• Welcome to the new Internet Infidels Discussion Board, formerly Talk Freethought.

Compatibilism: What's that About?

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond
Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation
So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable
So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:
1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.
Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

It failed the first time you posted it, and has failed every time after. That won't change no matter how many times you repeat it.

The reasons why it fails have been described countless times. It's mind boggling that you think it makes a point.
 
You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond
Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation
So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable
So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:
1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.
Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

It failed the first time you posted it, and has failed every time after. That won't change no matter how many times you repeat it.

The reasons why it fails have been described countless times. It's mind boggling that you think it makes a point.
It didn't fail. You did.

I am not asking "reasons for it to fail". I am asking very specifically for you to find in this progression "randomness" or "deviation".

This is a process which actually completely meets the definition of compatibilist choice.

I again invite you to find the reference to "randomness" or "deviation" just so we can put this stupid PRATT of yours about what compatibilists think is necessary to it's grave.

We can discuss your bullshit about neuroscience later but the part that you seem to think absolutely disallows compatibilist choice is the lack of access to deviation or randomness.

So go ahead. Find it.

Hilight it red.

Or admit that you cannot and it is not there, and thus NEVER argue that choice depends on either randomness or deviation ever again.
 
Don't worry. Alternate actions will not happen. We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances.

Given that there are no alternatives to choose from, what you order is not a choice.

It is an entailed series of actions.

Entailed actions are not freely willed or chosen, they are necessitated.

Whatever you think, consider, do, is fixed by antecedents, no alternatives, neither chosen or freely willed.



Saying ''will not happen'' just doesn't help establish compatibilism. If not determined, of course it 'will not happen.'

Confirming that it will not happen establishes determinism. Keep in mind that a compatibilist must establish both determinism and free will. So, I am simply pointing out that determinism is not actually violated as we consider our possibilities and make our choices. The single inevitable chain of events is constant throughout the process of choosing.

Realizable possibilities/alternatives don't exist within a deterministic system. The process of deliberation is as inevitable as the action taken.

The action taken is entailed before the process of deliberation even begins.

Not being in a position to understand how the system is developing or evolving, the brain responds as it must as information is acquired, this is on the menu, this is what I like, the other options don't appeal, etc.....a foregone conclusion.



''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains.

This subset takes the form of a personal narrative, which is constantly being updated. The personal narrative exists in parallel with our personal awareness, but the latter has no influence over the former.''

Neuroscience confirms that a primary function of the human brain is decision making. Choosing is really happening and our brains are really doing it. We are not aware of our non-conscious processes as they build our conscious experience. After all, that's what "non-conscious" means. Neuroscience also demonstrates that our conscious experience can be manipulated by transcranial magnetic stimulation and hypnotic suggestion. In the experimental laboratory, a person may volunteer, of their own free will, to be subjects of these experiments which demonstrate ways to influence what happens in the brain.

The primary function of a brain is to acquire and process information in order to navigate the objects and events of the world: survival.

How this is managed is determined by the architecture of the brain.

The brain of each species has evolved to meet the challenges of their environmental niche.

The architecture of a brain determines mental capacity and ability to respond in complex ways.

Free will has absolutely nothing to do with it.

Besides decision making, another function of the brain is what Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter function". It has the task of explaining to itself and others what the we are doing and why. Normally, it has sufficient information to do a pretty good job of this. But a person can be manipulated by hypnotic suggestion to perform some act, like taking off his shoe when he hears the word "hippopotamus", and then told to forget the suggestion. After he wakes up, someone will say the word and he'll remove his shoe, but he won't know why. The interpreter, left to explain this unexplainable event, will confabulate a story to try to make sense of it. "I thought I felt a pebble in my shoe", he may say.

Normally, though, outside the laboratory, our brains can give an accurate description of why we did something. For example, in the restaurant, knowing that we had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch, we knew exactly why we chose the Chef Salad when we could have had the Steak.

Interpreter function is not free will. It's another layer of information processing, making sense of the activity of other regions: the brain being a modular system.

