Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

The brain doesn't create in an attempt at anything.

Apparently, the brain does attempt to create solutions to problems presented by the environment.

And, you explain how and why this function came to be here:

Evolutionary pressures and external circumstances drive how the brain is constructed. That the result includes sense is driven by the utility they have in making living possible. Rational reality is a result of reality shaping life through evolution.

Exactly.

It will never be reality. It can only be an adjunct, an approximation, based on cumulative sense/response results.

Of course. The skull is a relatively small space. So, the brain must create a symbolic simulation of reality, and hope it is sufficient to manage survival in actual reality.

Determination doesn't produce reality. Determinism is how reality works.

Precisely. Determinism never determines anything. It simply makes note of the fact that there are reliable patterns of behavior in the movements of inanimate objects and the thoughts of intelligent minds. It describes these patterns in terms of causes and effects. That reliability makes the behavior predictable, so that we can make the best choices to succeed at surviving, thriving, and reproducing.

In order to get to rational approximation to reality empirical study of the stuff of reality first needs to develop to the point where that which reality produces can be replicated.

I'm not sure I understand the nature of replication you're referring to. Most of our empirical study of the stuff of reality is through simple trial and error, like the toddler learning to walk, or the scientist dropping a large ball and a small ball from the tower of Pisa to discover they land simultaneously.

On the other hand, if by replication you mean artificial intelligence, then I would suggest that our approaches to AI would be preceded by a study of actual intelligence, through psychology, etc.

Then what the brain and being produces can be empirically included within the reality package.

Again, we can observe the objective behavior, such as the customer in the restaurant deciding what to order, and inquire as to the subjective experience that went into the decision by asking, "Why did you choose the salad instead of the steak?"

 

[pood]

Hence centuries of free will debate.

Hi there! I'm a compatibilist. I'd like to show the incompatibilists, whether hard determinists or libertarian, how free will and determinism are compatible notions. It is time that you two lay down your arms, shake hands, and move on to some of the REAL problems that face humanity in this day and age, you know, war, famine, global warming, injustice, racial and religious persecution, etc. etc. etc.

I agree, the notion of free will is absolutely irrelevant. It tells us nothing about human nature, behaviour, drives, wants, needs, aspirations, how the world came to be in this state or how to fix it.

Yet we argue over free will.

The problems with compatibilism are as described. Other versions, Libertarian, QM uncertainty principle, etc, have their own problems

Fortunately, my compatibilism does not require any of that stuff. It only requires (1) using the ordinary, operational notion of free will that everyone is already using when assessing moral and legal responsibility,

The ordinary operational notion of free will simply refers to outward appearances, human behaviour as we observe it. Digging deeper into the drivers and means of thought and action paints a different picture.

Hence centuries of debate on the nature of free will, or its absence. That 'free will' is not really the means by which we think and act.

and (2) using the empirical notion of determinism, stripped of all its false implications.

Keep it Simple, Sam.

False implications? Are we not working with the same definition of determinism?

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?

You invoke the fallacy of the excluded middle? A lot has happened since the big bang you know. Stars have formed, planets, life has emerged and evolved on earth, countless species, brains structures, etc?

Not only that, but you ignore the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism? That both sides agree on how determinism works.

You realize that the issue is not with the definition of determinism, just the given definition of free will in relation to determinism?

I’ve already addressed this. The other side, as you would have it, most definitely does not agree to the Consequence Argument, which begs the question by defining free will out of existence. The scaled-back version of the Consequence Argument, presented by Hoefer, comes from a compatibilist. Finally, I’ve given my own definition of determinism, which is Hume’s “constant conjunction,” in which effects are observed to reliably follow causes, full stop. Nothing about precluding free will there, and, of course, Hume was another compatibilist. So I’ve ignored nothing.

You haven't addressed anything. You are repeating arguments that do not prove the proposition for the reasons given over many pages and numerous posts, but ignored.

Of course I addressed it! I was referring specifically to your claim that I IGNORED “the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism.” I did not IGNORE such an “inconvenient detail” because there is no such inconvenient detail to ignore! I have told you that no compatibilists accept the Consequence Argument, and I have told you REPEATEDLY that my own definition of determinism is limited to Hume’s “constant conjunction.“ So how can you possibly say I haven’t addressed this??

Nor I have “ignored” any of your posts. I have REBUTTED them. Big difference.

 

[pood]

As to ignoring, yoiu continue to ignore the followinq questions:

What is the distinction between “will” and “must’?

Do you think that the “laws“ of nature are descriptive or presciptive?

Where does “inner necessitation” fit in the heuristic of modal logic, which deals rigorously with modes of necessity, contingency, actuality and possibility?

I have but whatever I say is ignored, and the question is repeated.

''Will'' implies the possibility of an alternate action, therefore the freedom to do otherwise. ''Must'' has a sense of finality, that the outcome is a forgone conclusion, fixed. As Determinism does not permit alternate action, 'will' if determined is necessarily a case of 'must.'

If the world is determined, events are fixed by the conditions of the world, which we describe as the 'laws of nature.'

Inner necessitation refers to the architecture of a brain, which in turn determines function and output. Modal logic is enabled by the information processing of a brain and does not exist independently of it or its information processing activity.

