According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[The AntiChris]

So you agree that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism. If this was the sole point you've been making, who has disagreed with you? It's a universally understood and accepted attribute of libertarian free will (that it's incompatible with determinism) so it really shouldn't be a contentious issue.

As I have said to others, it seems to me that we are in violent agreement.

All I am saying is that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism.

But nobody disagrees with you! If you really believe this is a contentious issue then I can only conclude that you misunderstand the nature of the compatibilist/incompatibilist dispute.

It does occur to me that you don't realise that when compatibilists talk about free will , they're not talking about libertarian free will. You are aware that there are other conceptions of free will than libertarianism aren't you?

If you are calling "Compatibilism" the position that seeks to harmonize Free Will and Determinism by using a definition of Free Will that is different from Libertarian Free Will

Of course I am! As is every compatibilist! If you haven't grasped this then you have genuinely misunderstood the compatibilist/incompatibilist dispute!

Just to make it quite clear, ALL compatibilists take the libertarian notion of free will to be incoherent and reject it.

 

[DBT]

Only to someone who has a poor understanding of the implications of determinism, just as he himself defines it to be.

Nope..YOU keep defining determinism with necessitation added to it and imputing it on others.

It's a dishonest straw man which you need to quit with.

Your position in untenable, some strange mix of compatibilism and Libertarian free will, which happen to be incompatible.

If determinism is true, events must necessarily evolve without deviation. That is according to how you define determinism.

You can't have it both ways. If things cannot happen differently, they must necessarily happen as determined.

That, essentially, is necessitation.

Necessity
Necessity is the idea that everything that has ever happened and ever will happen is necessary, and can not be otherwise. Necessity is often opposed to chance and contingency. In a necessary world there is no chance. Everything that happens is necessitated.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce

Bullshit.

Nah, not bullshit, just - if deterministic - how the world works.

Including cognition, how our proclivities form and drive decision making, thought and action.

The basics again;

''Human behavior is affected both by genetic inheritance and by experience. The ways in which people develop are shaped by social experience and circumstances within the context of their inherited genetic potential. The scientific question is just how experience and hereditary potential interact in producing human behavior.

Each person is born into a social and cultural setting—family, community, social class, language, religion—and eventually develops many social connections. The characteristics of a child's social setting affect how he or she learns to think and behave, by means of instruction, rewards and punishment, and example. This setting includes home, school, neighborhood, and also, perhaps, local religious and law enforcement agencies. Then there are also the child's mostly informal interactions with friends, other peers, relatives, and the entertainment and news media. How individuals will respond to all these influences, or even which influence will be the most potent, tends not to be predictable. There is, however, some substantial similarity in how individuals respond to the same pattern of influences—that is, to being raised in the same culture. Furthermore, culturally induced behavior patterns, such as speech patterns, body language, and forms of humor, become so deeply imbedded in the human mind that they often operate without the individuals themselves being fully aware of them.''

I have described exactly how and why and when and where the abilities of humans clearly and unambiguously involved power over basic attitudes and decisions, from the ability to do so directly through manipulation of those neurons that are the basic attitudes, and the contingencies that they use to produce decisions.

Yet you persistently fail to account for the underlying mechanisms and drivers of thought and behaviour, which have nothing to do with the ideological notion of free will.

Rather than address those clear controls available to us with respect for our cognitive states, you wave your hands and the try to claim definitions preclude the obvious answer: that organisms can control themselves to a quite heavy degree.

The 'controls' themselves are subject to the same principles as everything else that happens within the system.

If the mechanisms of control, the prefrontal cortex is damaged or underdeveloped, there is little or no self control.

That is what you conveniently ignore;

The brain is fundamentally altered by damage to the OFC.

"It helps explain why people with damage to the OFC behave the way they do," he said. "They have the ability to learn normally about their world, but they have an area of their brains that is sluggish and inflexible in guiding their behavior, trapping them in a prison of habit, so to speak. These findings give us insight into how the brain is organized."