For instance;

''Experiments on split-brain patients reveal how readily the left brain interpreter can make up stories and beliefs. In one experiment, for example, when the word walk was presented only to the right side of a patient’s brain, he got up and started walking. When he was asked why he did this, the left brain (where language is stored and where the word walk was not presented) quickly created a reason for the action: “I wanted to go get a Coke.”

Even more fantastic examples of the left hemisphere at work come from the study of neurological disorders. In a complication of stroke called anosognosia with hemiplegia, patients cannot recognize that their left arm is theirs because the stroke damaged the right parietal cortex, which manages our body’s integrity, position, and movement. The left-hemisphere interpreter has to reconcile the information it receives from the visual cortex—that the limb is attached to its body but is not moving—with the fact that it is not receiving any input about the damage to that limb.

The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere interpreter. The interpreter must, then, create a belief to mediate the two known facts “I can see the limb isn’t moving” and “I can’t tell that it is damaged.” When patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and why they can’t move it, they will say “It’s not mine” or “I just don’t feel like moving it”—reasonable conclusions, given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is receiving. - Michael Gazzaniga
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from
Given that you have not used "alternative: an object presented to a choice function", I can only assume you do not understand what an alternative even is.

Again you have Gosh Galloped away from the discussion of "randomness and deviation", but we aren't done there yet. Not until you say "compatibilists do not rely on the ideas of real deviation or randomness to establish free will."

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond
Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation
So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable
So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:
1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.
Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

It failed the first time you posted it, and has failed every time after. That won't change no matter how many times you repeat it.

The reasons why it fails have been described countless times. It's mind boggling that you think it makes a point.
It didn't fail. You did.

I am not asking "reasons for it to fail". I am asking very specifically for you to find in this progression "randomness" or "deviation".

This is a process which actually completely meets the definition of compatibilist choice.

I again invite you to find the reference to "randomness" or "deviation" just so we can put this stupid PRATT of yours about what compatibilists think is necessary to it's grave.

We can discuss your bullshit about neuroscience later but the part that you seem to think absolutely disallows compatibilist choice is the lack of access to deviation or randomness.

So go ahead. Find it.

Hilight it red.

Or admit that you cannot and it is not there, and thus NEVER argue that choice depends on either randomness or deviation ever again.
 
We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances.

Given that there are no alternatives to choose from, what you order is not a choice.

Obviously you do not know what a choice is when you see one.

It is an entailed series of actions.

Yes indeed it is. And one of the actions that is deterministically entailed is making a choice.

Entailed actions are not freely willed or chosen, they are necessitated.

It is deterministically entailed that choosing will actually happen in the real world, where you like it or not.

When choosing does happen, it will either be deterministically entailed that you will be subject to coercion or other undue influence,
OR, it will be deterministically entailed that you will make your choice while FREE of coercion and undue influence.

The latter deterministically entailed event is commonly referred to as "free will".

Whatever you think, consider, do, is fixed by antecedents, no alternatives,

Of course. When it is deterministically entailed that we will be making a choice, we will have no alternative but to make that choice.

neither chosen or freely willed.

There is still no basis for such a claim. If choosing must happen then it will happen. If coercion must happen then it will happen. But if coercion and undue influence do not happen, then we will actually be making that choice ourselves, free of coercion and undue influence.

This is a simple matter of the reality of what is "happening on the ground". It is confirmed by objective observation of empirical events, such as the crowd of diners, each choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner.

It is really happening. But you still pretend it is not happening. I suspect that you are having an illusion.

The process of deliberation is as inevitable as the action taken.

Exactly. That's what I'm saying too.

Realizable possibilities/alternatives don't exist within a deterministic system.

If deliberation is an inevitable event, then realizable possibilities will be logically required within that event. They are as unavoidable as everything else.

The action taken is entailed before the process of deliberation even begins.

Yes. But we do not know what is entailed until after our deliberation is complete. There is no alternative route to that knowledge than by carrying that deliberation process through to its conclusion. The conclusion will not appear in the physical universe until that specific point in time.

