Are words immaterial?

[fast]

The mind is brain function as per heaps of research.

That's silly, and that's exactly why it's much better to have an analytic philosopher (and not just some scientist--adept in his field as he might be) to interpret the results (the so-called findings) of high quality research.

 

[Juma]

The mind is brain function as per heaps of research.

That's silly, and that's exactly why it's much better to have an analytic philosopher (and not just some scientist--adept in his field as he might be) to interpret the results (the so-called findings) of high quality research.

Really? May it be so that you have any arguments for that standpoint?

 

[fast]

The mind is brain function as per heaps of research.

That's silly, and that's exactly why it's much better to have an analytic philosopher (and not just some scientist--adept in his field as he might be) to interpret the results (the so-called findings) of high quality research.

Really? May it be so that you have any arguments for that standpoint?

Brain function can be studied with instrumentation. The mind cannot be studied with instrumentation. Therefore, the mind is not brain function.

The mind is dependent on brain function, but that's different.

 

[WAB]

Si, Perspie! I do have a vivid imagination. And how!

However, I don't think I've imagined what looks like less and less tolerance for creative (perhaps I should have said radical? Sometimes radical thinking is a positive thing, no?) ideas among certain scientistic types. Note I say scientistic types, not scientists. Of course we can argue about whether there even is such a thing as scientism or such a species as scientistic types of individuals. Maybe there is no such ism, and no such collective?

But—

[there's always a (_!_) ]

—when I see certain people's TED talks being banned, and people's names being tagged with 'woo' and other pejoratives, especially scholars like Roger Penrose, just to name one sadly maligned genius, I gotta worry. I'm a worrier. Where's the worry smilie?

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+1 for DBT.

"Scientistic types" is a straw man. It's the kind of automatic thought that comes to your mind when a skeptic criticizes the "obdurate follies"...

Wrong. I don't have these knee-jerk reactions. My suspicions and concerns about the behavior of certain folk in the science community is founded on years of paying attention and listening to discussion and debate on various issues. Many people share the same suspicions and concerns, hence the word 'scientism' is born: not by one person having an automatic thought, but by a much larger process of many people having similar suspicions and concerns.

 

[WAB]

Si, Perspie! I do have a vivid imagination. And how!

However, I don't think I've imagined what looks like less and less tolerance for creative (perhaps I should have said radical? Sometimes radical thinking is a positive thing, no?) ideas among certain scientistic types. Note I say scientistic types, not scientists. Of course we can argue about whether there even is such a thing as scientism or such a species as scientistic types of individuals. Maybe there is no such ism, and no such collective?

But—

[there's always a (_!_) ]

—when I see certain people's TED talks being banned, and people's names being tagged with 'woo' and other pejoratives, especially scholars like Roger Penrose, just to name one sadly maligned genius, I gotta worry. I'm a worrier. Where's the worry smilie?

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+1 for DBT.

I don't think you (specifically you) should use a smilie.

Why, fast?

 

[fast]

I don't think you (specifically you) should use a smilie.

Why, fast?

Because you are quite capable of articulating your thoughts (and I suspect emotions) without them ... that's a compliment.

 

[WAB]

Why, fast?

Because you are quite capable of articulating your thoughts (and I suspect emotions) without them ... that's a compliment.

Thanks...you had me worried there for a while...

 

[ryan]

Really? May it be so that you have any arguments for that standpoint?

Brain function can be studied with instrumentation. The mind cannot be studied with instrumentation. Therefore, the mind is not brain function.

The mind is dependent on brain function, but that's different.

But what can you say when the physicalists say that the mind is the brain functions?

 

[DBT]

Self preservation and self identity goes beyond the physical body and its demise. 'Self' includes not only our physical body/self but our psyche.

Self preservation is the fear if losing your ego. Nothing else.

Why do you say that? Is it some sort of philosophical principle or rule? What is the reasoning?

And what is 'ego' in this instance?

 

[DBT]

Is it Death people fear? Or the idea of losing everyone and everything they have known, everything they have loved and worked for all their lives?

