Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

I take that to mean that mental gymnastics (models) are not viable. Consider their source.

it doesn't matter where the model came from. All that matters is that the model (macroscale) approximates the reality (microscale) to some extent.

The fact that I can short circuit having to look at the microscale at all to get what I need of it (the functional determinism of macroscale physics) is enough.

In fact as we come to the point where the model starts to perfectly describe the macroscale result regardless of the microscale state, we can actually observe whether "it's deterministic" in fact implies "no choice".

The fact of it's approximal nature does not invalidate the objective sensibility of how the math works.

The fact that it is "merely approximal" just means that our provisional freedom assessments can be wrong, and this availability of wrongness is in fact the measure of whether the will performed upon towards that outcome is actually free. It does not mean that they must be so wrong that solving against U(x)= outcome yields unworkable solutions... It just means we need error bars when acting for ourselves in our reality as opposed to when we're actively being gods over sub-universes.

As such, the answer becomes clear: we do have the power to, and in fact no choice but, to be presented choices. We can default on them or defer them to less sensible parts of ourselves, but we can never simply entirely void them as long as we have neurons which can observe the apparent choice before the point of no return on that destination

 

[fromderinside]

I take that to mean that mental gymnastics (models) are not viable. Consider their source.

it doesn't matter where the model came from. All that matters is that the model (macroscale) approximates the reality (microscale) to some extent.

The fact that I can short circuit having to look at the microscale at all to get what I need of it (the functional determinism of macroscale physics) is enough.

The fact of model is dependent on the source of creation of model. A model developed from a process fragmented from reality cannot reflect reality. That is true simply because the process from which it comes cannot replicate more than from which it comes. The sum is equal to or less than the sum of it's parts.

 

[Jarhyn]

The fact of model is dependent on the source of creation of model

Genetic fallacy on the field!

No. The fact of the model is exactly how approximal the model is to the thing, how much of it's macrostate is predicted, down to how fine of a microstate, from the presented variance at the accorded time.

Each macrostate represents a set of microstates that defines it's immediate entropy, the sum total of information that cannot be accessed.

You don't need to access that information directly to summarize a range of states.

Even from the God's eye view I could just systematically generalize and allow approximal solution on the problem, with error. Allowing the error doesn't make it any less a choice on possibility, it just means the calculation gets faster, and the calculable probabilities cease to be 1 and 0.

It's just a matter of recognizing that our models are just as "not subjective, but approximal", but we got to the probability assessments we reach from the other end, from guessing until we didn't actually guess wrong.

It doesn't matter where the model came from so long as it actually works better than "random chance".

 

[fromderinside]

The fact of model is dependent on the source of creation of model

Genetic fallacy on the field!

No. The fact of the model is exactly how approximal the model is to the thing, how much of it's macrostate is predicted, down to how fine of a microstate, from the presented variance at the accorded time.

Each macrostate represents a set of microstates that defines it's immediate entropy, the sum total of information that cannot be accessed.

You don't need to access that information directly to summarize a range of states.

Even from the God's eye view I could just systematically generalize and allow approximal solution on the problem, with error. Allowing the error doesn't make it any less a choice on possibility, it just means the calculation gets faster, and the calculable probabilities cease to be 1 and 0.

It's just a matter of recognizing that our models are just as "not subjective, but approximal", but we got to the probability assessments we reach from the other end, from guessing until we didn't actually guess wrong.

It doesn't matter where the model came from so long as it actually works better than "random chance".

Approximal to what? You aren't in reality. You are from your mind which is from your senses which aren't really very good at all. This is from a retired sensory-psycho-physiologist who's been through a few rodeos like mapping human auditory movement thresholds.

 

[DBT]

There can be no 'could have' unless the state of the system was different, but that's not how determinism works.

Except clearly, we can change substrates of the system in the present, before the future gets here. Instead of the whole system being different, it functions perfectly well working on a mathematically representative proxy for the system that can be changed without changing the whole thing: a model.

Nothing can be changed if that change is not determined to happen. That is the point, you don't act in isolation, you are not autonomous in relation to the system and its development.

What you think and do is entailed by all that came before. Y

ou seem to think that you can somehow bypass the development of the system because, oh, ''we can change the substrata of the system in the present'' - which is absurd.

Absurd because the present is fixed by the past which in turn fixes the future. What you do now is entailed by the conditions of the past.

