Compatibilism: What's that About?

[pood]

DBT, you wrote:

Crock. Compatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be compatible with determinism.

To which I respond:

Crock. INcompatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be INcompatible with determinism.

FIFY, again.

To which I pointed out that Incompatibilists don't define free will.

Instead, 'Incompatibilists' question the given definitions of free will, be they Libertarian, Compatibilist or the common perception of making 'freely willed' conscious decisions.

Questioning that includes indeterminism, random events or QM.

Compatibilism, et al, like theism, is a positive claim; that free will exists, and this is what it is.

Of course you define free will! You’ve been doing it all along!

Only, you define it out of existence.

Just like atheists define ''God'' out of existence by pointing out that there is no evidence for ''God?''

It’s quite different. Atheists do not define god out of existence. They look at definitions of god and ask, where is the evidence for a god that fits those definitions? They do not then offer an alternative definition of God and say, “this would be God, if this existed.” But that is what you do with free will. You offer an alternative defiition that if true would really amount to dualism, an alternative that compatibilists agree does not exist.

I again note you simply ignore these critical questions:

What is the distinction between “will” and “must’?

Do you think that the “laws“ of nature are descriptive or presciptive?

Where does “inner necessitation” fit in the heuristic of modal logic, which deals rigorously with modes of necessity, contingency, actuality and possibility?

Could it be that your avoiding these questions is a result of frustration?

 

[Jarhyn]

DBT, you wrote:

Crock. Compatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be compatible with determinism.

To which I respond:

Crock. INcompatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be INcompatible with determinism.

FIFY, again.

To which I pointed out that Incompatibilists don't define free will.

Instead, 'Incompatibilists' question the given definitions of free will, be they Libertarian, Compatibilist or the common perception of making 'freely willed' conscious decisions.

Questioning that includes indeterminism, random events or QM.

Compatibilism, et al, like theism, is a positive claim; that free will exists, and this is what it is.

Of course you define free will! You’ve been doing it all along!

Only, you define it out of existence.

Just like atheists define ''God'' out of existence by pointing out that there is no evidence for ''God?''

It’s quite different. Atheists do not define god out of existence. They look at definitions of god and ask, where is the evidence for a god that fits those definitions? They do not then offer an alternative definition of God and say, “this would be God, if this existed.” But that is what you do with free will. You offer an alternative defiition that if true would really amount to dualism, an alternative that compatibilists agree does not exist.

I again note you simply ignore these critical questions:

What is the distinction between “will” and “must’?

Do you think that the “laws“ of nature are descriptive or presciptive?

Where does “inner necessitation” fit in the heuristic of modal logic, which deals rigorously with modes of necessity, contingency, actuality and possibility?

Could it be that your avoiding these questions is a result of frustration?

Well, to be fair, I'm arguing with a number of atheists in AdamWho's "nothing like gods exist" wherein they argue "you don't just get to define 'god'", even when they used the word "LIKE" so there is THAT...

 

[Jarhyn]

We function according to our makeup...

Our makeup, that comprises a requirement of physical form, a set of physically formed instructions unto said requirement, and a systemic interpretor that will execute those instructions as actions.

Requirement: a function that has at least two return values: success/fail.
Will: a set of physically formed instructions operated by success of requirement.
Agent: an interpreter capable of embedding and executing a will upon operation of requirement.

I think I found that "will" you keep losing

 

[Jarhyn]

To establish will you need to pervert determinism.

Religion at work, folks. I showed you where the will is and it isn't with electrons. I showed you where it is in the math that determinism sits on and of and is defined by.

You are the party waving their particles around in this.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The freedom to decide for ourselves what we will do, is not a contrivance. It is what the Ukrainians are fighting for at this very moment. It is a universal desire that everyone experiences as children, when they must do what adults tell them to do, rather than what they themselves want to do. With this freedom, to decide for ourselves what we will do, comes responsibility for the consequences of our chosen actions. If we screw up, our freedom may be curtailed until we learn to make better choices.

This is the simple notion of free will, the one that everyone understands.

