COLOUR

[ruby sparks]

Process A, sending, operated on by filter to transform information to receiving process B. What was in A is converted, with some loss, to B.

Ok.

Away from that and just out of curiosity, what's your take on the following?

"In 1913 the American psychologist J. B. Watson issued a manifesto for behaviourism in psychology. It was at first a purely methodological approach. It didn’t say or suggest that consciousness didn’t exist. It simply said that you couldn’t do proper science with it: the data of consciousness, as delivered by introspective report, weren’t susceptible of scientific treatment. So although—of course—consciousness existed, it was better to pass it by in the lab and study wholly publicly observable things like behaviour. This was a very fruitful move at the time. It’s still useful.

The trouble started, I’m sorry to say, when some philosophers got their hands on it. They took an admirable method and gamed it into a crazy metaphysics. With a fine fiddle of theoretical bells and whistles, they affirmed that consciousness is really just a matter of behaviour and dispositions to behaviour: nothing more. This was philosophical behaviourism (although psychologists were by no means immune)".

Are you of the first paragraph persuasion or the second?

 

[fromderinside]

R. U. Kidding me. Terrible methodological approach. Behaviorism was an unsound reaction to eugenics and psychichiarty. Behavior with Noyes pellets as a basis for science of human behavior? RUKM. Still, it's of use if you are interested using schedules of reinforcement controls for balanced behavioral procedures in experiments with animals for other factors such as drugs, hormones, finding floater species, etc.

I don't like ethological study because its basis is rigorous study of a species in the wild by one individual at a time resulting in one person opinion about what she sees.

The american approach, comparative psychology methods take the animal out of the environment into the labor intervening with the animals then putting them back in a controlled semi-natural situation. Don't like that approach much either. At least they are linked to underlying population and species difference study. Was the Snark a Boojum Frank Beach asked.

Not quite as bad as Skinner though. Thorndike, the father of behaviorism was more pragmatic, moderate, attuned to the benefits of scientific method. Compare his puzzle box with The Skinner box.

As for consciousness, if you are OK with scientific underpinnings of sense, perceive, awareness, attention, planning, and you can devise empirical underpinnings connected with the rest of material science I say go for it. Just be sure everyone is aware of the clear material underpinnings and methodology.

As for the two paragraphs Hobson's' Choice.

1.Watson using Wundt to attack scientific method for getting at the what and why of consciousness. it's BS!

2. I really have nothing against philosophers or philosophy. The existing methds at the time were atrocious. Skull bumps, electroshock, ethology with unsteady humans (Freud, Yung, Adler und zo weiter), and the philosophico-politico Eugenic movement by powerful racists of the day

 

[ruby sparks]

R. U. Kidding me. Terrible methodological approach. Behaviorism was an unsound reaction to eugenics and psychichiarty. Behavior with Noyes pellets as a basis for science of human behavior? RUKM. Still, it's of use if you are interested using schedules of reinforcement controls for balanced behavioral procedures in experiments with animals for other factors such as drugs, hormones, finding floater species, etc.

I don't like ethological study because its basis is rigorous study of a species in the wild by one individual at a time resulting in one person opinion about what she sees.

The american approach, comparative psychology methods take the animal out of the environment into the labor intervening with the animals then putting them back in a controlled semi-natural situation. Don't like that approach much either. At least they are linked to underlying population and species difference study. Was the Snark a Boojum Frank Beach asked.

Not quite as bad as Skinner though. Thorndike, the father of behaviorism was more pragmatic, moderate, attuned to the benefits of scientific method. Compare his puzzle box with The Skinner box.

As for consciousness, if you are OK with scientific underpinnings of sense, perceive, awareness, attention, planning, and you can devise empirical underpinnings connected with the rest of material science I say go for it. Just be sure everyone is aware of the clear material underpinnings and methodology.

As for the two paragraphs Hobson's' Choice.

1.Watson using Wundt to attack scientific method for getting at the what and why of consciousness. it's BS!