Not being in a position to understand how the system is developing or evolving, the brain responds as it must as information is acquired, this is on the menu, this is what I like, the other options don't appeal, etc.....a foregone conclusion.

1. It is not a question of understanding how the system works. We have plenty of neuroscientists to observe and try to explain how the brain works to produce our mental experiences.

2. Nor is it a question of whether we know that the world is operating deterministically. We can have full knowledge that our conclusion will be within a chain of reliable causation that stretches back to the beginning of time.

But, even knowing those things, we still do not know how our deliberation process will conclude. That's the problem. And the only way to know how it will conclude is by finishing the operation. We must see our possibilities as things that we can actually do. We must consider the benefits of our different options. And then we will choose the option that seems best to us at this point in time.

There is no "foregone conclusion". The conclusion will be reached exactly when it is reached, at the end of the deliberation process. And it will be entailed, in the most meaningful and relevant sense, by that deliberation process.

Interpreter function is not free will.

I didn't say it was. Free will is a deterministic event in which our brain decides for us we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

The interpreter function would recall the mental events that reached conscious awareness during that process, and explain what we just did. For example, the interpreter would explain why we chose the Chef Salad for dinner, when we could have chosen the juicy Steak (it was because of the bacon and eggs breakfast and the double cheeseburger lunch).
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from, what you order is not a choice.
What is a menu for then? Why do restaurants have them?

There are any number of customers, each with their own set of proclivities. Each customer placing their (entailed) order according to their state and condition in that moment in time.

Bob orders steak, rare with potato and veg, his wife June goes with Caeser Salad and a glass of white wine. etc, etc....

If the customers could order anything on the menu, it's not determinism. Multiple realizable options contradicts the terms.
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from
Given that you have not used "alternative: an object presented to a choice function", I can only assume you do not understand what an alternative even is.

Again you have Gosh Galloped away from the discussion of "randomness and deviation", but we aren't done there yet. Not until you say "compatibilists do not rely on the ideas of real deviation or randomness to establish free will."

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond
Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation
So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable
So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:
1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.
Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

It failed the first time you posted it, and has failed every time after. That won't change no matter how many times you repeat it.

The reasons why it fails have been described countless times. It's mind boggling that you think it makes a point.
It didn't fail. You did.

I am not asking "reasons for it to fail". I am asking very specifically for you to find in this progression "randomness" or "deviation".

This is a process which actually completely meets the definition of compatibilist choice.

I again invite you to find the reference to "randomness" or "deviation" just so we can put this stupid PRATT of yours about what compatibilists think is necessary to it's grave.

We can discuss your bullshit about neuroscience later but the part that you seem to think absolutely disallows compatibilist choice is the lack of access to deviation or randomness.

So go ahead. Find it.

Hilight it red.

Or admit that you cannot and it is not there, and thus NEVER argue that choice depends on either randomness or deviation ever again.

images



Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.

If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.
 
We will open the menu, consider the dinners that we can order, and choose the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances.

The bit about 'inevitable' being the nail in the coffin of free will and choice.

What is 'inevitable' is not freely chosen or willed.

What is inevitable is not chosen....it must happen regardless of choice. It must happen as determined.






Given that there are no alternatives to choose from, what you order is not a choice.

Obviously you do not know what a choice is when you see one.

The illusion of choice is not choice. The options are broadly there for any number of people over a period of time.

Each person having only possible one action in any given instance in time.

This has been explained over and over.

You yourself express the no choice principle yourself when you say - ''the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances''


You agree with what I am saying.

You are describing the no choice principle with - ''the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances,'' yet contradict it with the qualifier, 'choose.'

If something is the ''single inevitable action' in any given circumstance, it is the circumstances (environment, brain state, etc) that fixes the outcome, which has nothing to do free will or free choice.
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from
Given that you have not used "alternative: an object presented to a choice function", I can only assume you do not understand what an alternative even is.

Again you have Gosh Galloped away from the discussion of "randomness and deviation", but we aren't done there yet. Not until you say "compatibilists do not rely on the ideas of real deviation or randomness to establish free will."