The notion of "freedom from causal necessity" never enters anyone's mind until they encounter the philosophical debate, and get sucked into the paradox.

That's an example of careful wording at work - the ''freedom to decide for ourselves' can be more accurately described as 'the ability to decide for ourselves'. An ability that is not 'freely willed,' but made possible and enabled by the evolution of the highly complex information processor we call the brain.

Hmm, ability versus freedom. Here's how I think these words sort out:

We have abilities to perform functions.
We are either free to use those abilities or we are restrained from using them.
We are also subject to injuries or illnesses that impair those abilities, which is another form of restraint.

That seems to be how the words ability, function, freedom, and restraint, work. The "freedom to decide for ourselves" logically implies the "ability to decide for ourselves".

All brains 'decide for themselves.'

They have an ability to decide for themselves, but when another brain is pointing a gun at them and forcing them to choose to do what they do not want to do, they lack the freedom to decide for themselves (aka, "free will").

That is their evolutionary role. Architecture, state and condition determines how you as a conscious entity think, feel and act.

But that architecture, state, and condition can be coerced by a guy with a gun. And that coercion will change how the victim thinks, feels, and acts.

I am merely pointing out the problems with compatibilism in terms of the definition of determinism (which we agree on), it's implications for freedom and the nature and function of a brain, how decisions are made.

Here's what I'm trying to get across: Determinism has no issues with any freedoms except for one, the freedom from determinism. There is no freedom from causal necessity, anywhere, ever.

But every other freedom, from every meaningful and relevant constraint, still stands, within a perfectly deterministic universe. We can be free from slavery, free from prison, free from censorship, free from coercion, free from undue influence, free from mental illness, and for our birthday someone may buy us lunch and we'll eat free of charge.

The definition of determinism only eliminates freedom from cause and effect. All other meaningful and relevant freedoms continue to exist.

In the blueprint, there is this thing called a "will" that is external to the brain, rather than a product of the brain. And this external "will" is freely altering the brain's own "agency, thought, and action". This is the specific "free will" that you appear to be arguing against. You are saying it does not exist. And, I would agree.

Dualism? It's a misrepresentation of everything I've said. I have never suggested anything of the sort.

I'm saying that you are defining free will by describing what it cannot be. For example, you say that free will cannot be the will acting upon the brain because the brain is producing the will. Or did I hear you wrong?

You may be over-extrapolating the given definition of freedom which includes freedom from necessitation and having realizable alternatives.
Definition of freedom
1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action - Merriam Webster

With that definition you are trying to define free will as the "absence of necessity", which paints free will as something outside of causal necessity. You are constructing a notion of free will by describing what it cannot be. To say that free will cannot exist because nothing exists outside of causal necessity implies that free will claims to be outside of causal necessity (the libertarian notion).

I of course refer to inner necessitation.

Inner or outer, causal necessitation is everywhere and in everything, including us.

Determinism being the ultimate in necessitation of all actions.

And that crosses the line into dualism. All events are necessitated by prior actual events, not by the abstract notion of determinism. All events are caused by the natural interactions of the individual objects and specific forces that make up the physical universe. Determinism determines nothing. Causation causes nothing. Causal necessity necessitates nothing. The actual objects and forces themselves do all of the causing and necessitating described by determinism.

I stress that, because we happen to BE actual objects that exert actual force upon other objects, causing events to happen. And we do so for our own goals, reasons, and interests. Causation, causal necessity, and determinism are actually about us (and all the other objects and forces). Causation is used to describe the interactions that cause events. Determinism and causal necessity are used to assert the reliability of our behavior as we go about making things happen. But these abstract concepts are descriptive, not causative.

But there is no argument that contradicts the compatibilist notion of free will, the simple ability to decide for ourselves what we will do.

It's a definition that carefully defines its terms in order to affirm the consequent. It can be done with any number of things, politics, religion, ideology.....

Well, is the consequent affirmed or not? Isn't that the pertinent question?

If the "free will" described by common usage and common sense, is a meaningful and relevant notion, that serves some practical function, then how can you claim fault in that definition?