You tie yourself in knots with trying to define that clear process out of existence, simply because the extent to which it is accessible to you in particular happens to be limited.

Quit being a victim of your own inaction, learn the processes by which you can craft your own behavior, and become the master of yourself rather than submitting to some false master you name necessity.

Try again. This time try to show a little understanding of cognition and how it works.

Here's a hint;

Quote;
''There is evidence from clinical groups for the relative independence of social cognition from other aspects of cognition. For example, individuals with either frontal or prefrontal cortex damage show impaired social behavior and functioning, despite the retention of intact cognitive skills such as memory and language (15 17). The fact that social cognition can become selectively impaired after such an injury while sparing nonsocial cognition suggests that unique neural circuits subserve social cognition. A similar dissociation between social cognition and nonsocial cognitive skills is often observed in persons with prosopagnosia, who show selective impairments in the perceptions of faces but preserved perception for nonsocial stimuli (18). Such findings have led Kanwisher (18) to conclude that facial processing is a result of domain-specific, rather than general, neural mechanisms.''

 

[Jarhyn]

So you agree that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism. If this was the sole point you've been making, who has disagreed with you? It's a universally understood and accepted attribute of libertarian free will (that it's incompatible with determinism) so it really shouldn't be a contentious issue.

As I have said to others, it seems to me that we are in violent agreement.

All I am saying is that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism.

But nobody disagrees with you! If you really believe this is a contentious issue then I can only conclude that you misunderstand the nature of the compatibilist/incompatibilist dispute.

It does occur to me that you don't realise that when compatibilists talk about free will , they're not talking about libertarian free will. You are aware that there are other conceptions of free will than libertarianism aren't you?

If you are calling "Compatibilism" the position that seeks to harmonize Free Will and Determinism by using a definition of Free Will that is different from Libertarian Free Will

Of course I am! As is every compatibilist! If you haven't grasped this then you have genuinely misunderstood the compatibilist/incompatibilist dispute!

Just to make it quite clear, ALL compatibilists take the libertarian notion of free will to be incoherent and reject it.

This is what I keep telling him; and I'll reiterate that it's not the entire "notion". It's just the expectation that the source of responsibility is "the ability to do otherwise *in the same place and time*". The ability to do otherwise elsewhere as a metaphysical quality pertaining not to the individual view of some thing but to the set of objects bearing some property is still clearly there, and THAT, and not the ability to invoke contradictions, is where it comes from.

We observe freedoms being validated every time a software engineer runs a successful unit test with 100% code coverage. That's literally exactly what the process is meant to do: to test the freedoms actively just to absolutely make sure they are free, specifically in the way intended by the programmer.

 

[Jarhyn]

''Human behavior is affected both by genetic inheritance and by experience. The ways in which people develop are shaped by social experience and circumstances within the context of their inherited genetic potential. The scientific question is just how experience and hereditary potential interact in producing human behavior.

Ignoring for a moment the repetition of a variety of mistakes you make, this is incorrect.

Human behavior is shaped by genetic inheritance, yes, and by external experience yes, but also by experience of the behavior of the human themselves.

You are acting and pretending as if humans cannot modify their own "future behavior", the internal mechanisms which determine how they will act according to various inputs, despite the fact we can just reconnect our experience to our imaginations rather than external reality and test them.

We have gone many pages of you bloviating about what you think humans can't do and why and ignoring all the actual counter-examples to those claims which indicate there is something severely wrong with your analysis.

All you need to be disproven is ONE counter example.

I have presented you with boxes that manipulate their own states and humans that manipulate the script of "what will I do in the future" based on the present state.

If you didn't understand, these are concrete disproofs of your claim of a lack of regulatory control.

If the mechanisms of control, the prefrontal cortex is damaged or underdeveloped, there is little or no self control.

So I find this part interesting in that it directly accepts, fully and tacitly, that there IS self control happening when that prefrontal cortex is functional.

When I talk about "self control" though, I usually add this caveat: it is hard and takes work.

