COLOUR

[fromderinside]

Yes I did.

However there was a bit more than that in my post.

....which I'm painfully aware you want to avoid.

Too bad.

OK rousseau

I think we're done here.

Takes off cape. Leaves the phone booth as Clark Kent.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure.

Exactly.

Though you added a full stop that isn't in the text.

Because after posting the full sentence numerous times already, I was deliberately highlighting the first qualifying section to further emphasize that Palmer was clarifying his previous thought.

Colours we perceive. Colours we see. Clearly the same thing

In what universe? He is very clearly making a distinction between a mechanical process and a mental experience. That's precisely why Palmer chose those particular words; to delineate between physical properties emitted (colors we see), i.e. the "input information" as opposed to physical properties reflected (colors we perceive), i.e., the "output information."

Reflectance is the central fucking thesis of his book. You, otoh, have ignored everything else he wrote and instead have fixated on the heavily qualified and misconstrued notion that Palmer is arguing that color is ONLY created in the brain, which, even if it were true STILL DOESN'T ESTABLISH THAT THIS IS THE CASE.

In his repeatedly-stated view, "Colour only becomes relevant after light enters the eye of the observer who is equipped with the proper sort of visual nervous system to experience it".

I know you're Irish, but do you not understand English? "Color only becomes relevant..." RELEVANT "...after light enters the eye of the observer who is equipped with the proper sort of visual nervous system to experience it." EXPERIENCE.

Do you STILL not comprehend the difference between a mechanical process and a mental, psychological/phenomenological experience of that process? The difference between blue and the experience of blueness? How is that possible?

For him, there are no colour properties in light or objects, only properties that cause us to see them as coloured.

Inaccurate yet again, but, regardless,it does not matter if Palmer made the claim that color is ONLY created in the brain, he cannot legitimately make such a claim. It's unprovable and that fact remains the central fatal flaw in your own "model."

A fact you keep trying to hand wave away by insipidly claiming that proof isn't an issue or that you've already said it couldn't be proved or the like. It is THE issue for your model. If you can't prove--PROVE--that color ONLY exists in the brain, then you have no model. All you have is what is already known; the hard problem.

This ends now.

Fine.

Your sophistry, not my posts. But it might as well be, since you keep avoiding the central issues, like the fact that it is the rods and cones that color code, not the brain. Which is why, once again, Palmer made the distinction of the "input" information vs the "output" information; of what we see as opposed to what we subsequently experience.

Once again for auld lang syne, this quote from Palmer's book (that comes long before he ever makes any assertions regarding the psychological experience of color). Note in particular the last paragraph regarding information about the surface of an object:

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Well, believe it or not, in a very "Annie Hall" way and considering the surreal global condition, I actually reached out to Professor Palmer via email to ask him directly about what we've been arguing about and to my shock and utter delight, he actually responded! Here is what I wrote to him:

Professor-

Please forgive the unsolicited email, but a friend of mine and I have been having a prolonged argument over some of the claims you made in your seminal textbook and we're at an impasse so I thought, why not go to the source?

The issue boils down to the following sentence of yours: "Rather, color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights."

My friend has taken this particular sentence very literally (ignoring the other qualifying sentences preceding and following it, no less) to maintain that color ONLY exists in the brain.

My position is that all anyone can legitimately claim is that color exists at least in the brain and that the question as to whether or not it may also exist outside the brain can never be proved (due to the hard problem of consciousness).

I have also tried to point out to him the many qualifying remarks you make regarding the acquisition of information--and the differences between "input" information and "output" information--showing that what you are delineating is that the brain adds additional information (associative information) to the information coded by the rods and cones and that this is what constitutes the fuller, more robust psychological "experience."

And I've noted that the central theme of your book is about reflected light and how that changes the wavelength which in turn means we aren't acquiring intrinsic information, we are acquiring reflected information.

And that you noted emitted light (from a TV or computer monitor) is color coded, but he keeps insisting that for you, no matter where you used the word "color" it necessarily meant ONLY a psychological experience, excluding the possibility that color information could be external, only internally generated.

In short, I can't seem to get him to understand the difference between "blue" (the wavelength) and "the experience of blueness." Nor the fact that he is effectively arguing "blue ex nihilo."