Especially when its rival definition, "freedom from causal necessity", cannot be observed anywhere, and has no practical use outside of idle debate.

Function is not a matter of free choice.

That depends upon the function. The function of addition sums a series of numbers. The function of deciding for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, happens to be "making a free choice".

Function is determined by the state and form of the system.

And one of those functions is to decide whether to order the salad or the steak.

Any form of information processor is 'free to act according to its nature and makeup.' It does not will its own makeup and ability.

Fortunately, it never needs to will its own makeup and ability in order to choose between the salad and the steak. It only needs to BE its own nature and makeup, as it exercises its ability to choose what the person will have for dinner.

 

[fromderinside]

Determinism is this then then that. Both are singular. What you are doing is developing a scenario that conforms to your POV and posing it as a legitimate deterministic operation. It isn't.

Well,
there is "this": I pick up the menu,
then "that": I see the steak
then "this": my mouth waters
then "that": I remember the bacon and eggs I had for breakfast
then "this": I remember the cheeseburger I had for lunch
then "that": I begin to feel discomfort about the steak
then "this": I look for another alternative and see the salad
then "that": I realize the salad would be the better choice
then "this": I tell myself you should order the salad
then "that": I tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please"

So, choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparison, and outputs a single choice.

The deterministic situation you suggest is one where people seem to execute via some complex train of input outputs is one where that train is already be present in the envelope of 'this then thats' which it is. But the only input you are considering is the initial input and the only output you are considering is the terminal output. Its not choice but some complex reaction chain that you are dressing up as some sort of will, nonexistent, thing.

A choosing event is part of the causal chain. We cannot know, or care about, the whole chain, but only the parts that affect us in matters that concern us over our lifetimes. For example, I may have a concern about the types of food that will keep me healthy, and that concern will play itself out in my choices. As a human, with a human-size brain, I cannot deal with the entire complexity of universal causal necessity and all the other links in the chain.

But I can symbolically summarize notions of healthy and unhealthy eating, and use those when choosing what I will have for dinner. This is the rational causal mechanism at work. The rational causal mechanism (thinking and feeling) handles decision making. The biological causal mechanism (in all living organisms) supplies the drive to survive, thrive, and reproduce, and, when appropriate, will bump up decision making to the rational mechanism as needed. And both the rational and biological causal mechanisms operate within a physical infrastructure using the physical causal mechanism (inanimate objects).

 Causal system

The idea that the output of a function at any time depends only on past and present values of input is defined by the property commonly referred to as a causal system. A system that has some dependence on input values from the future (in addition to possible dependence on past or current input values) is termed a non-causal or acausal system, ... and a system that depends solely on future input values is an anticausal system. Note that some authors have defined an anticausal system as one that depends solely on future and present input values or, more simply, as a system that does not depend on past input values.

 Causal decision theory

Causal decision theory is a mathematical theory intended to determine the set of rational choices in a given situation. It is a school of thought in decision theory. In informal terms, it maintains that the rational choice is that with the best expected causal consequences (read outcomes)

 Determinism

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events are determined completely by previously existing causes (also known as Causal Determinism) Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have sprung from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. The opposite of determinism is some kind of indeterminism (otherwise called nondeterminism) or randomness.

Choice always depends on outcomes it is never just caused.

You need to swim around in some deep sewage to find any determinist buying in to "look to your outcomes to determine choice".

Chase yourself around that noose system for a while.

I've already pointed out that including such as a rational causality which is incompatible with determinism needs to make room for up to three levels of analysis which, in turn, need to be considered separately depending on whether one is talking with the boys or actually trying to explain the nature of the world rather than just lumping every methodological consideration into some determinism mishmash.

Yes we do both.

But no, they don't work together. You cannot elevate 'let's peek' methods into determinism if you want to understand things.

 

[DBT]

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?

You invoke the fallacy of the excluded middle? A lot has happened since the big bang you know. Stars have formed, planets, life has emerged and evolved on earth, countless species, brains structures, etc?

Not only that, but you ignore the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism? That both sides agree on how determinism works.

