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According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

free will as the ability to choose any option at any given time, which contradicts
... Absolutely nothing.

It contradicts absolutely nothing and here you are making the same basic syntax error in completely failing to understand conflation of the type/instance boundary, because you're committing it right here, yet again.

The ability of (a type) does not contradict the choices of (an instance).


Of course it does. It contradicts determinism as compatibilists define it to be. Which is why they define free will in the way they do, bypassing alternate choice.

As defined, determinism does not permit an alternate choice in any given instance of decision making.

Any ability, to type, think, act, has nothing to do with the issue.
 
Of course it does
No, it doesn't. It contradicts radical fatalism, but the universe needs not be radically fatalistic to be deterministic.
As defined, determinism does not permit an alternate choice in any given instance of decision making
No, language does not permit this specific *sentence* to make sense on any formulation, because you are committing an eggegious modal fallacy in it.

You are executing a syntax error and something in your brain prevents you from seeing it.
 
I find it fascinating that there are people who claim that a belief in absolute, unconditional and unqualified Determinism that would preclude the existence of Free Will is akin to a religious belief that must be rejected without empirical evidence or mathematical proof of its existence, while those same people cling to the fantastical notion that they have Free Will, which is equally unprovable and can be accepted only on faith that it exists. Where there is a competition between beliefs in two equally unprovable and non-falsifiable beliefs, the proponent of neither belief has the burden of proof that the belief that they hold is superior to the belief that they do not hold.

People who advocate Free Will invariably resort to the argument that they make choices and/or decisions all the time, and that they can prove that to be so by being presented with multiple options from which they are free to choose. The fact that such people believe they are engaging in an exercise of Free Will, however, proves nothing, because a belief in something (no matter how real the belief may feel) does not make it so.

Even in a world in which Determinism is not absolute, unconditional and unqualified it may be that humans lack Free Will on account of their physical, genetic, biological, and chemical make-up combined with their history and environment. As such, it is logically possible to posit a world that is not perfectly deterministic and in which humans lack Free Will. It is not, however, logically possible to posit a world that is perfectly deterministic and in which humans have Free Will -- unless, of course, Free Will is defined as the exercise of a response to antecedent activity that could not be other than it is (even before the exercise occurs).

Most compatibilists accept the proposition that a person could not have acted differently than they did act after the act has occurred. But that also means that the person could not act differently than they are about to act before the act occurs -- otherwise, it would not be true to say after the act occurs that the act could not have occurred in any different way. Rather, it would simply be the case that the act, which could have occurred in any one of multiple ways, occurred in one particular way i.e., the way it occurred) and cannot be changed after the fact. So long as one accepts the proposition that all historical activity has occurred in the only way it could have occurred (as opposed to simply the only way it did occur), then all such activity was pre-determined to occur by antecedent activity before it actually occurred. That precludes the existence of true Free Will, and leaves only the possibility of an illusory Free Will in which a person does not know how they will act before doing so, but also is subject to the compulsion of the universe to act in only one manner.

As I have said before, I am not advocating that the universe is, in fact, perfectly deterministic. I am simply drawing a logical conclusion from what it means for the universe to be so.

Conversely, I would argue that a universe in which true Free Will does exist logically precludes that universe from being perfectly deterministic -- at all levels, and not simply at the quantum level. If the universe is not perfectly deterministic, then the universe must be entirely probabilistic, because any unforeseen activity in the seemingly natural course of the universe is capable of producing a ripple effect far beyond its probable consequences. In a probabilistic universe, anything is possible (even if not probable) except, perhaps, for the possibility of something being impossible. In a probabilistic universe, there can be no certainty about any future activity of any aspect of the universe, because there is always the possibility of one or more improbable actions occurring that will materially disrupt the seemingly natural operation of the universe.

I am confident that there will be folks on this board who will reject this post out of hand, based upon one or more non-logical arguments that will be based on emotional attachment to Free Will and/or a refusal to accept the premises of the post. Invariably, some of those folks will resort to ad hominin attacks, which say far more about the person makin the attack than about the target of the attack. More often than not, the rejection of this post will turn on claimed scientific or mathematical proof that is asserted to exist, but will not be shown in sufficient detail to support the claim -- because no such proof truly exists outside the minds of people who claim to assert the existence of such proof. For all of these reasons, to the extent I am able to do so, I will not be replying to comments that fail to accept the premises of the philosophical discourse this post is intended to engender, and argue instead based on changing the premises. If the logic of the arguments flowing from the premises is flawed, I would be pleased to learn about it. If, however, someone simply does not like the logical conclusions that flow from the stated premises of the argument, there is no point in engaging in discourse.

