A thought experiment on killing

[PyramidHead]

The paradox goes both ways:

If consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes, it is a bad guide for behavior.
If consequentialism is a bad guide for behavior, morality cannot be decided by consequences alone.
If morality cannot be decided by consequences alone, it does not necessarily matter that consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes.
If it does not necessarily matter that consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes, consequentialism is not necessarily a bad guide for behavior.

If something is logically self-contradictory, then it's fitness is suspect whether it is a bad guide for behaviour or not. The reason why you have 'necessarily' in there is because the idea that consequentialism leads to bad outcomes is a problem for consequentialism even if you don't plan on evaluating morality based on outcomes.

I think a more serious objection is that consequentialism is insufficient. Insisting that an act must be rated on the consequences of that act, only gets you from rating different acts to rating different outcomes. You still have to apply an arbitrary value system to the outcome, just as you would otherwise have done to the original act.

The point is that the values are always applied ultimately to the consequences. When it appears that values are being applied to rights, or to following rules, or to divine commands, in the end those considerations can be reduced to their outcomes. I have never come across a serious moral argument that could not be completely reduced to arguing about consequences.

I don't think you can justify 'ultimately', or 'in the end', or 'reduce to'. I've never come across a serious argument based on consequences that didn't ultimately reduce to arguments about arbitrary values. You may think that an argument about not killing people reduces to an argument about the avoiding the consequence of a lot of dead people, but you could equally argue that any argument about the consequence of a lot of dead people reduces to an arbitrary value judgement about dead people being undesirable in general.

I agree, actually. No consequences are inherently undesirable in themselves. I was just making that point to contrast with rules-based or rights-based views. Though they are phrased in terms of e.g. "murdering someone is a violation of their right to self-determination," beneath that lies the sentiment that violating one's right to self-determination is a bad thing because it makes bad things happen, and as you rightly say, we don't like those bad things so don't murder anybody please.

 

[Philos]

In any example that shows why consequentialism is false, it is always the consequences of adopting consequentialism that forms the basis for that conclusion!

Why is that a problem? If adopting consequentialism has negative consequences, then consequentialism is self-contradictory, whether it is true or not.

I think a more serious objection is that consequentialism is insufficient. Insisting that an act must be rated on the consequences of that act, only gets you from rating different acts to rating different outcomes. You still have to apply an arbitrary value system to the outcome, just as you would otherwise have done to the original act.

Togo,

Yes, this is the problem of 'the end justifies the means'. Consequentialism allows dreadful means as long as the end comes out OK. IMHO the philosophy lives in this place. It just doesn't work; consequences are not enough, nowhere near.

Alex.

 

[Togo]

I agree, actually. No consequences are inherently undesirable in themselves. I was just making that point to contrast with rules-based or rights-based views. Though they are phrased in terms of e.g. "murdering someone is a violation of their right to self-determination," beneath that lies the sentiment that violating one's right to self-determination is a bad thing because it makes bad things happen, and as you rightly say, we don't like those bad things so don't murder anybody please.

But saying 'we don't like those bad things' is just another way of saying they're inherently undesirable in themselves. You're still describing a rules-based system, you just have rules about outcomes, rather than about actions.

Yes, this is the problem of 'the end justifies the means'. Consequentialism allows dreadful means as long as the end comes out OK.
IMHO the philosophy lives in this place. It just doesn't work; consequences are not enough, nowhere near.

Near where I grew up, there was a playground that had emergency access for cars on both sides. Drivers would, very occasionally, take a short cut through the playground. Because this was illegal, they did it quite fast. Say by chance, one driver hits a child. That's clearly an immoral act under consequentialism, because the consequence was severe. But there were no noticeable consequences for any of the other drivers. Was their moral position any better, just because they were lucky?

The problem that consequentialism faces here is that, for most of the drivers, there is no downside. The problem is the risk. An analysis of the consequences doesn't help, because the chances of a bad outcome are tiny. What we need is a synthesis of the likely consequences, without knowing the specifics. Which ends up being a pronouncement like "it's immoral to speed through a playground, even if you don't happen to hit anyone." Aka, a moral rule.

Consequentialism suffers from two problems, from my POV. The first is that it doesn't, in practice, eliminate arbitrary moral rules. And the second is that actual consequences aren't a reliable measure of risk even after the event, let alone before, which means you're always dealing with hypotheticals based on distillations of observations and experience, which is exactly what moral rules tend to be in any case.

The critical point, in my estimation, is not whether you chose to style your rule in terms of consequences or in terms of absolutes, but whether it is subject to challenge. It is never enough to simply have a set of rules, you must always evaluate those rules to see if they are worthy of you. Circumstances and people change, and 'don't touch the cookie jar' is a useful rule when you're 5, but not when you're 50.

 

[Philos]

Near where I grew up, there was a playground that had emergency access for cars on both sides. Drivers would, very occasionally, take a short cut through the playground. Because this was illegal, they did it quite fast. Say by chance, one driver hits a child. That's clearly an immoral act under consequentialism, because the consequence was severe. But there were no noticeable consequences for any of the other drivers. Was their moral position any better, just because they were lucky?

The problem that consequentialism faces here is that, for most of the drivers, there is no downside. The problem is the risk. An analysis of the consequences doesn't help, because the chances of a bad outcome are tiny. What we need is a synthesis of the likely consequences, without knowing the specifics. Which ends up being a pronouncement like "it's immoral to speed through a playground, even if you don't happen to hit anyone." Aka, a moral rule.

Consequentialism suffers from two problems, from my POV. The first is that it doesn't, in practice, eliminate arbitrary moral rules. And the second is that actual consequences aren't a reliable measure of risk even after the event, let alone before, which means you're always dealing with hypotheticals based on distillations of observations and experience, which is exactly what moral rules tend to be in any case.