You realize that the issue is not with the definition of determinism, just the given definition of free will in relation to determinism?

 

[DBT]

We function according to our makeup...

Our makeup, that comprises a requirement of physical form, a set of physically formed instructions unto said requirement, and a systemic interpretor that will execute those instructions as actions.

Information is processed before it is interpreted. An interaction of inputs and memory. If memory function fails, it all falls apart.

It has nothing to do with free will.

The term 'free will' is just being asserted and shoehorned where it doesn't belong. It's not a valid argument.

Requirement: a function that has at least two return values: success/fail.
Will: a set of physically formed instructions operated by success of requirement.
Agent: an interpreter capable of embedding and executing a will upon operation of requirement.

I think I found that "will" you keep losing

You have found nothing. Instructions are determined by memory function, not will. You persist in the practice of shoehorning.

 

[DBT]

The freedom to decide for ourselves what we will do, is not a contrivance. It is what the Ukrainians are fighting for at this very moment. It is a universal desire that everyone experiences as children, when they must do what adults tell them to do, rather than what they themselves want to do. With this freedom, to decide for ourselves what we will do, comes responsibility for the consequences of our chosen actions. If we screw up, our freedom may be curtailed until we learn to make better choices.

This is the simple notion of free will, the one that everyone understands.

The notion of "freedom from causal necessity" never enters anyone's mind until they encounter the philosophical debate, and get sucked into the paradox.

Decision making is a function enabled by neural networks and their activity. That is what brains have evolved to do.

The decisions that are made are not 'freely chosen' but determined by an interaction of information before they are made conscious, motor actions initiated before we become aware of it.

That is not 'free will.' Information processing not even willed.

That's an example of careful wording at work - the ''freedom to decide for ourselves' can be more accurately described as 'the ability to decide for ourselves'. An ability that is not 'freely willed,' but made possible and enabled by the evolution of the highly complex information processor we call the brain.

Hmm, ability versus freedom. Here's how I think these words sort out:

We have abilities to perform functions.
We are either free to use those abilities or we are restrained from using them.
We are also subject to injuries or illnesses that impair those abilities, which is another form of restraint.

That seems to be how the words ability, function, freedom, and restraint, work. The "freedom to decide for ourselves" logically implies the "ability to decide for ourselves".

Abilities that have evolved and are enabled by the architecture of the brain function accordingly. A determined system functions unimpeded and without restriction because nothing can do otherwise.

By definition, everything runs as determined, smoothly and without deviation. No influence, coercion or force can alter outcomes. Free will plays no part.

All brains 'decide for themselves.'

They have an ability to decide for themselves, but when another brain is pointing a gun at them and forcing them to choose to do what they do not want to do, they lack the freedom to decide for themselves (aka, "free will").

We have no choice but to do what has been determined by the system. That is the inner necessitation that eliminates the idea free will being compatible with determinism.

The state of the system in any given instance in time determines the progression of events and outcomes

Any form of information processor is 'free to act according to its nature and makeup.' It does not will its own makeup and ability.

Fortunately, it never needs to will its own makeup and ability in order to choose between the salad and the steak. It only needs to BE its own nature and makeup, as it exercises its ability to choose what the person will have for dinner.

If will is not involved in our decisions and actions, it can't be claimed that we acted out of free will.

We either necessarily act according will, or we are coerced or forced to act against it. The former is commonly referred to as free will, but if we dig deeper, we find that things are not so simple.

Hence centuries of free will debate.

The problems with compatibilism are as described. Other versions, Libertarian, QM uncertainty principle, etc, have their own problems

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Choice always depends on outcomes it is never just caused.

Correct. A concern for the outcomes is one of the determining factors of the choice.

You need to swim around in some deep sewage to find any determinist buying in to "look to your outcomes to determine choice".

I think we can avoid swimming in any sewage. Any true determinist would have to include all of the meaningful and relevant causes in their scheme of causal necessity. Excluding biological and rational causation would leave their determinism hopping around on one foot.

Chase yourself around that noose system for a while.

I'm just interested in lassoing the pragmatic and empirical truth of the matter.

