activity of a functional brain. The very structure of the senses have evolved to gather information, wavelength/photons, pressure waves, airborne molecules, etc, and the neural hardware to make sense of it through memory function. Destroying memory function alone, lobotomy (Henry M as one of the first examples) disintegrates recognition and the formation of coherent consciousness. As does applying anesthetic, or a blow to the head....rendering the subject unconscious. Rather than correlation, there is your example of causation.

For the sake of argument, let's say that consciousness is an inherit attribute of QM. This still doesn't help you with free will because even if the Universe comes into being through the act of observation, the act of observation does not include the will to shape and form what is perceived, stars, planets, rivers, oceans, trees, animals...all the things of the world, according to one's will.

So there goes Libertarian Free Will. As for conscious decision making, that is not a matter of observation, consciousness or will, but the underlying processing activity of neural structures, and not quantum uncertainty or observer related particle position, which cannot be manipulated by and act of will.

The term 'free will' is just a semantic construct, a philosophical or ideological position that does not readily relate to the brain/mind, QM or classical physics. It's irrelevant. We are what we are because of our physical makeup, and we do what we are able in terms of thought (both conscious and unconscious) and decision making on that basis.
 
All models are simplifcations to better undersatand the world. No model is a correct interpretation of it. I think it´s better to think of models in terms of how helpful they are rather than if they are right or wrong.
Yet you don't put out any disclaimer when you do claim something, in particular about consciousness etc. If you did, it would be clear that there's no need to be arguing anything with you. If, as you seem to say here, you understand that no model of the world is known to be correct, you should also accept that you actually don't know that thinking is an illusion as you claimed earlier that it was. In terms of coherence of what you just said now, if you accept that no model of the world is known to be correct, you should also accept that you actually don't know whether a model is or isn't useful (or "helpful"), or indeed whether usefulness has any definite onlological status. It's at least clear to me that our belief in usefulness is more plausibly delusional than our belief that we think (whenever we have a belief that we think).


Materialism has lots of explanatory power.
What do you mean by "power"? Are you not contradicting yourself by now claiming that your model somehow includes the certainty of it's own effectiveness in the world? Or is it just you opinion that it is so effective? If so why should we care about your opinion? I can also certainly think of something that materialism has failed to explain so far, namely that I have this subjective perspective on the fact that I am now thinking. I'm open to the idea that maybe one day we will have a proper explanation but we definitely don't now and we don't know if we ever will.

Just because of model is internally logically consistent doesn´t make it useful.
Some people seem to care about having a model of reality that may or may not be useful but will be correct, i.e. true of what they know of reality. Other people don't mind making logically incoherent claims and entertaining a model which is inconsistent with what they themselves know of reality. It's all a personal choice. Maybe it's just that we have different experiences of reality. After all, many people do behave strangely and others will often draw the conclusion that these people are just insane. Who knows but it is generally recognised that having the wrong model is a risk.
EB
 
There is certainly correlation between brain and thoughts, but obviously that's all it may be. Correlation is not proof of causation...we all know that don't we ?:)
It is more than mere correlation. There is not a single instance of, or example of a display of conscious behaviour outside of, or external to, the presence and electrochemical information gathering and processing activity of a functional brain.

Thoughts =/ behaviour Conscious thoughts =/ conscious behaviour Particularly if you're talking about idealism.

As does applying anesthetic, or a blow to the head....rendering the subject unconscious.

Brain is still functional while unconscious. And in some cases, still takes in sense data.

Which does raise some interesting questions as to what consciousness is and does, seeing how much of the brain carries on without it, and yet the person as a whole is totally immobalised by its lack.

This still doesn't help you with free will because even if the Universe comes into being through the act of observation, the act of observation does not include the will to shape and form what is perceived, stars, planets, rivers, oceans, trees, animals...all the things of the world, according to one's will.

So there goes Libertarian Free Will.

No, there goes DBTian free will. LFW does not include the power to reshape the world via thought. If you believe something like that is implied, you have to formally prove it as a matter of logical necessity, rather than just assume it.