This is just the basics of determinism. Saying that ''we can change the substrata of the system in the present'' shows a disregard of how determinism is defined.

Thus as per my other exercise, the idea that there has to be any deviation in the system-at-large is itself the illusion, not the choice.

There are no alternatives to choose from. What you do in the present is entailed by the past. What you do now proceeds without deviation, as did the past and as will the future

I return to asking you to point out where, this "deviation" is supposed to have happened

There are no deviations. There can be no deviations. Deviations contradict the terms and conditions of determinism.

 

[DBT]

Given determinism, anything that must necessarily happen cannot be prevented from happening. That's how it is defined.

Not quite. Given determinism, anything that must necessarily happen will not be prevented from happening.

Given the terms, will not is equivalent to cannot. If something cannot happen, obviously it will not happen.

Or, it will not happen because it cannot happen.

If something that is determined to happen can be prevented from happening, it's not determinism.

Determinism is satisfied as long as "what is determined to happen" will not be prevented from happening.

If determinism attempts to jump from "will not" to "cannot" it will find itself jumping into a paradox. You see, the causal mechanism that determines our choices (which determines our actions which determines what happens next) employs the notion of possibility in its operation. If determinism attempts to assert that only one possibility exists, that only one thing CAN happen, then it destroys a necessary causal mechanism. And determinism cannot destroy any causal mechanism without destroying itself.

It's meaningless semantics. If something cannot happen, it will not happen.

As determinism entails no deviation, which means no possible alternate actions, deviations by definition cannot happen, so, obviously, will not happen.

You may feel more comfortable with 'will not happen,' but it doesn't change anything, events still proceed as they must, there are no alternate actins, nobody can choose to do otherwise, events proceed as they must.

'Will not happen' alters nothing. It doesn't support the idea of free will.

Each and every action, no exceptions, is entailed by the prior state of the system, which includes brain activity.

And guess what we find within that brain activity: The notion of possibilities: things that we can do, even if we decide not to do them.

They are perceived possibilities. A perception based on the brain's incomplete understanding of the system and its development.

Perceived possibilities may happen at some time, thus becoming a reality in that instance in time and place, but only if determined, not freely chosen, not freely willed.

What you do in any given instance is determined by conditions in that instance, which were entailed by prior conditions as the system develops without deviation, or free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

you aren't in reality

Yes, I am in reality. I am an object, and that object is operating in reality.

Now go look up what "approximation" is.

 

[Jarhyn]

And it still looks like DBT is having trouble following instructions

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation

So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable

So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:

1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.

Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Given the terms, will not is equivalent to cannot. If something cannot happen, obviously it will not happen.
Or, it will not happen because it cannot happen.

Almost correct. CAN constrains WILL. If it cannot happen then it will not happen. If we did a Venn diagram, there would be a big circle for CAN happen and completely contained within that would be a smaller circle for WILL happen: (CAN HAPPEN (WILL HAPPEN)). That is the logical relationship between CAN and WILL.

And that should help to clarify why the reverse is NOT true. What WILL happen NEVER constrains what CAN happen.

What CAN happen is only constrained by our imagination and our ability to physically accomplish what we choose to do. If we never think of it, then we can never choose to do it. If we think of it but are unable to do it, then it is an impossibility.

So we can also do the Venn diagram this way:
(Things we think of to do (Things we are able to accomplish (Things that we decide that we WILL do) ) ).

In the restaurant, the menu causes us to think of multiple possibilities, and we are perfectly able to order any item that we choose to order.

Now, determinism simply means that it was inevitable that we would be looking at that restaurant menu at that specific time and place. And that seeing the juicy Steak dinner on the menu would inevitably trigger a desire. Then our judgement would kick in and we would recall the bacon and eggs we had for breakfast and the double cheeseburger we had for lunch. And then we would recall our doctor's recommendation that we eat more fruits and vegetables. Then we would consider the Chef Salad and judge that it would be the better option. And then we would say to the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

All of those physical and mental events would unfold in exactly that way, without deviation. Thus our choice was a deterministic event within a deterministic universe.

It's meaningless semantics.

The term "meaningless semantics" is paradoxical, considering that Semantics is "2.a. The branch of linguistics or philosophy concerned with meaning in language; the study or analysis of meaning in words, sentences, etc." (OED)

Semantics is how we know what we are talking about.