I've already pointed out that including such as a rational causality which is incompatible with determinism needs to make room for up to three levels of analysis which, in turn, need to be considered separately depending on whether one is talking with the boys or actually trying to explain the nature of the world rather than just lumping every methodological consideration into some determinism mishmash. Yes we do both.

Sorry, but the truth is the truth. Rational causation is based upon the model of reality that the brain constructs in its attempt to make sense of its physical environment. It uses the model to imagine different scenarios, scenarios that it plays out in its imagination, to estimate the likely outcomes of different options, so that it makes better choices. And it updates that model with the actual results of its actions in the real world. The biological and physical causal mechanisms are unable to model reality.

Determinism is defended by presuming that each causal mechanism is reliable within its own domain, and that every event is the reliable product of some specific combination of physical, biological, and rational causation.

Oh, and by saying that the rational causal mechanism is reliable, I don't mean to imply that its output is reliably correct. Bad information and bad logic will reliably produce bad results. Determinism only requires that the results are reliable, whether correct or incorrect.

But no, they don't work together. You cannot elevate 'let's peek' methods into determinism if you want to understand things.

Our understanding is, like all rational causation, limited by imperfect information and the size of our brain.

 

[Jarhyn]

Information is processed before it is interpreted

Nox information very much is "interpreted" before it is processed as a decision. Every layer of neural stuff between the input and the decision making bit "interprets" it in layers. I've watched neural networks self-organize to do this.

The only thing that is not interpreted before it is processed is "what the sequence of neural events was that was the decision."

I don't need a decision decompressed and categorized yet to have made it.

This is a major failure in your religion, and perhaps heralds a fundamental inability to actually understand what "information processing" actually is, especially in domains of neurology.

Could the information be interpreted before it is "processed" as a decision, or whatever other nonsense it is you think neurons are incapable of, by a classical Turing machine?

Because here's the kicker: neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do.

You bringing up neurons then is a red herring, if you might think machines can do the thing you don't think neurons can that would be required for free will to exist in a deterministic system. Then your position collapses merely to a very weak hard determinism: "neural systems" would be the limiting factor not "deterministic systems".

But neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do. Therefore it "neurology" cannot be this limiting factor you assume it must be.

Do you need me to make a patronizing modal logic construction?

 

[Jarhyn]

Oh, and by saying that the rational causal mechanism is reliable, I don't mean to imply that its output is reliably correct. Bad information and bad logic will reliably produce bad results. Determinism only requires that the results are reliable, whether correct or incorrect

How else would a will possibly be "unfree"? But we are limited by Godel's Incompleteness Theorem so that the output CANNOT POSSIBLY be "exactly correct", ever.

We instead deal in sets and transistive logic, in gambles and skill-shots.

 

[pood]

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?

You invoke the fallacy of the excluded middle? A lot has happened since the big bang you know. Stars have formed, planets, life has emerged and evolved on earth, countless species, brains structures, etc?

Not only that, but you ignore the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism? That both sides agree on how determinism works.

You realize that the issue is not with the definition of determinism, just the given definition of free will in relation to determinism?

I’ve already addressed this. The other side, as you would have it, most definitely does not agree to the Consequence Argument, which begs the question by defining free will out of existence. The scaled-back version of the Consequence Argument, presented by Hoefer, comes from a compatibilist. Finally, I’ve given my own definition of determinism, which is Hume’s “constant conjunction,” in which effects are observed to reliably follow causes, full stop. Nothing about precluding free will there, and, of course, Hume was another compatibilist. So I’ve ignored nothing.

 

[pood]

As to ignoring, yoiu continue to ignore the followinq questions:

What is the distinction between “will” and “must’?

Do you think that the “laws“ of nature are descriptive or presciptive?

Where does “inner necessitation” fit in the heuristic of modal logic, which deals rigorously with modes of necessity, contingency, actuality and possibility?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Decision making is a function enabled by neural networks and their activity. That is what brains have evolved to do.

Of course.

The decisions that are made are not 'freely chosen' but determined by an interaction of information before they are made conscious, motor actions initiated before we become aware of it.