Any clarification you care to provide would be deeply appreciated. And I figured since we're currently in a global lock down, you might just have the spare time.

Thank you and I hope you and your family are healthy and sound.

And here is his response:

You happened to catch me right while I was revising a chapter for a new book I'm writing that is all about color. The first chapter addresses the question you're asking about -- is color an aspect of internal experience or of an external reality -- and I think I've made some progress on that in the 20 years since since [sic] writing the 1999 book. In particular, there are at least two importantly different senses in which one could claim that color exists in the external world, which I now call "strong (or wavelength) externalism" versus "weak (or measurement) externalism". Maybe this will help you and your friend sort out you disagreements. I don't believe that strong externalism is tenable, but weak externalism is pretty clearly defensible, and it's consistent with "relationalism", which, for me is the "right" way to think about color.

So there you go.

 

[Politesse]

Well, believe it or not, in a very "Annie Hall" way and considering the surreal global condition, I actually reached out to Professor Palmer via email to ask him directly about what we've been arguing about and to my shock and utter delight, he actually responded! Here is what I wrote to him:

Professor-

Please forgive the unsolicited email, but a friend of mine and I have been having a prolonged argument over some of the claims you made in your seminal textbook and we're at an impasse so I thought, why not go to the source?

The issue boils down to the following sentence of yours: "Rather, color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights."

My friend has taken this particular sentence very literally (ignoring the other qualifying sentences preceding and following it, no less) to maintain that color ONLY exists in the brain.

My position is that all anyone can legitimately claim is that color exists at least in the brain and that the question as to whether or not it may also exist outside the brain can never be proved (due to the hard problem of consciousness).

I have also tried to point out to him the many qualifying remarks you make regarding the acquisition of information--and the differences between "input" information and "output" information--showing that what you are delineating is that the brain adds additional information (associative information) to the information coded by the rods and cones and that this is what constitutes the fuller, more robust psychological "experience."

And I've noted that the central theme of your book is about reflected light and how that changes the wavelength which in turn means we aren't acquiring intrinsic information, we are acquiring reflected information.

And that you noted emitted light (from a TV or computer monitor) is color coded, but he keeps insisting that for you, no matter where you used the word "color" it necessarily meant ONLY a psychological experience, excluding the possibility that color information could be external, only internally generated.

In short, I can't seem to get him to understand the difference between "blue" (the wavelength) and "the experience of blueness." Nor the fact that he is effectively arguing "blue ex nihilo."

Any clarification you care to provide would be deeply appreciated. And I figured since we're currently in a global lock down, you might just have the spare time.

Thank you and I hope you and your family are healthy and sound.

And here is his response:

You happened to catch me right while I was revising a chapter for a new book I'm writing that is all about color. The first chapter addresses the question you're asking about -- is color an aspect of internal experience or of an external reality -- and I think I've made some progress on that in the 20 years since since [sic] writing the 1999 book. In particular, there are at least two importantly different senses in which one could claim that color exists in the external world, which I now call "strong (or wavelength) externalism" versus "weak (or measurement) externalism". Maybe this will help you and your friend sort out you disagreements. I don't believe that strong externalism is tenable, but weak externalism is pretty clearly defensible, and it's consistent with "relationalism", which, for me is the "right" way to think about color.

So there you go.

As in, Professor Palmer agrees more with Ruby than with you? Or are you under the impression that you are a weak externalist?

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

As in, Professor Palmer agrees more with Ruby than with you?

"More with"? What does that mean? You either agree with a proposition or you do not.

Or are you under the impression that you are a weak externalist?