2. I really have nothing against philosophers or philosophy. The existing methds at the time were atrocious. Skull bumps, electroshock, ethology with unsteady humans (Freud, Yung, Adler und zo weiter), and the philosophico-politico Eugenic movement by powerful racists of the day

Thanks. You have interesting and knowledgeable takes on...what I might call.....the place of psychology among the sciences.

I'm not sure exactly what you mean when you say, "Watson using Wundt to attack scientific method for getting at the what and why of consciousness" partly because I am only loosely familiar with either of those people and with how psychology got from, for example, Wundt to now. So if you could elaborate on that line it would be interesting.

My own general impression is that psychology has always struggled to join the gang of 'proper' sciences. Someone who used to be a member here once said that psychology hasn't had its Newton or its Einstein yet and that's a statement that often comes back to me. My general impression of a lot of the people you mention is that they were trying to find a way that psychology could elevate itself to the level of some other sciences, the ones that were making leaps and bounds (at least back then). I'm not disparaging psychology when I say that, and it's also what I think about a number of other disciplines, not least philosophy, which has been hanging on to the coattails of science ever since the modern scientific method arrived. And I'm not putting psychology on a par with philosophy. Psychology is much more scientific.

I think psychology has an extra obstacle or two. One is that a fair amount of what goes on in the brain is essentially private, and the other is that the brain is so incredibly complicated that the study of it is arguably harder (as in more difficult) than what any of the so-called 'hard' sciences have to deal with. In the absence so far of anything more complicated, my guess is that nothing (that we know of) in the universe or about the universe is as complicated as a human brain. Quantum physicists might disagree about that and who am I (someone who doesn't understand quantum physics) to disagree with them in turn, but I bet a quark, however elusive, will at least behave more reliably and predictably than a human animal. Everything 'out there' is just material. We are material that thinks (and yes until further notice I'd say thoughts were material things). That's not to reify human thinking. Look where it's got us (the foothills of Mount Extinction) but I do think it's nevertheless more complicated than not thinking, because of the way the material components are joined up.

I've rambled. What was the topic again? Maybe we've done it to death.

 

[fromderinside]

Just throwing out words you can use to link to topics necessary for landing on my pov.

Weber: conducted psychological experiments that held validity, Just Noticeable Difference (JND)
Helmholtz:* speed of neural impulse, trichromatic color theory
Pavlov: Conditioned reflex, classical conditioning, respondent conditioning
Thorndike: learning theory, reinforcement, law of effect, operant conditioning
Watson: Behaviorism
Bridgman: Operationalism
Skinner: Radical behaviorism

*Psychology's Genius.

The following sum up of current thinking about Skinner's approach gets the drift for why I think Skinner misinterprets Bridgeman's operationalism.

Criticisms of Behaviourism focus on its theoretical weaknesses as well as its cold methods. Psychologists today consider this classical form of behaviorism to be "wrong" in the sense that modern cognitive research has clearly demonstrated the role of mental processes in psychology. Behaviorism cannot explain all of human behavior – for instance, behaviorism predicts that it should be possible to perform gay conversion therapy, and fails to explain why conditioning is not effective in altering human sexual orientation.^[16]

When one restricts endeavor to a construct, behaviorism, one restricts how one can evaluates said construct. Operations are there for whatever needs be explored, it shouldn't be set in concrete. For instance, if genetics is involved in behavior then build operations that include relevant genetic constraints on behavior change.

To wit:

The total misconstrual by psychologists of Bridgman’s “critical concern,” and the evidence suggesting that they had based their “reading” of Bridgman’s position on little more than a single slogan taken out of the context of the very paragraph in which it had occurred (at the beginning of his first book on general methodic issues, The Logic of Modern Physics, 1927)-provides a dramatic case study of the quality of scholarship that has long prevailed in psychology.

from:
Bridgman’s “Operational Analysis” versus “Operational Definition” in Psychology: A Study in the Pathology of Scholarship
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4612-2746-5_1

Hope these keywords are useful.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Yes it literally is.