Again, 'freely chosen' does not mean free from being determined by the normal working of our brains. Everyone expects their brain to make their choice and everyone hopes that their brain is working reliably. So, this notion that 'freely chosen' means 'freedom from our brain's normal behavior', is a strawman.

All that is expected of 'freely chosen' is that we are free to make the choice for ourselves, and not coerced or unduly influenced by someone or something else making the choice for us.

Information processing not even willed.

Information processing makes decisions to do things. Correct? And if information processing decides to do something that involves information processing, like responding to your comment, then it will follow through on its own chosen intention, by performing the information processing that produces the words I type, until I am finished.

Do you understand this yet?

Information Processing -> Chooses "I will respond to DBT's comment" -> Information Processing producing response.

Information processing includes following its own freely chosen will. Will is part of information processing, both as output, and, as input. And, of course, the "freely" in freely chosen refers to freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Abilities that have evolved and are enabled by the architecture of the brain function accordingly.

Correct.

A determined system functions unimpeded and without restriction because nothing can do otherwise.

In a determined system, nothing will do otherwise, even if it can do otherwise. Rocks cannot do anything on their own. They have no inherent abilities. But a living organism has the ability to move around. Even an amoeba can move around, by pulling itself along a surface with its 'foot'.

So the amoeba has the ability to move around. It also has the ability to stay put while consuming something it just absorbed. The amoeba will always be doing one or the other, causally determined by antecedent events. However, the amoeba always has the ability to move and also the ability to rest. While it is resting it will not be moving, but it still has the ability to move. While it is moving it will not be resting, but it still has the ability to rest. It's ability to do otherwise remains constant, despite what it will be doing by causal necessary.

By definition, everything runs as determined, smoothly and without deviation. No influence, coercion or force can alter outcomes. Free will plays no part.

You're conflating two different contextual levels. I'll sort them out for you again:
Either it will be causally necessary that we are coerced or unduly influenced,
Or, it will be causally necessary that we are free to decide for ourselves.

The outcomes will be different according to which conditions were causally necessary.

Causal necessity does not eliminate the possibility of coercion or undue influence.
Causal necessity does not eliminate the possibility of being free of coercion and undue influence.

So, we cannot logically conclude that "if everything runs as determined, smoothly and without deviation" there will be no coercion, or no undue influence, or no free will.

The claim that "by definition" if there is determinism then there will be no coercion or no undue influence or no free will, is simply false. Each of these circumstances, as defined, can and do exist in a perfectly deterministic system.

Determinism eliminates nothing, except indeterminism. Indeterminism is not required for the ordinary, practical meaning of free will. Universal causal necessity/inevitability is neither a meaningful nor a relevant restraint upon any freedom other than the imaginary unicorn, "freedom from causal necessity".

We have no choice but to do what has been determined by the system. That is the inner necessitation that eliminates the idea free will being compatible with determinism.

The inner necessitation is our brain choosing, between two or more options, what we will do. If the brain is free of coercion and undue influence, then it is a freely chosen "I will".

The inner necessitation that you claim makes free will impossible happens to be free will. Free will refers to our brain choosing for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Free will does not require freedom from our brain. Free will does not require freedom from causal necessity. So, free will is compatible with determinism.

The state of the system in any given instance in time determines the progression of events and outcomes

Of course. And the state of the system may include being coerced or unduly influenced, or the state of the system may be free of coercion and undue influence. Which state applies is a significant distinction when assessing the system's responsibility for its actions.

If will is not involved in our decisions and actions, it can't be claimed that we acted out of free will.

I've tried to point out the role of will in our brain's decision making.

Here's an example: I'm offering you two flavors of ice cream, chocolate and vanilla. Will you choose one of them now? Note that we have two separate decisions: (1a) "I will answer" (1b) "I will not answer". If (1a) "I will answer" then you will say (2a) "I will have chocolate" (according to your earlier stated preference), even though you could have chosen vanilla instead. If (1b) "I will not answer", then you'll not make the second choice.

