Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

In this thread, DBT is basically restating van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true)
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

Premise one assumes the laws of nature govern the universe. That is false. Hence we do not need to have “power” over the laws of nature, because those “laws” have no power over us. And, as Norman Swartz and others, often called Humean or neo-Humean compatibilists, argue, we do in fact, have some power over the “laws” of nature, because our own acts make those laws be what they are. As Swartz writes, to paraphrase, it’s true we have no power over the charge on an electron, but we do have the power to choose what color shirt to wear in the morning. If we take laws to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, and they are, then it is just as much a “law” that I wore a blue shirt this morning as is the “law” of the charge on the electron. Both “laws” are nothing more than a subset of true descriptions of the way that the world is.

Premise one has also by challenged on another front by Hoefer, whose own definition of determinism was rather ironically quoted by DBT, since Hoefer rejects hard determinism. Hoefer says that we do, in fact, have some power over the facts of the past, about which more later, though I have alluded to this before.

Since premise one is faulty premise two cannot follow and hence the conclusion cannot follow.

But even if both ends of premise one were true it still does not derail compatibilism when compatibilism merely says that doing what we choose to do, without external coercion or derailment, constitutes necessary and sufficient conditions for free will. Because even if P1 and 2 were both true, and they aren’t, those premises fail to take into account that we ourselves are part of the deterministic stream that has “power” over the facts of the future.

The definition I quoted precedes Hoefer's use of it, a standard definition whether Hoefer disputes it or not ....and - ironically - it the very same definition of determinism given by compatibilists on this forum, including Marvin Edwards.

I pointed this out when you brought it up the first time, now here we are again. Whatever I say, it's ignored and the very same fallacy is brought up again and again.

Again: the definition does not belong to Hoefer. It is the definition being used on this forum by both sides. We have agreed on the definition.

 

[DBT]

Let me get this straight.

CHOOSING

We (compatibilists and incompatibilists) all agree that it happens.

The problem is that incompatibilists (FDI at least) insist that the word "choosing" should not be used.

This isn't philosophy.

No, it's a matter of necessitated decisions and agency.

As determinism happens to be defined, events proceed as determined, no alternate actions are possible.

Necessitated decisions, with no possible alternative (determinism) are not freely willed decisions. They are not even willed decisions (will is not the agency), therefore it is false to claim that free will is compatible with determinism.

I'm afraid I can't see any relationship between what you wrote and what I assume you're responding to.

Which is precisely what I expected from you.

 

[DBT]

DBT, you wrote:

Crock. Compatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be compatible with determinism.

To which I respond:

Crock. INcompatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be INcompatible with determinism.

FIFY, again.

To which I pointed out that Incompatibilists don't define free will.

Instead, 'Incompatibilists' question the given definitions of free will, be they Libertarian, Compatibilist or the common perception of making 'freely willed' conscious decisions.

Questioning that includes indeterminism, random events or QM.

Compatibilism, et al, like theism, is a positive claim; that free will exists, and this is what it is.

 

[DBT]

That I do understand your position and the compatibilist definition of free will.
I just don't agree with it.

Do you possibly agree, that the compatibilist definition of free will, is in fact compatible with the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, in which every event is the reliable result of antecedent events?

It's a definition crafted to fit the bill. A version of affirming the consequent.

1. If it’s raining, then the streets are wet.
2. The streets are wet.
3. Therefore, it’s raining.

A Definition alone does not prove the proposition.

''God is Love, Love exists, therefore God is real'' doesn't prove the reality of God any more than 'acting in accordance with one's will, therefore free will'' proves the reality of free will: that will is indeed free.

I mean, if you look just at our definition, without replacing it with your own, do you find our definition incompatible with a deterministic view of the universe, or compatible with it?

I don't have a definition of free will to replace it with. Why would I? I am arguing against the idea of freedom of will (agency, thought, action, is not determined by will).