The term 'free will' is just a semantic construct, a philosophical or ideological position that does not readily relate to the brain/mind,... . It's irrelevant.

Irrelevant to what?


I understand you're not keen on idealism, but I don't think that the arguments you've presented do anything to really address it.

The key contention is whether we can justifiably assume that our sense perceptions of the world portray a framework of reality that is sufficiently robust and sufficiently accurately portrayed, that we can dismiss our sense perceptions when they come into conflict with it. If that can't be justified, then you either end with idealism, or 'science-as-faith', so it's a reasonably important question. Common solutions include justification through some form of a priori concept of utility, or adopting idealism as a context or prequel for some form of more materialist approach (e.g. Descartian dualism), or taking logic as a priori truth and working from there (e.g. Russel).
 
Other people don't mind making logically incoherent claims and entertaining a model which is inconsistent with what they themselves know of reality.

Various forms of neo-Freudian and Jungian psycho-analysis remain very effective in practice, despite being a bit of a mess conceptually.
 
Yet you don't put out any disclaimer when you do claim something, in particular about consciousness etc. If you did, it would be clear that there's no need to be arguing anything with you. If, as you seem to say here, you understand that no model of the world is known to be correct, you should also accept that you actually don't know that thinking is an illusion as you claimed earlier that it was. In terms of coherence of what you just said now, if you accept that no model of the world is known to be correct, you should also accept that you actually don't know whether a model is or isn't useful (or "helpful"), or indeed whether usefulness has any definite onlological status. It's at least clear to me that our belief in usefulness is more plausibly delusional than our belief that we think (whenever we have a belief that we think).

Calling all models incorrect is a bad way of phrasing it. I think a better way to phrase it is that no model is a 1 to 1 representation of reality. All models are simplifications. And to simplify you need to remove things. All models of the world have weaknesses, and they all break down in certain unusual or extreme circumstances.


Materialism has lots of explanatory power.
What do you mean by "power"? Are you not contradicting yourself by now claiming that your model somehow includes the certainty of it's own effectiveness in the world? Or is it just you opinion that it is so effective? If so why should we care about your opinion? I can also certainly think of something that materialism has failed to explain so far, namely that I have this subjective perspective on the fact that I am now thinking. I'm open to the idea that maybe one day we will have a proper explanation but we definitely don't now and we don't know if we ever will.

Aren´t you now making the claim that because we can´t know somthing with absolute certainty, therefore any opinion is equally valuable? I don´t agree. We just have to accept that we don´t know things with absolute certainty and work with that. You should care about opinions that you find convincing. It doesn´t get better than that.

Just because of model is internally logically consistent doesn´t make it useful.
Some people seem to care about having a model of reality that may or may not be useful but will be correct, i.e. true of what they know of reality. Other people don't mind making logically incoherent claims and entertaining a model which is inconsistent with what they themselves know of reality. It's all a personal choice. Maybe it's just that we have different experiences of reality. After all, many people do behave strangely and others will often draw the conclusion that these people are just insane. Who knows but it is generally recognised that having the wrong model is a risk.
EB

Any model that is logically inconsistent is by necessity false. So we can reject them out of thand. But a model needs more than just being logically consistent. A models usefullness is its truth value. The more true predictions a model can make about the world, the more useful, and therefore, the more relatively true it is.

Saying that all existence is ideas, is a simple and logically consistent model, but tells me absolutely nothing about the world. You might as well have said that truth is flarge. Might be true, but teaches me nothing, ie not useful.
 
A response entirely irrelevant to what it tries to pass off as a response to.
EB
 
Other people don't mind making logically incoherent claims and entertaining a model which is inconsistent with what they themselves know of reality.

