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According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

Believing in free will, however, places faith in the belief that our feelings are not deceptive, illusory, or programmed by the universe.

Ok, at least this is more honest... It's much more close to a direct admission to a belief in God or hidden complexity.

The fact is, I think we ARE in part programmed by something out there in the world, but that it is not the universe, at least not in that way.

Rather, it's the sum total of human beliefs and stories and ideas that constantly get exchanged and encoded into all the people everywhere that someone might run into over their life, these things, that program us... And we have the power to push on that.

We have the power to speak our stories and add something or discourage something; to speak dreams that might one day help another person who seeks after those same dreams to find them.

I do also point out that Elixir is right insofar as I do not expect humans in this universe to be able to differentiate between probabilistic or deterministic without pinpointing exactly what sort of "universe" this one appears to be and validating it... And even then I don't think it matters because it could be pseudo-probabilistic, and thus technically both.

And none of that really matters to the fact that as the universe carries on, this real and material element of the universe that programs us is vulnerable in part to our own manipulations.
 
Believing in free will, however, places faith in the belief that our feelings are not deceptive, illusory, or programmed by the universe.
Forgive me, but I don't see how "deceptive, illusory, or programmed by the universe" follows from ... which was it now? .. oh yeah - determinism.
It's not as if humans are owed some kind of transcendent awareness of the finest of even quantum events, such as would be required for any of the elements of determinism beyond Newtonian physics to ever* impinge on their personal freedoms of choice. The illusion, if it is an illusion, will never be broken from the inside, aka life.

*Einsteinian physics sometimes required, e.g. in space travel, GPS :)

it could be pseudo-probabilistic
That had occurred to me, but hard to add to an already unwieldy expression! :LOL:
 
And this, folks, is why we call him religious. He literally admits there is no flaw, that compatibilism offers iron clad definitions, the guy he claims agrees with him and who he claims to agree with agrees to as much...


That's just plain silly. The compatibilist argument is based on how compatibilists define determinism, and how they define free will in relation to how they define determinism.

I refer to their own terms and conditions.

Is that too hard to grasp?
And then he goes on to disagree with himself and start claiming that now there are flaws because we don't make modal errors.

The flaw lies in the given definition of free will not accounting for the nature of will. That given the compatibilist definition of determinism, will itself is shaped and formed by processes beyond its control.

The will is influenced by processes and antecedents beyond its control, but the mind, subconsciously and consciously, processes those inputs to determine an output, The brain is an active participant in the deterministic process.

Will is a part of the process. Just not the controller or decider.

Given determinism, will is not merely influenced by antecedents, but determined by them. To say 'influenced' suggests that will somehow has autonomy or choice, that will is able act on a number of options.

To suggest that any of a number of options can be taken in any given instance contradicts the terms and conditions of determinism as it is defined to be.
 
And, since I am my brain, it follows that I am an active participant in the deterministic process. It is not the determinism precludes free will — it is the other way around. Free will depends on determinism,
Which has been the whole point of compatibilists.

People seem to want to be free of the need for their actions to be consistent with their person or their person to be consistent with their actions.

That's never going to happen and is not a sensible request.

To me the libertarian and Fatalist complaint seems like "I must have the freedom God* to be free", and the fatalist says "I am not God therefore I have no freedom" where the solipsist says instead "I am God and have all freedom", and the compatibilist scolds both because neither are people gods or things that have no freedoms (when viewed in terms of possibility).

The trick is in understanding that humans can be gods**, but they can't be God because there is no such thing, and they don't need to be, either.

*God: EinSof
**god: TzimTzum
A system where all actions, including brain, mind, consciousness must evolve as determined, which includes will and decision making
Nope, not "must". There is no "must", just "shall". This is the same syntax error as in the sea battle language that Pood keeps pointing out.

It's that sneaky injection of the syntactically invalid "must" that you keep tripping over, like a child stocking a stick in their spokes and blaming someone else.

It's a must according to your own definition of free will.

Must I keep reminding you of the implications of your own definition. Surely at some point you must get a grip on the consequences of determinism as it is defined, how you yourself define it to be;

Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

You must understand that when there is ''no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system,'' that this does not permit alternate actions?

And you do know that the compatibilist argument for free will is based on determinism, just as you defined it to be?

If you don't agree, you are arguing against compatibilism without even realizing it.
 
Must I keep reminding you of the implications of your own definition. Surely at some point you must get a grip on the consequences of determinism as it is defined, how you yourself define it to be;

Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''
You have not even paid attention to what "randomness" is through all this discussion.