I can only point to the nature of freedom as it is conceived to be and apply it to the nature of will within a determined system....which by its very nature eliminates freedom. Where everything proceeds as determined, not controlled, willed or regulated.

Which reduces any definition of free will to a purely semantic construct that doesn't relate to how the world works.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Choosing is personal. Personal is subjective. ...

Of course it is personal and subjective. But we can also objectively observe people doing it. That's why we went into the restaurant, to see choosing happening in objective reality.

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparison, and outputs a single choice.

We observe people inputting the menu. We observe people outputting a single choice. And, if we want to know their criteria of comparison, we just ask. "Hi there. We're conducting a survey of the reasons people choose different meals. Would you mind telling us why you decided to order the salad instead of the steak?"

Your philosophy is corrupted by the use of other than reality, subjectivity which is only linked by poor association and approximation to reality caused by weak transduction fidelity.

Hey, same to you fella.

 

[Jarhyn]

subjective

Nowhere in my post do I use that word. Nowhere in my post do I accept it. Try again.

functions operate differently from reality

Now, sometimes functions do not operate in such a way as to fulfill the requirements of their will.

IF they don't/won't/can't, that "will" of the function is not "free".

The requirement is an object, and a set of real object relationships: it is objective. The deterministic reality around the requirement is a real object and a set of object relationships (really, here, positional geometries and moment forces).

The will is an object too: a set of instructions, each "merely what it is", as is the interpreter.

That the set of instructions is ARBITRARY, mutable, makes it no less an object.

The will is a set of instructions plus a requirement, an object, the requirement is an object, and that object will objectively reach a particular objectively observable geometry or it won't.

This is a demand of determinism.

 

[pood]

In this thread, DBT is basically restating van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true)
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

Premise one assumes the laws of nature govern the universe. That is false. Hence we do not need to have “power” over the laws of nature, because those “laws” have no power over us. And, as Norman Swartz and others, often called Humean or neo-Humean compatibilists, argue, we do in fact, have some power over the “laws” of nature, because our own acts make those laws be what they are. As Swartz writes, to paraphrase, it’s true we have no power over the charge on an electron, but we do have the power to choose what color shirt to wear in the morning. If we take laws to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, and they are, then it is just as much a “law” that I wore a blue shirt this morning as is the “law” of the charge on the electron. Both “laws” are nothing more than a subset of true descriptions of the way that the world is.

Premise one has also by challenged on another front by Hoefer, whose own definition of determinism was rather ironically quoted by DBT, since Hoefer rejects hard determinism. Hoefer says that we do, in fact, have some power over the facts of the past, about which more later, though I have alluded to this before.

Since premise one is faulty premise two cannot follow and hence the conclusion cannot follow.

But even if both ends of premise one were true it still does not derail compatibilism when compatibilism merely says that doing what we choose to do, without external coercion or derailment, constitutes necessary and sufficient conditions for free will. Because even if P1 and 2 were both true, and they aren’t, those premises fail to take into account that we ourselves are part of the deterministic stream that has “power” over the facts of the future.

The definition I quoted precedes Hoefer's use of it, a standard definition whether Hoefer disputes it or not ....and - ironically - it the very same definition of determinism given by compatibilists on this forum, including Marvin Edwards.

I pointed this out when you brought it up the first time, now here we are again. Whatever I say, it's ignored and the very same fallacy is brought up again and again.

Again: the definition does not belong to Hoefer. It is the definition being used on this forum by both sides. We have agreed on the definition.

No, the Consequence Argument is certainly not agreed to by compatibilists on this thread, because the argument defines free will out of existence.

If you want to say that Hoefer’s definition of determinism is not really the same as the Consequence Argument, and that other compatibilists here have at least agreed to Hoefer’s definition, perhaps that is so, but I have not agreed to it. I have stated that my definition of deterinism is parsimonious, limited merely to Hume’s “constant conjunction” argument: Effects are observed to reliably follow causes, full stop. Nothing else can be inferred from that.