The other thing Professor Palmer did--that I wasn't going to mention due to his request not to forward it to my "friend"--was to send me a draft copy of the first Chapter of his new book. He gave me permission to share the following:

There is a weaker form of externalism, however, that is far less demanding in terms of its grounding in physics. Weak externalism (or measurement externalism) requires that color be a physically measurable property of objects, but does not impose the additional requirement that it be a physically meaningful property of the sort that is necessary to understand how the physical world works in general. Surely this weak-externalist conception of color is relevant to understanding how some physical events occur — namely, the ones that take place in a person’s eyes and brain when light strikes the retina and begins the neural processes that ultimately result in human color experiences. It may also be relevant to subsequent physical events that are consequences of causing those experiences, such as my exchanging several pieces of paper for possession of a particular shirt, but is not required for an understanding of physical events in general. Naturally, strong (physical) externalism implies weak (measurement) externalism, but weak externalism might be true without strong externalism being true.
...
We have thus far been viewing the externalist/internalist issue as a dichotomy, assuming that one or the other must be correct, but this does not exhaust the range of possibilities. Other approaches become available if we consider the possibility that, in some sense, both might be true. One approach is that there might be two quite distinct meanings or senses of the word “color,” one of which is concerned with the properties of external objects and events, and the other of which is concerned with internal experiences (e.g., MacAdam, 1985).
...
This particular argument for a relational approach to color has been made quite forcefully by Thompson (1995, 2000), who calls it “ecologism.” The basic tenet of color ecologism is that color is an evolutionarily useful, relational property that exists in the interaction between an observing organism and its environment. Ecology is the study of the relations or interactions between organisms and their environments. This approach focuses on the nature of the “fit” between an organism and its environment, particularly on how an organism has adapted to its physical environment and how the organism’s behaviors can alter the nature of its environment. In an ecological view, color does not exist purely in either the physical or the experiential domain, but in the interaction between the two for a given observer under given conditions of observation. We will have more to say about this possibility in Chapters 4 and 6 when we consider the implications of differences among individuals and among species for understanding the nature of color. It will be easier to discuss this viewpoint after we have learned some basic facts about the physics of light in Chapter 2, the perception of color in Chapter 3, and the physiology of the visual system in Chapter 4, however, so we will defer an extended discussion of the nature and implications of color ecologism to later in the book.

So we'll all have to wait for the book in regard to a more detailed explanation of Palmer's current position, but based on his definition of "weak externalism" and the point about there may be two distinctly different definitions of "color," it certainly fits what I've been arguing this whole time.

Regardless of all of this, however, is that we are still nevertheless faced with the insurmountable fact that it's not possible to legitimately claim color is ONLY in the brain. Such an assertion is unprovable. That fact can never change and it is--once again--the fatal flaw in ruby's internalist model.

 

[Politesse]

"More with"? What does that mean? You either agree with a proposition or you do not.

In that case, Palmer doesn't agree with you at all, since what he said about even weak externalism was that "pretty clearly defensible", which is not the same thing as "certainly true". Frankly you are in way above your head in nuanced discussions of anything, if you don't think it is ever valid to neither agree nor disagree with a proposition.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

"More with"? What does that mean? You either agree with a proposition or you do not.

In that case, Palmer doesn't agree with you at all, since what he said about even weak externalism was that "pretty clearly defensible", which is not the same thing as "certainly true".

Where did I say weak externalism is "certainly true"?

Frankly you are in way above your head in nuanced discussions of anything, if you don't think it is ever valid to neither agree nor disagree with a proposition.

Why the fuck do you always resort to strawmen? What the fuck does any of that irrelevant semantics bullshit have to do with any of the salient points itt?

Here, I'll repeat precisely what I said and what you avoided:

So we'll all have to wait for the book in regard to a more detailed explanation of Palmer's current position, but based on his definition of "weak externalism" and the point about there may be two distinctly different definitions of "color," it certainly fits what I've been arguing this whole time.

Regardless of all of this, however, is that we are still nevertheless faced with the insurmountable fact that it's not possible to legitimately claim color is ONLY in the brain. Such an assertion is unprovable. That fact can never change and it is--once again--the fatal flaw in ruby's internalist model.

 

[Politesse]

Where did I say weak externalism is "certainly true"?

Frankly you are in way above your head in nuanced discussions of anything, if you don't think it is ever valid to neither agree nor disagree with a proposition.

Why the fuck do you always resort to strawmen?

You wrote:

You either agree with a proposition or you do not.

Neither Palmer, Ruby, or myself take such a only-black-or-white view on the question of color. But if it is either-or, then that means none of us agree with the proposition since there is acknowledged ambiguity in our stances.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

I'm just going to cut you off at your knees instead of deconstructing that entire pointless string of sophistry. To whit:

Neither Palmer, Ruby, or myself take such a only-black-or-white view on the question of color.