The brain's willingness to answer, causally necessitated the brain's subsequent behavior of providing the answer. That is the brain's own will controlling the brain's own subsequent behavior.

We either necessarily act according will, or we are coerced or forced to act against it. The former is commonly referred to as free will, but if we dig deeper, we find that things are not so simple.

Right. Things are pretty darn complex in the brain. But nothing in the complexity of the brain changes the observed behavior of the person choosing from the menu of alternate possibilities what they would order for dinner.

Hence centuries of free will debate.

Hi there! I'm a compatibilist. I'd like to show the incompatibilists, whether hard determinists or libertarian, how free will and determinism are compatible notions. It is time that you two lay down your arms, shake hands, and move on to some of the REAL problems that face humanity in this day and age, you know, war, famine, global warming, injustice, racial and religious persecution, etc. etc. etc.

The problems with compatibilism are as described. Other versions, Libertarian, QM uncertainty principle, etc, have their own problems

Fortunately, my compatibilism does not require any of that stuff. It only requires (1) using the ordinary, operational notion of free will that everyone is already using when assessing moral and legal responsibility, and (2) using the empirical notion of determinism, stripped of all its false implications.

Keep it Simple, Sam.

 

[fromderinside]

Choice always depends on outcomes it is never just caused.

Correct. A concern for the outcomes is one of the determining factors of the choice.

You need to swim around in some deep sewage to find any determinist buying in to "look to your outcomes to determine choice".

I think we can avoid swimming in any sewage. Any true determinist would have to include all of the meaningful and relevant causes in their scheme of causal necessity. Excluding biological and rational causation would leave their determinism hopping around on one foot.

Chase yourself around that noose system for a while.

I'm just interested in lassoing the pragmatic and empirical truth of the matter.

I've already pointed out that including such as a rational causality which is incompatible with determinism needs to make room for up to three levels of analysis which, in turn, need to be considered separately depending on whether one is talking with the boys or actually trying to explain the nature of the world rather than just lumping every methodological consideration into some determinism mishmash. Yes we do both.

Sorry, but the truth is the truth. Rational causation is based upon the model of reality that the brain constructs in its attempt to make sense of its physical environment. It uses the model to imagine different scenarios, scenarios that it plays out in its imagination, to estimate the likely outcomes of different options, so that it makes better choices. And it updates that model with the actual results of its actions in the real world. The biological and physical causal mechanisms are unable to model reality.

Determinism is defended by presuming that each causal mechanism is reliable within its own domain, and that every event is the reliable product of some specific combination of physical, biological, and rational causation.

Oh, and by saying that the rational causal mechanism is reliable, I don't mean to imply that its output is reliably correct. Bad information and bad logic will reliably produce bad results. Determinism only requires that the results are reliable, whether correct or incorrect.

But no, they don't work together. You cannot elevate 'let's peek' methods into determinism if you want to understand things.

Our understanding is, like all rational causation, limited by imperfect information and the size of our brain.

The brain doesn't create in an attempt at anything. Evolutionary pressures and external circumstances drive how the brain is constructed. That the result includes sense is driven by the utility they have in making living possible. Rational reality is a result of reality shaping life through evolution. It will never be reality. It can only be an adjunct, an approximation, based on cumulative sense/response results.

Determination doesn't produce reality. Determinism is how reality works. In order to get to rational approximation to reality empirical study of the stuff of reality first needs to develop to the point where that which reality produces can be replicated. Then what the brain and being produces can be empirically included within the reality package.

 

[DBT]

Information is processed before it is interpreted

Nox information very much is "interpreted" before it is processed as a decision. Every layer of neural stuff between the input and the decision making bit "interprets" it in layers. I've watched neural networks self-organize to do this.

The only thing that is not interpreted before it is processed is "what the sequence of neural events was that was the decision."

I don't need a decision decompressed and categorized yet to have made it.

This is a major failure in your religion, and perhaps heralds a fundamental inability to actually understand what "information processing" actually is, especially in domains of neurology.

Could the information be interpreted before it is "processed" as a decision, or whatever other nonsense it is you think neurons are incapable of, by a classical Turing machine?