Again, however, you ignore the substance of my most recent posts to focus instead on definitional minutiae. What is your position on whether the “laws” of nature are descriptive or prescriptive? What is your analysis of the difference between “will” and “must“? Your earlier answer, that the question is “too vague” frankly boggles, as I’ve noted. Where do you assign ”inner necessition” to the herustic of modal logic?

 

[pood]

And, Jebus, folks, we just got three threads on this topic merged, and now I see the discussion has been taken up in yet another thread. Why not just stick to one thread for the sake of convenience? Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

 

[pood]

DBT, you wrote:

Crock. Compatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be compatible with determinism.

To which I respond:

Crock. INcompatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be INcompatible with determinism.

FIFY, again.

To which I pointed out that Incompatibilists don't define free will.

Instead, 'Incompatibilists' question the given definitions of free will, be they Libertarian, Compatibilist or the common perception of making 'freely willed' conscious decisions.

Questioning that includes indeterminism, random events or QM.

Compatibilism, et al, like theism, is a positive claim; that free will exists, and this is what it is.

Of course you define free will! You’ve been doing it all along!

Only, you define it out of existence.

You set necessary and sufficient conditions for what you construe would be “real” free will in a causally deterministic context — such as, for example, you claim that to have free will, we would have to be able to “regularte” our own neuronal activity.

Abusrd! We ARE our neuronal activity — how is neuronal activity supposed to “regulate” neuronal activity??

But our neuronal activity does not need to “regulate” our neuronal activity for free will to be manifiest — all that our neuronal activity (that is, us) needs to be able to do, to have free will, is to choose what we do, among a menu of available options, free of conercion or restraint. And we do that a multitude of times every single day, without any problem whatsoever.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

That I do understand your position and the compatibilist definition of free will.
I just don't agree with it.

Do you possibly agree, that the compatibilist definition of free will, is in fact compatible with the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, in which every event is the reliable result of antecedent events?

It's a definition crafted to fit the bill. A version of affirming the consequent.

1. If it’s raining, then the streets are wet.
2. The streets are wet.
3. Therefore, it’s raining.

A Definition alone does not prove the proposition.

''God is Love, Love exists, therefore God is real'' doesn't prove the reality of God any more than 'acting in accordance with one's will, therefore free will'' proves the reality of free will: that will is indeed free.

The freedom to decide for ourselves what we will do, is not a contrivance. It is what the Ukrainians are fighting for at this very moment. It is a universal desire that everyone experiences as children who must do what adults them to do, rather than what they themselves want to do.

With this freedom, to decide for ourselves what we will do, comes responsibility for the consequences of our chosen actions. If we screw up, our freedom may be curtailed until we learn to make better choices.

This is the simple notion of free will, the one that everyone understands.

The notion of "freedom from causal necessity" never enters anyone's mind until they encounter the philosophical debate, and get sucked into the paradox.

I don't have a definition of free will to replace it with. Why would I? I am arguing against the idea of freedom of will (agency, thought, action, is not determined by will).

I can only point to the nature of freedom as it is conceived to be and apply it to the nature of will within a determined system....which by its very nature eliminates freedom. Where everything proceeds as determined, not controlled, willed or regulated.

Which reduces any definition of free will to a purely semantic construct that doesn't relate to how the world works.

Incompatibilists seem to be tilting at a windmill of their own construction. Although you claim to have no "definition" of free will, your argument follows a blueprint that maps out the size and shape of the windmill.

In the blueprint, there is this thing called a "will" that is external to the brain, rather than a product of the brain. And this external "will" is freely altering the brain's own "agency, thought, and action". This is the specific "free will" that you appear to be arguing against. You are saying it does not exist. And, I would agree.

But there is no argument that contradicts the compatibilist notion of free will, the simple ability to decide for ourselves what we will do.

