According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

Sapolsky is fairly clear that his book is not aimed at people who would not have their mind changed by any measure or type of scientific evidence. It's not that he is unaware of religious/philosophical arguments for free will, they just aren't relevant to a scientific discussion of the topic. I must say I am fairly sympathetic to this argument, as an anthropologist. Free will is interesting as a concept and influential as a motivator for social action, but it's important to understand where science ends and speculation begins, and to traverse the boundary only consciously.

But what I’m contending here is, that a scientific discussion of the topic, BY ITSELF, isn’t relevant to the issue, either. If you are going to talk about free will/determinism, you cannot JUST talk about biology; indeed, even if you want to restrict the discussion to science, you still can’t ONLY talk about biology, because biology rests on a scaffolding of chemistry and physics.

Although I haven’t read his book, from reviews of it, it sounds as if his aim is libertarian free will. If he doesn’t even consider the compatibilist version, the work is insufficient.

 

[Jarhyn]

I disagree about whether it is an empirical question.

Reality has a set of behaviors and qualities that, by any other name, would still be as they are, and there are relationships which, regardless of how they are described, interact in fixed ways.

Algorithms, contingent mechanisms, freedoms of a system towards some outcome are empirically observable qualities of systems, regardless of whether we name or capture that in any other language than that of "that which exists as it is".

Metaphysics is the task of discovering the ways language must go together to remain coherent and descriptive of the underlying reality, and of "physical systems" in general.

That cannot be done unless the language used is based on empirical observation.

I would pose that intuition will get us close, but it will tend towards certain parts being almost comically wrong, too. When it comes time to start naming things formally, we should do our damnedest to see if there is something from the empirical side that seems to be fairly close to the idea suggested by intuition, and see if the "intuitive" side doesn't make more sense when through enforcement of the empirically derived language.

That is the process I used to describe free will using the language of algorithms, contingent mechanisms, and precursor conditions, no more and no less.

 

[pood]

I disagree about whether it is an empirical question.

Reality has a set of behaviors and qualities that, by any other name, would still be as they are, and there are relationships which, regardless of how they are described, interact in fixed ways.

Algorithms, contingent mechanisms, freedoms of a system towards some outcome are empirically observable qualities of systems, regardless of whether we name or capture that in any other language than that of "that which exists as it is".

Metaphysics is the task of discovering the ways language must go together to remain coherent and descriptive of the underlying reality, and of "physical systems" in general.

That cannot be done unless the language used is based on empirical observation.

I would pose that intuition will get us close, but it will tend towards certain parts being almost comically wrong, too. When it comes time to start naming things formally, we should do our damnedest to see if there is something from the empirical side that seems to be fairly close to the idea suggested by intuition, and see if the "intuitive" side doesn't make more sense when through enforcement of the empirically derived language.

That is the process I used to describe free will using the language of algorithms, contingent mechanisms, and precursor conditions, no more and no less.

You’re right, it’s not entirely unempirical, but my point is that a key test for DBT’s claims — that we cannot do, other than what we do — can never be tested. That’s the crux of it.

Hard determinism itself is unscientific, because it does not seem subject to being tested by any of the tools in the suite of scientific methodologies. For example, falsification. Falsification isn’t a be-all and end-all for science, but it does have a place. Try to imagine a test to falsify hard determinism.

I can say, confronted with a choice between Pepsi and Coke, that I prefer Pepsi. But just to confute hard determinism, I choose Coke instead. And the hard determinist simply responds, “You were hard determined to try to refute hard determinism and that is why you picked Coke.“

It’s very like the religious belief that some hold, that God willed you to do what you did, and therefore whatever you did was God’s will.

As I have stated before, a simple demonstration of hard determinism would be if I attempted to drink Pepsi and some force, like an invisible hand, stayed my motion and forced me to grasp Coke instead. Needless to say, this has never happened to anyone — or if it has, to my knowledge no one has reported it.

 

[Jarhyn]

I disagree about whether it is an empirical question.

