A simpler explanation of free will.

[DBT]

You still have not explained how you know that these ideas, that you are so convinced by, are not just correlation.

I have explained exactly why structural and/or chemical alterations to the brain in relation to conscious experience is not a case of correlation, but causation. You as a conscious experience can be routinely switched off by applying anesthetic, physical trauma, etc

Specific chemicals alter consciousness in ways that are specific to the alteration in brain chemistry, effecting perception, mood and thought by disrupting normal chemistry and processing of information.

Same goes for structural or electrical changes to neural networks....lobotomy, electrical brain stimulation generating specific forms of conscious experience, Delgado, et al.

The evidence to show that the brain as a physical system is shaping and forming conscious experience is overwhelming.

The easiest way that I have of putting this (and I have said it before) is that if you play a computer game and you crash a simulated car into a simulated tree then it looks as though the tree has damaged the car, but in actual fact the "damage" is the result of the underlying programme...so in actual fact the collision between the car and the tree and the resulting damage is a series of correlations...the program itself is the cause.

That's not an analogy. The physical structure of a brain is not a software program (though memory function could probably be compared to software). When it is damaged beyond its own ability to heal or re-route information processing, the damage to the brain is actual, not virtual. Once broken, it cannot be reprogrammed or repaired or altered like video game images projected as pixels on a screen.

 

[Togo]

It isn't in the slightest bit dualist. Everything in this theory is thought process, the chair you're sat on , the sense of self that you have, mathematical laws...everything is thought process.

But then your view is the same as the materialists view: there is only a single basic principle underlying everything.

But then your view is the same as the materialists view: there is only a single basic principle underlying everything.

That's an interesting point. Is there any difference between the different kinds of monisms?

Some, sure.

There's dualism, and monism.

Dualism is the idea that there are both mental and physical events/objects/processes in the world, Monism is that there is only one.

Monism is then divided into Materialism, which is the idea that everything is fundamentally physical, or Mentalism, where everything is fundamentally mental.

Materialism, that is assuming that everything is physical, has a lot of implications for how we treat seemingly mental events. They all have to be reduced to something physical in a way that works conceptually. So you either end up with a 'physical' universe that takes on a great many attributes normally reserved for mental events, such as having events that have no energy, mass, or causative properties. Or you end up denying the relevance of anything that can't be tidily explained physically, and trying to ignore the holes until they go away (Eliminative Materialism).

Mentalism, assuming everything is mental, has a lot of implications for how we treat seemingly physical events. They end up being an unusually structured form of mental event, and you end up with some inconvenient questions as to how and why these notionally physical events have these properties if they aren't fundamentally different in some way.

So both monisms are similar in that they have to deal with whatever they deny. But the difficulties turn out differently because the subject matter is different.

Then there's Dualism. This covers a range of positions from assuming a physical and a mental universe of equal status, through Supervenience Dualism which is the most common form of modern dualism, to the weakest forms of dualism, e.g. the idea that mental events exist as phenomenon, but have no causal impact whatsoever and can only ever be 'generated' by physical events.

Quite a common recourse is to admit dualism but deny it's utility. So you agree that there are mental and physical events. but claim that mental events have no ability to effect the

As far as I can tell, fromderinside is an Eiminative Materialist, Horatio and Apeman are Mentalists, DBT and Kharkov claim to be Materialists, but their descriptions include mental events as distinct from physical brain, which may tip them into Dualism. Ryan I'm less sure.. I was a materialist (specifically Identity Theory) but am not entirely happy with that position, and have been trying to get my head around Chalmers theories of Supervenience Dualism. I'm not yet convinced.

There is also a position that the idea that mental events and physical events are conceptually different is false. I can't remember the name though.

I have explained exactly why structural and/or chemical alterations to the brain in relation to conscious experience is not a case of correlation, but causation. You as a conscious experience can be routinely switched off by applying anesthetic, physical trauma, etc

Could still be correlation. There isn't any way to prove causation instead of correlation from experimentation, because there is no necessity for them to be observably different.

 

[ryan]

There is also a position that the idea that mental events and physical events are conceptually different is false. I can't remember the name though.

Yeah, that's what I was getting at. Mentalism and physicalism seem to start merging into the same thing.

Ryan I'm less sure..

I stay away from being an "ist". Reality is too undefinable for me to hold true to any "isms". But the closest thing I am to any kind of ism, specifically dualism, is interactionism.