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond
Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation
So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable
So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:
1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.
Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

It failed the first time you posted it, and has failed every time after. That won't change no matter how many times you repeat it.

The reasons why it fails have been described countless times. It's mind boggling that you think it makes a point.
It didn't fail. You did.

I am not asking "reasons for it to fail". I am asking very specifically for you to find in this progression "randomness" or "deviation".

This is a process which actually completely meets the definition of compatibilist choice.

I again invite you to find the reference to "randomness" or "deviation" just so we can put this stupid PRATT of yours about what compatibilists think is necessary to it's grave.

We can discuss your bullshit about neuroscience later but the part that you seem to think absolutely disallows compatibilist choice is the lack of access to deviation or randomness.

So go ahead. Find it.

Hilight it red.

Or admit that you cannot and it is not there, and thus NEVER argue that choice depends on either randomness or deviation ever again.

[[Patronizing spam]]


Dr. Robert Sapolsky....
Again GISH GALLOP.

Find the randomness, find the deviation, or agree to put that PRATT to bed. Forever.

Hilight it in red.
 
Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.

If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.

I don't think Sapolsky can get away with asserting that "all of our behavior is a product of our biology" and then penciling in "neurobiology one second before the action" as an afterthought. We are not simply biological objects. We are also intelligent objects. We have thoughts and feelings, beliefs and values. These supply a rational causal mechanism that manages our behavior, delaying and tailoring our biological responses.
 
What is 'inevitable' is not freely chosen or willed.

Again, if it is inevitable that we must choose then we will have no choice but to choose. And, if it is inevitable that our choice will be free of coercion and undue influence, then it will inevitably be a choice of our own free will.

Unlike Dennett, I have no problem with the notion of inevitability.

The illusion of choice is not choice.

That's why I brought you to this restaurant. Watch the people come in, sit down, read the menu, and place their orders. This activity that we are objectively observing is called "choosing". Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some appropriate criteria of selection, and outputs a single choice. In each case the menu provides many alternate possibilities and each customer reduces these many options to a single dinner order.

We saw choosing happening right in front of us. We saw many possible choices (the menu) reduced to a single choice (the order).

Since we were not having an illusion, it logically follows that the notion that "choice is an illusion" must itself be an illusion.

The illusion that choosing is not happening (when it clearly is) is caused by figurative thinking. You (and all the philosophers and scientists making this same silly claim) are thinking that "Since the choice was inevitable, it is AS IF choosing never happened at all". But of course it did happen, right there in front of us.

The options are broadly there for any number of people over a period of time. Each person having only possible one action in any given instance in time. This has been explained over and over. You yourself express the no choice principle yourself when you say - ''the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances'' You agree with what I am saying.

Obviously, I do not agree with what you are saying. The choosing was never an illusion. In fact, given the terms of determinism, choosing would inevitably happen in physical reality, right then and there. And it was inevitable that the choosing operation would be performed individually by each diner in the restaurant, while free of any coercion or undue influence. Each according to their own free will.
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from, what you order is not a choice.
What is a menu for then? Why do restaurants have them?

There are any number of customers, each with their own set of proclivities. Each customer placing their (entailed) order according to their state and condition in that moment in time.
Yes. But what is a menu for then? Why does the restaurant have them?
Bob orders steak, rare with potato and veg, his wife June goes with Caeser Salad and a glass of white wine. etc, etc....
Yes, But what is a menu for then? Why does the restaurant have them?
If the customers could order anything on the menu, it's not determinism. Multiple realizable options contradicts the terms.
If the customers couldn't order anything on the menu, WHY THE FUCK ARE THERE MENUS???

What are they doing there? What are they for?
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from
Given that you have not used "alternative: an object presented to a choice function", I can only assume you do not understand what an alternative even is.

Again you have Gosh Galloped away from the discussion of "randomness and deviation", but we aren't done there yet. Not until you say "compatibilists do not rely on the ideas of real deviation or randomness to establish free will."

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond
Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation
So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable
So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:
1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.
Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

It failed the first time you posted it, and has failed every time after. That won't change no matter how many times you repeat it.