Reality has a set of behaviors and qualities that, by any other name, would still be as they are, and there are relationships which, regardless of how they are described, interact in fixed ways.

Algorithms, contingent mechanisms, freedoms of a system towards some outcome are empirically observable qualities of systems, regardless of whether we name or capture that in any other language than that of "that which exists as it is".

Metaphysics is the task of discovering the ways language must go together to remain coherent and descriptive of the underlying reality, and of "physical systems" in general.

That cannot be done unless the language used is based on empirical observation.

I would pose that intuition will get us close, but it will tend towards certain parts being almost comically wrong, too. When it comes time to start naming things formally, we should do our damnedest to see if there is something from the empirical side that seems to be fairly close to the idea suggested by intuition, and see if the "intuitive" side doesn't make more sense when through enforcement of the empirically derived language.

That is the process I used to describe free will using the language of algorithms, contingent mechanisms, and precursor conditions, no more and no less.

You’re right, it’s not entirely unempirical, but my point is that a key test for DBT’s claims — that we cannot do, other than what we do — can never be tested. That’s the crux of it.

Hard determinism itself is unscientific, because it does not seem subject to being tested by any of the tools in the suite of scientific methodologies. For example, falsification. Falsification isn’t a be-all and end-all for science, but it does have a place. Try to imagine a test to falsify hard determinism.

I can say, confronted with a choice between Pepsi and Coke, that I prefer Pepsi. But just to confute hard determinism, I choose Coke instead. And the hard determinist simply responds, “You were hard determined to try to refute hard determinism and that is why you picked Coke.“

It’s very like the religious belief that some hold, that God willed you to do what you did, and therefore whatever you did was God’s will.

As I have stated before, a simple demonstration of hard determinism would be if I attempted to drink Pepsi and some force, like an invisible hand, stayed my motion and forced me to grasp Coke instead. Needless to say, this has never happened to anyone — or if it has, to my knowledge no one has reported it.

Yes. This is a good and succinct clarification of your position, specifically that while some people make attempts at empiricism.

I will also caution that there are isolated situations where the "invisible hand" does act, though, namely for some people when attempting particularly major acts; for instance there are people who cannot physically commit a directly violent act no matter how they push themselves... Or those who cannot stay the activity of some other agency within their own brain.

In these situations the communicative, analytical portion of the brain may lack consciousness of the driving controller of behavior, and the result would end up being a lack of "free will", a failure of the the "special will", in the form of a lack of review prior to execution.

This does not invalidate all the times when such forces are absent, but it is important to recognize that the claim cannot be made so categorically.

 

[Politesse]

.Although I haven’t read his book, from reviews of it, it sounds as if his aim is libertarian free will. If he doesn’t even consider the compatibilist version, the work is insufficient.

I don't see why not. His real complaint is about people messing around in his field, making false claims about neuroscience in defense of free will. There's no reason you should need to address the entirety of metaphysics just to refute in clear and concrete terms the idea of mystical agency. Neuroendocrinology is what he knows about, so it's what he wrote about. Who would do any differently?

He does tackle a few versions of compatibilism, in the middle chapters, but its pretty clear that defending the scientific method is still his priority there. His main objections are to ideas like "the will decides, then the body acts" which are contradicted by simple observation of the nervous system.

 

[pood]

.Although I haven’t read his book, from reviews of it, it sounds as if his aim is libertarian free will. If he doesn’t even consider the compatibilist version, the work is insufficient.

I don't see why not. His real complaint is about people messing around in his field, making false claims about neuroscience in defense of free will. There's no reason you should need to address the entirety of metaphysics just to refute in clear and concrete terms the idea of mystical agency. Neuroendocrinology is what he knows about, so it's what he wrote about. Who would do any differently?

He does tackle a few versions of compatibilism, in the middle chapters, but its pretty clear that defending the scientific method is still his priority there. His main objections are to ideas like "the will decides, then the body acts" which are contradicted by simple observation of the nervous system.

Compatibilism, of course, does not invoke any sort of ”mystical agency.” There is nothing mystical about it.