Neuroscience confirms that the brain makes decisions that control what we do. When we are free to make that decision ourselves, it is called free will. When a decision is imposed upon us by coercion or other undue influence, we lack that freedom.

So, there is a definition of free will, that is meaningful and relevant, and that remains standing even in a perfectly deterministic universe, and even within a brain, our own brain, that operates deterministically, as it chooses for us what we will do.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

And, Jebus, folks, we just got three threads on this topic merged, and now I see the discussion has been taken up in yet another thread. Why not just stick to one thread for the sake of convenience? Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

Sorry. I was curious about previous discussions on the topic by others, so I checked out a couple of older threads to see if there was something new going on, or if some other people might also want to engage.

 

[Jarhyn]

And, Jebus, folks, we just got three threads on this topic merged, and now I see the discussion has been taken up in yet another thread. Why not just stick to one thread for the sake of convenience? Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

So, the discussion we're having on what free will is, in the other thread, is actually more fun for me right now?

at any rate, it seems FDI has a very hard time parsing that their idea of subjectivity is, well, a lot like how they view free will, if we are going to be determinists of the Hoefer form.

To be fair, I've outlined my argument of just-so-determinism, and my expectation of what necessitates whole universes of existence has a lot to do with properties of the natural numbers and their implications: I think that that if you look at the whole universe treating time as "just another dimension", any given particle at the end of it will have a finite graph structure of causal interaction defined by limitations of universal expansion and the relationship this has with C.

When viewed from the front, it is a map of will, and when viewed from other end going back, one sees "what had freedom".

it just so happens we can review our history so as to accomplish understanding of "freedom" in addition to "will".

when viewed from the whole of it, you can't see the forest for the trees.

Some of those descriptions will be "this 'absurd' initial value was this, and so it caused this value here to be that", but as per the god-and-dice thread, the values and deterministic causality for what to us appears to be random cosmic noise are apparently hidden!

This makes it "functionally stochastic" and Godel's Incompleteness Theorem lays demand that even were it not functionally stochastic we must be anyway.

 

[Jarhyn]

how is neuronal activity supposed to “regulate” neuronal activity

Through network backpropagation. Through network recursivity. Through systemic interrupt behaviors (one set of neurons fires in such a way as to divert the firing of another pattern along a second set of neurons).

All kinds of forms of neural activity regulates neural activity! That's why it's so absurd to claim that regulation is not possible!

I am a neural activity whose job is to regulate activities of other neurons.

In fact, all of "magic" in all serious esoteric discussion is about learning techniques to regulate activities of neural systems.

The regulation formats possible among neural architectures are only limited by the available network complexity, and that's not even getting into "sneaker net" style regulation like hormones and antagonists, agonists and such, which could accomplish any of the above forms of regulation, or even more widespread regulation.

Neurons are "regulation all the way down".

 

[fromderinside]

Choosing is personal. Personal is subjective. ...

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparison, and outputs a single choice.

Determinism is this then then that. Both are singular. What you are doing is developing a scenario that conforms to your POV and posing it as a legitimate deterministic operation. It isn't.

The deterministic situation you suggest is one where people seem to execute via some complex train of input outputs is one where that train is already be present in the envelope of 'this then thats' which it is. But the only input you are considering is the initial input and the only output you are considering is the terminal output. Its not choice but some complex reaction chain that you are dressing up as some sort of will, nonexistent, thing.

 

[fromderinside]

subjective

Nowhere in my post do I use that word. Nowhere in my post do I accept it. Try again.

functions operate differently from reality

Now, sometimes functions do not operate in such a way as to fulfill the requirements of their will.

IF they don't/won't/can't, that "will" of the function is not "free".

The requirement is an object, and a set of real object relationships: it is objective. The deterministic reality around the requirement is a real object and a set of object relationships (really, here, positional geometries and moment forces).

The will is an object too: a set of instructions, each "merely what it is", as is the interpreter.