The reasons why it fails have been described countless times. It's mind boggling that you think it makes a point.
It didn't fail. You did.

I am not asking "reasons for it to fail". I am asking very specifically for you to find in this progression "randomness" or "deviation".

This is a process which actually completely meets the definition of compatibilist choice.

I again invite you to find the reference to "randomness" or "deviation" just so we can put this stupid PRATT of yours about what compatibilists think is necessary to it's grave.

We can discuss your bullshit about neuroscience later but the part that you seem to think absolutely disallows compatibilist choice is the lack of access to deviation or randomness.

So go ahead. Find it.

Hilight it red.

Or admit that you cannot and it is not there, and thus NEVER argue that choice depends on either randomness or deviation ever again.

[[Patronizing spam]]


Dr. Robert Sapolsky....
Again GISH GALLOP.

Find the randomness, find the deviation, or agree to put that PRATT to bed. Forever.

Hilight it in red.

Couldn't be bothered with your nonsense. You ignore whatever I say, quote or cite. Go talk to your conscious computer.
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from, what you order is not a choice.
What is a menu for then? Why do restaurants have them?

I've already explained that the menu is there to cater for the tastes of a range of customers.


There are any number of customers, each with their own set of proclivities. Each customer placing their (entailed) order according to their state and condition in that moment in time.
Yes. But what is a menu for then? Why does the restaurant have them?

Each and every customer has their own tastes, wants and needs


Bob orders steak, rare with potato and veg, his wife June goes with Caeser Salad and a glass of white wine. etc, etc....
Yes, But what is a menu for then? Why does the restaurant have them?

Bob has a different taste in food than his wife. Each and every customer has their own tastes, wants and needs.
If the customers could order anything on the menu, it's not determinism. Multiple realizable options contradicts the terms.
If the customers couldn't order anything on the menu, WHY THE FUCK ARE THERE MENUS???

What are they doing there? What are they for?

The point being that what the customer orders in any given instance is determined by antecedents, proclivities, etc, consequently what the customer orders in any given instance has no alternatives in that instance.

Again;

Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''
 
What is 'inevitable' is not freely chosen or willed.

Again, if it is inevitable that we must choose then we will have no choice but to choose. And, if it is inevitable that our choice will be free of coercion and undue influence, then it will inevitably be a choice of our own free will.

Unlike Dennett, I have no problem with the notion of inevitability.

If an action is inevitable, it is not freely chosen. Given determinism, what you do is inevitable. What is done must be done as determined.

As there are no alternate options to choose from, there no choice in determinism.

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

There are no 'two or more possibilities' to be selected from within a deterministic system.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

The illusion of choice is not choice.

That's why I brought you to this restaurant. Watch the people come in, sit down, read the menu, and place their orders. This activity that we are objectively observing is called "choosing". Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some appropriate criteria of selection, and outputs a single choice. In each case the menu provides many alternate possibilities and each customer reduces these many options to a single dinner order.

Given determinism each and every selection is inevitable. There are no alternatives. What each and every customer orders, they must necessarily order.

If it's determined that Bod orders steak and baked potatoes at 7:35pm, Bob must necessarily order steak and baked potatoes at precisely 7:35pm.

Given determinism, that is true for each and very customer, each ordering according to their own state and condition, precisely and without deviation.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''



We saw choosing happening right in front of us. We saw many possible choices (the menu) reduced to a single choice (the order).

What we see is not the full picture. We don't have access to the necessary information to understand why Bob orders steak and baked potatoes at precisely 7:35pm.....we just see Bob order a meal from the menu

You agree that nothing else could have happened. That there is no possible deviation.

That each and every customer must necessarily order as determined by the development of the system.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Since we were not having an illusion, it logically follows that the notion that "choice is an illusion" must itself be an illusion.

Determinism, by definition, only permits a fixed progression of events. Whatever happens must necessarily happen

There is no way around this without contradicting the given terms.