If something cannot happen, it will not happen.

Correct. But the reverse is not true. CAN constrains WILL, but WILL does not constrain CAN.

As determinism entails no deviation, which means no possible alternate actions, deviations by definition cannot happen, so, obviously, will not happen.

Hate to keep doing this to you, but when faced with the restaurant menu it is impossible not to think of possible alternate actions.

Failing to think of those possibilities would be precisely the kind of alternate action that determinism would make impossible.

We have no choice but to choose. We have no alternative but to consider our alternatives. It is impossible to consider any of the items on the menu as impossible. These are all facts that "events unfolding with no possible alternatives" implies.

You may feel more comfortable with 'will not happen,' but it doesn't change anything, events still proceed as they must, there are no alternate actions, nobody can choose to do otherwise, events proceed as they must.

And the way events must necessarily proceed includes us reading the menu, considering the multiple items we CAN order, and deciding upon the single item that we WILL order. We will not choose to not choose, because it was inevitable that we would be choosing at that specific time and place.

'Will not happen' alters nothing. It doesn't support the idea of free will.

Free will is just another deterministic event within a system of deterministic events. Free will is not free of causal necessity. Free will is simply free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

The point is that determinism, correctly understood, has no argument against free will, correctly understood.

They are perceived possibilities.

Correct! A possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. However, the thought of a possibility has causal significance, because we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible one. The notion of possibilities is part of the rational causal mechanism by which we discover the things that we CAN do in order to decide what we WILL do.

Within a deterministic universe, rational thought is a significant causal mechanism. It produces many events that would otherwise be impossible, like cars, airplanes, and atom bombs.

A perception based on the brain's incomplete understanding of the system and its development.

Correct. When we don't know what WILL happen, we must imagine what CAN happen, to prepare for what does happen. The notion of possibility enables us to deal constructively with our vast ignorance, by employing what we do know (things that CAN happen and things that we CAN do) in useful ways.

Perceived possibilities may happen at some time, thus becoming a reality in that instance in time and place, but only if determined,

Correct.

... not freely chosen, not freely willed.

Only if you define free will as freedom from causal necessity. But not if you define free will as freedom from coercion and undue influence.

Free will is the deterministic event in which a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Choosing is the deterministic causal mechanism that determines what we WILL do. It is one of many causal mechanisms that make up the deterministic universe.

What you do in any given instance is determined by conditions in that instance, which were entailed by prior conditions as the system develops without deviation, ...

And those "conditions", in every instance of choosing, will include us and all of our thoughts and feelings, and the possibilities that we imagine.

You see, determinism doesn't actually change anything.

 

[fromderinside]

you aren't in reality

Yes, I am in reality. I am an object, and that object is operating in reality.

Now go look up what "approximation" is.

Rather than go after your straw man 'approximation' I choose to expose your fiction about 'object' as 'reality'.

Fiction and Reality in objects

Is object enough to talk about reality? In 2015 “The Estranged Object,” Michael Young theorized fiction with the concept of reality. Rhett Russo, David Ruy, Ferda Kolatan, Jason Payne have collecte…

exfaculty.com

Bottom Line:
...

This tells that in the recent discourse of fiction, reality appears to be new as well as undiscovered with its full potential in formal structure. As all authors agreed in the treatise, the problem of the real is new because of the new ontological understanding of architecture. It is evident that the concept of real is still new because the ontological problem necessitates the contextual framework next to objective form.

“Reality” is constructed by your brain. Here’s what that means, and why it matters.

What the science of visual illusions can teach us about our polarized world.

neuroscience.stanford.edu

...

This isn’t easy. Our psychology makes it hard. “We have this naive realism that the way we see the world is the way that it really is,” Balcetis told me last year. Naive realism is the feeling that our perception of the world reflects the truth.

These strawberries appear to be red, but the actual pixels comprising the image are either gray or cyan. Courtesy of Akiyoshi Kitaoka

But illusions remind us it does not. This is why illusions aren’t just science — they’re provocative art. They force us to reinterpret our senses, and our sense of being in the world. They tell us about the true nature of how our brains work: The same neurological machinery that leads us to discover the truth can lead us to perceive illusions, and our brains don’t always tell us the difference.

Navigating this is the challenge of being a living, thinking person. But simply acknowledging it and trying to put it into practice is a good place to start.