Shame on you.
A pseudo-probabilistic system is deterministic AND contains "randomness" in the form of information from the original condition that is uncorrelated to anything else that has happened in the system, is undecidable from within it, and is clearly capable of being otherwise at any step but simply isn't.

I presented dwarf fortress and described exactly how and when these deterministic things can be "otherwise," and even situations where they are.

That you fail to understand how all that comes together is, I think, why you persist in your religious bullshit.

will somehow has autonomy
Yes, wills create momentary autonomy.

If you dislike this, get over it.

You do not understand enough to have this conversation. About anything.
 
Forgive me, but I don't see how "deceptive, illusory, or programmed by the universe" follows from ... which was it now? .. oh yeah - determinism.
BSilvEsq presents the matter in terms of "our feelings", which is just as well cast in terms of our experiences.

On some occasions, when individual persons deliberate, they have the sense that what they are to decide is not already set/determined. This is to say that they have the sense that there is indeterminateness with regards to what they do; such persons in such circumstances have the sense that they are free-to. If, as per all forms of determinism, there is no such actual indeterminateness, then the deliberating persons who have the sense that they are free-to decide/choose/select since what they decide/choose/select is not already determined are under an illusion that there actually is indeterminateness. Therefore, illusion follows from determinism.

Those who express thoughts about determinism in terms of coercion or control or must (regardless of whether or not expressing in those terms is necessary or justified) assert that the sense of being free-from external coercion or control or some other sort of must is an illusion. Therefore, illusion follows from determinism.

With regards to the must version of incompatibilist determinism, the first thing to get out of the way is the fact that the resort to must is not necessary. However, the charge of modal fallacy against the use of this must is not so very powerful at least inasmuch as a justified fallacy charge is not sufficient to warrant dismissing what the person asserting the must means by the must despite how the intended meaning is expressed.

The modal fallacy charge is a product of language analysis (see below for a brief introductory explanation) and originates from a logic domain which is not thought of, characterized as, or restricted to the strictly physical or to physics. As such, the domain of logic in itself is not restricted to physics.

Those determinists who resort to must expressions, and who think that the actually physical is such that it is itself sufficient for an eternally determinate/determined actuality, essentially restrict logic to consideration within the physics domain. Whereas, in the not-restricted-to-physics logic domain, an encounter with the word must brings forth an opposing possibility (in this case it would probably be best expressed as need not), in the more limited physics domain the must only indicates the lack of alternative physical possibilities with regards to what is to occur.

From the vantage point of the physics domain, for any given situation, there may well be conceivable alternative possibilities from the viewpoint of the not-restricted-to-physics logic domain, but the actual physical is such that it is eternally determined (it is an eternally determinate fact of the matter) that only one of those conceivable possibilities follows from any given physics/physical situation.

This is to say that, even without resorting to such terms as coercion or control or must, incompatibilist determinists can still insist that no one is free-from the physical which is so very restrictive that what is experienced next is eternally determined. And, supposedly, humans experiencing reality as if it were not eternally determined is just humans experiencing illusion.

All versions of determinism suffer from illusion-itis. And, yes, illusion-itis is a made up word, but it is readily understandable to those persons who understand the word illusion and the suffix -itis. The problem with determinism illusion-itis can be found right there in the word illusion. That word itself suggests not-illusion. But if experiences as basic as being free-from and being free-to are illusions, then is any human experience not an illusion? Even the thinking that comes up with determinism? Even the thinking that comes up with physics? Is there illusion without there being not-illusion? Is there illusion if there is no escape from illusion?

But, of course, all versions of determinism are incoherent even if they are perfectly internally consistent. Determinism does not cohere with the experience of human being - with there being this one exception of sorts: Thinking determinism/eternalism to be a fact seems to provide some benefit to some - maybe even a lot of - people. In itself, that is a good thing. And I am unaware of any persons going around and, when having an experience of being free-to, stifling themselves with the reminder that they are not actually free-to. That being the case, comfort had from thinking determinism to be the case is a good thing which need not - and insofar as it does not - interfere with persons further developing/expanding the personal ability/condition of being free-to.
 
is not already determined
It is not already determined, even in a deterministic world. It will be determined when it's damn well determined and not a second before.

This is the fundamental mistake that leads to the idea that illusion follows from determinism. It's based on an error.

Those who express thoughts about determinism in terms of coercion or control or must (regardless of whether or not expressing in those terms is necessary or justified) assert that the sense of being free-from external coercion or control or some other sort of must is an illusion. Therefore, illusion follows from determinism.
No, only the idea of it being an illusion is an illusion, here. Those terms are not justified, so they are only placing themselves in a fun house of mirrors all projecting that error, that contradiction, and allowing them to come to insane conclusions.