Let the games begin -- again, no replies to irrational assertions will be forthcoming :)
 
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while those same people cling to the fantastical notion that they have Free Will, which is equally unprovable
I have quite specifically proven that what I believe in is very real.

Crafting a will is no more than the action of explicit software engineering, whether that software is laid down in a brain or as hardware (as all software technically is). The freedoms of that will are no less than the material realities of the switches themselves which select and make choices on the states of the system.

That is there, right before you. Software engineers, behavioral engineering, engineering of learning systems and learning processes, it's all right there.

I have tried my best to illustrate the difference between things connected as members of some group or set rather than individual things, how this is clearly a workable and even proven mechanism of reality, that similar things made of similar stuff in similar ways have the same properties and these are shared regardless of where it happens to be.

I would advocate mostly that the universe may be perfectly deterministic, largely because as I have argued somewhere in the depths of this thread and definitely in the depths of another math allows that any deterministic system can be encoded as a probabilistic one with just-so dice rolls and visa-versa. It just depends on where you encode the undecidable information.

I have described, in fact, a perfectly deterministic universe for you with my flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept.

But the block artifact which that produces is not metaphysically absent of the physics that hold it. None of it is pre-determined; it's still got an arrow of time embedded in its very meaning and nature that means that each frame is determined, but not in any sense of "pre-", but by the physics on the field.

You seem to be trying to save radical fatalism from the fact that this error will not be accepted, but this error will not be accepted.

I might add that even ChatGPT can clearly identify a modal error.
 
I find it fascinating that there are people who claim that a belief in absolute, unconditional and unqualified Determinism that would preclude the existence of Free Will is akin to a religious belief that must be rejected without empirical evidence or mathematical proof of its existence, while those same people cling to the fantastical notion that they have Free Will, which is equally unprovable and can be accepted only on faith that it exists. Where there is a competition between beliefs in two equally unprovable and non-falsifiable beliefs, the proponent of neither belief has the burden of proof that the belief that they hold is superior to the belief that they do not hold.

People who advocate Free Will invariably resort to the argument that they make choices and/or decisions all the time, and that they can prove that to be so by being presented with multiple options from which they are free to choose. The fact that such people believe they are engaging in an exercise of Free Will, however, proves nothing, because a belief in something (no matter how real the belief may feel) does not make it so.

Even in a world in which Determinism is not absolute, unconditional and unqualified it may be that humans lack Free Will on account of their physical, genetic, biological, and chemical make-up combined with their history and environment. As such, it is logically possible to posit a world that is not perfectly deterministic and in which humans lack Free Will. It is not, however, logically possible to posit a world that is perfectly deterministic and in which humans have Free Will -- unless, of course, Free Will is defined as the exercise of a response to antecedent activity that could not be other than it is (even before the exercise occurs).

Most compatibilists accept the proposition that a person could not have acted differently than they did act after the act has occurred. But that also means that the person could not act differently than they are about to act before the act occurs -- otherwise, it would not be true to say after the act occurs that the act could not have occurred in any different way. Rather, it would simply be the case that the act, which could have occurred in any one of multiple ways, occurred in one particular way i.e., the way it occurred) and cannot be changed after the fact. So long as one accepts the proposition that all historical activity has occurred in the only way it could have occurred (as opposed to simply the only way it did occur), then all such activity was pre-determined to occur by antecedent activity before it actually occurred. That precludes the existence of true Free Will, and leaves only the possibility of an illusory Free Will in which a person does not know how they will act before doing so, but also is subject to the compulsion of the universe to act in only one manner.

As I have said before, I am not advocating that the universe is, in fact, perfectly deterministic. I am simply drawing a logical conclusion from what it means for the universe to be so.

Conversely, I would argue that a universe in which true Free Will does exist logically precludes that universe from being perfectly deterministic -- at all levels, and not simply at the quantum level. If the universe is not perfectly deterministic, then the universe must be entirely probabilistic, because any unforeseen activity in the seemingly natural course of the universe is capable of producing a ripple effect far beyond its probable consequences. In a probabilistic universe, anything is possible (even if not probable) except, perhaps, for the possibility of something being impossible. In a probabilistic universe, there can be no certainty about any future activity of any aspect of the universe, because there is always the possibility of one or more improbable actions occurring that will materially disrupt the seemingly natural operation of the universe.