The options are broadly there for any number of people over a period of time. Each person having only possible one action in any given instance in time. This has been explained over and over. You yourself express the no choice principle yourself when you say - ''the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances'' You agree with what I am saying.

Obviously, I do not agree with what you are saying. The choosing was never an illusion. In fact, given the terms of determinism, choosing would inevitably happen in physical reality, right then and there. And it was inevitable that the choosing operation would be performed individually by each diner in the restaurant, while free of any coercion or undue influence. Each according to their own free will.

You do agree with what I say. You agree whenever you say 'the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances''- which is precisely what I am pointing out: every action is inevitable.

Actions that are inevitable permit no alternatives, if action A is inevitable, action B, C or D do not and cannot happen instead

inevitable

ĭn-ĕv′ĭ-tə-bəl

adjective​

  1. Impossible to avoid or prevent; certain to happen. synonym: certain.
  2. Invariably occurring or appearing; predictable.
  3. Not evitable; incapable of being shunned; unavoidable; certain.
 
Bob has a different taste in food than his wife. Each and every customer has their own tastes, wants and needs.
Yes. But why do they get handed a menu? They each have the same tastes, wants and needs before they see it, that they do afterwards. What's the point of the menu? Why bother printing one, if the customers are going to unavoidably order whatever they were destined to order?

Ask a thousand people, and 999 will say it tells customers what their options are. The other one will say that, as the customers don't have any options in a deterministic universe, the menus are completely futile and pointless.

Or, more likely, that one will try desperately to avoid saying this, because it's obvious even to him that the idea that the menu is futile is absurd.
 
Given that there are no alternatives to choose from
Given that you have not used "alternative: an object presented to a choice function", I can only assume you do not understand what an alternative even is.

Again you have Gosh Galloped away from the discussion of "randomness and deviation", but we aren't done there yet. Not until you say "compatibilists do not rely on the ideas of real deviation or randomness to establish free will."

You conveniently overlook the obvious: life and the world makes you what you are and how you think and respond
Nobody asked for anything different.

Nobody asked for there to be no reasons behind our choices except you and Kylie.

The idea of not having reasons behind our choices is nonsensical.

All that we ever needed to be making a choice is to be the only thing in that moment that is constraining ourselves either way.

Either find the reference to randomness and deviation or agree to quit bringing up this straw-man of yours.

Crock, your own definition of determinism entails a fixed system, a series of events that develop without deviation
So, according to your definition....as there is ''no randomness involved in the development of future states of the system,''

Go ahead. Find the reference to randomness or deviation, if you happen to believe there is one. Highlight it in red.

entailed, fixed, unchangeable
So it won't, which doesn't mean it can't re:
1. The dwarf is there, and I am going to make them do something, thus I stop my sub-universe and save it's state.

2. I copy the state.

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a will into the dwarf's head.

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the dwarf can "possibly" do, as an extension of the original state. this takes a great deal of time. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of the dwarf's head."

6. Armed with this U(x) function definition on the contents of the dwarf's head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the dwarf's head, leaving behind the original universe entirely, and continuing with this one in which I mind controlled the dwarf.

Then the next part is that you need to realize there needs be no god or actual mind control going on here because the "dwarf" in our reality has the power to approximate U well enough, in macrophysical scale, to run this process themselves without having to stop time to run the solution.

The end result ends up being something like:


1. I am going to make ME do something, thus I stop my activity and think quickly, before I must make a decision.

2. I imagine a universe as macrophysics describes it, several times. (I make a copy).

3. I blindly write, to each of the copies, a series of stated actions. (I write a will into my own hypothetical head).

4. I run the system forward to see what is going to happen in each.

5. I find out all the things that the I can "possibly" do, in this hypothetical future moment, as an extension of the original state. this takes a little time, but not enough to actually bring me to the real future moment in which a decision must be made. This actually maps out a function U(x), where x is what is known in math as a "free variable". The free variable here is "the contents of my decision".

6. Armed with this approximal U(x) function definition on the contents of the my own head head, I then set U(x) equal to the desired contents and then solve for x. This tells me what momentary x leads to the desired outcome.