What a brain can or cannot do is determined by the state and condition of the system in any given instance in time.

When I asked you directly earlier about the difference between “will“ and “must,” you said the question was “too vague.“ Now you have answered. Your answer is that there are no contingnetly true propositions about the world, only necessarily true propositions, i.e., modal collapse. By your lights it follows that the proposition, “All triangles have three sides” and “I ordered salad for dinner last night” have the exact same modal status: logically necessary. Others can decide for themselves whether they find this claim as ridiculous as I do.

Now you say that the conditions of the world are what we describe as “the laws of nature.” Fine. So you agree that the so-called “laws of nature” actually take their truth from the way that the world is, rather than the “laws” of nature somehow imposing their truths upon the world. But once you agree to that, you eliminate a key prop of your Consequence Argument, that we have no control over the “laws” of nature. Since the laws are descriptive and not prescriptive, we have power over the laws of nature simply by doing, what we freely do. It follows that the “laws,” at least in part, are up to us – a key tenet of what is often called Humean compatibilism.

 

[pood]

Humean Compatibilism

 

[pood]

Arg, it looks like you have to buy that article. I have read this for free elsewhere; will try to dig up that free article later.

 

[pood]

A brief taxonomy:

The hard detrerminist argues that given antecedent conditions a, b, c, then I MUST do d.

The standard compatibilist argues that given antecedent conditions a, b, c, then I will (not MUST!) do d.

The Humean conpatibilist argues that given antecedent conditions a, b, c, then I will (not just can) do whatever I want — d, e, f, whatever.

The Libertarian argues that antecedent cirumstances have no sway whatever over my choices. See: Strong Free Will Theorem.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

"Hi there! I'm a compatibilist. I'd like to show the incompatibilists, whether hard determinists or libertarian, how free will and determinism are compatible notions. It is time that you two lay down your arms, shake hands, and move on to some of the REAL problems that face humanity in this day and age, you know, war, famine, global warming, injustice, racial and religious persecution, etc. etc. etc."

I agree, the notion of free will is absolutely irrelevant. It tells us nothing about human nature, behaviour, drives, wants, needs, aspirations, how the world came to be in this state or how to fix it.

Free will distinguishes a deliberate act from an accidental act, a coerced act, an insane act, or an act caused by some other influence that can reasonably said to be beyond the person's control.

People are held responsible for an act that they do of their own free will.

So, the notion of free will is very relevant when determining the cause of an act.

For example, we hold Vladimir Putin and the Russian government responsible for the deaths and destruction in Ukraine.

The first step in fixing anything is to discover the cause of the problem.

The ordinary operational notion of free will simply refers to outward appearances, human behaviour as we observe it.

We actually do dig deeper than outward appearances. For example, to distinguish a deliberate act from an insane act may require expert testimony, psychiatric evaluation, and thoughtfully judging the evidence. And coercion can take indirect forms, like holding someone's family hostage rather than pointing a gun directly at the victim's head.

Digging deeper into the drivers and means of thought and action paints a different picture.

Any useful information is certainly welcome. But the notions of determinism and causal necessity are not useful in any way.

All events are always causally necessary, regardless of the specific cause. But in order to correct a specific behavior, we must know the specific cause. Was the cause a brain tumor? Then remove the tumor. Was the cause coercion? Then remove the threat. Was the cause a deliberate choice to profit at someone else's expense? Then take steps to alter how that person thinks about such choices in the future.

All of the utility of the notion of reliable cause and effect comes from knowing the specific causes of specific effects. And this is the basis of all our applied sciences.

Hence centuries of debate on the nature of free will, or its absence.

No. The centuries of debate originated with the notion that causal necessity was something that we needed to be free from, before we could decide for ourselves what we would do.

That 'free will' is not really the means by which we think and act.

Free will is not the "means" by which we think and act. We already come with the ability to think about, and then choose, what we will do. Free will refers to those choosing events where we do so while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

and (2) using the empirical notion of determinism, stripped of all its false implications.

False implications? Are we not working with the same definition of determinism?

The notion that determinism eliminates freedom is a false implication. Every freedom derives its meaning from some form of meaningful constraint. In, "We set the bird free from its cage", the cage is the constraint. In, "The lady at the grocery store was offering free samples", the constraint is the cost. In, "I participated in Libet's experiment of my own free will", the constraint is coercion or some other undue influence.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, choosing what we choose, and doing what we do. That is not a meaningful constraint, because it is basically us doing "what we would have done anyway".

And it is not a relevant constraint, because to be relevant it must be something that we can actually be free of. The bird can be set free of its cage. The lady at the store can offer samples free of charge. And people volunteer to participate in psychological experiments, like Libet's, rather than being forced to (as has happened on occasion in the past, but is generally illegal now). But no event is ever free of causal necessity.

The incompatibilist brings up causal necessity (determinism) as if it were a meaningful and relevant constraint that we must somehow be free of in order to call ourselves truly free. But it is not something that we can be free of. Nor is it something that anyone ever needs to be free of, because it is not a meaningful constraint.

Every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect. Universal causal necessity is logically derived from the assumption that all events are the reliable effects of prior causes. We, ourselves, are the reliable effects of prior causes. And we, ourselves, are the reliable prior causes of future effects.