Except that ruby does. Ruby has repeatedly affirmed that color is ONLY in the brain AND that Palmer holds the same position. From his own hand, Palmer does not hold that position.

 

[fromderinside]

There are propositions and there are propositions. I prefer those that have some potential basis for use. When a proposition is materially falsifiable it is useless.

With the current color proposition one can demonstrate the internal option materially falsifiable. Majorities for this or that opinion are not operable unless so declared by some enforceable document.

Have a great colors on the head of pin tea party.

You can opine however you wish. I don't care. So doing only demonstrates you like pushing out your pinky when drinking bad tea.

 

[ruby sparks]

Such an assertion is unprovable. That fact can never change and it is--once again--the fatal flaw in ruby's internalist model.

That's basically in error. Something can't be a fatal flaw in any claim if it's not in the claim. Rationalism 101.

Let's look at the alternative, saying that colour is not only in the brain (is an objective property of objects or light). Can that be similarly proved either? No. So is that a fatal flaw in that claim too? Wow. Now we see that so-called 'fatal flaws' are all over the shop. What to do? Forget about (that sort of) proof until such time as it is available, that's what. It's a straw man and completely irrelevant. We should not even be discussing it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now, the model where it is deemed acceptable to have (or which uses) different definitions of what colour is so that there is (at least) one definition that covers properties of objects or light (and elsewhere) and also another definition which covers the phenomenological experience, has already been accepted and its existence acknowledged. It is one way to talk about colour (not an uncommon one). It is not my preferred way. I prefer, at least for the purposes of this discussion, to define colour in brains as the only actual, real colour and consider the external properties of light or objects to be so different that they do not fit the definition of colour and so it would be improper and a misnomer to call them colour. In other words, the properties of objects and light are something else. If you want to call (at least) two different phenomena colour, go ahead. I have already said that many times. All that could be proved is that there are different models using different definitions. I like mine. For one thing, I think it's more precise, including definitionally. Yours has colour in at least four different forms, and associated locations (namely in objects, in light, presumably in the optical nerve, pre-brain processing, since that must surely follow, and in the brain, after processing).

Now if, say, Palmer has since his 1999 book shifted his position (or nuanced it or made progress or whatever) to now accept or use (at least) two definitions of colour, then fine. Even if that had been his original position, that would also have been fine. It was certainly the view of some others before 1999. The alternative model, that actual, real colour is only in brains, is still valid. In other words, one is as valid as the other, and proof that one is right and the other wrong is not only an unavailable option, it crucially depends on what definitions one uses. If all you have been doing is to try to convince me that there exists another model which rests on a different set of definitions you have been wasting your time since I already accepted that long before starting this thread.

Also, colour relationalism is quite opposed to the sort of colour objectivism you have been expressing throughout. Relationalism is closer to my preferred model than yours.

There is a short section on it in the Stanford entry by Maund which was the source of the Palmer quote in the OP and which you later cited also. From there you can then source more detailed texts by those proposing the various types of colour relationalism. Jonathan Cohen has written much about it in recent times for example (eg see below, from 2004), but you can go back as far as John Locke if you want. Obviously, it can't be proved by anyone that colour is either relational or not. Other properties can at least be subject to potential verification by other measurements, but not colour (which is possibly one reason it was called a secondary not a primary property by those using that ontology, and why the model that has it on a par with other psychological phenomena such as pain is still valid).

Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto
http://aardvark.ucsd.edu/color/relational.html#tthFtNtAAD

Note that Cohen's relationalism is not identical with other relationalist models, some of which are more like dispositionalism (in which the properties of objects and light are merely disposed to cause colour experiences, similar to how other properties are disposed to cause pain experiences) though the two are closely related, since in both, colour is essentially subjectivist, perceiver-dependent to at least some degree.

 

[fromderinside]

Oh goody. ruby sparks gives us a flush handle in the form of a gratuitous dismissal of color as an objective property of either light or objects.

Color is an objective, material, property of light when an objective process, evolution, uses it to choose between this or that species surviving. And, oh yeah, color isn't found in the optic nerve. Rather color found in the output of the receptor transducing light to color prior to being transported in the optic nerve.