I am confident that there will be folks on this board who will reject this post out of hand, based upon one or more non-logical arguments that will be based on emotional attachment to Free Will and/or a refusal to accept the premises of the post. Invariably, some of those folks will resort to ad hominin attacks, which say far more about the person makin the attack than about the target of the attack. More often than not, the rejection of this post will turn on claimed scientific or mathematical proof that is asserted to exist, but will not be shown in sufficient detail to support the claim -- because no such proof truly exists outside the minds of people who claim to assert the existence of such proof. For all of these reasons, to the extent I am able to do so, I will not be replying to comments that fail to accept the premises of the philosophical discourse this post is intended to engender, and argue instead based on changing the premises. If the logic of the arguments flowing from the premises is flawed, I would be pleased to learn about it. If, however, someone simply does not like the logical conclusions that flow from the stated premises of the argument, there is no point in engaging in discourse.

Let the games begin -- again, no replies to irrational assertions will be forthcoming :)

So much wrong with this. Should I even bother again?
 
Gee, if people have no choice but to make (alleged) ad hominem attacks, what is the point of bitching about them?

Oh, I know — you have no choice but to bitch about them.

Such nonsense.
 
The idea that you could not have acted differently after the act has occurred is a modal fallacy. Which means you could have acted differently before the act occurred.

One must not conflate contingency with necessity.
 
while those same people cling to the fantastical notion that they have Free Will, which is equally unprovable
I have quite specifically proven that what I believe in is very real.

. . .

I have described, in fact, a perfectly deterministic universe for you with my flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept.

As expected, a claim of proof without the proof, itself -- just a naked claim.

As for the contention that the flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept supports the naked claim, Google AI, powered by Gemini 2.5 claims otherwise. Indeed, Google AI asserts that the flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept illustrates that Free Will is an illusion within a truly deterministic closed set. In other words, and as I have been saying, Compatibilism cannot be harmonized with Determinism other than by defining Free Will to include an illusory ability to make choices or decisions. As explained by Google AI:

In the context of the deterministic "Flatland" universe of Conway's Game of Life (GOL), the concept of free will is a philosophical discussion revolving around determinism, emergence, and the limits of perception. True free will, as conventionally understood (libertarian free will), does not exist within the GOL's strictly deterministic system, though an appearance of free will might emerge from its complex, unpredictable (computationally irreducible) patterns.

Determinism in the Game of Life
  • Fixed Rules: The GOL operates on simple, fixed local rules: a cell is either alive or dead in the next generation based purely on the state of its eight neighbors.
  • Predictable Future: Given an initial pattern, the entire future of the GOL universe is uniquely determined. The same starting condition will always yield the exact same result. This hard determinism means that every event, from a simple "blinker" to a complex "glider gun," is a necessary consequence of the initial state and the rules, without any possibility for uncaused choices or genuine alternatives.

The "Flatland" Perspective and Emergence
  • Limited Perception: The "Flatland" analogy from the novella of the same name illustrates the limitations of perception within a lower dimension. Beings within the GOL's 2D grid ("Flatlanders") would only perceive their own local reality. They might see complex "self-aware" entities (like a "Spectre" or "glider") moving and interacting, and might interpret these actions as free will.
  • Emergent Properties: The "entities" within GOL are emergent properties, meaning they are distinct, higher-level patterns that arise from the interaction of lower-level components (individual cells). While the properties of these emergent entities cannot be easily explained at the cell level, they are still entirely dependent on and ultimately governed by the underlying deterministic rules.
  • Computational Irreducibility: As philosopher Stephen Wolfram argued, many cellular automata display "computational irreducibility". This means the only way to predict the outcome of a complex GOL pattern is to run the simulation itself; it cannot be shortcut by an easier formula. This unpredictability, from the perspective of an observer (or an entity within the system), might feel like free will or open-ended possibility, even though the system is fundamentally deterministic.

Philosophical Interpretations
  • Hard Determinism: This view holds that because the GOL is fully determined, free will cannot exist within it.
  • Compatibilism: A compatibilist argument might suggest that a form of "free will" can exist even within a deterministic system. In this view, "free will" is redefined as the ability of an emergent entity (like a glider) to act according to its own emergent "nature" or "desires" (e.g., following a determined trajectory), without external coercion from within the system, even if the entire universe's future is predetermined by the initial setup.
  • True Free Will Requires External Influence: For true libertarian free will to exist, something external or non-material, beyond the established parameters and the initial conditions, would be required to influence the outcome. In a standard GOL, no such external influence exists.
In summary, the GOL/Flatland concept highlights how apparent complexity and unpredictability can arise from simple, deterministic rules. While "inhabitants" might perceive agency or choice, any "free will" is an illusion born from complexity and limited perspective, not a fundamental property of the deterministic universe itself.