Which is the main problem. You are taking one concept he asserted too literally, while ignoring all of the qualifying remarks he made (in particular the very next sentence) and the entire thrust of his argument and book, which is about reflectance and the fact that what we see is light being changed by the physical interaction of the photons bouncing off of the object, not necessarily the photons being emitted by the object.

He even clarifies that when photons are emitted from an object--like a TV or computer monitor--it is a different kind of color event than when they are reflected, but because of your literalism, you robbed him of meaning.

—let’s just pivot to your model.

What’s the point of it?

I believe it gets things the right way around and is more precise.

That's not a point, that's a belief and all it does is affirm the fact that the hard problem is a hard problem. All you (or Palmer or anyone) can argue is that color--as with literally all experience--is at least created in the brain. But we already know the brain makes models based on the information acquired by the body.

What no one can argue (legitimately) is that color is ONLY created in the brain. There simply is no possible method to prove that due to the conditions of the hard problem. Note that Palmer doesn't argue it; at best, he simply asserts it (as do all before him). Declaring that color is not in the ray, for example, is not an argument; it is an assertion without hope of support.

In short, you have done nothing more than affirm the conditions of the hard problem and the fact that those same conditions preclude anyone from proving that color is not also "out there."

Worse, however, is that you are ignoring the evidence we do have that strongly indicates that color is also "out there"--such as the simple fact that we (and many other species) evolved an elaborate, universal color coding system (a system that encodes BEFORE the sight signals are sent to the brain no less) and the fact that we can replicate it with technology--in favor of your belief.

And, finally, there are the central logic failures of your belief that you can't address merely ignore, which are:

1. how could we each independently evolve the same color coding system across species if it were not copying/mimicking/recreating an objective condition? Please don't respond to that point with the insipid "I've already agreed it's an objective condition." The phrase goes directly to color, not some unknown alternate condition neither of us have argued. And
2. if blue/red/green/yellow/purple, etc., do not exist "out there" then how and why did we create them? What did we base those colors upon, universally across species?

That is blue ex-nihilo as I am using that term (in its proper sense). If blue does not exist "out there" then how did we first create it and why, let alone how did it become a universally created phenomenon across species that is ALSO replicable through our technology?

If you can't answer any of those questions then asserting your model is the "right way" around and/or "more precise" is (ironically) vapid at best.

 

[ruby sparks]

You are taking one concept he asserted too literally, while ignoring all of the qualifying remarks he made (in particular the very next sentence) and the entire thrust of his argument and book, which is about reflectance and the fact that what we see is light being changed by the physical interaction of the photons bouncing off of the object, not necessarily the photons being emitted by the object.

As far as I am aware, he did not make any qualifying remarks about colour being anything other than a psychological phenomenon. Can you provide a citation to the contrary?

He even clarifies that when photons are emitted from an object--like a TV or computer monitor--it is a different kind of color event than when they are reflected, but because of your literalism, you robbed him of meaning.

Given that you’ve misquoted him previously, I would ask for a specific citation for that or it didn’t happen. I would need a reference to ‘different kind of colour event’ in the first instance and an indication that it was considered to be outside a brain.

If (if) Palmer has allowed for ‘colour events’, or colour in any sense, outside the brain, then ok, but I really don’t believe he did.

Aside from that, the rest of your post has several questionable items in it, imo, and I have in any case already replied to all of the points previously, in some cases several times. Some of the questions are just unnecessary, such as (again) asking how could a visual system evolve without detecting colour (answer, as previously, by detecting and processing other properties of external stimuli, as is the case for many brain sensations and other psychological phenomena). The complaint about lack of proof is still a straw man, obviously, since no one has it or is claiming to have it. Blue is of course not created from nothing and no one is suggesting it (psychological sensations, emotions, thoughts, beliefs and other features of consciousness not being “out there” in the external stimuli is not at all unusual). Etc.

 

[ruby sparks]

The following sum up of current thinking about Skinner's approach gets the drift for why I think Skinner misinterprets Bridgeman's operationalism.