 

[Kharakov]

DBT and Kharkov claim to be Materialists, but their descriptions include mental events as distinct from physical brain, which may tip them into Dualism.

I claimed to be a materialist? I could see myself as a metarealist...

1 year and 7 days, and a few seconds ago:

Materialism is so passe. Consciousnessism is where it's at.

 

[Horatio Parker]

far as I can tell, fromderinside is an Eiminative Materialist, Horatio and Apeman are Mentalists, DBT and Kharkov claim to be Materialists, but their descriptions include mental events as distinct from physical brain, which may tip them into Dualism. Ryan I'm less sure.. I was a materialist (specifically Identity Theory) but am not entirely happy with that position, and have been trying to get my head around Chalmers theories of Supervenience Dualism. I'm not yet convinced.

Objectively, I'm agnostic. I prefer to view reality as physical/intelligible duality. Whether intelligibility persists I have no idea. Free will is a fundamental part of human life. We are constantly assessing ourselves and our environment and trying to improve, trying to recognize our fate and trying to change it. To me this is free will in action. I'm satisfied with FW as a construction; it explains enough in folk terms to be useful, whatever objective reality may be.

Ryan's theory is interesting, but I'm not a convert.

 

[Togo]

far as I can tell, fromderinside is an Eiminative Materialist, Horatio and Apeman are Mentalists, DBT and Kharkov claim to be Materialists, but their descriptions include mental events as distinct from physical brain, which may tip them into Dualism. Ryan I'm less sure.. I was a materialist (specifically Identity Theory) but am not entirely happy with that position, and have been trying to get my head around Chalmers theories of Supervenience Dualism. I'm not yet convinced.

Objectively, I'm agnostic. I prefer to view reality as physical/intelligible duality. Whether intelligibility persists I have no idea. Free will is a fundamental part of human life. We are constantly assessing ourselves and our environment and trying to improve, trying to recognize our fate and trying to change it. To me this is free will in action. I'm satisfied with FW as a construction; it explains enough in folk terms to be useful, whatever objective reality may be.

And it's really useful, too. You get some really accurate and useful predictions out of it. I'm not against replacing it with something else, but it has to be a replacement, with a theory that does the same work, not a hand-wavy appeal to ignore it. At base, though, I'm not so much a fan of free will as I am a sceptic of determinism.

Ryan's theory is interesting, but I'm not a convert.

Yeah, nor me. DBT's point, that adding a random element to decision making doesn't create free will, isn't going to go away. The theory still contradicts Kharkov's determined universe, and in DBTs it would just produce random choices. It works fine in an non-determined universe, which is why their objections have no real substance for me, but then so would a system not based on QM. I find it interesting because of the links to medical research on micro-tubules and consciousness, or rather the puzzling phenomenon of unconsciousness. But to my mind the big impact of QM is that it forms some kind of special exception to determinism, but rather it's a dramatic illustration that the universe was never as mechanistic as it was made out to be.

It's kinda sad that discussing a new idea produces posts that are just insults and personal attacks. It doesn't have to be that way.

 

[Juma]

It's kinda sad that discussing a new idea produces posts that are just insults and personal attacks. It doesn't have to be that way.

No, it would not need to be that way if you play honestly. Neither you or ryan is good at that.

 

[Togo]

It's kinda sad that discussing a new idea produces posts that are just insults and personal attacks. It doesn't have to be that way.

No, it would not need to be that way if you play honestly. Neither you or ryan is good at that.

People don't disagree with you because they secretly agree with you and don't want to admit it. They disagree with you because they think you're wrong.

No one hangs around a philosophy forum hoping for an opportunity to lie to you.

Sometimes it can be hard to understand why someone disagrees with you. Particularly in philosophy, where someone might agree with your position but reject your reasoning, or vice versa, or might reasonably argue for a position they don't actually hold, or against a position they do hold. It's a subject where breaking down and analysing a priori beliefs can not only be difficult, but emotionally painful. It's a subject where you don't get to prove yourself right.

You can try and understand it, or you can decide that other people are lying to confuse you. Either way, insulting them only demonstrates an inability to say something useful.

And what's the point? Have you ever gone onto a thread, discovered a few posters heaping abuse on another, and thought "Gosh, so many people are insulting him, he must be wrong!"? Or do you scroll back a few pages and try and work out what the disagreement is about? If you can't find any reasons, just insults and vague assertions, what do you conclude?