But the incompatibilist's presentation of causal necessity (determinism) attempts to excise us from the causal chain. And that falsifies their version of determinism.

We are both using the same definition of determinism, in that every event is always the reliable result of prior events. But the notion that we are not meaningful and relevant causes, within that chain of events, is a false implication. And the notion that any other freedom we enjoy must also include freedom from causal necessity, is a false implication.

"Freedom from causal necessity" is an irrational notion. The thought that we need to be free of cause and effect before we can be the cause of an effect, is a self-contradiction that creates a paradox. So, let's stop doing that.

 

[Jarhyn]

Information is processed before it is interpreted

Nox information very much is "interpreted" before it is processed as a decision. Every layer of neural stuff between the input and the decision making bit "interprets" it in layers. I've watched neural networks self-organize to do this.

The only thing that is not interpreted before it is processed is "what the sequence of neural events was that was the decision."

I don't need a decision decompressed and categorized yet to have made it.

This is a major failure in your religion, and perhaps heralds a fundamental inability to actually understand what "information processing" actually is, especially in domains of neurology.

Could the information be interpreted before it is "processed" as a decision, or whatever other nonsense it is you think neurons are incapable of, by a classical Turing machine?

Because here's the kicker: neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do.

You bringing up neurons then is a red herring, if you might think machines can do the thing you don't think neurons can that would be required for free will to exist in a deterministic system. Then your position collapses merely to a very weak hard determinism: "neural systems" would be the limiting factor not "deterministic systems".

But neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do. Therefore it "neurology" cannot be this limiting factor you assume it must be.

Do you need me to make a patronizing modal logic construction?

What a neuron can or can't do is determined by its physical structure and function.

There are different types of neurons and functions, motor neurons, sensory neurons, interneurons, glial support cells, multipolar, unipolar, bipolar, pseudo polar, etc, etc.....all contribute to the overall functioning of a brain as an information processor, none functions on the principle of free will.

''Neural function, therefore free will'' is not an argument.

What A single neuron can do is like considering what A single transistor can do; it is not much, really. Its kind of facile to think that a single neuron has to accomplish forming an entire agent alone.

It takes a lot of transistors arrayed in a very particular way to even execute a single "arbitrary function".

In any given action of a neural stack, neurons contribute to larger activities. Still, together, neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do.

The point is, what a single neuron can't really do alone, many neurons do together, much like the many transistors in a classical Turing machine.

You still also have to reckon with the FACT that these operations have been demonstrated, and demonstrated within deterministic systems, and your claim lies on "NO deterministic system may..." And all I have to do is show "a deterministic system where it is!" And then your argument goes right out the window.

Its just frustrating that, unlike when a proper mathematician makes claims of system theory, when the religious believer has their claims disproved, they just try to hide them deeper in sophistry rather than accepting a moment of existential crisis and growing.

 

[fromderinside]

The brain doesn't create in an attempt at anything.

Apparently, the brain does attempt to create solutions to problems presented by the environment.

And, you explain how and why this function came to be here:

Evolutionary pressures and external circumstances drive how the brain is constructed. That the result includes sense is driven by the utility they have in making living possible. Rational reality is a result of reality shaping life through evolution.

Exactly.

It will never be reality. It can only be an adjunct, an approximation, based on cumulative sense/response results.

Of course. The skull is a relatively small space. So, the brain must create a symbolic simulation of reality, and hope it is sufficient to manage survival in actual reality.

Determination doesn't produce reality. Determinism is how reality works.

Precisely. Determinism never determines anything. It simply makes note of the fact that there are reliable patterns of behavior in the movements of inanimate objects and the thoughts of intelligent minds. It describes these patterns in terms of causes and effects. That reliability makes the behavior predictable, so that we can make the best choices to succeed at surviving, thriving, and reproducing.

In order to get to rational approximation to reality empirical study of the stuff of reality first needs to develop to the point where that which reality produces can be replicated.

I'm not sure I understand the nature of replication you're referring to. Most of our empirical study of the stuff of reality is through simple trial and error, like the toddler learning to walk, or the scientist dropping a large ball and a small ball from the tower of Pisa to discover they land simultaneously.

On the other hand, if by replication you mean artificial intelligence, then I would suggest that our approaches to AI would be preceded by a study of actual intelligence, through psychology, etc.

Then what the brain and being produces can be empirically included within the reality package.

Again, we can observe the objective behavior, such as the customer in the restaurant deciding what to order, and inquire as to the subjective experience that went into the decision by asking, "Why did you choose the salad instead of the steak?"

Every thing to which you agree with me on behavior is strictly 'this then that.' There is no 'because this then that.' Such would be looking to results to explain causes. Evolution does not look to outcomes to explain evolution it occurs randomly in the process of 'this then that.' Scientists have learned that 'this then that' in nature tends to produce results preserving natural maximums for conservation of energy, that energy is neither created nor destroyed, etc..

 

[DBT]

Hence centuries of free will debate.