Of course, “the will decides, then the body acts” is contradicted by the facts if we take that statement to mean that there is some kind of dualistic homunculus of widget or executive authority or soul that oversees the run of things in my brain. But that is libertarianism, the idea that there is some kind of magical ”will” outside the normal deterministic run of events, including the deterministic workings of the brain.

But the point is that the body and mind are interrelated, and when I get deterministic inputs and my mind subconsciously weighs these inputs, that is perfect OK for compatibilism, because my mind, including my subconscious, IS me. And as the LIbet experiments showed, the conscious mind is perfectly able to exercise a veto power over the results of subconscious deliberations. If I push a rock down a hill, it has no choice but to follow the path of least resistance. If you push a human down a hill you are likely to see a very different result.

 

[Politesse]

" mind" ... "weighs these inputs"

What physical, non-mystical process is this meant to describe?

 

[DBT]

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will:

A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

It's far from being a good critique

I'm devastated. I felt sure you'd be persuaded.

The current rate for a free will rationale is hovering at around 10 cents. You can buy them in bulk to save money.

The issue of free will is not about metaphysics, ''possible worlds, had things been different, you could have acted differently,'' but the question of what free will is and how it works in relation to a deterministic world where all events are shaped by antecedents, including brain activity and decision making.

Defined by the compatibilist as constant conjunction or ''events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"), where free will is said to be a decision made without external force, coercion or undue influence.

Not in 'possible worlds' where 'things could have been different,' but in relation to a deterministic system as it evolves from past to present and future states.

 

[pood]

" mind" ... "weighs these inputs"

What physical, non-mystical process is this meant to describe?

The mind weighing inputs is a mystical process to you?

Don’t you think that a physical brain exists, and functions physically?

 

[pood]

Indeed, what is mystical is hard determinism, that an impersonal, non-material, invisible ”force” emanating from the big bang forces me to choose Coke when I really want Pepsi. And like God, you can neither detect nor falsify this enigmatic … something. Now that’s mystical!

 

[Politesse]

" mind" ... "weighs these inputs"

What physical, non-mystical process is this meant to describe?

The mind weighing inputs is a mystical process to you?

Don’t you think that a physical brain exists, and functions physically?

Not really an answer to my question.

Are you claiming that the physical brain - all of it, all at once, but none of the rest of the nervous and endocrine systems- is this "mind" of yours, that is also who you consider the "you" that makes decision?

And of course the brain has physical functions, but I'm you what you think is happening, physically, when your "mind" is "weighing inputs"?

 

[Politesse]

Indeed, what is mystical is hard determinism, that an impersonal, non-material, invisible ”force” emanating from the big bang forces me to choose Coke when I really want Pepsi. And like God, you can neither detect nor falsify this enigmatic … something. Now that’s mystical!

The nervous system is most certainly detectable, and its processes are observable. No non-material force is required to explain its observed functions. No force is required at all. Our universe is deterministic in nature, and if there's any deep purpose to it beyond what we can see, that may be so but it is a question for theologians and phiosophers. Science does not have to the tools to answer why the universe exists, only to observe how it exists.

 

[pood]

Our universe is deterministic in nature, and if there's any deep purpose to it beyond what we can see, that may be so but it is a question for theologians and phiosophers. Science does not have to the tools to answer why the universe exists, only to observe how it exists.

I never argued otherwise, and have no idea why you are writing this to me.

As to the rest:

Of course the nervous system is part of the brain and the nervous system and the brain and the body work together as a unit. Recent studies in embodied intelligence hold that consciousness and self-awareness may require physical evolved bodies in order to emerge, thus casting doubt on the prospect of sentient computers.

So the nervous system receiving and responding to deterministic inputs, and the subconscious mind, and all the rest of it, are involved in our decision-making. This is precisely what compatibilist free will predicts. The idea that these facts somehow preclude our having free will rests on the unjustified premise that “true” free will must be libertarian — detached from our nervous system, our subconscious, our synapses and neurons, etc. Of course compatibilism rejects this thesis, as do I. So what is actually your question to me? I am not a believer in libertarian, or contra-causal, free will.