 

[ryan]

Objectively, I'm agnostic. I prefer to view reality as physical/intelligible duality. Whether intelligibility persists I have no idea. Free will is a fundamental part of human life. We are constantly assessing ourselves and our environment and trying to improve, trying to recognize our fate and trying to change it. To me this is free will in action. I'm satisfied with FW as a construction; it explains enough in folk terms to be useful, whatever objective reality may be.

And it's really useful, too. You get some really accurate and useful predictions out of it. I'm not against replacing it with something else, but it has to be a replacement, with a theory that does the same work, not a hand-wavy appeal to ignore it. At base, though, I'm not so much a fan of free will as I am a sceptic of determinism.

Ryan's theory is interesting, but I'm not a convert.

Yeah, nor me. DBT's point, that adding a random element to decision making doesn't create free will, isn't going to go away.

If we look at the more popular definitions of free will, we will find that free will is quite vague. From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, they have,

"“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives."

"On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire."

"Free Will as Ultimate Origination (Ability to do Otherwise)"

If there is a definition that you are using that is not one of these definitions or one that is not completely the components of the three listed here, please let me know.

So now, all we need is a model that has the property of one of these definitions. I should also add that my argument does not work very well with dualism although dualism does not falsify it as far as I can tell. So, for now, let's just assume a monism.

Looking at the third definition, we can see how QM allows us the ability to have chosen differently. If we have two identical universes and both have identical pasts, QM allows us to choose differently in the other universe.

 

[fromderinside]

And it's really useful, too. You get some really accurate and useful predictions out of it. I'm not against replacing it with something else, but it has to be a replacement, with a theory that does the same work, not a hand-wavy appeal to ignore it. At base, though, I'm not so much a fan of free will as I am a sceptic of determinism.

Ryan's theory is interesting, but I'm not a convert.

Yeah, nor me. DBT's point, that adding a random element to decision making doesn't create free will, isn't going to go away.

... QM allows us the ability to have chosen differently. If we have two identical universes and both have identical pasts, QM allows us to choose differently in the other universe.

I'm with Horatio Parker, DBT, and Togo here. QM permits stochastic tools which is like saying adding a random element to decision making.

looking at

SEP material you presented: "“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives."

"On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire."

The definition of free will must come from within the notion that the agent has in hand a only bit of what is known about the nature of reality. Thus limited all results must take into account the limited nature of the one claiming 'free will'. As Togo and I are discussing even Haggard sides with determinism, reluctantly, in nature, but, he leaves open the possibility that one, if one accepts consciousness and its limits in an individual or even in a group of similar individuals, feels free to choose. Obviously that's not the same thing as free will, but, its good enough to explain how individuals and groups perceive their freedom choose. I say lets start and end there leaving explanation of the nature of things to those who are equipped with empirical tool kits to do so.

Now the problem reduces to one of psychology and sociology.

 

[ryan]

And it's really useful, too. You get some really accurate and useful predictions out of it. I'm not against replacing it with something else, but it has to be a replacement, with a theory that does the same work, not a hand-wavy appeal to ignore it. At base, though, I'm not so much a fan of free will as I am a sceptic of determinism.

Ryan's theory is interesting, but I'm not a convert.

Yeah, nor me. DBT's point, that adding a random element to decision making doesn't create free will, isn't going to go away.

... QM allows us the ability to have chosen differently. If we have two identical universes and both have identical pasts, QM allows us to choose differently in the other universe.

I'm with Horatio Parker, DBT, and Togo here. QM permits stochastic tools which is like saying adding a random element to decision making.

Yes, but, we don't know whether or not the QM elements are forced to take the random action, maybe because of extra dimensions, or maybe they truly have freedom. This freedom would appear to be random.

looking at

SEP material you presented: "“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives."

"On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire."

The definition of free will must come from within the notion that the agent has in hand a only bit of what is known about the nature of reality. Thus limited all results must take into account the limited nature of the one claiming 'free will'. As Togo and I are discussing even Haggard sides with determinism, reluctantly, in nature, but, he leaves open the possibility that one, if one accepts consciousness and its limits in an individual or even in a group of similar individuals, feels free to choose.