Hi there! I'm a compatibilist. I'd like to show the incompatibilists, whether hard determinists or libertarian, how free will and determinism are compatible notions. It is time that you two lay down your arms, shake hands, and move on to some of the REAL problems that face humanity in this day and age, you know, war, famine, global warming, injustice, racial and religious persecution, etc. etc. etc.

I agree, the notion of free will is absolutely irrelevant. It tells us nothing about human nature, behaviour, drives, wants, needs, aspirations, how the world came to be in this state or how to fix it.

Yet we argue over free will.

The problems with compatibilism are as described. Other versions, Libertarian, QM uncertainty principle, etc, have their own problems

Fortunately, my compatibilism does not require any of that stuff. It only requires (1) using the ordinary, operational notion of free will that everyone is already using when assessing moral and legal responsibility,

The ordinary operational notion of free will simply refers to outward appearances, human behaviour as we observe it. Digging deeper into the drivers and means of thought and action paints a different picture.

Hence centuries of debate on the nature of free will, or its absence. That 'free will' is not really the means by which we think and act.

and (2) using the empirical notion of determinism, stripped of all its false implications.

Keep it Simple, Sam.

False implications? Are we not working with the same definition of determinism?

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?

You invoke the fallacy of the excluded middle? A lot has happened since the big bang you know. Stars have formed, planets, life has emerged and evolved on earth, countless species, brains structures, etc?

Not only that, but you ignore the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism? That both sides agree on how determinism works.

You realize that the issue is not with the definition of determinism, just the given definition of free will in relation to determinism?

I’ve already addressed this. The other side, as you would have it, most definitely does not agree to the Consequence Argument, which begs the question by defining free will out of existence. The scaled-back version of the Consequence Argument, presented by Hoefer, comes from a compatibilist. Finally, I’ve given my own definition of determinism, which is Hume’s “constant conjunction,” in which effects are observed to reliably follow causes, full stop. Nothing about precluding free will there, and, of course, Hume was another compatibilist. So I’ve ignored nothing.

You haven't addressed anything. You are repeating arguments that do not prove the proposition for the reasons given over many pages and numerous posts, but ignored.

Of course I addressed it! I was referring specifically to your claim that I IGNORED “the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism.” I did not IGNORE such an “inconvenient detail” because there is no such inconvenient detail to ignore! I have told you that no compatibilists accept the Consequence Argument, and I have told you REPEATEDLY that my own definition of determinism is limited to Hume’s “constant conjunction.“ So how can you possibly say I haven’t addressed this??

Nor I have “ignored” any of your posts. I have REBUTTED them. Big difference.

You may imagine (good for you) that you have made a rebuttal, but that is far from being the case. You say that you don't ignore inconvenient details, yet do just that each and every time you respond.

The bottom line it that compatibilism fails to prove its proposition because it merely applies the 'free will' label to a select set of conditions; acting according to one's will without external necessitation, force or coercion.

The argument fails because it completely ignores internal necessitation, which no less fixes outcomes - regardless of will or free will - than external elements.

In fact internal necessitation is driven by information input which is external and acts upon the system. That is the fatal flaw in compatibilism

So if it makes you feel better to imagine victory in this debate, enjoy the illusion.

 

[DBT]

As to ignoring, yoiu continue to ignore the followinq questions:

What is the distinction between “will” and “must’?

Do you think that the “laws“ of nature are descriptive or presciptive?

Where does “inner necessitation” fit in the heuristic of modal logic, which deals rigorously with modes of necessity, contingency, actuality and possibility?

I have but whatever I say is ignored, and the question is repeated.

''Will'' implies the possibility of an alternate action, therefore the freedom to do otherwise. ''Must'' has a sense of finality, that the outcome is a forgone conclusion, fixed. As Determinism does not permit alternate action, 'will' if determined is necessarily a case of 'must.'

If the world is determined, events are fixed by the conditions of the world, which we describe as the 'laws of nature.'

Inner necessitation refers to the architecture of a brain, which in turn determines function and output. Modal logic is enabled by the information processing of a brain and does not exist independently of it or its information processing activity.

What a brain can or cannot do is determined by the state and condition of the system in any given instance in time.

When I asked you directly earlier about the difference between “will“ and “must,” you said the question was “too vague.“ Now you have answered.

It is vague, which forced me to make assumptions as to your use of 'will' and 'must' - which may not be what you meant.

This time I made the assumptions even though the point of no possible alternate action within a determined system has been made over and over, which makes 'will' or 'must' irrelevant.

Your answer is that there are no contingnetly true propositions about the world, only necessarily true propositions, i.e., modal collapse. By your lights it follows that the proposition, “All triangles have three sides” and “I ordered salad for dinner last night” have the exact same modal status: logically necessary. Others can decide for themselves whether they find this claim as ridiculous as I do.

Now you say that the conditions of the world are what we describe as “the laws of nature.” Fine. So you agree that the so-called “laws of nature” actually take their truth from the way that the world is, rather than the “laws” of nature somehow imposing their truths upon the world. But once you agree to that, you eliminate a key prop of your Consequence Argument, that we have no control over the “laws” of nature. Since the laws are descriptive and not prescriptive, we have power over the laws of nature simply by doing, what we freely do. It follows that the “laws,” at least in part, are up to us – a key tenet of what is often called Humean compatibilism.