Now I won't have to deal with parsing out such as what is a relational property, a rationalist color theory, a realist or dispositionalism model of color philosophy or the properties of Ivory soap in the age of coronavirus.

See. You didn't need to go to the deep end of the philosophical pool to make your point. You blew up your position with your first unsupportable dismissal of it's counter.

Are you really in tune with the screed you just posted ruby sparks?

 

[ruby sparks]

A reminder of what I said in the OP specifically regarding the 3 claims (my bolding here):

Claim 1: objects are not themselves coloured, they do not have colour.

Claim 2A: Colour is a psychologically-experienced 'mental' phenomenon only. Colour does not really exist other than in this way.

Claim 2B: Colour is a psychologically-experienced 'mental' phenomenon of consciousness only. Colour does not really exist other than in this way.

I think claim 1 is the easier and more recognised to be the case. I might hold that one quite strongly.

Claim 2A is, I think, not something that can be shown to be the case by any reasonable standard and is therefore (I would separately claim) an unresolved issue, but it is my inclination to go along with it and so I will start off defending the statement quoted above (which is apparently in blue).

Claim 2B is slightly more onerous, and may be even more up for debate, imo.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

So, in short, and once again, blah blah blah blah colour in brains as the only actual, real colour. Which is most definitely not Palmer’s position. Full stop. It’s not “close” or “closer than mine”—which is a childish claim no matter what, since this isn’t a competition—Palmer does not hold the position “colour in brains is the only actual, real colour.”

You do. Over and over and over again you have affirmed this.

And, once again and for always, the fatal flaw in that claim is that it is unprovable, due to the conditions of the hard problem.

Well, actually, now there are two fatal flaws; one is that it is fundamentally unprovable and the other is that it amounts to an argument from definition, where you have just arbitrarily decided to define your version of “color” (i.e., “colour in brains”) as the “only actual, real” version.

How could you possible prove something to be the “only actual, real” version?

So, yet again, the merry-go-round takes us right back where we started.

Let's look at the alternative, saying that colour is not only in the brain (is an objective property of objects or light). Can that be similarly proved either? No.

Absolutely right. That too is an unprovable claim.

What to do? Forget about (that sort of) proof until such time as it is available, that's what.

You're STILL not getting it. There can never be a time when such proof "is available." It is unprovable, due to the conditions of the hard problem. Do you seriously still not comprehend what that means?

Nor can you just "forget about (that sort of) proof." It is the fatal flaw in your "model." You cannot claim "colour in brains as the only actual, real colour" if that claim is unprovable.

I'm not saying "cannot" as in your vocal chords will magically close shut. You cannot legitimately make a claim that you know is unprovable. What would be the point?

Here, I'll ironically prove it: color outside of brains is the only actual, real color. That is a completely vacuous claim. All you (or anyone) can do is, at best, shrug your shoulders and walk away or say something equally vacuous, like, "I hold the same belief."

 

[ruby sparks]

Palmer does not hold the position “colour in brains is the only actual, real colour.”

Surely it is not beyond you to allow that someone may modify or nuance their views after 21 years.

As I said, If Palmer has either modified his views, or even if he hasn't because he already (despite my not realising it) allowed for colour other than as a psychological phenomenon only, then his model is different to the one I am agreeing with here, even if only in terms of definitions, but also conceptually in some ways.

Palmer is not the only person, either in this thread or outside it, including other relevant academics (be they physicists, neuroscientists, philosophers or psychologists) who apparently hold (or held) at least a similar explanation*. Others will have or have had different explanations, or concepts, models or definitions. I myself am at this point still quite comfortable that colour as a psychological phenomenon only remains an option, although not the only one. Perhaps at some point I will find out something, or something will be put to me, that will mean I should discount or abandon it.

Maybe you cold ask Palmer to post something here. I have no problem admitting my preferred model is incorrect in some way if it is or can be shown to be. I am not qualified to be an expert. Perhaps in the intervening years he has found good reasons to at least move slightly away from what he said in his 1999 book. If so, it would be interesting to briefly know what the reasons were.

Other than that, maybe you can think of something.