The deterministic view of brain processes seems to be eroding. There are mathematical descriptions that are used for QM that successfully explain cognitive brain processes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cognition . Then there is the real QM aspect that apparently has been found in microtubules of neurons throughout cognitive processes. The former point is just a huge hint that there really are quantum processes going on but do not imply it. The latter point is evidence that QM probably has an effect on cognitive processes.

My argument requires reasonable assumptions and is only meant to falsify DBT's certainty that free will can't exist. The argument is not meant to be the most probable possibility.

 

[fromderinside]

Not knowing is not the same as "it's possible". QM behaves very regularly. One may not know which known option, time, or place, but, one does know sequence. If there are four or six possible options, one of which will always result and it will always appear at some time and place after induced by an event. It is determined.

Taking possibility and using it like a hammer isn't an argument, if, at every pounding others find more certain options to be at the base of your speculation. It is your refusal to accept these more certain, predictable, and verified answers that makes your continued reference back to "but you can't know" now becoming whining.

You just argued QM permits choice. I wrote that choices are known and fixed (determined) and every reaction follows an action. In other words what you speculate is the very definition of determined. You don't even get out of the possible gate.

 

[Kharakov]

There are mathematical descriptions that are used for QM that successfully explain cognitive brain processes, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cognition .

...that can accurately map many complex deterministic processes as well.

You could make a "fuzzy" artificial brain simulation by using QM type processes that creates the exact same results as a normal brain (with deterministic neural, glia, etc. structures) simulation. In fact, using QM type math, instead of creating a deterministic simulation with every single neuron/glia cell/structure, is a lot simpler in terms of computational load ( Computational_complexity_theory).

We'll have functional stochastic ("QM math type") brain simulations far before deterministic ones, because the deterministic models are several orders of magnitude more computationally intensive (in terms of number of operations, and memory size requirements).

So there is definitely going to be a nice little niche of ignorance between the quantum mathematical formalism brain simulations and deterministic brain simulations that some LFWoo peddlers will use to claim "you don't know", and then afterwords, when the deterministic simulations generate the same results, they will say "well, just because a deterministic system creates the exact same thing doesn't mean that the system is deterministic".

Then there is the real QM aspect that apparently has been found in microtubules of neurons throughout cognitive processes. The former point is just a huge hint that there really are quantum processes going on but do not imply it. The latter point is evidence that QM probably have an effect on cognitive processes.

 [B]Quantum cognition[/B] is an emerging field which applies the mathematical formalism of quantum theory to model cognitive phenomena such as information processing by the human brain....
it is not reliant on the hypothesis that there is something micro-physical quantum mechanical about the brain

 

[ryan]

Not knowing is not the same as "it's possible". QM behaves very regularly. One may not know which known option, time, or place, but, one does know sequence. If there are four or six possible options, one of which will always result and it will always appear at some time and place after induced by an event. It is determined.

Yes, there are places where an electron can't be - absolutely can't be even in an infinite amount of time. We can say that there is some determinism within the randomness, or vice-versa.

Taking possibility and using it like a hammer isn't an argument, if, at every pounding others find more certain options to be at the base of your speculation. It is your refusal to accept these more certain, predictable, and verified answers that makes your continued reference back to "but you can't know" now becoming whining.

Look harder at my argument. It isn't about putting anything in the gaps; it's about putting in some very obvious and crucial bridges. If that's whining, then you are just going to have to deal with it.

You just argued QM permits choice. I wrote that choices are known and fixed (determined) and every reaction follows an action. In other words what you speculate is the very definition of determined.

Usually people don't associate QM with determinism, so I brought up the QM behavior in microtubules as an obvious reason why our choices may not be determined.

Now, if QM is determined, I will concede. There is an obvious condition in my argument that QM must be undetermined.

 

[ryan]

...that can accurately map many complex deterministic processes as well.

You could make a "fuzzy" artificial brain simulation by using QM type processes that creates the exact same results as a normal brain (with deterministic neural, glia, etc. structures) simulation. In fact, using QM type math, instead of creating a deterministic simulation with every single neuron/glia cell/structure, is a lot simpler in terms of computational load ( Computational_complexity_theory).

We'll have functional stochastic ("QM math type") brain simulations far before deterministic ones, because the deterministic models are several orders of magnitude more computationally intensive (in terms of number of operations, and memory size requirements).

So there is definitely going to be a nice little niche of ignorance between the quantum mathematical formalism brain simulations and deterministic brain simulations that some LFWoo peddlers will use to claim "you don't know", and then afterwords, when the deterministic simulations generate the same results, they will say "well, just because a deterministic system creates the exact same thing doesn't mean that the system is deterministic".