It's not hard to grasp. Our words are symbols that we assign meaning to in order to communicate.

If we say the world is deterministic, we base our words on observation of cause and effect. We define causal determinism as 'initial conditions and how things go thereafter fixed by natural law' because the world appears to work according to observable principles, what we call the laws of nature, which exist regardless of our words or descriptions.

If the world is deterministic, it allows no alternate actions. Which means no alternate thoughts, feelings, desires, fears or willed changes.

In a determined world what we think, feel, think, deliberate and do is fixed by antecedents, and definition based on careful wording and ignoring or dismissing inconvenient elements like inner necessitation/determinism, does not prove that free will exists as an agent that makes a difference to outcomes.

 

[Jarhyn]

There is no 'because this then that.'

No, there is absolutely "because this then that".

It's kind of strange that the laws of cause and effect are implied by the basic elements of math.

Pi cannot be calculated to "that" without "because this", simply put. Nor could √2. Your claim that fundamentally there is no such thing as "because this, then that" is flushed down the toilet with the rest of the morning ablutions.

You would have us believe that there is nothing beyond raw sequential count.

But we know that is not the case: We know that the very nature of irrational numbers implies causally related chains with stateliness into existence.

Also, let me just say WOW, like, your religion ignores the entirety of the existence of the present.

 

[DBT]

Information is processed before it is interpreted

Nox information very much is "interpreted" before it is processed as a decision. Every layer of neural stuff between the input and the decision making bit "interprets" it in layers. I've watched neural networks self-organize to do this.

The only thing that is not interpreted before it is processed is "what the sequence of neural events was that was the decision."

I don't need a decision decompressed and categorized yet to have made it.

This is a major failure in your religion, and perhaps heralds a fundamental inability to actually understand what "information processing" actually is, especially in domains of neurology.

Could the information be interpreted before it is "processed" as a decision, or whatever other nonsense it is you think neurons are incapable of, by a classical Turing machine?

Because here's the kicker: neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do.

You bringing up neurons then is a red herring, if you might think machines can do the thing you don't think neurons can that would be required for free will to exist in a deterministic system. Then your position collapses merely to a very weak hard determinism: "neural systems" would be the limiting factor not "deterministic systems".

But neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do. Therefore it "neurology" cannot be this limiting factor you assume it must be.

Do you need me to make a patronizing modal logic construction?

What a neuron can or can't do is determined by its physical structure and function.

There are different types of neurons and functions, motor neurons, sensory neurons, interneurons, glial support cells, multipolar, unipolar, bipolar, pseudo polar, etc, etc.....all contribute to the overall functioning of a brain as an information processor, none functions on the principle of free will.

''Neural function, therefore free will'' is not an argument.

What A single neuron can do is like considering what A single transistor can do; it is not much, really. Its kind of facile to think that a single neuron has to accomplish forming an entire agent alone.

It takes a lot of transistors arrayed in a very particular way to even execute a single "arbitrary function".

In any given action of a neural stack, neurons contribute to larger activities. Still, together, neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do.

The point is, what a single neuron can't really do alone, many neurons do together, much like the many transistors in a classical Turing machine.

You still also have to reckon with the FACT that these operations have been demonstrated, and demonstrated within deterministic systems, and your claim lies on "NO deterministic system may..." And all I have to do is show "a deterministic system where it is!" And then your argument goes right out the window.

Its just frustrating that, unlike when a proper mathematician makes claims of system theory, when the religious believer has their claims disproved, they just try to hide them deeper in sophistry rather than accepting a moment of existential crisis and growing.

It doesn't matter how many transistors, diodes or silicon you assemble; it doesn't equate to free will. Processing power is not free will.

It doesn't matter how many neurons there are or how well they are connected or how much information is processed. Processing information is not free will.

Form and function is not willed. Output is determined by the state and architecture of the system. The architecture of the brain of a fly determines the behaviour of the fly. Neural complexity and evolutionary roles, an interaction of genes and environment, enables higher order thought and response. Thought and action being the output of information processing....which does not automatically equate to free will.

 

[DBT]

False implications? Are we not working with the same definition of determinism?

The notion that determinism eliminates freedom is a false implication. Every freedom derives its meaning from some form of meaningful constraint. In, "We set the bird free from its cage", the cage is the constraint. In, "The lady at the grocery store was offering free samples", the constraint is the cost. In, "I participated in Libet's experiment of my own free will", the constraint is coercion or some other undue influence.

Clearly it does eliminate freedom. If freedom is defined as having realizable alternatives, but determinism does not allow alternate actions, that each and every action is fixed by antecedents, there are no realizable alternatives to be realized, only the action fixed by antecedents.

An event, fixed by antecedents, is clearly not a freely willed chosen action. It is fixed by elements that are beyond the control of the person, inputs, how the brain responds prior to awareness, etc.

Where is free will at work to be seen?

Inner necessitation is the fixer of actions. External information acts upon the system, the nature of that information interacting with memory function determines response.

The 'compatibilist' definition of free will ignores inner necessitated as the means of response, simply declaring; 'acting in accordance with one's will is free will' - never mind the means by which actions are generated.