DBT and other hard determinists seem to think that the brain is a passive, mute, dumb receptacle responding mindlessly and reflexively to external inputs, like a rock rolling downhill after a push by a hand, like a moth gravitating toward bright light. I and others have simply pointed out that the brain and nervous system and body, in all their complexity, are PART OF the deterministic stream, taking in inputs and weighing and considering them, a wholly physical process void of any mysticism. The brain, the nervous system, the body, TAKE IN deterministic inputs, and OUTPUT — determine — choices, outcomes.

I spoke earlier of how Jerry Coyne told an improv jazz musician that his piece was composed IN ADVANCE of the musician actually sitting down to even think about it. Do you believe that? Because that‘s the most mystical idea I’ve heard yet.

 

[Politesse]

Our universe is deterministic in nature, and if there's any deep purpose to it beyond what we can see, that may be so but it is a question for theologians and phiosophers. Science does not have to the tools to answer why the universe exists, only to observe how it exists.

I never argued otherwise, and have no idea why you are writing this to me.

Because you are positing that determinism requires magical forces beyond the observable. We cannot really comment on that as scientists. If there is a mystical force that obliges the universe to look a certain way, that's the Pope's problem. The scientist's purview is the observable and predictable. You certainly don't need to understand any mystical concepts in order to conclude that the observable world is deterministic in character. We know that it is, because when we make predictions based on unifortarian reasoning, they invariably work. Why it is predictable may be an interesting question, but it's not relevant to the topic at hand.

As to the rest:

Of course the nervous system is part of the brain and the nervous system and the brain and the body work together as a unit. Recent studies in embodied intelligence hold that consciousness and self-awareness may require physical evolved bodies in order to emerge, thus casting doubt on the prospect of sentient computers.

So the nervous system receiving and responding to deterministic inputs, and the subconscious mind, and all the rest of it, are involved in our decision-making. This is precisely what compatibilist free will predicts. The idea that these facts somehow preclude our having free will rests on the unjustified premise that “true” free will must be libertarian — detached from our nervous system, our subconscious, our synapses and neurons, etc. Of course compatibilism rejects this thesis, as do I. So what is actually your question to me? I am not a believer in libertarian, or contra-causal, free will.

DBT and other hard determinists seem to think that the brain is a passive, mute, dumb receptacle responding mindlessly and reflexively to external inputs, like a rock rolling downhill after a push by a hand, like a moth gravitating toward bright light. I and others have simply pointed out that the brain and nervous system and body, in all their complexity, are PART OF the deterministic stream, taking in inputs and weighing and considering them, a wholly physical process void of any mysticism. The brain, the nervous system, the body, TAKE IN deterministic inputs, and OUTPUT — determine — choices, outcomes.

I spoke earlier of how Jerry Coyne told an improv jazz musician that his piece was composed IN ADVANCE of the musician actually sitting down to even think about it. Do you believe that? Because that‘s the most mystical idea I’ve heard yet.

So you have posited that "mind" "myself" and "brain" are all synonyms, yes? But that "brain" also includes the entirety of the nervous system, which is "part of the brain" rather than (as is usually supposed) the other way around? But not the sensory organs that introduce data into the system? Or are they also included in "brain"?

I'm pressing you on this point, because I think you are educated anough to know that "mind" is a fiddly concept at best, and has meant many different things to many different people from many different cultures. If you're going to talk about cultural abstractions like minds and wills and decisions as though they were not only real but somehow indistinguishable from their material counterparts, it's necessary to determine what material structures and processes these metaphorical entities are supposed to be constituted in. How can I speak reasonably about what the "mind" does within the body, while leaving it fuzzy what organs and processes I'm even referring to? You mention prediction, but a compatibilist model of the mind can only predict anything if it is, well, completely undistinguishable from the deterministic model of the universe as a whole.

 

[Jarhyn]

" mind" ... "weighs these inputs"

What physical, non-mystical process is this meant to describe?

The mind weighing inputs is a mystical process to you?

Don’t you think that a physical brain exists, and functions physically?