I know I will try to keep remembering that reality always seems real. Even when I mess it up.

Sorry Charlie, er, Jarhyn. Object is not reality.

 

[DBT]

And it still looks like DBT is having trouble following instructions

Nothing of the sort. Your rationale shows that you have yet to grasp the significance or implications of your own definition of determinism.

Which is why you come up with irrelevant arguments in defense of free will ideology.

 

[DBT]

Given the terms, will not is equivalent to cannot. If something cannot happen, obviously it will not happen.
Or, it will not happen because it cannot happen.

Almost correct. CAN constrains WILL. If it cannot happen then it will not happen. If we did a Venn diagram, there would be a big circle for CAN happen and completely contained within that would be a smaller circle for WILL happen: (CAN HAPPEN (WILL HAPPEN)). That is the logical relationship between CAN and WILL.

Nope, it is correct.

As determinism does not permit alternate actions, there is no possibility of alternate actions happening: alternate actions cannot happen.

So, because alternate actions - which contradict the terms of determinism - cannot happen, they obviously will not happen.

It's doesn't help anyway, invoking 'will not happen' doesn't provide a foothold for compatibilism.

And that should help to clarify why the reverse is NOT true. What WILL happen NEVER constrains what CAN happen.

Given determinism, what happens, must necessarily happen. Being determined, there can be no constraint on what must necessarily happen

What must necessarily happen is a matter of entailment, not free will.

What must necessarily happen proceeds without restraint,restriction, force or undue influence. That's determinism at work, not free will.

What you do in any given instance is determined by conditions in that instance, which were entailed by prior conditions as the system develops without deviation, ...

And those "conditions", in every instance of choosing, will include us and all of our thoughts and feelings, and the possibilities that we imagine.

You see, determinism doesn't actually change anything.

As there are no possible alternatives to select from, the system evolves as it must (initial conditions and fixed ever after), nothing is actually chosen.

Every action is a foregone conclusion.

If you had the necessary information, you could predict the end from the beginning, or at any point in-between.

You may feel like you could have done differently, but that is an illusion. An illusion that is exposed when bad 'decisions' are made.....''if only I had not made that decision' - yet the conditions at the time made it inevitable, and the past cannot be undone through the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

As determinism does not permit alternate actions, there is no possibility of alternate actions happening: alternate actions cannot happen.

Don't worry. Alternate actions will not happen. We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances.

So, because alternate actions - which contradict the terms of determinism - cannot happen, they obviously will not happen.

Obviously. We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances. Nothing other than this will happen.

It's doesn't help anyway, invoking 'will not happen' doesn't provide a foothold for compatibilism.

Compatibilism already has a firm footing. Determinism holds, because what will inevitably happen inevitably happens. Free will holds because whenever we open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances, it is accomplished while free of coercion and undue influence.

It's really quite simple.

Given determinism, what happens, must necessarily happen. Being determined, there can be no constraint on what must necessarily happen

And there isn't. Whenever we open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances, both determinism and free will are fully satisfied.

What must necessarily happen is a matter of entailment, not free will.

And that is where incompatibilism loses its foothold. In a deterministic universe there will be cases where a person is forced at gunpoint to do something they do not want to do. But in most cases, a person will be free of such coercion, and will choose for themselves what they will do.

Obviously, both scenarios can and do exist within a deterministic universe.

What must necessarily happen proceeds without restraint, restriction, force or undue influence.

And that is clearly off the rails. Within a deterministic universe we still have events involving coercion, insanity, and other such undue influences. I mean, just look at the daily news!

You cannot magically remove these events or pretend that they do not happen.

That's determinism at work, not free will.

Within our deterministic system we have all events being reliably caused by prior events. Some of these events will involve coercion and undue influence. Some of these events will be free of coercion and undue influence, in which people simply decide for themselves what they will order for dinner (you know, of their own freely chosen "I will have the Chef Salad, please").

Within ALL deterministic events there are found events of coercion and events of free will. The Venn diagram would include a big circle called Deterministic Events, and within that circle would be two smaller circles that are mutually exclusive, Free Will Events and Coercion and Undue Influence Events. Like this: (Deterministic Events (Free Will Events) (Coercion and Undue Influence Events)). The area outside of these two inner circles would include all the other events that have nothing to do with choosing what we will do.