The fact that some people have a harder time of it, or need to reconstruct the machine, or need to ask someone else to do some abstract stuff to augment the will of the person with the desire to impart self control does not wave away the self control as an available and attainable mechanism "across" reality. It only means it happens to be absent or lacking in that ONE place for that ONE reason.

It is a "momentary" rather than "utter" lack of self control within the context of physics as happens in our observable reality.

The self control necessary for responsibility is right there.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Compatibilism is simply the belief that free will and determinism are compatible. ... Compatibilism makes no claims about determinism/indeterminism.

If compatibilism makes no claims about determinism, then it is not possible for compatibilism to maintain that free will and determinism are compatible. At the very least, compatibilism most certainly has to characterize - make claims about - determinism. You might mean that compatibilism need not hold determinism to be a correct characterization of actuality, but that has not been the context of the ongoing discussion thus far. So, let's take up this different context.

Compatibilists can be determinists, indeterminists or agnostic

This suggests that compatibilists are to be characterized best, first, and foremost as analysts of the possible relationships between determinism and free will. That would certainly be the case for the agnostic compatibilists.

Such analysis can begin by addressing the notion of determinism. You have not (yet) objected to the characterization of determinism as, in effect, denying that there is macrophysical indeterminateness. The analysis then addresses the notion of free will. The notion of free will can be considered as a matter or description of human experience.

On occasion, there are humans who think they have the experience of there being actual indeterminateness. That experience is not of there being limitless possibilities available, but it is common for humans to think - to have the sense - that the indeterminateness is what affords a freedom to settle the apparent indeterminateness. Of course, humans in such a circumstance do not think that actuality stops to await their decisions or choices. It is as if actuality has its own momentum. In which case, the perceived indeterminateness is akin to an opportunity to interrupt the momentum of actuality or to change the course which actuality would otherwise take.

Based on this experience, indeterminateness is necessary for there to be freedom; indeterminateness is necessary in order for a person to be free; indeterminateness is necessary in order for a person to be free-to actually decide or choose.

Of course, the compatibilist analyst would here say that a determinism which denies that there is actual macrophysical indeterminateness is a determinism which is incompatible with there being the sort of freedom for which indeterminateness is necessary.

This means that a compatibilist who is not just an analyst but is in fact a determinist is a compatibilist who is an incompatibilist with regards to the sort of freedom for which indeterminateness is necessary.

And, yet, as the compatibilist analyst would note, the compatibilist-determinist is still claiming that there is a sort of freedom for which indeterminateness is not necessary.

Typically, this freedom is described as the state of being free-from external coercion or control, and that being free-from is as much a matter of human experience as is the experience of there being apparent indeterminateness. Indeed, in addition to indeterminateness, even this sort of freedom - this being free-from - is necessary in order for a person to be free-to in the manner above discussed. It is just that, from the perspective of there being actual macrophysical indeterminateness, being free-from is not sufficient for being free-to. And this is to say that a compatibilist-determinism which denies that there is actual macrophysical indeterminateness is incompatible with that freedom for which indeterminateness is necessary for being free-to. Therefore, this sort of compatibilism (this compatibilist-determinism) is an incompatibilism, and a person who holds to this sort of compatibilist-determinism is a compatibilist who is an incompatibilist.

The compatibilist-mere-analyst would then take up the case of the incompatibilist-determinist. The incompatibilist-determinist does not - or need not - deny the experience of being free-from external coercion or control. Rather, the incompatibilist-determinist can simply hold that being free-from is not a sufficient description of being free. Accordingly, the incompatibilist-determinist objection to compatibilist-determinism amounts to a charge of there being a failure to disambiguate the term free.

Or, in the alternative, the incompatibilist-determinist might more aggressively insist that compatibilist-determinism relies on an intentionally ambiguous and non-necessary way of using free. This more aggressive charge just highlights that the disagreement between the incompatibilist-determinists and the compatibilist-determinists boils down to an argument over usage of the word free.