''Neuroscientists have repeatedly pointed out that pattern recognition represents the key to understanding cognition in humans. Pattern recognition also forms the very basis by which we predict future events, i e. we are literally forced to make assumptions concerning outcomes, and we do so by relying on sequences of events experienced in the past.'' - Huettel et al.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Every thing to which you agree with me on behavior is strictly 'this then that.' There is no 'because this then that.'

It sounds like you're saying there is only coincidence, but no causation. Are you saying there is no 'this be the cause of that' ('because')?

Such would be looking to results to explain causes.

Well, no, we don't expect all causation to be deliberate. But a deliberate choice is seeking a specific outcome, so the outcome may be the first clue as to the reasoning behind it. The behavior of inanimate objects is never deliberate. A rockslide is caused by gravity and the structure's loss of support. So when we explain the "reasons" why it happened we're looking for physical rather than rational causes. Biological drives serve a built-in structural purpose, but not a reason.

Evolution does not look to outcomes to explain evolution it occurs randomly in the process of 'this then that.' Scientists have learned that 'this then that' in nature tends to produce results preserving natural maximums for conservation of energy, that energy is neither created nor destroyed, etc..

Yeah, I was reading Mark Solms' book, "The Hidden Spring", and he gets into homeostasis and entropy in describing the evolution of the brain. I had basic biology in college but I never took physics (mostly TV shows like 'Watch Mr. Wizard', and, ironically, the Moody Bible Institute of Science, where I learned of Einstein's time dilation).

 

[Jarhyn]

It doesn't matter how many transistors, diodes or silicon you assemble; it doesn't equate to free will. Processing power is not free will.

It isn't about processing power. It's about the specific algorithm being implemented.

It doesn't matter how many neurons there are or how well they are connected or how much information is processed. Processing information is not free will

Said without evidence, dismissed with great healing piles of evidence anyway: the dwarf with the door had a will, and it was not free. The dwarf after the door had a will against the statue, that will was free.

These are concrete facts of a math upon the causality observed.

Form and function is not willed. Output is determined by the state and architecture of the system.

Form and function are willed exactly when the form, state, and architecture of the system are part of the output of the system, which for neural critters is "often, just short of always".

That you recognize that the system has stateliness is at least a step forward. This state can be a whole series of arbitrary instructions each with requirements, and a major requirement attached to the lot of it. Each step, each gated instruction block amounts to yet another "sub-will" which is itself a will (much like a set, now that I think about it... I really need to read up on the Langlands program).

Again, you are like a young child objecting to addition because they don't want to have to accept or understand the concept of fungibility, and that we are discussing language used to describe an observable principle that for all appearances it looks like the child just stubbornly refuses to learn or accept as useful, perhaps because it means then that the adult can prove that because there were 6 cookies in the cookie jar and now there are 5, that someone added a cookie to their face-hole and subtracted from the jar and that this is an observable fact.

 

[pood]

Hence centuries of free will debate.

Hi there! I'm a compatibilist. I'd like to show the incompatibilists, whether hard determinists or libertarian, how free will and determinism are compatible notions. It is time that you two lay down your arms, shake hands, and move on to some of the REAL problems that face humanity in this day and age, you know, war, famine, global warming, injustice, racial and religious persecution, etc. etc. etc.

I agree, the notion of free will is absolutely irrelevant. It tells us nothing about human nature, behaviour, drives, wants, needs, aspirations, how the world came to be in this state or how to fix it.

Yet we argue over free will.

The problems with compatibilism are as described. Other versions, Libertarian, QM uncertainty principle, etc, have their own problems

Fortunately, my compatibilism does not require any of that stuff. It only requires (1) using the ordinary, operational notion of free will that everyone is already using when assessing moral and legal responsibility,

The ordinary operational notion of free will simply refers to outward appearances, human behaviour as we observe it. Digging deeper into the drivers and means of thought and action paints a different picture.

Hence centuries of debate on the nature of free will, or its absence. That 'free will' is not really the means by which we think and act.

and (2) using the empirical notion of determinism, stripped of all its false implications.

Keep it Simple, Sam.

False implications? Are we not working with the same definition of determinism?

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?

You invoke the fallacy of the excluded middle? A lot has happened since the big bang you know. Stars have formed, planets, life has emerged and evolved on earth, countless species, brains structures, etc?

Not only that, but you ignore the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism? That both sides agree on how determinism works.

You realize that the issue is not with the definition of determinism, just the given definition of free will in relation to determinism?

I’ve already addressed this. The other side, as you would have it, most definitely does not agree to the Consequence Argument, which begs the question by defining free will out of existence. The scaled-back version of the Consequence Argument, presented by Hoefer, comes from a compatibilist. Finally, I’ve given my own definition of determinism, which is Hume’s “constant conjunction,” in which effects are observed to reliably follow causes, full stop. Nothing about precluding free will there, and, of course, Hume was another compatibilist. So I’ve ignored nothing.

You haven't addressed anything. You are repeating arguments that do not prove the proposition for the reasons given over many pages and numerous posts, but ignored.