That the set of instructions is ARBITRARY, mutable, makes it no less an object.

The will is a set of instructions plus a requirement, an object, the requirement is an object, and that object will objectively reach a particular objectively observable geometry or it won't.

This is a demand of determinism.

Its worse than that. You presume it which is a subjective thing. You are in denial. To establish will you need to pervert determinism. So you embed particles, electrons or some such, in your models and then claim they are the material element required to satisfy reality.

No they are models. Your manipulations lead to outcomes you designed in to you models which is certainly not reality.

 

[DBT]

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

 

[DBT]

DBT, you wrote:

Crock. Compatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be compatible with determinism.

To which I respond:

Crock. INcompatibilists simply define 'free will' in a way that allows it to be INcompatible with determinism.

FIFY, again.

To which I pointed out that Incompatibilists don't define free will.

Instead, 'Incompatibilists' question the given definitions of free will, be they Libertarian, Compatibilist or the common perception of making 'freely willed' conscious decisions.

Questioning that includes indeterminism, random events or QM.

Compatibilism, et al, like theism, is a positive claim; that free will exists, and this is what it is.

Of course you define free will! You’ve been doing it all along!

Only, you define it out of existence.

Just like atheists define ''God'' out of existence by pointing out that there is no evidence for ''God?''

Pointing out the flaws in the compatibilist definition is not 'defining free will.'

Where is freedom of will when it can't do anything?

Where is freedom of will when will can't make a difference to outcomes?

Determinism does not allow alternate actions. The determined action is the only possible action.

That which is determined is not chosen or willed.

That alone is the end of compatibilism.

Not because I say so, but because the nature and function of a brain (not functioning on the power of will) and the given definition of determinism (agreed upon by several participants here) logically rules out freedom of will.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Determinism is this then then that. Both are singular. What you are doing is developing a scenario that conforms to your POV and posing it as a legitimate deterministic operation. It isn't.

Well,
there is "this": I pick up the menu,
then "that": I see the steak
then "this": my mouth waters
then "that": I remember the bacon and eggs I had for breakfast
then "this": I remember the cheeseburger I had for lunch
then "that": I begin to feel discomfort about the steak
then "this": I look for another alternative and see the salad
then "that": I realize the salad would be the better choice
then "this": I tell myself you should order the salad
then "that": I tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please"

So, choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparison, and outputs a single choice.

The deterministic situation you suggest is one where people seem to execute via some complex train of input outputs is one where that train is already be present in the envelope of 'this then thats' which it is. But the only input you are considering is the initial input and the only output you are considering is the terminal output. Its not choice but some complex reaction chain that you are dressing up as some sort of will, nonexistent, thing.

A choosing event is part of the causal chain. We cannot know, or care about, the whole chain, but only the parts that affect us in matters that concern us over our lifetimes. For example, I may have a concern about the types of food that will keep me healthy, and that concern will play itself out in my choices. As a human, with a human-size brain, I cannot deal with the entire complexity of universal causal necessity and all the other links in the chain.

But I can symbolically summarize notions of healthy and unhealthy eating, and use those when choosing what I will have for dinner. This is the rational causal mechanism at work. The rational causal mechanism (thinking and feeling) handles decision making. The biological causal mechanism (in all living organisms) supplies the drive to survive, thrive, and reproduce, and, when appropriate, will bump up decision making to the rational mechanism as needed. And both the rational and biological causal mechanisms operate within a physical infrastructure using the physical causal mechanism (inanimate objects).

 

[DBT]

That I do understand your position and the compatibilist definition of free will.
I just don't agree with it.

Do you possibly agree, that the compatibilist definition of free will, is in fact compatible with the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, in which every event is the reliable result of antecedent events?

It's a definition crafted to fit the bill. A version of affirming the consequent.

1. If it’s raining, then the streets are wet.
2. The streets are wet.
3. Therefore, it’s raining.

A Definition alone does not prove the proposition.