The modal fallacy charge is a product of language analysis (see below for a brief introductory explanation) and originates from a logic domain which is not thought of, characterized as, or restricted to the strictly physical or to physics. As such, the domain of logic in itself is not restricted to physics.
I would assert that this binds metaphysics under logic.

what is experienced next is eternally determined.
Except it isn't. That's the whole trick of the mind that's going on. It's not already determined. "Already" is a description of a place, a location.

"Eternally" just asserts the "set of all sets".

It's a belief in God and a belief in God let's you believe literally anything.

The same belief in God allows the Libertarians to believe in their "freedom from physics" as much as it allows the hard determinist to believe that they have no freedom from God.

It's nonsense, and just one more religion to be recognized as belonging on the pile.
 
It is not already determined, even in a deterministic world. It will be determined when it's damn well determined and not a second before.
That not ... determined above at least suggests indeterminate and the very (macrophysical) indeterminateness denied by all versions of determinism. Indeterminateness is compatible with non-determinism.

Given the eternal determinateness common to static "block" spacetime and non-static "growing block" spacetime, to say that everything is "determined when it's damn well determined and not a second before" is nothing other than to assert that there is a determinate and eternally determined spacetime where-when location for each and every "event".

Do you think there is ever any actual macrophysical indeterminateness? Do you think there is ever any actual macrophysical indeterminateness subject to being made determinate in accord with and by some not eternally determined to occur human act?
 
That not ... determined above at least suggests indeterminate
Nope. It's a trick of the light I'm afraid.

Nothing about it implies Indeterminate; it just implies that to be there you have to go there and there is not here, when discussing elsewhere in spacetime.

"It's only here where it's here-shaped, and you can only find here by going through all that other time somehow".

It's not PREdetermined... "Elsewhere it displays here and here is here not because of the previous moment but because of how it is there" would be the closest I can think to 'pre-determined', and even that is actually strictly reliant on whatever original operation of time, you having inherited it in the act of the hypothetical projection.

"Pre" determined would be to literally actually be determined by some uncorrelated third state and not actually the passage of time over stuff.

And because people can just utter 'predetermined" without being slapped by a cosmic syntax error notification, people continue make this mistake over and over and over again.

The fact that it hasn't been determined yet at the physical location of space time "prior" to the current one doesn't mean that the operation of time on the present so as to translate your view to the new time doesn't place you at a determined outcome based on the first... But key point here: they're different times and the determination is a function of translating across the coordinate system.

To use a much simpler example, if f(x)=x/2, then f(N) is only determined to be 2 where N = 4 and nowhere else.
 
The fact that it hasn't been determined yet at the physical location of space time "prior" to the current one
That which "hasn't been determined yet" is in a condition of being not-determined.

That which is eternally determined can appear, such as from the perspective of a "[prior] location [within] space time", as being not-determined at that "prior" location despite being actually eternally determined.

That which appears to be not-determined (or not-yet-determined) when observed from some internal to spacetime perspective is not necessarily not-determined; it might actually be determined - for instance, if it is eternally determined.

That which is eternally determined can well never appear (or never be perceived) as eternally determined even at some spacetime location "after" it is observable as determined.
 
It's not PREdetermined
Is it eternally determined
This is a syntax violation
eternally determinate
Also a syntax violation
Only in terms of the precondition; not in any way that would imply "it's that way because God:EinSof said so".
Only in that one moment as a function of having followed a specific causality to exactly there.

Many different possible causalities get there and go to different places after.

So set *in terms of what*, because it's not actually set in terms of "everything else".
Not until and exactly in that moment where time settles it that way and only there.
 
This is a syntax violation
Not in English.

Not [settled] until and exactly in that moment where time settles it that way and only there.
In English, as I am quite certain you are aware, if it is not settled "until ... that moment", then it is syntactically and sensibly said to be not-determined, not-settled, not-fixed until that moment.
But still fixed at that moment.

Not until, but at.

Not before, but only at the appointed time and place.

And because it IS determined at that time and place, it is "determined".

Just because there are places it isn't determined to be like that, this does not eliminate the one place it IS...

Not pre-, but regular old "determined"
 

To suggest that any of a number of options can be taken in any given instance contradicts the terms and conditions of determinism as it is defined to be.

Contradicts the terms and conditions of hard determinism.

But we have been over this again and again,
 
Hard determinism is the thesis that the Big Bang writes novels and poems, designs buildings, creates symphonies.

Anyone not blinded by dogma can instantly see how inane that is,
 
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