Not really an answer to my question.

Are you claiming that the physical brain - all of it, all at once, but none of the rest of the nervous and endocrine systems- is this "mind" of yours, that is also who you consider the "you" that makes decision?

And of course the brain has physical functions, but I'm you what you think is happening, physically, when your "mind" is "weighing inputs"?

So while I know you mean well here, I think you are being a bit uncharitable here.

What I think personally is happening when the brain weighs inputs is that it is quite literally detecting whether some balance of signals exceeds some threshold, possibly a threshold set by an opposing set of signals, to see which set of signals has more force to overcome the other, therefore selecting a winner. The implementation is rather unimportant, but neurons are "complete" insofar as the requirements of function for doing that dance.

At no point is any part of it nonphysical or mystical, and you can describe the experience at any given step or location completely.

@pood embodied consciousness has its issues, insofar as from my perspective it's an attempt to capture how things like "A and B" become 'naturally meaningful' in the form of "clear and sunny" combined with the 'biocentrism' aspect that attempts to head-in-sand about machine consciousness.

There is no fundamental difference sensational difference between a signal originating between a sensor mediated by neural switches activated with dye molecules and a signal originating from a sensor activated by a photovoltaic cell protected by a filter, insofar as both are detections of the natural verb/noun "is blue" by whatever name.

Embodied Consciousness or whatever does recognize that systems of consciousness require some manner of conserved environmental access to become conscious of stuff, but the issue here is in all the additional assumptions that the adherents to that religion shoehorn in atop the need for a system of consciousness to have access to meaningful pre-linguistic natural phenomena, requirements such as "evolved" or even "accesses non-simulated spaces".

We can and do embody ChatGPT in Minecraft, complete with access to a limited exposure of sense information. The issue is that the adherents to the religion of embodied consciousness do not see is that "embodiment" is a very general concept, and anything with a physical instantiation and some manner of messaging to an external environment qualifies as "embodied", so literally every computer system and machine which accepts external input existing as a construction of physical stuff qualifies as having "embodied consciousness".

 

[pood]

Our universe is deterministic in nature, and if there's any deep purpose to it beyond what we can see, that may be so but it is a question for theologians and phiosophers. Science does not have to the tools to answer why the universe exists, only to observe how it exists.

I never argued otherwise, and have no idea why you are writing this to me.

Because you are positing that determinism requires magical forces beyond the observable.

No, I am not. I have no idea how you get this from what I wrote. What magical forces? The brain is a magical force? The body? The nervous system?

We cannot really comment on that as scientists. If there is a mystical force that obliges the universe to look a certain way, that's the Pope's problem. The scientist's purview is the observable and predictable. You certainly don't need to understand any mystical concepts in order to conclude that the observable world is deterministic in character.

I know. Compatiblism IS determinism. It’s also called “soft determinism,” as opposed to DBT’s hard determinism.

We know that it is, because when we make predictions based on unifortarian reasoning, they invariably work.

Right.

Why it is predictable may be an interesting question, but it's not relevant to the topic at hand.

I agree.

As to the rest:

Of course the nervous system is part of the brain and the nervous system and the brain and the body work together as a unit. Recent studies in embodied intelligence hold that consciousness and self-awareness may require physical evolved bodies in order to emerge, thus casting doubt on the prospect of sentient computers.

So the nervous system receiving and responding to deterministic inputs, and the subconscious mind, and all the rest of it, are involved in our decision-making. This is precisely what compatibilist free will predicts. The idea that these facts somehow preclude our having free will rests on the unjustified premise that “true” free will must be libertarian — detached from our nervous system, our subconscious, our synapses and neurons, etc. Of course compatibilism rejects this thesis, as do I. So what is actually your question to me? I am not a believer in libertarian, or contra-causal, free will.

DBT and other hard determinists seem to think that the brain is a passive, mute, dumb receptacle responding mindlessly and reflexively to external inputs, like a rock rolling downhill after a push by a hand, like a moth gravitating toward bright light. I and others have simply pointed out that the brain and nervous system and body, in all their complexity, are PART OF the deterministic stream, taking in inputs and weighing and considering them, a wholly physical process void of any mysticism. The brain, the nervous system, the body, TAKE IN deterministic inputs, and OUTPUT — determine — choices, outcomes.