Criticisms of Behaviourism focus on its theoretical weaknesses as well as its cold methods. Psychologists today consider this classical form of behaviorism to be "wrong" in the sense that modern cognitive research has clearly demonstrated the role of mental processes in psychology. Behaviorism cannot explain all of human behavior – for instance, behaviorism predicts that it should be possible to perform gay conversion therapy, and fails to explain why conditioning is not effective in altering human sexual orientation.^[16]

When one restricts endeavor to a construct, behaviorism, one restricts how one can evaluates said construct. Operations are there for whatever needs be explored, it shouldn't be set in concrete. For instance, if genetics is involved in behavior then build operations that include relevant genetic constraints on behavior change.

To wit:

The total misconstrual by psychologists of Bridgman’s “critical concern,” and the evidence suggesting that they had based their “reading” of Bridgman’s position on little more than a single slogan taken out of the context of the very paragraph in which it had occurred (at the beginning of his first book on general methodic issues, The Logic of Modern Physics, 1927)-provides a dramatic case study of the quality of scholarship that has long prevailed in psychology.

from:
Bridgman’s “Operational Analysis” versus “Operational Definition” in Psychology: A Study in the Pathology of Scholarship
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4612-2746-5_1

Hope these keywords are useful.

That was a very interesting read and explains a lot. Thanks for linking.

I picked out a few sentences (as screenshots from google books):




and



https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...Study in the Pathology of Scholarship&f=false

So, as you said:

As for consciousness, if you are OK with scientific underpinnings of sense, perceive, awareness, attention, planning, and you can devise empirical underpinnings connected with the rest of material science I say go for it. Just be sure everyone is aware of the clear material underpinnings and methodology.

 

[ruby sparks]

nm

 

[fromderinside]

Let me expand on what needs to be considered for psychologists to apply operational methodogy.

From Sensation in Psychology: What is Sensation Psychology? http://www.psychologydiscussion.net...psychology-what-is-sensation-psychology/13651

Below is just an introduction to skin, organic sensibility, vestibular, kinesthetic senses IOW not the major senses of vision, hearing, olfaction, taste.

The organization of the discussion can be seen as an attempt to operationalize by subcategory in an ever more reduced perspective

The skin itself has four senses namely, the sense of cold, warmth, pain and touch. These are known as the external senses but there is also a kinesthetic sense through which we become aware of the position of our limbs and tensions in our muscles.

The vestibular sense located in our ears supplies lots with the information about the movement of our head and helps us to maintain the balance of our body. Besides these, there are other senses located within the body, which give us information about pressure, pain and temperature within the body and hence they are called organic senses. These three are known as internal senses. A minimum list of man’s senses includes- vision, hearing, cold, warmth, pain, touch, organic sensibility, smell, taste, kinesthesis and the vestibular sense.

Each sensory receptor responds to a particular type of stimulation. For example, ... the warmth and cold receptor in the skin are stimulated by thermal energy or temperature changes.

The sense of touch, pain, kinesthesis and vestibular senses are stimulated by some kind of mechanical movement. These different sense modalities show that our sense organs are highly specialized to respond to only some kind of stimulation. The kind of stimulation, which usually stimulates a sensory receptor is called the adequate stimulus.

The minimum strength of the stimulus that is necessary to excite any particular sense organ is known as the lower threshold or limen, sometimes also called the lower absolute threshold. This threshold can be determined by presenting the subject with a stimulus of a given intensity and asking him whether he detects it or not; on the next trail a different stimulus intensity is used and such a procedure is followed through a wide range of intensities. On the basis of certain theoretical considerations, psychologists have agreed to define the absolute threshold as that value at which the stimulus is perceived 50 per cent of the time. Table 2.1 gives the data of absolute threshold for different sense modalities.

I left the last part of identifications of this initial higher level description to you as an exercise - und zo weiter

Note that every bolded item needs more definition in physical type, activity, and measure terms. Ultimately one can get down to specific activity and function which also needs be linked to existing physical knowledge.

My primary area was audition for which I had to refer to anatomy, physiology, biochemistry and biophysics, mechanics, systems, control, and other more fundamental empirical science, mathematics, and engineering references for both performance and experimental design.