7. I then put x in the part of my own head that represents the region of free variance, thus making the decision leaving behind the past entirely, and continuing with this future in which I effectively mind controlled myself.
Nowhere is there randomness. There is only linear deterministic calculation happening here.

As you can see, it's not illusory, it's just approximal.

It's necessary approximal nature due to Incompleteness does not in fact change that it is the same fundamental operation being done, merely with approximal data.

It failed the first time you posted it, and has failed every time after. That won't change no matter how many times you repeat it.

The reasons why it fails have been described countless times. It's mind boggling that you think it makes a point.
It didn't fail. You did.

I am not asking "reasons for it to fail". I am asking very specifically for you to find in this progression "randomness" or "deviation".

This is a process which actually completely meets the definition of compatibilist choice.

I again invite you to find the reference to "randomness" or "deviation" just so we can put this stupid PRATT of yours about what compatibilists think is necessary to it's grave.

We can discuss your bullshit about neuroscience later but the part that you seem to think absolutely disallows compatibilist choice is the lack of access to deviation or randomness.

So go ahead. Find it.

Hilight it red.

Or admit that you cannot and it is not there, and thus NEVER argue that choice depends on either randomness or deviation ever again.

[[Patronizing spam]]


Dr. Robert Sapolsky....
Again GISH GALLOP.

Find the randomness, find the deviation, or agree to put that PRATT to bed. Forever.

Hilight it in red.

Couldn't be bothered with your nonsense. You ignore whatever I say, quote or cite. Go talk to your conscious computer.
Heh, I ignore what you say or quote? I offered you a simple exercise. We can move on when you either accept that you cannot possibly fulfill the exercise, or you manage to fulfill it (you can't, though).

You have attempted to avoid the question several times now but as long as you persist in claiming choice requires deviation or randomness, we will end up back here with me asking you to actually find the deviation or randomness in the thing that is standing as the general example of a clear choice.
 
If an action is inevitable, it is not freely chosen.

You continue to ignore the case in which it is inevitable that we will be making a decision (choosing).

You continue to ignore the case where it is inevitable that our choice will be our own (freely choosing), and the choice will not be forced upon us by coercion or undue influence.

As there are no alternate options to choose from, there no choice in determinism.

You continue to ignore the case in the restaurant where we have a literal menu of alternate options to choose from.

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

There are no 'two or more possibilities' to be selected from within a deterministic system.

And you continue to confirm that everyone understands what choosing is and what possibilities are, yet you wish to erase these concepts from our dictionaries.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

Correct. Choosing is a deterministic operation that will deliver the same outputs given the same inputs (the same options and the same criteria with the same weights).

That's why we came to this restaurant, to watch the people come in, sit down, read the menu, and place their orders. Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some appropriate criteria of selection, and outputs a single choice. In each case the menu provides many alternate possibilities and each customer reduces these many options to a single dinner order. Choosing really happens.

Given determinism each and every selection is inevitable.

Of course. And what else is inevitable? The menu of alternate possibilities is inevitable. Our consideration of multiple options is inevitable. Our weighing these options in terms of our own goals and reasons is inevitable. Our making this choice for ourselves, free of any coercion or undue influence, is inevitable.

There are no alternatives.

There is no alternative to the menu of alternatives.

If it's determined that Bob orders steak and baked potatoes at 7:35pm, Bob must necessarily order steak and baked potatoes at precisely 7:35pm.

And, sure enough, Bob ordered the steak and baked potatoes at 7:35pm, of his own free will, because that was the way it necessarily must happen.

Given determinism, that is true for each and very customer, each ordering according to their own state and condition, precisely and without deviation.

Yep. What was true for Bob was true for everyone else as well. Each chose to order what they ordered of their own free will, because it had to happen exactly that way, and in no other way.

We saw choosing happening right in front of us. In each case we saw the many possible choices on the menu reduced to a single dinner order.

What we see is not the full picture. We don't have access to the necessary information to understand why Bob orders steak and baked potatoes at precisely 7:35pm.....we just see Bob order a meal from the menu

The key question is, suppose we actually did see the full picture? Would it actually change anything? I suggest it would not.