* For example, here is yet another example, from last year, from Beau Lotto, Professor of Neuroscience, University of London.

"Colour is a construct of our brain. Colour exists in here [in the brain]. It doesn't exist out there".

https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1609949764001/

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Palmer does not hold the position “colour in brains is the only actual, real colour.”

Surely it is not beyond you to allow that someone may modify or nuance their views, or the strength of asserting them, after 21 years.

Strawman and evasive.

As I said, If Palmer has either modified his views, or even if he hasn't because he already (despite my not realising it) allowed for colour other than as a psychological phenomenon only, then he and I would now disagree even if only in terms of definitions, but also conceptually in some ways.

Which is what I have been pointing out to you over and over and over...

I myself am at this point quite comfortable that it(colour as a psychological phenomenon only)

I know. It's the central fatal flaw to your position (the word "only").

remains a valid option, although not the only one.

You can't claim that color is ONLY a psychological phenomenon and then in the same fucking sentence contradict that.

And what in the world does "valid option" mean? The only "valid option" is to state: color is at least a psychological phenomenon. Like I've been pointing out over and over and over....

Perhaps at some point I will find out something or something will be put to me that will mean I should discount it.

That is literally all I have been doing this entire time only to be met with evasions, fallacies and repetition to the point where I actually reached out to Professor Palmer--and he responded--and all you've done is hand-wave away his response while ONCE AGAIN affirming your own position.

Maybe you cold ask Palmer to post something here.

What would be the point?

I have no problem admitting my preferred model is flawed if it is.

All evidence (literally) to the contrary. It is not a matter of "if." It IS fatally flawed since it's unprovable. Again, do you just not comprehend what that entails?

Perhaps in the intervening years he has found good reasons to at least move slightly away from what he said in his 1999 book. If so, it would be interesting to know what they are.

Then you'll have to read his new book as he has only written the first chapter, which noted (emphasis mine):

This particular argument for a relational approach to color has been made quite forcefully by Thompson (1995, 2000), who calls it “ecologism.” The basic tenet of color ecologism is that color is an evolutionarily useful, relational property that exists in the interaction between an observing organism and its environment. Ecology is the study of the relations or interactions between organisms and their environments. This approach focuses on the nature of the “fit” between an organism and its environment, particularly on how an organism has adapted to its physical environment and how the organism’s behaviors can alter the nature of its environment. In an ecological view, color does not exist purely in either the physical or the experiential domain, but in the interaction between the two for a given observer under given conditions of observation. We will have more to say about this possibility in Chapters 4 and 6 when we consider the implications of differences among individuals and among species for understanding the nature of color. It will be easier to discuss this viewpoint after we have learned some basic facts about the physics of light in Chapter 2, the perception of color in Chapter 3, and the physiology of the visual system in Chapter 4, however, so we will defer an extended discussion of the nature and implications of color ecologism to later in the book.

So you could read Thompson now, as Palmer said "relationalism" is, in his opinion and using the same quotes he did, the "right" way to view color.

We have a critique of "ecology" from the MIT paper previously posted:

2.5. The ecological view

In an important article, Thompson et al. (1992) have developed an "ecological view" of color, inspired by Gibson (1979). The view is best expressed in (Thompson 1995a), and so we shall focus on this book (see also Thompson et al. 1992; Varela et al. 1991). According to the ecological view, "a proper account of the ontology of colour and of chromatic perceptual content should be relational and ecologicalf" (Thompson 1995a, p. 243, our emphasis).

By "relational," Thompson means that the colors are relational properties. A relational property is the property of bearing a specific relation to a specific thing (or things). For example, being a sibling (or, in an alternative notation, x is a sibling) is a relational property, because it is the property of bearing the two-place relation x is a sibling of y, to someone.[20] Dispositions are also relational properties: for example, the property of being disposed to look red to humans is the property of bearing the two-place relation x is disposed to look red to y, to human beings. So, as Thompson notes (p. 243), dispositionalism is also a relational theory of color. Thompson himself thinks that colors are kinds of dispositions to affect perceivers, although he emphasizes that his brand of dispositionalism is quite different from the traditional sort. The really distinctive part of his position is supposed to be its "ecological" character. But what does this amount to? According to Thompson:

For a relational account to be philosophically satisfying and naturalistic it must be ecological. The world outside the perceiver must be considered as an environment, rather than a neutral material universe. And the perceiver must be considered as an active exploring animal, rather than a passive spectator that simply receives sensations from physical impressions. (p. 244; see also pp. 177-78)

There is a way of reading this passage on which "ecological" doesn't add very much to "relational." As a piece of methodology, it is surely true that an investigation of color vision should not limit itself to laboratory situations in which subjects are highly constrained behaviorally, and visual stimuli are also severely limited. There is nothing here for a physicalist or anyone else to disagree with.