Then there is the real QM aspect that apparently has been found in microtubules of neurons throughout cognitive processes. The former point is just a huge hint that there really are quantum processes going on but do not imply it. The latter point is evidence that QM probably have an effect on cognitive processes.

 [B]Quantum cognition[/B] is an emerging field which applies the mathematical formalism of quantum theory to model cognitive phenomena such as information processing by the human brain....
it is not reliant on the hypothesis that there is something micro-physical quantum mechanical about the brain

Please read what I put in bold from my post that you quoted.

 

[Kharakov]

My point is that it isn't a hint at all.

The math is used to map processes known to be deterministic in addition to processes which have not yet been proven to be deterministic.

I don't disagree that QM processes play some sort of role in brain function, I just don't think the role is non-deterministic nor do I think that it is non-conscious.

 

[ryan]

The math is used to map processes known to be deterministic in addition to processes which have not yet been proven to be deterministic.

But that math is also used to model QM, sooooo ...

I don't disagree that QM processes play some sort of role in brain function, I just don't think the role is non-deterministic nor do I think that it is non-conscious.

So your issue is that QM is deterministic. Well, my argument must assume pure randomness at the level of QM or below. Until they find this deterministic bottom, I feel like the assumption is not a very big stretch.

I do not understand what you mean when you say that you don't think the QM role is "non-conscious". Who is saying that it must be conscious?

 

[DBT]

My argument requires reasonable assumptions and is only meant to falsify DBT's certainty that free will can't exist. The argument is not meant to be the most probable possibility.

Except that your assumptions have been shown to be wrong by several posters, including myself.

Your contention is wrong for the basic reason that any form of random quantum interference within the system is not under the regulative control of 'you' as a conscious entity (also being shaped and formed by neural activity) nor neural networks as they perform their information processing activity which shapes and forms both the experience of you as a conscious entity along with your thoughts feelings, decisions and actions...which is not quantum randomness.

Hence the failure of your contention on page one of the first thread on the subject. Sorry, that is harshly put, but true.

 

[ryan]

My argument requires reasonable assumptions and is only meant to falsify DBT's certainty that free will can't exist. The argument is not meant to be the most probable possibility.

Except that your assumptions have been shown to be wrong by several posters, including myself.

You still seem to be confused about what I mean by "assumption". The reason why I say this is because your issue is not with any of my assumptions; rather, it's with my positive claim. Put differently, your issue is with the implication of my assumptions.

Your contention is wrong for the basic reason that any form of random quantum interference within the system is not under the regulative control of 'you' as a conscious entity (also being shaped and formed by neural activity) nor neural networks as they perform their information processing activity which shapes and forms both the experience of you as a conscious entity along with your thoughts feelings, decisions and actions...which is not quantum randomness.

Now we are back to what I was saying over and over again was making me crazy. You keep forgetting that the QM is a part of "I". In my argument, the QM gives "I" the property of freedom.

 

[bilby]

Except that your assumptions have been shown to be wrong by several posters, including myself.

You still seem to be confused about what I mean by "assumption". The reason why I say this is because your issue is not with any of my assumptions; rather, it's with my positive claim. Put differently, your issue is with the implication of my assumptions.

Your contention is wrong for the basic reason that any form of random quantum interference within the system is not under the regulative control of 'you' as a conscious entity (also being shaped and formed by neural activity) nor neural networks as they perform their information processing activity which shapes and forms both the experience of you as a conscious entity along with your thoughts feelings, decisions and actions...which is not quantum randomness.

Now we are back to what I was saying over and over again was making me crazy. You keep forgetting that the QM is a part of "I". In my argument, the QM gives "I" the property of freedom.

Except that you don't have an argument; you just keep asserting that 'QM gives "I" the property of freedom' without any explanation of how that could possibly be true.

My pineal gland is a part of "I". If I say 'The pineal gland gives "I" the property of freedom', then that would be a bald assertion, requiring some more detail on at least one plausible mechanism for this to occur to back it up.

Perhaps you think that it is obvious how QM leads to 'freedom'; perhaps you simply are making the error of thinking that 'random' and 'free' are the same thing (Hint: they are not).

What you are NOT doing is explaining why you think that 'QM gives "I" the property of freedom', or why anyone else should consider this anything other than an empty assertion.