Of course I addressed it! I was referring specifically to your claim that I IGNORED “the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism.” I did not IGNORE such an “inconvenient detail” because there is no such inconvenient detail to ignore! I have told you that no compatibilists accept the Consequence Argument, and I have told you REPEATEDLY that my own definition of determinism is limited to Hume’s “constant conjunction.“ So how can you possibly say I haven’t addressed this??

Nor I have “ignored” any of your posts. I have REBUTTED them. Big difference.

You may imagine (good for you) that you have made a rebuttal, but that is far from being the case. You say that you don't ignore inconvenient details, yet do just that each and every time you respond.

The bottom line it that compatibilism fails to prove its proposition because it merely applies the 'free will' label to a select set of conditions; acting according to one's will without external necessitation, force or coercion.

The argument fails because it completely ignores internal necessitation, which no less fixes outcomes - regardless of will or free will - than external elements.

In fact internal necessitation is driven by information input which is external and acts upon the system. That is the fatal flaw in compatibilism

So if it makes you feel better to imagine victory in this debate, enjoy the illusion.

You see, I do not “imagine victory” in this debate. I do not claim to have refuted your claims, only to have rebutted them. “Refurte” and “rebut” are not the same thing. And while I actually do think I have refuted your claims, you and others will contest this; but it is incontrestable that I have rebutted them — which is the exact opposite of ignoring them.

You say I “ignore inconvenient details.” Which ones? What you actually mean is that since I don’t agree with you, and have reubutted your cliams, it follows then that I have ignored your claims. IOW, if people don’t agree with you, you think they are ignorning you.

 

[Jarhyn]

Hence centuries of free will debate.

Hi there! I'm a compatibilist. I'd like to show the incompatibilists, whether hard determinists or libertarian, how free will and determinism are compatible notions. It is time that you two lay down your arms, shake hands, and move on to some of the REAL problems that face humanity in this day and age, you know, war, famine, global warming, injustice, racial and religious persecution, etc. etc. etc.

I agree, the notion of free will is absolutely irrelevant. It tells us nothing about human nature, behaviour, drives, wants, needs, aspirations, how the world came to be in this state or how to fix it.

Yet we argue over free will.

The problems with compatibilism are as described. Other versions, Libertarian, QM uncertainty principle, etc, have their own problems

Fortunately, my compatibilism does not require any of that stuff. It only requires (1) using the ordinary, operational notion of free will that everyone is already using when assessing moral and legal responsibility,

The ordinary operational notion of free will simply refers to outward appearances, human behaviour as we observe it. Digging deeper into the drivers and means of thought and action paints a different picture.

Hence centuries of debate on the nature of free will, or its absence. That 'free will' is not really the means by which we think and act.

and (2) using the empirical notion of determinism, stripped of all its false implications.

Keep it Simple, Sam.

False implications? Are we not working with the same definition of determinism?

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?

You invoke the fallacy of the excluded middle? A lot has happened since the big bang you know. Stars have formed, planets, life has emerged and evolved on earth, countless species, brains structures, etc?

Not only that, but you ignore the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism? That both sides agree on how determinism works.

You realize that the issue is not with the definition of determinism, just the given definition of free will in relation to determinism?

I’ve already addressed this. The other side, as you would have it, most definitely does not agree to the Consequence Argument, which begs the question by defining free will out of existence. The scaled-back version of the Consequence Argument, presented by Hoefer, comes from a compatibilist. Finally, I’ve given my own definition of determinism, which is Hume’s “constant conjunction,” in which effects are observed to reliably follow causes, full stop. Nothing about precluding free will there, and, of course, Hume was another compatibilist. So I’ve ignored nothing.

You haven't addressed anything. You are repeating arguments that do not prove the proposition for the reasons given over many pages and numerous posts, but ignored.

Of course I addressed it! I was referring specifically to your claim that I IGNORED “the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism.” I did not IGNORE such an “inconvenient detail” because there is no such inconvenient detail to ignore! I have told you that no compatibilists accept the Consequence Argument, and I have told you REPEATEDLY that my own definition of determinism is limited to Hume’s “constant conjunction.“ So how can you possibly say I haven’t addressed this??

Nor I have “ignored” any of your posts. I have REBUTTED them. Big difference.

You may imagine (good for you) that you have made a rebuttal, but that is far from being the case. You say that you don't ignore inconvenient details, yet do just that each and every time you respond.

The bottom line it that compatibilism fails to prove its proposition because it merely applies the 'free will' label to a select set of conditions; acting according to one's will without external necessitation, force or coercion.

The argument fails because it completely ignores internal necessitation, which no less fixes outcomes - regardless of will or free will - than external elements.

In fact internal necessitation is driven by information input which is external and acts upon the system. That is the fatal flaw in compatibilism

So if it makes you feel better to imagine victory in this debate, enjoy the illusion.

You see, I do not “imagine victory” in this debate. I do not claim to have refuted your claims, only to have rebutted them. “Refurte” and “rebut” are not the same thing. And while I actually do think I have refuted your claims, you and others will contest this; but it is incontrestable that I have rebutted them — which is the exact opposite of ignoring them.

You say I “ignore inconvenient details.” Which ones? What you actually mean is that since I don’t agree with you, and have reubutted your cliams, it follows then that I have ignored your claims. IOW, if people don’t agree with you, you think they are ignorning you.