Point being made it's an excruciatingly exacting process for which most are not patient enough to descend through to get specific answers. And that is just the first part of the process.

Essentially, the above is to what I was referring when I talked about being satisfied with empirical links and connections. "It's hard" is no excuse to bail out and assert "I heard that...." instead.

I'm saying that one be up to date on psychology. One must also be conversant in physics, chemistry, biology, and the interaction disciplines as well as appropriate mathematics to be a decent sensory scientist.

It's so nice to shove color off to the brain.. It's a bit more difficult to correctly parse out the links between color, light, and evolution to find out what is actually taking place.


Breaking off from operationalism.

Back to whether feeling is valid for assigning color.

Feel as strongly as you might you're wrong on this issue.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

You are taking one concept he asserted too literally, while ignoring all of the qualifying remarks he made (in particular the very next sentence) and the entire thrust of his argument and book, which is about reflectance and the fact that what we see is light being changed by the physical interaction of the photons bouncing off of the object, not necessarily the photons being emitted by the object.

As far as I am aware, he did not make any qualifying remarks about colour being anything other than a psychological phenomenon. Can you provide a citation to the contrary?

I have repeatedly. The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure.

He even clarifies that when photons are emitted from an object--like a TV or computer monitor--it is a different kind of color event than when they are reflected, but because of your literalism, you robbed him of meaning.

Given that you’ve misquoted him previously

This ends now. You are simply being disingenuous and dogmatic to serve your preconceived beliefs as proven by the fact that even if Palmer asserted that color ONLY happens in the brain, it would be a completely unsupportable assertion, a fact you keep trying to avoid by incorrectly asserting the idea of "proof" to be both addressed/accepted and outside the scope.

The fact that no one can prove color is ONLY in the brain is the central failure of your position. And by that I mean, once again, that the nature of the hard problem precludes us from ever being able to prove color exists ONLY in the brain. It's not possible to assert or assume for the sake of argument or just for the silly fuck of it call it your "model"; no one can legitimately state that color exists ONLY in the brain. Not because I personally don't want them to; because the nature of our physical universe precludes it.

The best anyone can ever do is state that color is at least created in the brain. No one--not you, not Palmer, not Newton--can state that color is ONLY created in the brain. It's not a supportable assertion.

Why can't you comprehend what that means? It is as straightforward and undeniable as 2 + 2 = 4.

And since you can't prove that color is ONLY in the brain, it renders your "model" forever incomplete and therefore pointless. So, yes, you must prove that color exists ONLY in the brain. You can't assert it; you can't pretend that it does for the sake of argument or your "model"; you must PROVE that this is the case or else all you will ever have (which is all you can ever have) is the statement: color exists at least in the brain.

Have fun with that.

 

[ruby sparks]

The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure.

Exactly.

Though you added a full stop that isn't in the text.

The sentence in full:

"The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure, but these physical properties are different in important ways from the colors we perceive".

Colours we perceive. Colours we see. Clearly the same thing, and to Palmer, a psychological phenomenon only. In his repeatedly-stated view, "Colour only becomes relevant after light enters the eye of the observer who is equipped with the proper sort of visual nervous system to experience it". For him, there are no colour properties in light or objects, only properties that cause us to see them as coloured.

I won't quote in full the many other sections which are fully consistent with that.

This ends now.

Fine.

 

[fromderinside]

The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure.

Exactly.

Though you added a full stop that isn't in the text.

The sentence in full:

"The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure, but these physical properties are different in important ways from the colors we perceive".

Colours we perceive. Colours we see. Clearly the same thing, and to Palmer, a psychological phenomenon only. In his repeatedly-stated view, "Colour only becomes relevant after light enters the eye of the observer who is equipped with the proper sort of visual nervous system to experience it". For him, there are no colour properties in light or objects, only properties that cause us to see them as coloured.

I won't quote in full the many other sections which are fully consistent with that.

This ends now.

Fine.

Palmer and others misspoke when they waved by inventing a new intervening variable when it is just a physical filter, evolved to the extent biologically possible, producing what the nervous system processes.