You agree that nothing else could have happened. That there is no possible deviation.

Well, you know how touchy I am about the misuse of the notions of "could have" and "possibilities". But, what I do agree to is that nothing else would have happened, because everything will always happen just so, without any deviation.

That each and every customer must necessarily order as determined by the development of the system.

And the only thing I object to in that statement is the metaphorical agency assigned to "the system".

The agency is located within each and every customer, and that agency is fully deterministic. Choosing proceeds reliably from mental event to mental event without deviation (a neurological path unique to each brain).

Determinism, by definition, only permits a fixed progression of events. Whatever happens must necessarily happen. There is no way around this without contradicting the given terms.

Again, I agree in principle, except for the metaphorical agency assigned to determinism (as if determinism "permits" or "disallows" or actively does anything). But I can go along with the metaphor until it is taken too far and leads to false conclusions.

For example, the claim that "choosing is an illusion" is a figurative statement that is literally false. Choosing actually happens, therefore it is not literally "an illusion". Ironically, to believe that something that is actually happening is merely an illusion would itself be an illusion.

You agree whenever you say 'the single thing that we inevitably would order under these circumstances''- which is precisely what I am pointing out: every action is inevitable.

Every event/action is causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in eternity.

Actions that are inevitable permit no alternatives, if action A is inevitable, action B, C or D do not and cannot happen instead

Well, if action A is inevitable, then A will happen. If action B is inevitable then B will happen. If action C is inevitable then C will happen. And if action D is inevitable then D will happen.

If we do not know which action is inevitable, but we are still concerned as to which one will happen, then we must consider the possibility that A is inevitable, and the possibility that B is inevitable, and the possibility that C is inevitable, and the possibility that D is inevitable. It could be that any one of them is the inevitable action that will happen. It could be A, it could be B, it could be C, and it could be D. We have four different possibilities, four things that can happen.

We simply don't know which one is inevitable. When we do not know what WILL happen, we imagine the different things that CAN happen, to prepare for what DOES happen.

inevitable
ĭn-ĕv′ĭ-tə-bəl

adjective​

  1. Impossible to avoid or prevent; certain to happen. synonym: certain.
  2. Invariably occurring or appearing; predictable.
  3. Not evitable; incapable of being shunned; unavoidable; certain.

Because we are not omniscient, it is INEVITABLE that we will often not know what is INEVITABLE. These events, where we DO NOT KNOW what is inevitable are "certain to happen, impossible to avoid or prevent, theoretically predictable, invariably occurring, not evitable, incapable of being shunned or avoided, and certain." It is INEVITABLE that we will often not know what is inevitable, such that we will INEVITABLY imagine more than one possible inevitability.

I hope that clears it up for everyone.
 
If an action is inevitable, it is not freely chosen.



If we do not know which action is inevitable, but we are still concerned as to which one will happen, then we must consider the possibility that A is inevitable, and the possibility that B is inevitable, and the possibility that C is inevitable, and the possibility that D is inevitable. It could be that any one of them is the inevitable action that will happen. It could be A, it could be B, it could be C, and it could be D. We have four different possibilities, four things that can happen.

We simply don't know which one is inevitable. When we do not know what WILL happen, we imagine the different things that CAN happen, to prepare for what DOES happen.


Because we are not omniscient, it is INEVITABLE that we will often not know what is INEVITABLE. These events, where we DO NOT KNOW what is inevitable are "certain to happen, impossible to avoid or prevent, theoretically predictable, invariably occurring, not evitable, incapable of being shunned or avoided, and certain." It is INEVITABLE that we will often not know what is inevitable, such that we will INEVITABLY imagine more than one possible inevitability.

I hope that clears it up for everyone.
Sure does. Your insertion of ourselves as points of consideration as humans in a determined universe permits you to unleash a bunch meaningless strawman 'concerns' which have nothing to do with whether what happens is determined. Determinism is not subject to what you think. How dare you insert yourself as some sort of instrument when you are in fact part of the material being treated
 
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