I'll note here that "given two objects holding models to the context in reality, these two objects cannot produce conflicting answers and both be right".

Of course that assumes that one holds a correct model. The only model that can possibly be correct is "I am incorrect." Or "I am correct because this is proved with the basic axioms of math" which only hold as long as the axioms do, and cannot tell facts about "now", only of "history" and "trends".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The notion that determinism eliminates freedom is a false implication. Every freedom derives its meaning from some form of meaningful constraint. In, "We set the bird free from its cage", the cage is the constraint. In, "The lady at the grocery store was offering free samples", the constraint is the cost. In, "I participated in Libet's experiment of my own free will", the constraint is coercion or some other undue influence.

Clearly it does eliminate freedom.

If determinism eliminated freedom, then why aren't you lobbying the Merriam-Webster company to remove the words "free" and "freedom" from their dictionary? But you're not doing that, are you.

At some level, you must realize that the notion that causal necessity is "something that we must be free of" is a delusion. Causal necessity is nothing more than reliable cause and effect, something that we observe everyday, in everything that happens, and in everything that we do.

We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that operate as a single, complex, human being. These mechanisms are our hearts beating and our brains thinking and our legs walking and our voices talking and our jaws chewing gum. Every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect.

So, the notion that we must somehow be "free of cause and effect" is pretty silly. Don't you agree?

If freedom is defined as having realizable alternatives, but determinism does not allow alternate actions, that each and every action is fixed by antecedents, there are no realizable alternatives to be realized, only the action fixed by antecedents.

And how can you maintain the view that there are no realizable alternatives when faced with the restaurant menu? Ironically, it was causally necessary that we would be faced with that menu of realizable alternatives. That event, like all events, was fixed by antecedent events.

There was literally no alternative to having a menu of realizable alternatives to choose from. So, clearly determinism not only allows alternate actions, it guarantees that we will encounter realizable alternatives.

An event, fixed by antecedents, is clearly not a freely willed chosen action. It is fixed by elements that are beyond the control of the person, inputs, how the brain responds prior to awareness, etc.

If it is fixed by antecedents that the action will be chosen, while free of coercion and undue influence, then it will be BOTH fixed by antecedents AND a freely chosen will. It is a false dilemma to claim that it cannot be both.

Where is free will at work to be seen?

Well, since "choosing what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence" happens a lot in a restaurant, I suggest we look there. We will find the choosing operation being performed by every customer who walks in, browses the menu, and places an order. And we will also see the relation of free will to responsibility when we observe the waiter bringing them the bill.

Inner necessitation is the fixer of actions.

Of course. And, when there are multiple options and we must choose one, the process of that inner necessitation is called "choosing".

External information acts upon the system, the nature of that information interacting with memory function determines response.

Of course. In the restaurant, that external information is called a "menu", and we must choose from that menu what we will have for dinner. While making that choice, one of the memory functions may include recalling what we had for breakfast and what we had for lunch, in order to make a healthy choice for dinner.

The 'compatibilist' definition of free will ignores inner necessitated as the means of response, simply declaring; 'acting in accordance with one's will is free will' - never mind the means by which actions are generated.

''Neuroscientists have repeatedly pointed out that pattern recognition represents the key to understanding cognition in humans. Pattern recognition also forms the very basis by which we predict future events, i e. we are literally forced to make assumptions concerning outcomes, and we do so by relying on sequences of events experienced in the past.'' - Huettel et al.

You should know better by now than to suggest that compatibilists ignore neuroscience. It seems that the incompatibilists are the ones that are short-sheeting the neuroscience. Neuroscience, including the text you quoted, affirms repeatedly that brains make decisions, and that those decisions control our actions. For example, in the restaurant, the pattern recognition by which we predicted we would enjoy the steak dinner was a reliance upon sequences of events involving steak dinners that we experienced in the past. And so was our memory of the bacon and eggs for breakfast and the double cheeseburger we had for lunch. That's why we decided to have the salad instead.

The claim that compatibilists are ignoring anything from neuroscience is totally bogus.

 

[fromderinside]

Every thing to which you agree with me on behavior is strictly 'this then that.' There is no 'because this then that.'

It sounds like you're saying there is only coincidence, but no causation. Are you saying there is no 'this be the cause of that' ('because')?

Such would be looking to results to explain causes.

Well, no, we don't expect all causation to be deliberate. But a deliberate choice is seeking a specific outcome, so the outcome may be the first clue as to the reasoning behind it. The behavior of inanimate objects is never deliberate. A rockslide is caused by gravity and the structure's loss of support. So when we explain the "reasons" why it happened we're looking for physical rather than rational causes. Biological drives serve a built-in structural purpose, but not a reason.

You keep trying to run your flag up the wrong flag poles. This is cause and that is effect. Ergo This then that. When one gets to the point of proposing deliberate causation one has already presumed mind where the self defined stuff applies. Choice is not determined it is a construction by a mind to explain why self is even relevant.

You would have a lot of trouble explaining whither subvocalization with such 'effect determines' thinking. For me it is a convenient example of how one justifies whatever one is doing. You, on the other hand, are saying as you are doing but you are placing the saying which is caused by the doing before the doing. Doesn't work that way.