The point is that it's not the mind. Rather it's what has evolved to process that light which the nervous system receives. What has evolved is a receptor that processes light as color which is then processed by the nervous system. Light is filtered by the receptor as color. The nervous system knows no other form. It even reflects the color nature transduced in accordance with the receptor's phototopice design reinforcing that it is color that produces the nervous response to what is physically presented to it. The nervous system simply processes what is received. No invention by mind at all.

Maybe some day you'll see what effect "I heard, I believe, It's hard" has on your thinking about what goes on in the nervous system.

What torque's my jaws are neuroscientists still pursuing means for the nervous system to influence visual receptor without having visual system providing descending processes directly to the receptors. It's possible given the electro-biochemical nature of the receptor nervous system interface, but unlikely, given existing electrochemical mechanical designs of nervous system and receptor and evidence from other descending interfaces with receptor systems having neural processes directly interfacing with receptors.

 

[ruby sparks]

Breaking off from operationalism.

Back to whether feeling is valid for assigning color.

Feel as strongly as you might you're wrong on this issue.

What do you mean exactly by 'assigning colour' (and indeed feeling as valid for doing it) though? It's quite possible I would not disagree with you, depending on what exactly you mean. Colours can be assigned to objects and light if that's either the convention you accept or if for whatever reason you hold that it is correct.

If on the other hand you mean 'assigning' colour a location in the brain and only in the brain, then you simply do not currently have grounds to say that is wrong. It is clearly one possible model, certainly not just mine, and not all that unusual in terms of being used by people who are relevantly-qualified enough to have an informed or even expert opinion. At worst, if you do not like the model, just say you prefer another model instead and we can agree to disagree. The matter is not going to be resolved here by us.

Thanks for the other stuff.

 

[ruby sparks]

.....neuroscientists still pursuing means for the nervous system to influence visual receptor without having visual system providing descending processes directly to the receptors.

The nervous system influencing receptors? If you had a citation for someone claiming that it would be interesting to read. I don't think I've yet read of it.

It's certainly not part of my preferred model, or any version of it that I've yet come across.

 

[ruby sparks]

Palmer and others misspoke when they waved by inventing a new intervening variable when it is just a physical filter.....

I am actually afraid to ask what you even mean there by intervening variable. I don't see Palmer introducing one. At worst, he refers to psychological phenomena. I thought we were done with the rubbish about avoiding that sort of thing when it turned out even your Bridgman was essentially ok with it.

You know, when I refer to 'mind' or 'consciousness', I obviously do not mean a distinct entity and never have done, only the sum total of whatever relevant and active physical processes it could be reduced down to. You know, the ones you list, before arbitrarily leaving out that the result is sometimes conscious experience.

 

[fromderinside]

I obviously do not mean a distinct entity and never have done, only the sum total of whatever relevant and active physical processes it could be reduced down to. You know, the ones you list, before arbitrarily leaving out that the result is sometimes conscious experience.

Yet when he says mind or consciousness Bridgman distinguishes between nervous system and other physical processors. It's just plain wrong to mix an external physical process like a visual information filter process, the receptor organ function, with neural processes. ONe transforms light information to color information which neural processes use to organize and provide instructions to other neural (mental) and other (biological) mechanisms and processes with respect to that information that carry out activities generated by the neural processes.

In that sense there is a very clear distinction between mind and body. We don't include digestion with mind except through distinguishing between these two human (insert your favorite animal) processes unless we are considering the effects of one process upon the other. Then we refer to the direction of process flow and make clear what is mental and what is not mental.

Neither is it right to lump something as psychological then scream at critics when it is clear you don't mean that as your comment above reflects. When you go from lump, psychological, to throwing in receptor and effector with insert-our-own-pet-mental-thingie and an overstated "whatever relevant and active physical processes it could be reduced down to" for what goes on in the nervous system, receptor system, any stray effector system, to suit your view about the scope of the mind. Way to far up the abstraction ladder for meaningful discourse. Kind of like seeing all that goes on around you then claiming it is because "God is good."

