According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Jarhyn]

ignoring unconscious causality

First, I'm not sure given my definition of 'conscious' that anything at all strictly lacks the phenomena of physical experience. In fact stated that way nothing lacks the phenomena of physical experience, because everything experiences change due to physical interaction.

Still, causality is not always unconscious, even by your definition: you are ignoring all the remaining extant conscious activities which are causal, including your own decisions. They are not contra-causal, they have been caused, but being caused does not mean something is non-causal.

You are yet again confusing in your post contingent and necessary truths.

There is a difference between "this structure implements 'if this then that'" and "this, given 'if this then that' therefore that".

 

[Ruth Harris]

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will:

A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

Thanks for the good article! It has one paragraph which explains clearly what I was trying to say in my opening post but could not manage to do well:

Sapolsky’s broader mistake seems to be assuming his questions are purely scientific: answered by looking just at what the science says. While science is relevant, we first need some idea of what free will is (which is a metaphysical question) and how it relates to moral responsibility (a normative question). This is something philosophers have been interrogating for a very long time.

We are more than just physical beings ruled by our environment.

Ruth

 

[bilby]

We are more than just physical beings ruled by our environment.

No, we aren't.

The laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood.

Seriously. The laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood.

 

[Ruth Harris]

No, we aren't.

In your view. Fair enough, but that is not my view. Like I said before, philosophy is not a strong suit for me so I don't typically get into deep discussions or arguments about it. I won't derail this thread with my reasons for holding this position but you can guess it pretty easily by looking at my profile.

The articles you linked were pretty interesting. So were the comments. Thanks for sharing them.

Ruth

 

[Politesse]

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will:

A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

Thanks for the good article! It has one paragraph which explains clearly what I was trying to say in my opening post but could not manage to do well:

Sapolsky’s broader mistake seems to be assuming his questions are purely scientific: answered by looking just at what the science says. While science is relevant, we first need some idea of what free will is (which is a metaphysical question) and how it relates to moral responsibility (a normative question). This is something philosophers have been interrogating for a very long time.

We are more than just physical beings ruled by our environment.

Ruth

Why would a scientist feel compelled to comment on the "metaphysics" of free will? Robert Sapolsky is a neuroendocrinologist, not a religious leader.

 

[Jarhyn]

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will:

A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

Thanks for the good article! It has one paragraph which explains clearly what I was trying to say in my opening post but could not manage to do well:

Sapolsky’s broader mistake seems to be assuming his questions are purely scientific: answered by looking just at what the science says. While science is relevant, we first need some idea of what free will is (which is a metaphysical question) and how it relates to moral responsibility (a normative question). This is something philosophers have been interrogating for a very long time.

We are more than just physical beings ruled by our environment.

Ruth

Why would a scientist feel compelled to comment on the "metaphysics" of free will? Robert Sapolsky is a neuroendocrinologist, not a religious leader.

Well, I've felt as an information scientist to comment on the metaphysics of "free will" a time or two, specifically about the process by which algorithms come to be extant and how they see execution in the universe.

I've repeatedly unpacked all the words I mean when I say "they had free will" to the extent I can say the same idea in some contexts with the words "it was a skill issue".

I don't think that's a matter of religion exactly, but it's also not a matter of endocrinology either, since the endocrine system is itself rather merely a part, and not well situated as a field of study to understand a more holistic model of the human mind.

If someone doesn't have a deep and abiding history of understanding the math of how computation works and how linguistic systems originate from particular forms of structures, they are going to be shooting wildly in the dark.

 

[The AntiChris]

Thanks for the good article! It has one paragraph which explains clearly what I was trying to say in my opening post but could not manage to do well:

Sapolsky’s broader mistake seems to be assuming his questions are purely scientific: answered by looking just at what the science says. While science is relevant, we first need some idea of what free will is (which is a metaphysical question) and how it relates to moral responsibility (a normative question). This is something philosophers have been interrogating for a very long time.

We are more than just physical beings ruled by our environment.

Glad you liked the article. However. I don't think think your interpretation of this paragraph is correct. I'm pretty certain the author (Adam Piovarchy) is not suggesting that we are anything more than "physical beings ruled by our environment".

 

[bilby]

the endocrine system is itself rather merely a part, and not well situated as a field of study to understand a more holistic model of the human mind.

Yup. Endrocrinology is unbelievably difficult.

Therefore we should ignore it, and pretend that neurology is the only important issue.

Or better yet, we could pretend that the "mind" is only tangentially related to the endocrine system.

It's just a part.

Studying the endocrine system is mind bogglingly difficult; Therefore we should try to model the "mind" without reference to it.