As there are no possible alternatives to select from, the system evolves as it must (initial conditions and fixed ever after), nothing is actually chosen.

But can't you see that determinism has insured that people will be selecting things from the restaurant menu at that time and place! This is what is so baffling about the incompatibilist position. Determinism has guaranteed that these events will happen, otherwise they would not be happening!

Every action is a foregone conclusion.

And thoughts such as "every action is a foregone conclusion" are figurative notions that clearly conflict with empirical reality!

In empirical reality, each customer will reach their conclusion through a deterministic thought process called "choosing". At the beginning of this logical operation, the conclusion, whatever it is inevitably determined to be, is still unknown to the customer. The customer does not know at the outset what he or she will order for dinner. From their perspective, there is no "foregone conclusion" until they actually reach that conclusion for themselves. So, they each read the menu of possible dinners, consider their options in terms of their own dietary criteria for selecting what they will eat, and based on that evaluation they choose the single inevitable thing that they will order.

Choosing is the inevitable event that will resolve the menu of possibilities into a single inevitable dinner order. It is the mechanism that gets us from the point of uncertainty to that conclusion you spoke of.

If you had the necessary information, you could predict the end from the beginning, or at any point in-between.

Correct. But we simply do not have the necessary information. All we have is the menu, of things we can choose to order, and the brain's decision making function, which resolves the multiple possibilities into a single dinner order. It is only at the conclusion of the choosing operation that we have the information as to what we would inevitably order.

You may feel like you could have done differently, but that is an illusion.

It is not an "illusion", but a simple logical conclusion. If "I can order the Steak" was true a moment ago, then "I could have ordered the Steak" will be true now. If "the traffic light can remain red" was true a moment ago, then "the traffic light could have remained red" will be true now. If "I can choose the vanilla ice cream" was true a moment ago, then "I could have chosen the vanilla ice cream" will be true now. We can go on this way all day, because that is the common understanding of what "I could have done" actually means.

An illusion that is exposed when bad 'decisions' are made.....''if only I had not made that decision' - yet the conditions at the time made it inevitable, and the past cannot be undone through the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

The reason we look backward at what has happened, is to better predict what will happen in the future, to learn from our mistakes, and plan for better choices. The past cannot be undone, but the future, on the other hand, is not a "foregone conclusion", but is yet to be chosen.

This understanding is fully consistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

 

[Jarhyn]

And it still looks like DBT is having trouble following instructions

Nothing of the sort. Your rationale shows that you have yet to grasp the significance or implications of your own definition of determinism.

Which is why you come up with irrelevant arguments in defense of free will ideology.

The thing here is, you are the one claiming that the process is compatibilists are calling choice would require randomness, deviation, or a process that is not logically available.

I laid out the core process of making a choice upon one's hypothetical futures as to which shall be the real future.

If you cannot actually locate the things you insist MUST NOT be possible because "determinism" in that process, then your argument is full of shit.

So we return to here:

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation

So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable

So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:

1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.

Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

 

[bilby]

The fact is that when the only constraint is the one command given to the most obedient dog in the world, we are physically incapable of disobeying it, and yet simultaneously completely unconstrained by it.

Go ahead: Do as you please!

You can't disobey this command. If you want to be a contrarian, and decide to do something else as a protest against the authority that issued the instruction, your desire to do this drags you back into compliance. Disobedience is impossible; Compliance is inevitable.

Determinism is just the observation that it's impossible to deviate from obedience to this instruction. The fact that deviation is impossible doesn't, however, have any influence whatsoever on our liberty.

 

[fromderinside]

...with our liberty .... I agree since liberty is something we perceive why should something interfere with it.

 

[DBT]

And it still looks like DBT is having trouble following instructions

Nothing of the sort. Your rationale shows that you have yet to grasp the significance or implications of your own definition of determinism.

Which is why you come up with irrelevant arguments in defense of free will ideology.

The thing here is, you are the one claiming that the process is compatibilists are calling choice would require randomness, deviation, or a process that is not logically available.

I laid out the core process of making a choice upon one's hypothetical futures as to which shall be the real future.

If you cannot actually locate the things you insist MUST NOT be possible because "determinism" in that process, then your argument is full of shit.

So we return to here:

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation

So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable

So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:

1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.

Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

Again;

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond, genetics, environment, family, culture and life experiences shape and form your being, determining how you think and what you think and do in any given circumstance.

That your situation in relation to your brain state informs the response that is made in each and every circumstance.

Not understanding the implications of your definition of determinism, you ignore the basics of cognition and response.

The nervous system.
''Every moment of the day your nervous system is active. It exchanges millions of signals corresponding with feeling, thoughts and actions. A simple example of how important the nervous system is in your behavior is meeting a friend.
First, the visual information of your eyes is sent to your brain by nervous cells. There the information is interpreted and translated into a signal to take action. Finally the brain sends a command to your voice or to another action system like muscles or glands. For example, you may start walking towards him. Your nervous system enables this rapid recognition and action. ''

Social conditioning.
''Human behavior is affected both by genetic inheritance and by experience. The ways in which people develop are shaped by social experience and circumstances within the context of their inherited genetic potential. The scientific question is just how experience and hereditary potential interact in producing human behavior.

Each person is born into a social and cultural setting—family, community, social class, language, religion—and eventually develops many social connections. The characteristics of a child's social setting affect how he or she learns to think and behave, by means of instruction, rewards and punishment, and example.

This setting includes home, school, neighborhood, and also, perhaps, local religious and law enforcement agencies. Then there are also the child's mostly informal interactions with friends, other peers, relatives, and the entertainment and news media. How individuals will respond to all these influences, or even which influence will be the most potent, tends not to be predictable.

There is, however, some substantial similarity in how individuals respond to the same pattern of influences—that is, to being raised in the same culture. Furthermore, culturally induced behavior patterns, such as speech patterns, body language, and forms of humor, become so deeply imbedded in the human mind that they often operate without the individuals themselves being fully aware of them.'


Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.

If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.

 

[DBT]

As determinism does not permit alternate actions, there is no possibility of alternate actions happening: alternate actions cannot happen.

Don't worry. Alternate actions will not happen. We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances.

Saying ''will not happen'' just doesn't help establish compatibilism.

If not determined, of course it 'will not happen.'

It will not happen because, given the terms of determinism, what 'will not happen' cannot happen. If we are talking about determinism - if something is not determined to happen, it will not happen, it won't happen, it cannot happen, the system as it unfolds does not allow it to happen, it's not on the cards to happen, there is no hope of it happening.

No matter how much you want it to happen, wish it to happen, desire it to happen, work toward making it happen, if not determined, it will not happen.

It will not happen because if it could, it would contradict the terms and conditions of the system as you define them to be.

So, because alternate actions - which contradict the terms of determinism - cannot happen, they obviously will not happen.

Obviously. We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances. Nothing other than this will happen.

You can and will do precisely what is determined by the system, the circumstance, your own makeup and proclivities in the moment of action in that time and place.

Not only must these events take place as determined, nothing can prevent or alter what happens as determined.

It's doesn't help anyway, invoking 'will not happen' doesn't provide a foothold for compatibilism.

Compatibilism already has a firm footing. Determinism holds, because what will inevitably happen inevitably happens. Free will holds because whenever we open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances, it is accomplished while free of coercion and undue influence.

It's really quite simple.

Compatibilism, as with many belief systems, has its following. There are also incompatibilists, those who see that the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism. Nor indeterminism, for that matter.


The personal narrative/information acting upon the brain;
''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains.

This subset takes the form of a personal narrative, which is constantly being updated. The personal narrative exists in parallel with our personal awareness, but the latter has no influence over the former.''

 

[Jarhyn]

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond

Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation

So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable

So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:

1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.

Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Don't worry. Alternate actions will not happen. We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances.

Saying ''will not happen'' just doesn't help establish compatibilism. If not determined, of course it 'will not happen.'

Confirming that it will not happen establishes determinism. Keep in mind that a compatibilist must establish both determinism and free will. So, I am simply pointing out that determinism is not actually violated as we consider our possibilities and make our choices. The single inevitable chain of events is constant throughout the process of choosing.

It will not happen because, given the terms of determinism, what 'will not happen' cannot happen.

Saying that "what will not happen cannot happen" is the logical error that results in a paradox. "Can" constrains "will", because if it cannot happen then it will not happen. But "will" does not constrain "can", because what we "can" do is only limited by our physical ability to carry out that option if we choose to do so. There is nothing on the restaurant menu that we "cannot" order. But there are plenty of items that we "will not" order.