''God is Love, Love exists, therefore God is real'' doesn't prove the reality of God any more than 'acting in accordance with one's will, therefore free will'' proves the reality of free will: that will is indeed free.

The freedom to decide for ourselves what we will do, is not a contrivance. It is what the Ukrainians are fighting for at this very moment. It is a universal desire that everyone experiences as children who must do what adults them to do, rather than what they themselves want to do.

With this freedom, to decide for ourselves what we will do, comes responsibility for the consequences of our chosen actions. If we screw up, our freedom may be curtailed until we learn to make better choices.

This is the simple notion of free will, the one that everyone understands.

The notion of "freedom from causal necessity" never enters anyone's mind until they encounter the philosophical debate, and get sucked into the paradox.

That's an example of careful wording at work - the ''freedom to decide for ourselves' can be more accurately described as 'the ability to decide for ourselves'

An ability that is not 'freely willed,' but made possible and enabled by the evolution of the highly complex information processor we call the brain.

All brains 'decide for themselves.' That is their evolutionary role. Architecture, state and condition determines how you as a conscious entity think, feel and act.

I don't have a definition of free will to replace it with. Why would I? I am arguing against the idea of freedom of will (agency, thought, action, is not determined by will).

I can only point to the nature of freedom as it is conceived to be and apply it to the nature of will within a determined system....which by its very nature eliminates freedom. Where everything proceeds as determined, not controlled, willed or regulated.

Which reduces any definition of free will to a purely semantic construct that doesn't relate to how the world works.

Incompatibilists seem to be tilting at a windmill of their own construction. Although you claim to have no "definition" of free will, your argument follows a blueprint that maps out the size and shape of the windmill.

I don't have a construction. I am merely pointing out the problems with compatibilism in terms of the definition of determinism (which we agree on), it's implications for freedom and the nature and function of a brain, how decisions are made.

All of which I have supported.

In the blueprint, there is this thing called a "will" that is external to the brain, rather than a product of the brain. And this external "will" is freely altering the brain's own "agency, thought, and action". This is the specific "free will" that you appear to be arguing against. You are saying it does not exist. And, I would agree.

Dualism? It's a misrepresentation of everything I've said. I have never suggested anything of the sort.

You may be over-extrapolating the given definition of freedom which includes freedom from necessitation and having realizable alternatives.

Definition of freedom
1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action - Merriam Webster

I of course refer to inner necessitation. Determinism being the ultimate in necessitation of all actions.

But there is no argument that contradicts the compatibilist notion of free will, the simple ability to decide for ourselves what we will do.

It's a definition that carefully defines its terms in order to affirm the consequent. It can be done with any number of things, politics, religion, ideology.....

Neuroscience confirms that the brain makes decisions that control what we do. When we are free to make that decision ourselves, it is called free will. When a decision is imposed upon us by coercion or other undue influence, we lack that freedom.

So, there is a definition of free will, that is meaningful and relevant, and that remains standing even in a perfectly deterministic universe, and even within a brain, our own brain, that operates deterministically, as it chooses for us what we will do.

Function is not a matter of free choice. Function is determined by the state and form of the system. Any form of information processor is 'free to act according to its nature and makeup.' It does not will its own makeup and ability.

Output is determined by the state of the system, neither freely chosen or willed.

We function according to our makeup, not our will.

 

[pood]

Oh, I know, DBT will say the Big Bang made you do it. At least, he said that earlier; then later he said that the brain is the sole decider. Go figure.

You are misrepresenting what I said. Apparently as a result frustration. Which - given that compatibilism is the attempt to unite two incompatible elements, determinism and freedom of will when alternate actions are impossible - is quite understandable.

Where did I misrepresent what you said? I distinctly recall you saying several times that the big bang is the source of all necessitated actions. Then later you said the brain is the sole agent of our actions, which is true. So which is it?