But no manner of expression is to be regarded as actually necessary. All manners of expression can be presented alternatively, and, in this case, that would mean without use of the word free in any of its forms. Both the incompatibilist-determinists and the compatibilist-determinists seem to deny that there is actual macrophysical indeterminateness. In this regard, both the incompatibilist-determinists and the compatibilist-determinists are incompatiblists. It also seems that both the incompatibilist-determinists and the compatibilist-determinists can agree to there being the experience of there being occasions which are without external coercion and control.

Of course, the foregoing is in a physicalism context, and the incompatibilist-determinist and the compatibilist-determinist positions discussed have been from the perspective of a non-reductive physicalism. An ardently held reductive physicalism viewpoint could introduce other possibly relevant factors that would lead to disagreements beyond that related to use of the term free.

The bottom line is that even if compatibilism is not necessarily a determinism (which is to say if a compatibilist-mere-analyst is agnostic with regards to whether determinism corresponds with actuality), compatibilist-determinism is an incompatibilism, and compatibilist-determinists are incompatibilists if they deny that the experienced macrophysical indeterminateness is or can be actual macrophysical indeterminateness.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

I have already posed that there is no micro physical indeterminateness, but that this fact still does not mean that the facts of those moments are eternally true in any sense that implies that things "must" and "always" were that way; they are still where they are, when they are, as they are there.

Just to clarify, the reason I have cast discussion in terms of the macrophysical was to note the context as one which is more at the human level and not at the quantum or microphysical level. So, I do not know whether your "micro" was a typo or beside the point. Accordingly, I will assume it to be a typo with you intending to say that you deny that there is macrophysical indeterminateness.

That being the case, or if that is the case, then you deny that there is macrophysical indeterminateness, you deny that "things" are macrophysically indeterminate "where they are, when they are, as they are there." You also discuss in terms of contexts, but even someone who thinks there is actual macrophysical indeterminateness can say with perfect sensibility and logic that even a context which itself is determinate can contain indeterminate macrophysical aspects or components or features, what have you.

Do you hold that a context (which, after all, is a "thing") that is itself macrophysically determinate necessarily does not include macrophysical indeterminateness?

 

[Jarhyn]

So, I do not know whether your "micro" was a typo or beside the point. Accordingly, I will assume it to be a typo with you intending to say that you deny that there is macrophysical indeterminateness

No, not a typo, just a heirarcical dependency.

If you are having trouble understanding that only microphysical "indeterminateness*" can open any macrophysical system to "indeterminateness*", but I have no reason to think you understand determinatism independent of fatalism. I have seen you spit so many modal fallacies now that I'm beginning to lose faith in your desire to root them out.

In fact this nugget:

[Someone] can say with perfect sensibility and logic that even a context which itself is determinate can contain indeterminate macrophysical aspects or components or features, what have you.

... Tells me you don't.... Because no, you can't.

Certainly there are undecidable, unpredictable and random elements from inside, and macrophysical aspects that can be metaphysically freed, those macrophysical elements in that moment are fixed.

As soon as you consider "aspects", these are no longer "contained" at all, they are the container. The "aspects" are metaphysical, not physical. Rather, that context is contained by the aspect.

Yet again we are looking at a type/instance error

 

[The AntiChris]

Compatibilism is simply the belief that free will and determinism are compatible. ... Compatibilism makes no claims about determinism/indeterminism.

If compatibilism makes no claims about determinism, then it is not possible for compatibilism to maintain that free will and determinism are compatible.

Of course it can. I don't think you fully understand the basic claims of compatibilism.

Essentially compatibilism is simply the belief that free will is possible whether or not the universe is deterministic. Whether or not determinism is true is irrelevant to compatibilism.

At the very least, compatibilism most certainly has to characterize - make claims about - determinism.

It really doesn't. It's irrelevant.

You might mean that compatibilism need not hold determinism to be a correct characterization of actuality, but that has not been the context of the ongoing discussion thus far. So, let's take up this different context.

I mean it's irrelevant. Any discussion of determinism in these discussions is usually driven by incompatibilists who insist that freedom is not possible under determinism.