Because here's the kicker: neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do.

You bringing up neurons then is a red herring, if you might think machines can do the thing you don't think neurons can that would be required for free will to exist in a deterministic system. Then your position collapses merely to a very weak hard determinism: "neural systems" would be the limiting factor not "deterministic systems".

But neurons can do anything a classical Turing machine can do. Therefore it "neurology" cannot be this limiting factor you assume it must be.

Do you need me to make a patronizing modal logic construction?

What a neuron can or can't do is determined by its physical structure and function.

There are different types of neurons and functions, motor neurons, sensory neurons, interneurons, glial support cells, multipolar, unipolar, bipolar, pseudo polar, etc, etc.....all contribute to the overall functioning of a brain as an information processor, none functions on the principle of free will.

''Neural function, therefore free will'' is not an argument.

 

[DBT]

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?

You invoke the fallacy of the excluded middle? A lot has happened since the big bang you know. Stars have formed, planets, life has emerged and evolved on earth, countless species, brains structures, etc?

Not only that, but you ignore the inconvenient detail that there has been an agreement on the definition of determinism? That both sides agree on how determinism works.

You realize that the issue is not with the definition of determinism, just the given definition of free will in relation to determinism?

I’ve already addressed this. The other side, as you would have it, most definitely does not agree to the Consequence Argument, which begs the question by defining free will out of existence. The scaled-back version of the Consequence Argument, presented by Hoefer, comes from a compatibilist. Finally, I’ve given my own definition of determinism, which is Hume’s “constant conjunction,” in which effects are observed to reliably follow causes, full stop. Nothing about precluding free will there, and, of course, Hume was another compatibilist. So I’ve ignored nothing.

You haven't addressed anything. You are repeating arguments that do not prove the proposition for the reasons given over many pages and numerous posts, but ignored.

 

[DBT]

As to ignoring, yoiu continue to ignore the followinq questions:

What is the distinction between “will” and “must’?

Do you think that the “laws“ of nature are descriptive or presciptive?

Where does “inner necessitation” fit in the heuristic of modal logic, which deals rigorously with modes of necessity, contingency, actuality and possibility?

I have but whatever I say is ignored, and the question is repeated.

''Will'' implies the possibility of an alternate action, therefore the freedom to do otherwise. ''Must'' has a sense of finality, that the outcome is a forgone conclusion, fixed. As Determinism does not permit alternate action, 'will' if determined is necessarily a case of 'must.'

If the world is determined, events are fixed by the conditions of the world, which we describe as the 'laws of nature.'

Inner necessitation refers to the architecture of a brain, which in turn determines function and output. Modal logic is enabled by the information processing of a brain and does not exist independently of it or its information processing activity.

What a brain can or cannot do is determined by the state and condition of the system in any given instance in time.

 

[DBT]

Hence centuries of free will debate.

Hi there! I'm a compatibilist. I'd like to show the incompatibilists, whether hard determinists or libertarian, how free will and determinism are compatible notions. It is time that you two lay down your arms, shake hands, and move on to some of the REAL problems that face humanity in this day and age, you know, war, famine, global warming, injustice, racial and religious persecution, etc. etc. etc.

I agree, the notion of free will is absolutely irrelevant. It tells us nothing about human nature, behaviour, drives, wants, needs, aspirations, how the world came to be in this state or how to fix it.

Yet we argue over free will.

The problems with compatibilism are as described. Other versions, Libertarian, QM uncertainty principle, etc, have their own problems

Fortunately, my compatibilism does not require any of that stuff. It only requires (1) using the ordinary, operational notion of free will that everyone is already using when assessing moral and legal responsibility,

The ordinary operational notion of free will simply refers to outward appearances, human behaviour as we observe it. Digging deeper into the drivers and means of thought and action paints a different picture.

Hence centuries of debate on the nature of free will, or its absence. That 'free will' is not really the means by which we think and act.

and (2) using the empirical notion of determinism, stripped of all its false implications.

Keep it Simple, Sam.

False implications? Are we not working with the same definition of determinism?