They're not mutually exclusive options. But fear of death is an outstanding component.

Yes, death entails loss. The ultimate loss. The loss of friends, relations, loved ones, wealth, possessions, attachments. The final end, the end of one's life and one's existence. This, including the fear of a painful death, essentially being the source of the fear of death.

 

[Perspicuo]

The mind is brain function as per heaps of research.

That's silly, and that's exactly why it's much better to have an analytic philosopher (and not just some scientist--adept in his field as he might be) to interpret the results (the so-called findings) of high quality research.

Yep. No surer argument than stating a scientist is not an expert in her/his field.

And by the way, analytic philosophers are by and large favorable to neuroscience and tend to adopt the same conclusions neuroscientists have, which undermines a bit your idea that the philosophers will have a different idea.

 

[Perspicuo]

Really? May it be so that you have any arguments for that standpoint?

Brain function can be studied with instrumentation. The mind cannot be studied with instrumentation. Therefore, the mind is not brain function.

The mind is dependent on brain function, but that's different.

Well, I guess you don't think much of approximately a centennium of psychological research, from Gestalttheorie down to the present day. With instrumentation. In labs. Through methodology that has evolved from simple arithmetic to the sophisticated statistical anaylsis of the last four decades.

You're actually reinforcing my POV with every queer objection you make.

 

[Perspicuo]

"Scientistic types" is a straw man. It's the kind of automatic thought that comes to your mind when a skeptic criticizes the "obdurate follies"...

Wrong. I don't have these knee-jerk reactions. My suspicions and concerns about the behavior of certain folk in the science community is founded on years of paying attention and listening to discussion and debate on various issues. Many people share the same suspicions and concerns, hence the word 'scientism' is born: not by one person having an automatic thought, but by a much larger process of many people having similar suspicions and concerns.

Many people with an ax to grind. Curious. Do you have anything to support a contention that "scientism-ists" (or whatever you would call them) have different conclusions neuroscientists have regarding the brain as the seat and locus of the mind? I mean, it boils down to this in the end.

I would guess you consider, say, Daniel Dennett a proponent of scientism since he considers and activiely promotes the idea I am talking about. So perhaps you could start there. Is there any contradiction between Dennett and the conclusions of neuroscience?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Me personally I don't know but never mind. However, if you want to say it's not material just because it's not matter then you don't have any substantial point. You are just making a frivolous point. Until you get to justify what the substantial issue is.

Some respectable physicists, most of them apparently, seem to think that time, space, or both, have no substance. Me I think that space and time are representational constructs, i.e. concepts in our minds. However, I don't see how it would be possible to prove anything. So, the question is, do you think you have a substantial point to make? If so, what is it?
EB

I have already made my point earlier in this thread. A different configuration of the exact same matter/energy can have a different effect from an input consisting of the same matter in both situations. There can be a major difference between both instances caused by immaterial where immaterial = not matter/energy.

And I still fail to see that it is substantial. The whole object of science, not just physics, are the properties of the material world. I can't see how one could construe the properties of the material world as made of matter. If the properties of the material world were somehow made of matter they would be indistinguishable from each other. The world would be matter and nothing else. So, it is quite clear that the material world is not just matter. Now, what is it you are trying to say beyond this evidence?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

IF there is a class of words that's immaterial then we wouldn't be able to perceive them so we would still keep saying all words are material.

To claim that words have meaning is to say that part of the word is somehow part of your mind and therefore potentially immaterial. Unless you see meaning as material too, like Quine, but then you have this problem that you have to find a materialist explanation to meaning, which you won't be able to do until you can show that the role of the mind in meaning is nil or show that the mind is material. We're not there yet...
EB

My point about configuration I think is important here. A blob of ink and the exact same ink turned into a word are going to have much different effects on the brain.

It's simply because of the spaces between parts of the ink. The spacing causes the eye to absorb photons which in turn trigger reactions at different times in the visual system.

So a word is partly matter and partly immaterial if we accept that spaces are immaterial.