Compatibilists can be determinists, indeterminists or agnostic

This suggests that compatibilists are to be characterized best, first, and foremost as analysts of the possible relationships between determinism and free will.

No, it's saying that determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant to compatibilists.

 

[BSilvEsq]

No, it's saying that determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant to compatibilists.

By definition, "Compatibilism" is the position that Determinism and Free Will are compatible. It is not possible to have such a position without a stated definition of both Determinism and Free Will for purposes of the comparison. Or, are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?

This is a genuine inquiry and not an assertion described as a question. As such, I would much appreciate a non-dismissive response that excludes statements like:

This isn't just wrong, it's utter nonsense and demonstrates that you really don't understand the terms you're using.

Such a reply does nothing to further the conversation. Given the otherwise respectful posts you have made, however, I am assuming you were just expressing frustration and that no disrespect was intended.

I think we can all agree that everyone posting on this board is an intelligent person who is attempting to work through a complex issue, and that is best to focus the discussion on substance and not make assumptions, much less claims, about the personalities.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Essentially compatibilism is simply the belief that free will is possible whether or not the universe is deterministic.

That is sheer, unmitigated non-sense.

If what you say were true, then compatibilism would simply be the belief that free will were possible.

But, then, calling that belief compatibilism would be sheer and unmitigated non-sense in itself, because the very word compatibilism indicates a claimed compatibility, and, in this case, that would be a compatibility between free will and ... and ... what?

Compatible with something, surely, because it couldn't be compatible with nothing, since if it were compatible with nothing, it couldn't be and wouldn't be compatible, and there can be no compatibilism if there are no things that are compatible.

Is the supposed compatibility with a deterministic universe and a non-deterministic universe but not with a universe that is neither deterministic nor non-deterministic?

Well, that is non-sense as well, not only because deterministic does not necessarily indicate the determinateness which has been at issue, but also because the pairing of "deterministic" with "or not" posits a fully determinate condition such that it would not make sense to refer to a universe that is neither deterministic nor non-deterministic. (I reckon that could be a sort of apophatic description, but you haven't struck me as the type of person who appreciates or knows when to use apophasis, and, besides, apophasis here would not salvage your compatibilism non-sense.)

And that leaves us right back at compatibilism simply being the belief that free will is possible, and that brings right back what amounts to the superfluousness of the term compatibilism itself, a superfluousness which eliminates any sensible utility to be had with or from the term compatibilism. And that means it is senseless to use the term.

Your non-sense is not interesting. It was briefly entertaining in that it provided an occasion for indulging in stream-of-consciousness writing, but your non-sense was not interesting. Your non-sense is not even a good apologetics maneuver.

 

[bilby]

I think we can all agree that everyone in this board is an intelligent person who is attempting to work through a complex issue, and that is best to focus the discussion on substance and not make assumptions, much less claims, about the personalities.

...and in the same vein, that it is best to ignore such assumptions and claims rather than to respond to them, as touchiness about perceived disrespect tends to come across as arrogance, despite any intent to merely steer discourse towards a polite social standard.

Bearing in mind that people here are from a variety of social backgrounds, and what to you may be a minimum standard for politeness could to others seem like being uptight, stuffy, and/or controlling.

 

[BSilvEsq]

I think we can all agree that everyone in this board is an intelligent person who is attempting to work through a complex issue, and that is best to focus the discussion on substance and not make assumptions, much less claims, about the personalities.

...and in the same vein, that it is best to ignore such assumptions and claims rather than to respond to them, as touchiness about perceived disrespect tends to come across as arrogance, despite any intent to merely steer discourse towards a polite social standard.

Bearing in mind that people here are from a variety of social backgrounds, and what to you may be a minimum standard for politeness could to others seem like being uptight, stuffy, and/or controlling.

fair enough


I suppose the following would be fair discourse in some social backgrounds (but I still would not expect it on this board where folks do seem to be above that):

 

[The AntiChris]

No, it's saying that determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant to compatibilists.