Various forms of neo-Freudian and Jungian psycho-analysis remain very effective in practice, despite being a bit of a mess conceptually.
I don't mind irrational effectiveness, if these are at all examples of it. We have plenty of non-rational effectiveness in ordinary, everyday life, even "unthinking" effectiveness, and also unconscious effectiveness, if that's not the same thing. I remember as a kid being unconscious for a few moments while carrying my cat in my arms over a 10m-distance, with obstacles, twists and turns, all without falling or tripping, and without the cat even noticing anyhting odd. Not noctambulism as such, but a similar performance. I'm all for effectiveness but we, so-called 'rational animals', we didn't start it, other animals did, even plants did for God's sake, so I guess it makes the point of effectiveness really lame as a prop in any argument.

I guess my point is that I don't see why this commendable concern for effectiveness should in any way require use of the language invented by George Orwell in '1984'. It just freaks me out.
EB
 
Irrelevant to what?

Just the fact that you ask the question shows that you either haven't been paying attention, or you are not interested in paying attention and would rather do battle with a strawman of your own making.

The reasons why the term 'free will' is irrelevant have already been given, numerous times, and outlined in the very post you responded to (and conveniently ignore). There is no need to repeat or rephrase.

Descriptions, arguments, links and quotes have been given. If this information is insufficient for the purpose of helping you understand why the term is considered by some to be irrelevant, there is nothing more I can do to help you to understand.

You are on your own.

Good luck.


Just to help jog a few neurons into action:

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system'' - - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.
 
A response entirely irrelevant to what it tries to pass off as a response to.
EB

A marvellously funny example of self reference?
If you really found my post "marvellously funny", which I doubt, I think you'd have a serious problem. Hysteria or something.

Perhaps you are trying your hand at making jokes so that's good and we can be proud of you but I have to tell you autistic jokes rarely are funny.

Your post also gives the sense that you are on on a vendetta or something, which comes out as more pathetic than funny.
EB
 
A marvellously funny example of self reference?
If you really found my post "marvellously funny", which I doubt, I think you'd have a serious problem. Hysteria or something.

Perhaps you are trying your hand at making jokes so that's good and we can be proud of you but I have to tell you autistic jokes rarely are funny.

Your post also gives the sense that you are on on a vendetta or something, which comes out as more pathetic than funny.
EB
For fucks sake, chill man! Going on like that is not good for your heart. Your post was funny, sad you dont reslize it...
 
For fucks sake, chill man! Going on like that is not good for your heart. Your post was funny, sad you dont reslize it...

Speak's right, though. Zoid gave a response that didn't answer or even address the question, and you're 'you too!' post doesn't change that.

The problem with discussing free will is that you have to bring yourself to discuss not only your own ideas but other people's. You actually have to engage with ideas that don't work the way your own work, and address them without just falling back on the idea that they don't match your assumptions.

For example:

Irrelevant to what?

Just the fact that you ask the question shows that you either haven't been paying attention,

I've been paying attention. Specifically I've been paying attention to the points you don't address in your replies.

You can not make a claim that something is relevant or irrelevant without a prior claim of what is the topic of discussion. Something can only be relevant or irrelevant to a particular topic. You are dismissing LFW, which is a definition of free will that differs from your own, on the basis that it doesn't address what you believe the topic should be about. That may or may not be your position, or your intention, but that is what a claim of irrelevance actually means.

Every time you say LFW is irrelevant, you're begging the question. You're trying to confine the discussion of free will to the terms that are relevant for your own views, rather than considering the position you are actually addressing

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it

That's great, but that's an argument for it being false, and has nothing to do with your claim that it's irrelevant. Note that something can be relevant and false, or irrelevant and true.

The fact that you're giving me an argument for truth/falsehood in response to a point about relevance/irrelevance may go some way to explaining why you end up repeating yourself.

-- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough,

Fortunately we know the universe isn't mechanistic in the sense you're claiming.

and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will!

If you wanted to give an example of the fallacy of the rejected middle, sure. I note that despite your heavy reliance on this concept, you've never actually given such an argument, except in the form of stating it and then demanding others disprove it.

Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system'' - - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

Which is an argument that is:
a) about relevance to ethics
b) Compatibalist, a position you rejected earlier
 
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