But then this "immateriality" is utterly trivial. Something you really want to ignore for some reason. Words are immaterial in this sense just as much as anything physical is immaterial in this sense: the sun, the galaxy, a cake, a neutron, whatever. They are all immaterial in this trivial sense. So, what's new here?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Material is not a difficult notion. It's a natural notion.

The problem may be that it's not a scientific concept. We don't have any ready-made description of it.

It is also arguable that what is material is was is real. Reality is what it is irrespective of us and our views or even perceptions of it. Real things that would be beyond perception would still be real things. Our ignorance would be our ignorance.

And there is still the question of the quality of our experience or the fact that it exists as such. Material? Me, I certainly don't know that.
EB

Just a thought: It seems as though you are going to be forever lost in the rabbit hole if you don't at least accept some postulate. Usually it is good to start with mainstream postulates so that the arguments on a thread are coherent with yours.

Hmm, I think I'm just missing your point here!
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I figured property was not the appropriate word...

Anyway, to explain myself: If I say a word 'has' meaning, that isn't to say that that meaning is somehow intrinsic in the word, or that the word literally contains a meaning the way a pea-pod contains a pea. What I mean is that we understand the meaning of a word, based on what we've been taught about what meaning others have traditionally ascribed to it.

Hence, the word 'brown' 'has' meaning, not in itself as in something constituent to its existence in physical form, but only insofar as the letters b-r-o-w-n, in that order, conveys one or more ideas to the mind of an English language reader. It conveys the idea of a dark color, and/or a surname, depending on the context in which it's used (it can convey other meanings as well, of course, depending on context and on the mind reading it).

Lest I not be clear: when I say a word 'conveys' meaning to the mind, it isn't the word that does the conveying. It's the mind that does the work, drawing meaning from the word.

In the sentence, "The members of Van Halen had all the brown M&Ms removed from the complimentary bowl of M&Ms in their dressing room, because they're arrogant rock stars," the word brown conveys a dark color. In the sentence, "Mr. Brown has eaten the pyjamas and we are now taking him to the emergency room," the word Brown conveys a surname, and a color only by association and habit. We could get into capital letters and what they signify, but why bother?

Your comment about the footprint kind of makes my argument for me:

True, a footprint can have meaning, but, like the physical form of a word, does not have meaning as an intrinsic element or property. A footprint only 'has' meaning insofar as it conveys an idea to a mind: "Hmm, someone wearing size thirteen Reeboks has trod on the floor I just mopped! That clown-footed bastard!"

Short version: meaning is not material.

The problem with these kinds of discussions over words is that they frequently veer into sophistry and tedious navigations of the inny or outy

Ok, thank you for explaining!

The upshot for me is that words are just as immaterial as footprints, that is they are entirely material, notwithstanding ryan's views about footprints.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

What is nat accounyed for, yet, is the the actual experience of what goes on in your mind.

That, I quite agree with it.

I would agree to the statement if Juma had used some other word(s) than experience. Let's say the sentence read:

What is not accounted for, yet, is the the actual experience mechanical, electrical, biological process of what goes on in your mind then I'd be inclined to agree, since I don't think science has given a full account of the complex operation of brains, be they human brains or bird brains.[/I]

I think what Juma meant and that I'm sure you agree with was that our subjective experience is still not accounted for in materialist or physicalist terms.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

As long as there is a philosopher who doesn't want to accept the scientific view of the world, consciousness will always be a "hard problem", as the last bastion of the guardian angel in his/her fancy that protects him/her from fear of death.

In the meantime, neuroscience keeps dazzling us with discoveries of how the brain creates mental phenomena, while the walls of that bastion keep falling and falling until what is left is an empty house and the echoes of giggly litanies of denial of the last few naysayers who once stood defiant before the bright light that dared come in.

The problem is that this particular bastion keeps falling in a way that doesn't seem to lead to the scientists besieging it to get inside at all. Are you done yet?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

No reason to fear being dead.

Many reasons to fear dying. It can be very unpleasant.

Of course dying can be very unpleasant. Living can be very unpleasant too.

Dying can be unpleasant because dying is living.
EBuddha