By definition, "Compatibilism" is the position that Determinism and Free Will are compatible.

Yes.

It is not possible to have such a position without a stated definition of both Determinism and Free Will for purposes of the comparison.

Of course they define their conception of free will (I've never suggested otherwise). They don't specify the precise definition of determinism because it's irrelevant. If they did it would man that they were incompatibilists with regard to any version of free will that didn't fit that definition. Compatibilists don't care how you define determinism, it's irrelevant!

Or, are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?

Yes!!!

The free will that compatibilists subscribe to is not dependent on determinism/indeterminism.

The only reason compatibilism is defined as compatible with determinism is because it stands in opposition to the irrationality of those who insist that no one is free under determinism - the incompatibilists.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Or, are you saying now that Compatibilism simply means a belief that Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be?

Yes!!!

The free will that compatibilists subscribe to is not dependent on determinism/indeterminism.

The only reason compatibilism is defined as compatible with determinism is because it stands in opposition to the irrationality of those who insist that no one is free under determinism - the incompatibilists.

I am unable to follow the logic of this last exchange.

I take it from your reply that you contend that "Free Will can and/or does exist without regard to anything else that might be true of the universe -- in which case Free Will (however you define it) would be compatible with Determinism without regard to what Determinism might be."

If that is accurate, it necessarily means that you contend that Free Will can and/or does exist even if Determinism "might be" the operation of the universe in the manner others on this board have characterized as Fatalistic. If you are not saying that, then you also are not saying that Free Will is compatible with the truth of Determinism no matter what determinism might be. If you are saying that Free Will is compatible with the Determinism if Determinism is defined in the fatalistic sense, can you please explain what you mean by Free Will in that context - because I fail to understand how that can be.

I do not believe your answer will be that of some others that Free Will is compatible with the truth of Determinism if Determinism is defined in the fatalistic sense because that definition of Determinism is nonsensical -- which response by others is what James describes as a "quagmire of evasion." To answer the question in a rigorous manner requires acceptance of the premise of the question. An acceptable answer would be that Free Will is not compatible with Determinism if Determinism is defined in the fatalistic sense, but it is nonsensical to define Determinism in that manner. That would answer the question directly -- albeit with an added commentary. Another alternative is that Free Will is compatible with Determinism if Determinism is defined in the fatalistic sense because [X] -- with X including a definition of Free Will that does not reject or contradict the hypothetical truth of Determinism if Determinism is defined in the fatalistic sense.

As with my prior post to you, this is a genuine inquiry and not an assertion described as a question. In fact, I would hope that I did not need to state that fact, as it is always the case with questions I ask. My questions are not rhetorical, and are designed to elicit information from others that might help me better understand their views.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think we can all agree that everyone in this board is an intelligent person who is attempting to work through a complex issue, and that is best to focus the discussion on substance and not make assumptions, much less claims, about the personalities.

...and in the same vein, that it is best to ignore such assumptions and claims rather than to respond to them, as touchiness about perceived disrespect tends to come across as arrogance, despite any intent to merely steer discourse towards a polite social standard.

Bearing in mind that people here are from a variety of social backgrounds, and what to you may be a minimum standard for politeness could to others seem like being uptight, stuffy, and/or controlling.

fair enough


I suppose the following would be fair discourse in some social backgrounds (but I still would not expect it on this board where folks do seem to be above that):


View attachment 52897

Only if it comes with accordingly good arguments. Then, you don't see me lobbing complaints about arguments unless they contain something I actually point out some bit as contradictory or some syntax error or both.

Diogenes mocked people by appearing in a barrel and, I think, actually mocking people. He usually did it when he thought he had a point that people persistently failed to take into consideration.

I'm not going to say I agree with Diogenes in his philosophy in general, because I couldn't care less about living the original nature of man. I mean, I know how, I just really hope to never have to.

That said, diogenes was a bit of an asshole and a troll, and I'm pretty sure people actually hold him on high regard for all he occasionally shit in the street, at least when he had a point to make.