The critical point, in my estimation, is not whether you chose to style your rule in terms of consequences or in terms of absolutes, but whether it is subject to challenge. It is never enough to simply have a set of rules, you must always evaluate those rules to see if they are worthy of you. Circumstances and people change, and 'don't touch the cookie jar' is a useful rule when you're 5, but not when you're 50.

Togo,

On this topic, there is a interesting debate on the issue of 'moral luck'. I think it was between Bernard Williams and Tom Nagel?

So far our debate on this thread has been a lot about situations and consequences but we haven't talked much about the motives of the agent. IMHO morality is about motives if it is about anything at all. In my terrorist example I am wanting to know how people feel about doing something, how doing something would affect their feelings about themselves, issues such as personal bravery, conscience, guilt, regret... While the outcome of an event might bear on these feelings it would not (in Kant's view) change the rightness or wrongness of an act retrospectively.

Your playground example would be a good basis for a thought experiment on moral luck, motive and consequences.

Alex.

 

[ronburgundy]

Assuming a scenario in which killing the person intending death to innocent others is the only way to prevent those deaths.

Yes, yes, and yes.

In fact, same answers even if killing them is not the "only way" but the way most likely to succeed in saving those others' lives.
And also, same answers even if the person is not going to kill but "just" severely harm the others.

 

[Philos]

I have never come across a serious moral argument that could not be completely reduced to arguing about consequences.

Pyramid,

This is a late comment, but I have never come across a philosophical reduction that didn't raise my suspicions.

Of course, reductions are attractive as they appeal to our need for tidyness and completeness, but I'm not sure that philosophy is that tidy or complete.

Alex.

 

[arkirk]

Folks,

Here is a thought experiment which may help to clarify our thoughts on the killing of a person.

Imagine that you are in Pakistan in 1999 and have the opportunity to meet and the means to kill Osama bin Laden. This can be done privately and you will be able to escape afterwards undetected.

Given the facts above, I would ask some questions that may enlighten us on our own views and feelings about killing.

1. Would you want to kill bin Laden?

2. I you do, do you feel that you have the stomach for a face to face killing?

3. If the answer to the first two questions if 'Yes', do you believe that the action is right?

Alex.

There is nobody on this planet I want to kill. This killing business hasn't seemed to work for all of about 10,000 years now. Why should I think I can change reality? I suppose there is an answer to that, though I feel it will probably be formed because a person is impatient, fearful, and aggressive. If we look at bad leaders who have been killed to remove them from power, we find that usually the bad leaders are replaced with even worse ones.

In answer to the thought experiment. If you were sure you could get away with killing your adversary, you would very possibly also be able to control him in other ways that did not involve killing him. Obviously, if he tries to kill you, you may have no choice...but usually in no choice situations, you won't get away with it anyway.

 

[Jimmy Higgins]

bin Laden was in Afghanistan in '99. The US already had tried to kill him once. Republican obstructionism would prevent a second try.

Knowing what we knew then, cockpits should have been locked and inaccessible. That would have prevented the Towers being taken down. bin Laden has been killed, but terrorism still exists. It is hard to know whether killing bin Laden in the 90's would have prevented 9/11 or the rebirth of al Qaeda. But locking those cockpit doors would have prevented 9/11, or certainly narrowed down the death toll substantially.

 

[bilby]

bin Laden was in Afghanistan in '99. The US already had tried to kill him once. Republican obstructionism would prevent a second try.

Knowing what we knew then, cockpits should have been locked and inaccessible. That would have prevented the Towers being taken down. bin Laden has been killed, but terrorism still exists. It is hard to know whether killing bin Laden in the 90's would have prevented 9/11 or the rebirth of al Qaeda. But locking those cockpit doors would have prevented 9/11, or certainly narrowed down the death toll substantially.

Locking cockpit doors has possibly already lead to more deaths than it has prevented; and it is almost certainly going to lead to more lives lost than saved in the long run.

It was a stupid political response motivated by fear; Aviation safety decisions should be based on rational assessment not only of the benefits of any proposed change, but also of the new risks that change might engender, not on the emotions of politicians desperate to be seen to be 'doing something'.

Hull loss incidents for airliners in the developed world are now so rare that pilot suicide accounts for at least three, possibly as many as five, of the six most recent events. Lockable cockpit doors make it easy for a suicidal pilot to exclude the second pilot (and the cabin crew) from the cockpit while he acts - something that was previously very hard to achieve.

Locking cockpit doors 'prevents' another 9/11; but another 9/11 is highly unlikely anyway - Aircrew and passengers no longer assume that their lives will be saved by compliance with hijackers, so locked door or not, hijacking has become very difficult indeed to accomplish.

 

[Philos]

Locking cockpit doors has possibly already lead to more deaths than it has prevented; and it is almost certainly going to lead to more lives lost than saved in the long run.

It was a stupid political response motivated by fear; Aviation safety decisions should be based on rational assessment not only of the benefits of any proposed change, but also of the new risks that change might engender, not on the emotions of politicians desperate to be seen to be 'doing something'.

Hull loss incidents for airliners in the developed world are now so rare that pilot suicide accounts for at least three, possibly as many as five, of the six most recent events. Lockable cockpit doors make it easy for a suicidal pilot to exclude the second pilot (and the cabin crew) from the cockpit while he acts - something that was previously very hard to achieve.

Locking cockpit doors 'prevents' another 9/11; but another 9/11 is highly unlikely anyway - Aircrew and passengers no longer assume that their lives will be saved by compliance with hijackers, so locked door or not, hijacking has become very difficult indeed to accomplish.

bilby,

Your comment is highly relevant, considering what just happened in the French Alps!

Alex.