Clearly something stronger is intended. What is wrong with the theories of color we have considered so far is supposed to be that "the animal and its environment are treated as fundamentally separate systems. The distal world is specified in advance and provides a source of input that is independent of the animal" (p. 222). What "ecological" is intended to add to "relational" is (at least) the claim that the environment and the perceiver are not "fundamentally separate systems" (p. 222)–they are "inherently interdependent" (p. 245).

We find this addition to a large degree obscure. Thompson's main illustration is the possibility that color vision in various species coevolved with the colors of plants and other animals. Perhaps trichromatic vision in primates coevolved with colored fruits (Mollon 1989): it is mutually advantageous for the fruits to be seen by the primates (the primates get food and the fruits get their seeds dispersed). If so, then the colors of the fruits in the primates' environment is partly explained by the primates' color vision, as well as conversely. The trouble is that this sort of dependence between color vision and the colors of objects does not constrain the nature of the colors in any interesting way: coevolution is not in any tension with physicalism, for example.[21] The easiest way of seeing this is to consider a parallel case. Imagine that a popular car company designs its cupholders to accommodate cups from a popular coffee company. The initial fit could be a little more snug, so some time later the coffee company makes a small adjustment in the size of its cups. Yet more improvement is possible, hence the next generation of cupholders is amended accordingly; and so on. The cupholders therefore "coevolve" with the shape of the cups. But this obviously does not show much of anything about the nature of shapes; in particular, it doesn't show that shapes are nonphysical properties.

So, as far as we can make out, the ecological view boils down to something not much different from traditional dispositionalism (for a similar criticism see Whitmyer 1999). Moreover, it is somewhat less developed, because Thompson tells us very little about how the "ecological-level" dispositions are to be specified. Evidently the "particular perceivers" and "particular viewing conditions" (Thompson 1995a, p. 245) should be specified in a number of different ways to accommodate, among other things, color vision across species (p. 246), but Thompson does not supply any of the details.

 

[ruby sparks]

I myself am at this point quite comfortable that it(colour as a psychological phenomenon only)

I know. It's the central fatal flaw to your position (the word "only").

You don't have grounds to say it's a fatal flaw. You might have, if I claimed that it was something we could be certain about, but I'm explicitly not doing that and never have been.

It's a bit like this analogy. Suppose we want to get to a certain place (eg a town). We can take several routes. If each of them gets us there then they are all valid routes. They would only be invalid (perhaps better to say incorrect) if we didn't get there.

Now, I'm suggesting that the 'destination' is analogous to arriving at 'the features of colour vision'. The model I prefer gets us there, just as much as a model using different terms, definitions and concepts. If a model did not get us there (if there was something in one model, ie 'set of directions', that failed to get us there) then we might have grounds to say it was the wrong set of directions.

If both get us there, then we are stuck asking which is the best set of directions. I prefer mine on the basis that the definition of colour is more precise. However, that is not a deal-breaker. What it might be better to do, I think, is to suspend judgement, to allow that both models can be considered valid, and await some new development that will illuminate either that one or both is incorrect, that both are correct in certain different ways, or that the best model is some combination of the two.

In the meantime, it is perfectly acceptable (and is what happens in the real world for this topic) to hold one model over another as a preference, so long as it works as an explanation and contains nothing that is either unreasonable or so unusual that we might question it, something for which we are going out on a metaphysical/epistological/ontological limb (eg that pixies cause photons to oscillate). And that is exactly what I said in the OP and what I have been doing throughout the thread. If you have a different model, fine. Start a thread advancing it. Or do it here. I can foresee a few issues, including 'why do you have so many forms of colour and so many locations for it'?

remains a valid option, although not the only one.