It's better to be wrong but comprehensible, than to be right but inexplicably complex.

Apparently.

 

[DBT]

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will:

A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

It's far from being a good critique

From the article; ''The trouble with Sapolsky’s arguments, as free will expert John Martin Fischer explains, is he doesn’t actually present any argument for why his conception of free will is correct.''

The issue is not Sapolsky's definition of free will, the general perception/the ability to make decisions, or the Libertarian version, or your definition of free will whatever it may be, but the very definition that compatibilists themselves give.

I don't give a definition of free will, the compatibilist does. So, the question is, does the compatibilist definition of free will establish compatibility with the compatibilist definition of determinism?

For all the given reasons, including Sapolsky's, compatibilism does not establish freedom of will in relation to a deterministic system.

 

[DBT]

ignoring unconscious causality

First, I'm not sure given my definition of 'conscious' that anything at all strictly lacks the phenomena of physical experience. In fact stated that way nothing lacks the phenomena of physical experience, because everything experiences change due to physical interaction.

Given your claim of consciousness and will in machines, your definition of 'conscious' is kind of loose. So loose that it's meaningless.

Still, causality is not always unconscious, even by your definition: you are ignoring all the remaining extant conscious activities which are causal, including your own decisions. They are not contra-causal, they have been caused, but being caused does not mean something is non-causal.

Consciousness is being generated by an underlying information processing activity that shapes and forms its output in relation to conscious thoughts, decisions and actions.

Consciousness doesn't choose.

You are yet again confusing in your post contingent and necessary truths.

There is a difference between "this structure implements 'if this then that'" and "this, given 'if this then that' therefore that".

Nah, your assumptions of the nature of agency, decisions and actions, etc, is flawed. That is the problem.

''Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident. As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior''

 

[The AntiChris]

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will:

A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

It's far from being a good critique

I'm devastated. I felt sure you'd be persuaded.

 

[pood]

Why would a scientist feel compelled to comment on the "metaphysics" of free will? Robert Sapolsky is a neuroendocrinologist, not a religious leader.

Metaphysics is not religion.

 

[Politesse]

Why would a scientist feel compelled to comment on the "metaphysics" of free will? Robert Sapolsky is a neuroendocrinologist, not a religious leader.

Metaphysics is not religion.

I want to talk physics, I find a physicist. I want to talk metaphysics, I find a guru. Both are fine, but the point is I would not expect someone like Sapolsky to commenting on subjects outside his domain, which is neuroendocrinology. You don't need philosophy to help explain the functions of the human body, these can be described through empirical evidence, without any special appeals to the spectral or idealized.

 

[pood]

Why would a scientist feel compelled to comment on the "metaphysics" of free will? Robert Sapolsky is a neuroendocrinologist, not a religious leader.

Metaphysics is not religion.

I want to talk physics, I find a physicist. I want to talk metaphysics, I find a guru. Both are fine, but the point is I would not expect someone like Sapolsky to commenting on subjects outside his domain, which is neuroendocrinology. You don't need philosophy to help explain the functions of the human body, these can be described through empirical evidence, without any special appeals to the spectral or idealized.

Unfortunately, he is talking outside his domain, because he is talking about metaphysics (which is not religion), and his lack of knowledge shows glaringly. Of course, there might be those who argue that metaphysics itself is nonsense, and they’re entitled to their opinion. One might, however, usefully retort that scientism (as opposed to science) is also nonsense, because scientism advances the thesis that the only statements worth making are scientific ones. That would be odd in itself, since the statement ”the only statements worth making are scientific ones” is not a scientific statement, but rather a metaphysical one.

 

[Jarhyn]

the endocrine system is itself rather merely a part, and not well situated as a field of study to understand a more holistic model of the human mind.

Yup. Endrocrinology is unbelievably difficult.

Therefore we should ignore it, and pretend that neurology is the only important issue.

Or better yet, we could pretend that the "mind" is only tangentially related to the endocrine system.

It's just a part.

Studying the endocrine system is mind bogglingly difficult; Therefore we should try to model the "mind" without reference to it.

It's better to be wrong but comprehensible, than to be right but inexplicably complex.

Apparently.

You misconstrue my point, in that the endocrine system is specifically a bias linkage system between broad regions of the brain, allowing a few neurons to affect many far flung neurons.

Studying endocrinology will give you "A connects broadly to B" but again that's all "coarse tune" information and doesn't give a good idea of what the core behavior is on the finer, more complex messaging surfaces.

You can study memory hardware until you are blue in the face or the structure of a South bridge for that matter, but if you want to know how the system actually functions, you need to abstract those away and study the processor and contents of the memory.

It's not as simple as "I study something complex inside a complex system" so as to understand that it's about context composing to language.