I spoke earlier of how Jerry Coyne told an improv jazz musician that his piece was composed IN ADVANCE of the musician actually sitting down to even think about it. Do you believe that? Because that‘s the most mystical idea I’ve heard yet.

So you have posited that "mind" "myself" and "brain" are all synonyms, yes? But that "brain" also includes the entirety of the nervous system, which is "part of the brain" rather than (as is usually supposed) the other way around? But not the sensory organs that introduce data into the system? Or are they also included in "brain"?

I'm pressing you on this point, because I think you are educated anough to know that "mind" is a fiddly concept at best, and has meant many different things to many different people from many different cultures. If you're going to talk about cultural abstractions like minds and wills and decisions as though they were not only real but somehow indistinguishable from their material counterparts, it's necessary to determine what material structures and processes these metaphorical entities are supposed to be constituted in. How can I speak reasonably about what the "mind" does within the body, while leaving it fuzzy what organs and processes I'm even referring to? You mention prediction, but a compatibilist model of the mind can only predict anything if it is, well, completely undistinguishable from the deterministic model of the universe as a whole.

Yes, the mind is a fiddly concept, and as a matter of fact, we don’t know fully how the brain works, and we really have no idea how the brain produces consciousness include qualia — the so called Hard Problem.

All that said, I have posited only that the brain is part of the deterministic stream, and determines its own outputs based on deterministic inputs. That’s compatibilism. What’s the problem?

 

[Politesse]

Our universe is deterministic in nature, and if there's any deep purpose to it beyond what we can see, that may be so but it is a question for theologians and phiosophers. Science does not have to the tools to answer why the universe exists, only to observe how it exists.

I never argued otherwise, and have no idea why you are writing this to me.

Because you are positing that determinism requires magical forces beyond the observable.

No, I am not. I have no idea how you get this from what I wrote. What magical forces? The brain is a magical force? The body? The nervous system?

We cannot really comment on that as scientists. If there is a mystical force that obliges the universe to look a certain way, that's the Pope's problem. The scientist's purview is the observable and predictable. You certainly don't need to understand any mystical concepts in order to conclude that the observable world is deterministic in character.

I know. Compatiblism IS determinism. It’s also called “soft determinism,” as opposed to DBT’s hard determinism.

We know that it is, because when we make predictions based on unifortarian reasoning, they invariably work.

Right.

Why it is predictable may be an interesting question, but it's not relevant to the topic at hand.

I agree.

As to the rest:

Of course the nervous system is part of the brain and the nervous system and the brain and the body work together as a unit. Recent studies in embodied intelligence hold that consciousness and self-awareness may require physical evolved bodies in order to emerge, thus casting doubt on the prospect of sentient computers.

So the nervous system receiving and responding to deterministic inputs, and the subconscious mind, and all the rest of it, are involved in our decision-making. This is precisely what compatibilist free will predicts. The idea that these facts somehow preclude our having free will rests on the unjustified premise that “true” free will must be libertarian — detached from our nervous system, our subconscious, our synapses and neurons, etc. Of course compatibilism rejects this thesis, as do I. So what is actually your question to me? I am not a believer in libertarian, or contra-causal, free will.

DBT and other hard determinists seem to think that the brain is a passive, mute, dumb receptacle responding mindlessly and reflexively to external inputs, like a rock rolling downhill after a push by a hand, like a moth gravitating toward bright light. I and others have simply pointed out that the brain and nervous system and body, in all their complexity, are PART OF the deterministic stream, taking in inputs and weighing and considering them, a wholly physical process void of any mysticism. The brain, the nervous system, the body, TAKE IN deterministic inputs, and OUTPUT — determine — choices, outcomes.

I spoke earlier of how Jerry Coyne told an improv jazz musician that his piece was composed IN ADVANCE of the musician actually sitting down to even think about it. Do you believe that? Because that‘s the most mystical idea I’ve heard yet.