You can't claim that color is ONLY a psychological phenomenon and then in the same fucking sentence contradict that.

Allowing for other possible models to be correct is quite simply not a contradiction, it's just rationally prudent when something is not resolved. Your debating standards are all over the shop and have been throughout, and half the time you do not even seem to understand the meanings of certain words (see: 'category error' and 'ex-nilho') or when they are actually relevant (see: 'proof', 'hard problem of consciousness' and 'self').

I won't go into detail about your initial claim that pain is in (or is) the stimuli. I'll leave that for you to reclaim. You remember, it was your tack before you switched to claiming a supposed category error.

It is not a matter of "if." It IS fatally flawed since it's unprovable. Again, do you just not comprehend what that entails?

Oh I think I do, and I think that you clearly don't.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

You don't have grounds to say it's a flaw.

The "grounds" are self evident. You are claiming that color is "a psychological phenomenon only." That is an unprovable claim and the ongoing insistence of including the word "only" a fatal flaw.

You might have, if I claimed that it was something we could be certain about, but I'm not doing that.

THEN DON'T USE THE WORD "ONLY." Fucking hell.

It's a bit like this analogy. Suppose we want to get to a certain place (eg a town). We can take several routes. If each of them gets us there then they are all valid routes.

And if the route is NOT valid, since it can't exist and yet you keep insisting that it does when it self-evidently does not?

Now, I'm suggesting that the 'destination' is analogous to arriving at 'the features of colour vision'.

No, you are not. You are "suggesting" that color is ONLY a psychological phenomenon, which is an unprovable claim.

The model I prefer gets us there

Again, no it does not. Nor can it.

I prefer mine on the basis that the definition of colour is more precise.

Also wrong and vacuous.

In the meantime, it is perfectly acceptable to hold one model over another as a preference.

As a belief, you mean, and "acceptable" to whom and in what manner?

And that is exactly what I aid in the OP and what I have been doing throughout the thread.

Again, no, it is not, but why stop regurgitating the exact same sophistry now?

remains a valid option, although not the only one.

You can't claim that color is ONLY a psychological phenomenon and then in the same fucking sentence contradict that.

Allowing for other possible models to be correct is not a contradiction

Why would you first claim that color is ONLY a psychological phenomenon and then at the same time say, "but it could also not be?" The word "only" is exclusionary.

If what you mean is it could be, but it could also not be, that's simply saying you don't know what color is. So just say you don't know what color is!

Jtfc.

It is not a matter of "if." It IS fatally flawed since it's unprovable. Again, do you just not comprehend what that entails?

Oh I think I do, and I think that you don't.

Clearly. Which is only the more ironic.

 

[ruby sparks]

If what you mean is it could be, but it could also not be, that's simply saying you don't know what color is. So just say you don't know what color is!

I don't know what colour is. I merely have one possible explanation for it, which I am inclined to prefer, for reasons given. If only you had read the OP.

And if the route is NOT valid, since it can't exist and yet you keep insisting that it does when it self-evidently does not?

Now we are potentially going in the direction of somewhere interesting vis-a-vis objections. Are you claiming that the OP explanation can't exist? Gosh. If so, that would be quite a bold claim, and a killer blow to the explanation/model. Do elaborate.

I hope this is not yet another case of you misapplying terms again. I'm going to assume that you do in fact understand what 'can't exist' entails.

Consider me very sceptical that you can demonstrate it, but go ahead.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

I don't know what colour is.

Great! Then we're done.

I merely have one possible explanation for it

That is NOT what you have been repeatedly claiming for the past dozen or so threads! You have been stating over and over and over again that color is ONLY a psychological phenomenon. That is NOT offering one "possible explanation;" it is categorically declaring that there is ONLY one explanation for it!

What the fuck, ruby? Are you just trolling now, or desperately backpedaling now that Palmer has personally confirmed that he does not hold the position you kept attributing to him?

And if the route is NOT valid, since it can't exist and yet you keep insisting that it does when it self-evidently does not?

Excuse me? Are you now claiming that the OP explanation can't exist? Gosh. Do elaborate.

FFS. What is wrong with you?