Some parts of the system are just more important to understanding core behavior and endocrinology, while capable of driving core state verbs, is not actually capable of revealing the logic of the system that handles those core states. It can say "hungry/angry" and give the illusion that there's nothing there that gives more nuanced control over how or even whether to act on that information. It's a single internal sense system and while important does not give the whole picture, or any of the picture as regards the holistic function.

Yet again it's like studying an antenna system on a radio and coming to the conclusion that there's nothing on a radio that regulates its own behavior because everything you study says the signals just come from this passive one way thing...

 

[Politesse]

Unfortunately, he is talking outside his domain, because he is talking about metaphysics (which is not religion), and his lack of knowledge shows glaringly

Haven't read the book, I take it. No, he makes no arguments from a non-empirical basis.

 

[pood]

Unfortunately, he is talking outside his domain, because he is talking about metaphysics (which is not religion), and his lack of knowledge shows glaringly

Haven't read the book, I take it. No, he makes no arguments from a non-empirical basis.

Metaphysics is not about empiricism, at least not directly. It’s a branch of philosophy, not science. He is indeed talking outside his domain of expertise.

 

[Politesse]

Unfortunately, he is talking outside his domain, because he is talking about metaphysics (which is not religion), and his lack of knowledge shows glaringly

Haven't read the book, I take it. No, he makes no arguments from a non-empirical basis.

Metaphysics is not about empiricism, at least not directly. It’s a branch of philosophy, not science. He is indeed talking outside his domain of expertise.

The book in question is not about metaphysics, except insofar as metaphysical ideas become the basis for pseudoscience.

 

[pood]

Unfortunately, he is talking outside his domain, because he is talking about metaphysics (which is not religion), and his lack of knowledge shows glaringly

Haven't read the book, I take it. No, he makes no arguments from a non-empirical basis.

Metaphysics is not about empiricism, at least not directly. It’s a branch of philosophy, not science. He is indeed talking outside his domain of expertise.

The book in question is not about metaphysics, except insofar as metaphysical ideas become the basis for pseudoscience.

The book in question is INADVERTENTLY about metaphysics, because free will v. determinism is a metaphysical problem. It cannot be a scientific problem because the whole issue is unempirical. Sopolsky can muster all the scientific data he wants, but he can never conduct one crucial experiment: Imagine I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T. If we played back the whole history of the universe with the EXACT SAME ANTECEDENT EVENTS, would I pick Pepsi again, or would I choose Coke this time? DBT claims I would choose Pepsi again because antecedent deterministic events NECESSITATE my picking Pepsi, and that I would ALWAYS pick Pepsi no matter how many times the experiment were run.

I don’t, in fact, disagree with him that under these circumstances, I would indeed ALWAYS pick Pepsi. Where I disagree is that I MUST pick Pepsi — that my action is necessary, as he would have it, entailed by the identical antecedents. That is his argument. HIs argument is logically incorrect, because it commits a modal scope fallacy, as I have explained numberless times. I hold that if we could run this experiment, I would indeed always pick Pepsi, because that is what I WANT to do, not because I HAVE TO DO IT.

As I have explained many times, his fallacy is:

Given antecedents w, x, and y, necessarily z.

That IS the modal scope fallacy.

The corrected argument is:

Necessarily (w, x, y —>z), where z remains now and forever contingent (could have been otherwise).

The corrected modal argument removes the fallacy DBT commits, but it also destroys his hard determinism.

In any case, the experiment above cannot be run. We cannot back up, so to say, and replay the history of the universe, to see whether I would pick Pepsi or Coke. And even if we could, and I picked Pepsi every time, it would never prove his claim, that I MUST pick Pepsi, because his claim commits a logical fallacy, as explained.

Hence, the debate Sopolsky has entered upon is indeed METAPHYSICAL, even if he doesn’t know it (and indeed, also involves logic, another branch of philosophy). That’s his problem — if he wrote the book, he ought to be able to address its metaphysical aspects, but he doesn’t, because I think he is unaware of them. In much the same way, in one of his later books (possibly his last), Stephen Hawking wrote, on the very first page, “philosophy is dead.” He then proceeded to write an entire work of … philosophy. Without even knowing it.

 

[Politesse]

Sapolsky is fairly clear that his book is not aimed at people who would not have their mind changed by any measure or type of scientific evidence. It's not that he is unaware of religious/philosophical arguments for free will, they just aren't relevant to a scientific discussion of the topic. I must say I am fairly sympathetic to this argument, as an anthropologist. Free will is interesting as a concept and influential as a motivator for social action, but it's important to understand where science ends and speculation begins, and to traverse the boundary only consciously.