So you have posited that "mind" "myself" and "brain" are all synonyms, yes? But that "brain" also includes the entirety of the nervous system, which is "part of the brain" rather than (as is usually supposed) the other way around? But not the sensory organs that introduce data into the system? Or are they also included in "brain"?

I'm pressing you on this point, because I think you are educated anough to know that "mind" is a fiddly concept at best, and has meant many different things to many different people from many different cultures. If you're going to talk about cultural abstractions like minds and wills and decisions as though they were not only real but somehow indistinguishable from their material counterparts, it's necessary to determine what material structures and processes these metaphorical entities are supposed to be constituted in. How can I speak reasonably about what the "mind" does within the body, while leaving it fuzzy what organs and processes I'm even referring to? You mention prediction, but a compatibilist model of the mind can only predict anything if it is, well, completely undistinguishable from the deterministic model of the universe as a whole.

Yes, the mind is a fiddly concept, and as a matter of fact, we don’t know fully how the brain works, and we really have no idea how the brain produces consciousness include qualia — the so called Hard Problem.

All that said, I have posited only that the brain is part of the deterministic stream, and determines its own outputs based on deterministic inputs. That’s compatibilism. What’s the problem?

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

 

[Jarhyn]

Our universe is deterministic in nature, and if there's any deep purpose to it beyond what we can see, that may be so but it is a question for theologians and phiosophers. Science does not have to the tools to answer why the universe exists, only to observe how it exists.

I never argued otherwise, and have no idea why you are writing this to me.

Because you are positing that determinism requires magical forces beyond the observable.

No, I am not. I have no idea how you get this from what I wrote. What magical forces? The brain is a magical force? The body? The nervous system?

We cannot really comment on that as scientists. If there is a mystical force that obliges the universe to look a certain way, that's the Pope's problem. The scientist's purview is the observable and predictable. You certainly don't need to understand any mystical concepts in order to conclude that the observable world is deterministic in character.

I know. Compatiblism IS determinism. It’s also called “soft determinism,” as opposed to DBT’s hard determinism.

We know that it is, because when we make predictions based on unifortarian reasoning, they invariably work.

Right.

Why it is predictable may be an interesting question, but it's not relevant to the topic at hand.

I agree.

As to the rest:

Of course the nervous system is part of the brain and the nervous system and the brain and the body work together as a unit. Recent studies in embodied intelligence hold that consciousness and self-awareness may require physical evolved bodies in order to emerge, thus casting doubt on the prospect of sentient computers.

So the nervous system receiving and responding to deterministic inputs, and the subconscious mind, and all the rest of it, are involved in our decision-making. This is precisely what compatibilist free will predicts. The idea that these facts somehow preclude our having free will rests on the unjustified premise that “true” free will must be libertarian — detached from our nervous system, our subconscious, our synapses and neurons, etc. Of course compatibilism rejects this thesis, as do I. So what is actually your question to me? I am not a believer in libertarian, or contra-causal, free will.

DBT and other hard determinists seem to think that the brain is a passive, mute, dumb receptacle responding mindlessly and reflexively to external inputs, like a rock rolling downhill after a push by a hand, like a moth gravitating toward bright light. I and others have simply pointed out that the brain and nervous system and body, in all their complexity, are PART OF the deterministic stream, taking in inputs and weighing and considering them, a wholly physical process void of any mysticism. The brain, the nervous system, the body, TAKE IN deterministic inputs, and OUTPUT — determine — choices, outcomes.

I spoke earlier of how Jerry Coyne told an improv jazz musician that his piece was composed IN ADVANCE of the musician actually sitting down to even think about it. Do you believe that? Because that‘s the most mystical idea I’ve heard yet.

So you have posited that "mind" "myself" and "brain" are all synonyms, yes? But that "brain" also includes the entirety of the nervous system, which is "part of the brain" rather than (as is usually supposed) the other way around? But not the sensory organs that introduce data into the system? Or are they also included in "brain"?