The emphasis is supplied by Google, and not by me.
 
Google AI, powered by Gemini 2.5
Seriously?

If you expect useful analysis and/or reliable information about anything from an LLM, then you don't understand the first thing about what an LLM is or does.

You might as well claim your position is supported by your horoscope.
 
The ad hom fallacy occurs when someone claims an argument is wrong because of some personal characteristic of the person making the argument. It can even be a good personal characteristic!

Example of the latter: Jane, you are much too intelligent to believe in your argument. Therefore it’s wrong.

Or it can be that you claim an argument is right because of some personal characteristic of the person making it.

Jane, you are so intelligent, your argument must be right!

No one has even come close to ad homming you.

You appear not to know as much about philosophy as you seem to claim.
 
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But do keep citing Google AI. :rolleyes: Which is not to say that Google AI is wrong, which would be — what? An ad LLM fallacy? — only that it is just stealing stuff off the internet and is empirically unreliable.
 
while those same people cling to the fantastical notion that they have Free Will, which is equally unprovable
I have quite specifically proven that what I believe in is very real.

. . .

I have described, in fact, a perfectly deterministic universe for you with my flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept.

As expected, a claim of proof without the proof, itself -- just a naked claim.

As for the contention that the flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept supports the naked claim, Google AI, powered by Gemini 2.5 claims otherwise. Indeed, Google AI asserts that the flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept illustrates that Free Will is an illusion within a truly deterministic closed set. In other words, and as I have been saying, Compatibilism cannot be harmonized with Determinism other than by defining Free Will to include an illusory ability to make choices or decisions. As explained by Google AI:

In the context of the deterministic "Flatland" universe of Conway's Game of Life (GOL), the concept of free will is a philosophical discussion revolving around determinism, emergence, and the limits of perception. True free will, as conventionally understood (libertarian free will), does not exist within the GOL's strictly deterministic system, though an appearance of free will might emerge from its complex, unpredictable (computationally irreducible) patterns.

Determinism in the Game of Life
  • Fixed Rules: The GOL operates on simple, fixed local rules: a cell is either alive or dead in the next generation based purely on the state of its eight neighbors.
  • Predictable Future: Given an initial pattern, the entire future of the GOL universe is uniquely determined. The same starting condition will always yield the exact same result. This hard determinism means that every event, from a simple "blinker" to a complex "glider gun," is a necessary consequence of the initial state and the rules, without any possibility for uncaused choices or genuine alternatives.

The "Flatland" Perspective and Emergence
  • Limited Perception: The "Flatland" analogy from the novella of the same name illustrates the limitations of perception within a lower dimension. Beings within the GOL's 2D grid ("Flatlanders") would only perceive their own local reality. They might see complex "self-aware" entities (like a "Spectre" or "glider") moving and interacting, and might interpret these actions as free will.
  • Emergent Properties: The "entities" within GOL are emergent properties, meaning they are distinct, higher-level patterns that arise from the interaction of lower-level components (individual cells). While the properties of these emergent entities cannot be easily explained at the cell level, they are still entirely dependent on and ultimately governed by the underlying deterministic rules.
  • Computational Irreducibility: As philosopher Stephen Wolfram argued, many cellular automata display "computational irreducibility". This means the only way to predict the outcome of a complex GOL pattern is to run the simulation itself; it cannot be shortcut by an easier formula. This unpredictability, from the perspective of an observer (or an entity within the system), might feel like free will or open-ended possibility, even though the system is fundamentally deterministic.

Philosophical Interpretations
  • Hard Determinism: This view holds that because the GOL is fully determined, free will cannot exist within it.
  • Compatibilism: A compatibilist argument might suggest that a form of "free will" can exist even within a deterministic system. In this view, "free will" is redefined as the ability of an emergent entity (like a glider) to act according to its own emergent "nature" or "desires" (e.g., following a determined trajectory), without external coercion from within the system, even if the entire universe's future is predetermined by the initial setup.
  • True Free Will Requires External Influence: For true libertarian free will to exist, something external or non-material, beyond the established parameters and the initial conditions, would be required to influence the outcome. In a standard GOL, no such external influence exists.
In summary, the GOL/Flatland concept highlights how apparent complexity and unpredictability can arise from simple, deterministic rules. While "inhabitants" might perceive agency or choice, any "free will" is an illusion born from complexity and limited perspective, not a fundamental property of the deterministic universe itself.

