That's a percept. The object is independent of that. The percept is dependent on both the subject and the object.
So what's wrong with using the substance of precept as an attribute of thing leading to the object? I'm not giving here because it's pretty clear that precept is represented in some determinable physical state.
I'm not sure what you're asking. There seems to be (at least to me) two different senses of the word, "thing", the narrow sense and the broad sense, both of which I eluded to early when discussing the implications between "some thing" and "something". Both the moon and hunger is something (as opposed to nothing), but only the moon is some thing, as hunger is not actually some thing we can (for instance) hold and touch--or remove and put on a table.
To me, I see no problem looking to that particular object in the sky we refer to as our moon and saying, "look at that thing". The moon is an object, and the moon is a thing. Either way, it is something, and so too is hunger, but it's neither an object or a thing (well, not a thing in the narrow sense).
One interesting thing (haha), about the moon is that it's mind-independent. In fact, it was here long before there were humans to perceive it and form mental precepts of it. It was here before we came and formed a language where we came to use the word, "moon" that has both a meaning and reference. The referent of the term is the actual object in the sky. The referent of the term was here long before the word. No word required...no percept required...no meaning required...no mind necessary. The moon was there (and still is). It's a thing. It's an object.
I perceive the moon. Yes, that would be me. Of course, there is no node making a direct link between my brain and the object high above our planet, and maybe that just highlights the complexity of perception, but I don't think it makes it false that I perceive the moon, so even if by chance there are electro-chemical processes that culminate in perceiving only percepts consequential of other biological processes, then careful should we be not to be too myopic in thinking about what it means to perceive something just because other processes are involved.
Percepts. An object? No. It's something, but just like the mind and hunger, it's not an actual object. But then again, neither are numbers, even if by chance they are abstract objects, as not even an abstract object is a kind of object. Careful (oh so careful) we must be when making inferences about the kinds of things things are based on the names ascribed to them.