I'm pressing you on this point, because I think you are educated anough to know that "mind" is a fiddly concept at best, and has meant many different things to many different people from many different cultures. If you're going to talk about cultural abstractions like minds and wills and decisions as though they were not only real but somehow indistinguishable from their material counterparts, it's necessary to determine what material structures and processes these metaphorical entities are supposed to be constituted in. How can I speak reasonably about what the "mind" does within the body, while leaving it fuzzy what organs and processes I'm even referring to? You mention prediction, but a compatibilist model of the mind can only predict anything if it is, well, completely undistinguishable from the deterministic model of the universe as a whole.

Yes, the mind is a fiddly concept, and as a matter of fact, we don’t know fully how the brain works, and we really have no idea how the brain produces consciousness include qualia — the so called Hard Problem.

All that said, I have posited only that the brain is part of the deterministic stream, and determines its own outputs based on deterministic inputs. That’s compatibilism. What’s the problem?

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

Our position is not different from "determinism is a thing". The difference is between determinism and "hard determinism".

I have been clear with what that physical process is, namely that it is the implementation of logical determination of output state through stately switching systems. This is observable, and understandable as to how some natural phenomena being measured as to quality allows verbiage about those qualities to be generated through the natural verbiage of the gates that build the stately system.

For example "A and B and not C and not D" does not allow the building of "line" but if we replace A, B, C, D with "blue at quadrant N", we can see how some concept of AND and NOT among those quadrants starts to build into consciousness of a line.

The brain makes statements and makes contingency around the truth of propositions, thereby forming wills, and those wills have freedoms in terms of where and why execution may reach some particular statement of them.

As such, the brain can be abstracted as a computer with programs that compile and execute other programs, (the wills as programs) and their freedoms as indicated in terms of the contingent mechanisms, and whether they are free to some outcome as to whether the preconditions to the contingencies are met, regardless of whether the contingent mechanism has sampled the state so as to activate.

In this way, the compatibilist does not have a position different from "determinism". The only difference is that the compatibilist recognizes that all of the language about freedom is still valid, if it is used to discuss the algorithms and the vector of the system and how outside forces would change it in various ways, even absent the reification of those forces. The hard determinist instead ascribes a magical power, fatalism, which they believe reaches into them and removes any ability to participate and renders the self a casual observer of shadows on the wall.

 

[pood]

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

Sigh. I am not ”throwing a fit.” I thought I was having a conversation. I seems you are determined to turn it into some kind of confrontation. I have no interest in that.

Let me try again. Please read carefully.

Compatibilism is not “distinguished” from determinism. Compatibilism IS determinism.

Got that? Finally?

Now, why don‘t you ask DBT what physical, observable processes HE is describing? You know, the process that allegedly makes a person choosing who to marry, what job to take, and what to do with the rest of his or her life, indistinguishable from a rock rolling down a hill. The process that means an improv jazz musician didn’t actually create his piece. I mean, seriously. He’s the one advancing an absurdity, not me.

Finally, if you wish to have a reasonable conversation about this topic, I will engage with you. If not, I won’t. Your choice.

 

[Politesse]

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

Sigh. I am not ”throwing a fit.” I thought I was having a conversation. I seems you are determined to turn it into some kind of confrontation. I have no interest in that.

Let me try again. Please read carefully.

Compatibilism is not “distinguished” from determinism. Compatibilism IS determinism.

Got that? Finally?

Now, why don‘t you ask DBT what physical, observable processes HE is describing? You know, the process that allegedly makes a person choosing who to marry, what job to take, and what to do with the rest of his or her life, indistinguishable from a rock rolling down a hill. The process that means an improv jazz musician didn’t actually create his piece. I mean, seriously. He’s the one advancing an absurdity, not me.

Finally, if you wish to have a reasonable conversation about this topic, I will engage with you. If not, I won’t. Your choice.

If the positions are indistinguishable, why distinguish them?

I have no interest in defending DBTs arguments for them.

I'm rapidly losing interest in a thread ostensibly about a book, but one that no one has read or plans to read.