I have yet to see an appeal for attaching "necessity" or "ultimateness" as a property to any truth except under or within some context that doesn't evaluate to a modal fallacy.

 

[BSilvEsq]

I have yet to see an appeal for attaching "necessity" or "ultimateness" as a property to any truth except under or within some context that doesn't evaluate to a modal fallacy.

I have tried to explain this before, and I will try again using different words to see if that is of any avail.

There is not, and cannot be, any type of fallacy -- modal or otherwise -- when positing a theoretical foundational premise or axiom. A fallacy can occur only when moving from a premise to a conclusion.

I am not drawing any conclusion that the universe is, in fact, deterministic in the sense you characterize as fatalism (which characterization I am willing to accept). Nor am I even positing that the universe does in fact operate that way. Rather, I am simply positing as theoretical foundational premise that the way in which nature occurs is deterministic in the sense you characterize as fatalism. That theoretical foundational premise cannot be fallacious. It can be factually wrong, it can be nonsensical, it can be ludicrous, it can defy credulity, and it can be subjected to multiple other criticisms, but it cannot be fallacious.

Also, the theoretical premise is not that the universe creates any rules or even follows them in the sense that a soldier might follow orders. The term rules is simply descriptive of the way in which the universe is posited to operate. Nor does the foundational premise mandate that the universe will continue to act in the manner it is posited to act at any point in the future -- although I am at a loss to understand how that chain of activity would change in the absence of external intervention of some sort (but that is neither here nor there for purposes of the premise).

I agree that it would involve a modal fallacy to adopt a theoretical foundational premise that the the entirety of the current past was predetermined by antecedent activity, and therefore all future activity is predetermined by antecedent activity. It also would involve a modal fallacy to move from the foundational premise that the past is immutable to a conclusion that the future is immutable. It also would involve a modal fallacy to move from a foundational premise that only one thing (and not more than one thing) can occur at a given instance to the conclusion that the one thing that does occur is the only one thing that could have occurred before it actually did occur. But, the theoretical foundational premise of the form of determinism that you characterize as fatalistic is that all activity is predetermined by antecedent activity such that it is the only activity that can occur and/or it is the very activity that must occur.

It does not matter why the foundational premise is adopted, and there need no be any appeal to doing so. The sole purpose of adopting the foundational premise (at least in the first instance) is for the purpose of engaging in a thought experiment respecting the conclusions that can be drawn from that premise without committing a fallacy. Just as the fundamental purpose of science it to discovery empirical probabilities without regard to what they might be and of what use they might have, a fundamental purpose of philosophy is to engage in thought for the sake of doing so without regard to where it might lead to the truth of the foundation premise that commenced the engagement. It is an exercise in pure logic with an arbitrary springboard that may or may not have any correlation to reality (if there is such a thing as reality).

 

[Jarhyn]

There is not, and cannot be, any type of fallacy -- modal or otherwise -- when positing a theoretical foundational premise or axiom

Yes there can, specifically when stating the necessity of some other axiom.

Rather, I am positing that as theoretical foundational premise that the way in which nature occurs is deterministic in the sense you characterize as fatalism

And when you do that, whenever you do that, you create an axiom which generated a syntax error, trivializing your system of axioms by introducing a contradiction.

The term rules is simply descriptive of the way in which the universe is posited to operate.

It's descriptive, here, of the "rules" you posit, as a contradiction, a nonsense, a syntax error.

It does not matter why the foundational premise is adopted, and there need no be any appeal to doing so.

No, any premise which attaches necessitation, really "positionlessness" to a position is metaphysically invalid.

We keep going over this.

Such worlds are not "possible" under non-contradiction.

 

[BSilvEsq]

There is not, and cannot be, any type of fallacy -- modal or otherwise -- when positing a theoretical foundational premise or axiom

Yes there can, specifically when stating the necessity of some other axiom.

Rather, I am positing that as theoretical foundational premise that the way in which nature occurs is deterministic in the sense you characterize as fatalism

And when you do that, whenever you do that, you create an axiom which generated a syntax error, trivializing your system of axioms by introducing a contradiction.