The emphasis is supplied by Google, and not by me.

Oh, boy!
 
To be clear, I inadvertently thanked one of BiSilv’s posts when I meant to quote it. I have summarily withdrawn the errant thanks,
 
The idea that you could not have acted differently after the act has occurred is a modal fallacy. Which means you could have acted differently before the act occurred.

One must not conflate contingency with necessity.
The modal fallacy is in assuming that one could not have acted differently based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way. That is neither here nor there with respect to the argument I am advancing -- which, again, is simply an argument about the logical consequences of presuming the existence of a perfectly deterministic universe, and not an assertion that the universe is, in fact, perfectly deterministic (which may or may not be the case).

I am not arguing that the mere fact that someone did something means that they could not have done differently. To draw that conclusion from that premise would, in fact be a modal fallacy. Actually, it would be an even greater fallacy of arguing a conclusion from a single premise.

What I am arguing is the following:


Premise 1.1: Determinism, to be true, requires that all activity, including human cognition, is, at all times and in all places, inexorably determined by antecedent activity such that any given activity, including human cognition, cannot be anything other than it is (and was so before it even occurred).

Premise 1.2: Free Will, to be true, requires that a human being have the capacity to act (or, at least, to decide to act) in a manner that is not inexorably determined by antecedent activity.

Conclusion 1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.


Conclusion 1 / Premise 2.1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.

Premise 2.2: Compatibilism, to be valid, requires that Determinism and Free Will can both be true at the same time (and in the same universe).

Conclusion 2: Compatibilism is not valid.

Again, I am not arguing that it is a fact that any act could not have been different before it occurs based on the fact that it does occur. I am arguing only that hypothesizing it to be true that an act could not have been different than it occurred simply because it did, in fact, occur, necessarily leads to the conclusion that Free Will (as opposed to the illusion of Free Will) does not exist. And to be clear, the premise of determinism is for all worlds and all times, so it is not an argument that the conclusion fails based on a allacy that the conclusion fails to take into account other worlds and/or times.
 
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Google AI, powered by Gemini 2.5
Seriously?

If you expect useful analysis and/or reliable information about anything from an LLM, then you don't understand the first thing about what an LLM is or does.

You might as well claim your position is supported by your horoscope.
Criticism accepted. I agree with you, and have not before relied upon AI to advance an argument. It just seemed apt in this particular instance to counter an artificial assertion of proof with an artificial counter-authority. It will not happen again!
 
The idea that you could not have acted differently after the act has occurred is a modal fallacy. Which means you could have acted differently before the act occurred.

One must not conflate contingency with necessity.
The modal fallacy is in assuming that one could not have acted differently based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way.

Sorry, I misread. Deleted the earlier post.

Yes, that is the modal fallacy.

One could have acted differently, though not based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way.
 
The idea that you could not have acted differently after the act has occurred is a modal fallacy. Which means you could have acted differently before the act occurred.

One must not conflate contingency with necessity.
The modal fallacy is in assuming that one could not have acted differently based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way.

Sorry, I misread. Deleted the earlier post.

Yes, that is the modal fallacy.

One could have acted differently, though not based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way.
Let's be clear. I am not assuming anything about what an action that has occurred proves. Other people are making those assertions. I am stating a premise that Determinism involves absolute necessity of a future action that cannot occur other than it will / does occur. There can be no modal fallacy in stating a premise. A fallacy can occur only in the statement of a conclusion that is said to follow from one or more stated premises.
 
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The ad hom fallacy occurs when someone claims an argument is wrong because of some personal characteristic of the person making the argument. It can even be a good personal characteristic!

Example of the latter: Jane, you are much too intelligent to believe in your argument. Therefore it’s wrong.

Or it can be that you claim an argument is right because of some personal characteristic of the person making it.

Jane, you are so intelligent, your argument must be right!

No one has even come close to ad homming you.

You appear not to know as much about philosophy as you seem to claim.
Notably, I did not state that anyone has (as in past tense) engaged in an ad hominem attack. I simply noted that someone may do so (as in future tense), and stated that I will not respond to such an attack if and when made.
 
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