The ability to order the Steak means we "can" order it. But, because of the bacon and eggs for breakfast and the double cheeseburger for lunch, we "will not" order it, even though we "can" order it. And in the past tense, we "would not have" ordered it even though we "could have" ordered it.

Within the human brain, the only way to get to the single thing that we "will" choose is to first identify the multiple things that we "can" choose. If we attempt to limit what we "can" choose to what we "will" choose, we end up in a paradox:

Waiter: "What will you have for dinner tonight?"
Diner: "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Because of determinism, there is only one thing that you can order, which is the same thing that you will order."
Diner: "How do I choose what I will order if I don't know what I can order?"
Waiter: "I don't know. But I'm here to take your order once you figure it out."

This is the problem that you present to the human mind when suggesting that "what will not happen cannot happen". It ends up trapped in a paradox.

If we are talking about determinism - if something is not determined to happen, it will not happen, it won't happen,

And that is where we must stop. That is sufficient for determinism. Going on to say that "it cannot happen" runs head on into the paradox.

No matter how much you want it to happen, wish it to happen, desire it to happen, work toward making it happen, if not determined, it will not happen.

In the real world, wanting something to happen and working toward making it happen, are the causal mechanism that determines that it will happen.

It will not happen because if it could, it would contradict the terms and conditions of the system as you define them to be.

You are forgetting that the wanting and the working were also causally necessary from any prior point in time. So, there is no contradiction to the requirements of determinism. The "wanting something to happen" and the "working to make it happen" are just normal events that show up in the causal chain, just like any other deterministic event!

You can and will do precisely what is determined by the system, the circumstance, your own makeup and proclivities in the moment of action in that time and place.

Am I not part of the system? Am I not also part of the circumstances? Are not my own makeup and proclivities integral parts of me? And was it not my own choices at breakfast (bacon and eggs) and lunch (double cheeseburger) that caused me to choose the Chef Salad for dinner? The notion that there is some "system" external to me that is determining what I will do is superstitious nonsense.

Not only must these events take place as determined, nothing can prevent or alter what happens as determined.

It doesn't bother me, that my choice was causally inevitable from any prior point in the past, as long as I know that it was actually me making the choice. And I made that choice myself, free of any coercion or undue influence, so it was a freely chosen "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

Compatibilism has a firm footing. Determinism holds, because what will inevitably happen inevitably happens. Free will holds because whenever we open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances, it is accomplished while free of coercion and undue influence.

It's that simple.

Compatibilism, as with many belief systems, has its following. There are also incompatibilists, those who see that the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism. Nor indeterminism, for that matter.

I find it simpler to presume a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, and to assume any event is reliably caused, even if we have no clue as to what that cause might be. I assume that any apparent "indeterminism" is a problem of prediction, rather than causation. But the fact that we cannot determine the cause is insufficient reason to presume there is no cause.

The personal narrative/information acting upon the brain;
''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains.

This subset takes the form of a personal narrative, which is constantly being updated. The personal narrative exists in parallel with our personal awareness, but the latter has no influence over the former.''

Neuroscience confirms that a primary function of the human brain is decision making. Choosing is really happening and our brains are really doing it. We are not aware of our non-conscious processes as they build our conscious experience. After all, that's what "non-conscious" means. Neuroscience also demonstrates that our conscious experience can be manipulated by transcranial magnetic stimulation and hypnotic suggestion. In the experimental laboratory, a person may volunteer, of their own free will, to be subjects of these experiments which demonstrate ways to influence what happens in the brain.

Besides decision making, another function of the brain is what Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter function". It has the task of explaining to itself and others what the we are doing and why. Normally, it has sufficient information to do a pretty good job of this. But a person can be manipulated by hypnotic suggestion to perform some act, like taking off his shoe when he hears the word "hippopotamus", and then told to forget the suggestion. After he wakes up, someone will say the word and he'll remove his shoe, but he won't know why. The interpreter, left to explain this unexplainable event, will confabulate a story to try to make sense of it. "I thought I felt a pebble in my shoe", he may say.

Normally, though, outside the laboratory, our brains can give an accurate description of why we did something. For example, in the restaurant, knowing that we had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch, we knew exactly why we chose the Chef Salad when we could have had the Steak.