All I've done is show there are two separate functions going on because of two different processes. I've separated color process from what the nervous system causes to what the receptor system causes. Makes life and physics much easier. Oh, and ultimately makes psychology easier as well. No need to explain the unexplainable. I mean there is so much the nervous system is doing with color as has been pointed out above in arguments about whether physical color is physical or in the mind.

It turns out color is physical and mental processes makes up a bunch of stuff to explain to the mindful what color is which or how. After all color needs explaining if it is to be effectively used by those who have that capability. Enough on the plate already.

Finally I am looking for such references myself which would be important if there were some mechanism to tune particular receptors to analyzed information baselines in the brain. No one has found such processes yet from my review.

I'm now searching for environmental media in the retina (dopa and the like) with no luck. Probably no possible magnetic influences either, as they are a long shot anyway. It would be a leap that could make the receptor part of the NS. Really I'm trying close the door on directionality of processes which at present is upward into the CNS and downward from CNS only to ganglion cells which are part of the CNS. The pigmented receptor cells remain part of the receptor filter.

The auditory system permits NS tuning and responsiveness of receptor cells so the transducer ends at putting input into receptor cells. That is the transducer provides input for assessing signal and adjusting signal processing for recovery of altered nature of acoustic input induced by the receptor conversion of unified signal into frequency arranged signal which the AS uses to some effect.

 

[ruby sparks]

But no one ever suggested that the receptor organ function and neural processes were not separate!

I don’t think you’re actually following what’s been said and not been said at all.

As for neuroscientists claiming that the nervous system influences visual receptors, I’ll wait for a citation. It’s not part of the model I’m using or any version of it that I’ve seen yet.

 

[fromderinside]

Constantly changing targets. I didn't say receptor organ I said receptor processes. It's (receptor) processes and (neural) processes being compared not organs and processes.

I've gosome experience on this topic since, as the second reference below identifies the auditory neural process receptor processes boundary as unique in defining terms in what is end of one and the beginning the other.

The Efferent System or Olivocochlear Function Bundle – Fine Regulator and Protector of Hearing Perception https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3615293/

The efferent system of the ear possesses several distinct functions, in particular noise protection, mediation of selective attention and improvement of signal to noise ratio. It also supports adaptation and frequency selectivity by modification of the micromechanical properties of outer hair cells.

Neural control of iris and eyelids are similarly neurally modulated intensity and hazard gate controls for vision.

Auditory Cortex Basal Activity Modulates Cochlear Responses in Chinchillas

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3340362/

The auditory efferent system has unique neuroanatomical pathways that connect the cerebral cortex with sensory receptor cells. Pyramidal neurons located in layers V and VI of the primary auditory cortex constitute descending projections to the thalamus, inferior colliculus, and even directly to the superior olivary complex and to the cochlear nucleus. Efferent pathways are connected to the cochlear receptor by the olivocochlear system, which innervates outer hair cells and auditory nerve fibers. The functional role of the cortico-olivocochlear efferent system remains debated. We hypothesized that auditory cortex basal activity modulates cochlear and auditory-nerve afferent responses through the efferent system.

This is more functional sensory regulation more like what I was trying to find analogs in vision.

Start stop is one thing. (the first study and vision reference)

The control of what is sent in an ongoing manner is what I'd use as criteria for the brain having some part in transduction of information, determining, information transduced which wold redraw my line between receptor and nervous system. That is what I've set as the boundary between transducer and nervous system in this vision discussion. IOP I always keep and open mind.

OK. Now you can put sensory poster suit.

 

[rousseau]

A 340 post thread on colour!

Can someone aim fromderinside somewhere else? I've heard enough about the emotional quotient of Trump supporters.

 

[ruby sparks]

Constantly changing targets. I didn't say receptor organ I said receptor processes. It's (receptor) processes and (neural) processes being compared not organs and processes.

I didn’t compare receptor organ and neural processes, I said ‘receptor organ function, and neural processes’, because that is what YOU said!

Ok I think we really are done this time. Thanks for the discussion.