The term rules is simply descriptive of the way in which the universe is posited to operate.

It's descriptive, here, of the "rules" you posit, as a contradiction, a nonsense, a syntax error.

It does not matter why the foundational premise is adopted, and there need no be any appeal to doing so.

No, any premise which attaches necessitation, really "positionlessness" to a position is metaphysically invalid.

I am confident that we have now beaten this horse to death. We will just need to agree to disagree and part ways. If you believe my position is in error, so be it. I, too, believe your position to be in error.

The thing I enjoy most about being a lawyer is that there is an impartial and trained tribunal that ultimately calls the balls and strikes.

What transpires here is like a baseball game in which the pitcher and batter argue over whether a pitch was a ball or a strike, and there is no umpire to resolve the controversy. I accept your view that I have struck out, but I respectfully disagree. You may be right or you may be wrong, and there is no higher authority to resolve our impasse.

So, I wish you well, and will continue to read your posts without further comment unless and until you say something new and different that makes sense to me.

I will, however, leave you with two questions that you may or may not answer -- namely, (i) does the Pope commit a fallacy when he places his faith in the foundational premise that there is a God? and (ii) do scientists commit a fallacy when they place their faith in the foundational premise that there is an objective reality that is capable of being discerned by human beings (with our without appropriate technology)?

 

[Jarhyn]

You may be right or you may be wrong, and there is no higher authority to resolve our impasse

I have pointed to exactly the reason you are wrong.

Noncontradiction is THE highest requirement.

The way mathematicians actually disprove things is they assume something axiomatically and see if they get a contradiction as a result!

I did this on every attempt you made, specifically discovering a a fallacy repeated several times, specifically that positionally or contextually true things are utterly true except under the shared context.

One thing you will learn about me: I do not agree to disagree.

One or both of us is wrong.

I don't think it's me because the thing that judges MY statements tends to be a machine that doesn't give a shit how kindly you ask or kiss it's ass, it tells you "quit trying to perform an operation on a Type as an Instance."

 

[BSilvEsq]

You may be right or you may be wrong, and there is no higher authority to resolve our impasse

I have pointed to exactly the reason you are wrong.

Noncontradiction is THE highest requirement.

The way mathematicians actually disprove things is they assume something axiomatically and see if they get a contradiction as a result!

I did this on every attempt you made, specifically discovering a a fallacy repeated several times, specifically that positionally or contextually true things are utterly true except under the shared context.

One thing you will learn about me: I do not agree to disagree.

One or both of us is wrong.

I don't think it's me because the thing that judges MY statements tends to be a machine that doesn't give a shit how kindly you ask or kiss it's ass, it tells you "quit trying to perform an operation on a Type as an Instance."

I am fine with agreeing to disagree when there is no effective way to break a tie.

I also am happy to be proved wrong when I am wrong, and I readily admit to my errors when I understand them. I also do not need someone to agree with me when I am right.

You say that one or both of us is wrong. That seems right to me in this instance. We could, however, both be right if we are using different language, which is easy to do when discussing concepts of this nature.

Notwithstanding what I previously wrote, I do tend to agree with you that a self-contradictory premise is illogical. If I were to say that that X is both Y and Not Y, it would be a self contradictory premise that violates fundamental rules of logic. As such, so long as we were to agree to use logic as a measuring stick of validity, the premise that X is both Y and Not Y would be a self-contradictory and invalid premise.

Where we part ways is that I do not understand the self-contradiction you claim to have demonstrated from accepting as a theoretical foundational premise that every activity that has occurred in the past was inexorably necessitated by prior activity, such that it can be said, for example, that the Big Bang (assuming there was nothing else in the universe at the moment that occurred) write the Bible. As factually absurd as it feels to believe that to have occurred, where is the self-contradiction?

If you have a computer program that states that the foregoing is an invalid operation, I am interested in seeing it in operation. I am not sure that would be persuasive to me, but it seems to me that you are saying that to be the case, so I am interested to see it in operation.