Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

Second QM is, on its face, relevant to what free will is about

No it isn't. Superdeterminism, being non-disprovable, means that all systems may be represented with a Deterministic model.

At any rate, free will has absolutely nothing to do with randomness or deviation, so whether QM introduces some quantity of "randomness" (more accurately, unavoidably and unpredictable chaotic behavior), makes no difference.

 

[DBT]

It doesn't matter what we know or don't know. It doesn't matter what we are aware of or unaware of: the system just progresses as determined regardless of what we know, don't know, are aware or unaware of.

That's not causal determinism. Causal determinism is derived from the notion of perfectly reliable cause and effect. As in the source you quoted:

That doesn't negate what I said. I didn't question 'perfectly reliable cause and effect.' I do wonder about your inclusion of 'reliable,' which seems to suggest that we somehow use this 'reliability' to our advantage.

''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.' - Techopedia

Choosing, for example, is a deterministic system. Given the following inputs:
1. Two dinner options, Steak versus Salad.
2. Having had bacon and eggs for breakfast.
3. Having had a double cheeseburger for lunch.
4. Having the dietary goal of eating more fruits and vegetables.
Will always produce the same output: "I will have the Chef Salad for dinner, please".

This choosing event is embedded within a broader deterministic event, in which we decided to go to that specific restaurant, which is embedded within a broader deterministic event, which is the span of our life, which is embedded in a broader deterministic event, in which all species evolved from inanimate matter, which is embedded in a broader deterministic event, in which the universe expanded from a super condensed ball of matter to what it is today.

Yes, the action taken has no alternatives, each and every action is determined as the system develops or evolves.

That is not free will. It is entailment. Entailment cannot be labelled free will.

Whatever happens within the system must happen as determined, without deviation.

Whatever happens within the system must happen by current events reliably causing new events. The events themselves are causing the next events. (An "event" is any change in the state of a deterministic system).

Why call it 'reliable?' Of course there are no deviations. Nothing else can happen, including how we think and what we think and do.

Being fixed is 'reliable,' but 'regulated' or 'freely willed,' it certainly is not.

Our perceptions are significant causes of our behavior. Thus they are significant causes of how the system evolves or develops. We cannot exclude such causes without undermining determinism.

Our perceptions themselves are fixed by antecedents in an unbroken series of causal events, each state and condition of the system determining the next. Our perceptions are not freely chosen, nor can they regulate events according to our will....will itself is fixed by antecedents in a series of causal events.

So, uncertainty is a real event within the human mind, and it plays a role in causally determining what we will do. Being an entailed event, it cannot be ignored without giving a false view of determinism.

Uncertainty regulates nothing, uncertainty changes nothing, being fixed by antecedents, an aspect of the state and condition of the system, it emerges and evolves as it must without deviation.

With uncertainty comes the logic and language of possibilities, in which multiple things can happen, even though a single thing will happen, and in which multiple items on the restaurant menu can be chosen, even though a single thing will be chosen.

Multiple things can and do happen within a complex system, not only can happen, but if determined, must happen.

Yet not a single event within this system of multiplicity of events had a possible alternative. Each and every event, no matter how complex the web of causality, must happen precisely as determined.

Free will? Not a chance.

And this means that determinism cannot undermine this logic without breaking it. If you break it, you start spitting out paradoxes, like the ones I listed. For example, having to decide what we will order without first knowing what we can order.

Sorry, but the 'decision' is necessitated, not freely chosen. There was never a possible alternative.

No alternative, no choice.

Sorry.

 

[Jarhyn]

I do wonder about your inclusion of 'reliable,' which seems to suggest that we somehow use this 'reliability' to our advantage.

We do use this reliability to our advantage.

each and every action is determined as the system develops or evolves

You are again ignoring HOW it is determined, what is going on in the machine.

Each and every turn of the wheels is determined as the system of the car develops or evolves. That doesn't make it any less "a process of cyclic combustion driving a set of pistons against a crankshaft..."

Both things are true.

The process is one such that we are uncertain of what we will do and the only way to do anything is to first ascertain what that is. You call it "unconscious process" which is wrong but unimportantly so. What is important is that this process involves the production of a number of artifacts, presentation of that set of artifacts to an engine, and then the engine operates on one of the artifacts.

The one it chooses doesn't make the other artifacts non-existent.

This is how the uncertainty gets resolved.

As to that first bit...

The reliability of the system is absolutely the advantage because of cause and effect were not reliable, did not function in consistent ways in some respects, we wouldn't be able to do this exercise at all of generating artifacts.

We would not be able to select the steak, because steak would not exist. It wouldn't be coherent. It's not just that farmers would find themselves unable to raise a second cow and cut a second slab of meat, but there would be no way to learn to even try that. Rubbing neurons against neurons would not work. Resources could not be found. Things that were found could not be relied on to be resources. Even the idea of a resource shakes apart in that context.

Life could not exist in a system with no reliable cause and effect, which is probably one of the reasons why QM constructs are not meaningfully capable of being "alive" or making "choices". This is one of the reasons that @bilby (among others) even as a Quantum Indeterminist, recognizes that compatibilist free will is the only game in town. Free will only starts to be a meaningful concept in Deterministic systems and macrophysics is deterministic enough for it to be expressed.

In a world of unreliable cause and effect, there is no possibility of thought or intelligence or choice.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Paradoxes are illusions based on our presumptions.

Yes. And our presumptions can be altered by false, but believable suggestions, drawing us into a paradox. For example, take Zeno's paradox of the race between Achilles and the Tortoise. Achilles is the fastest runner in Greece. The Tortoise, being a tortoise, is one of slowest animals. So, Achilles gives the tortoise a long head start. Then Achilles takes off in pursuit, running to where the tortoise is. But when Achilles gets to where the tortoise was, the tortoise, slow as he may be, has moved on. So, Achilles runs to where the tortoise is now. But again, when he arrives, the tortoise has move farther ahead. It would seem that Achilles will never be able to catch up to, much less pass the tortoise, no matter how fast Achilles runs.

What's the false but believable suggestion?

We get the same problem with determinism and free will. A simple question like, "How can we have free will if every choice we make was inevitable since the beginning of time?" creates the paradox.

What's the false but believable suggestion?

*From: https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/63811/is-the-universe-fundamentally-deterministic#:~:text=You're right; the Schrödinger's equation induces a unitary,"evolution" that the wavefunction may experience: wavefunction collapse.

the Schrödinger's equation induces a unitary time evolution, and it is deterministic. Indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics is given by another "evolution" that the wavefunction may experience: wavefunction collapse. This is the source of indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics, and is a mechanism that is still not well understood at a fundamental level (this is often called as "Measurement Problem").

If you want a book that talks about this kind of problems, I suggest you "Decoherence and the Appearance of a Classical World in Quantum Theory" by Joos, Zeh et al; it is a good book on this and other modern topics in Quantum Mechanics. It's understandable with some effort, assuming you know basic things about Hilbert Spaces and the basic mathematical tools of QM.

Fortunately, QM is not necessary to understand what free will is about. So we can ignore it in discussions of free will. And if determinism is limited to "this and thus that", we may presume that QM is just as deterministic as everything else.

As usual you got your presumptions wrong both times you proclaim.

First distance covered depends independently on time per unit distance traveled not on extrapolation of relative distance one is separated at each observation.

Second QM is, on its face, relevant to what free will is about. We cannot presume QM is deterministic without experiment which will reveal a deterministic relationship. Socratic proclamations are not experiments. Bad Socratic proclamations based on presumptions are useless statements.

The correct answer to the Achilles versus the Tortoise paradox is the false suggestion that Achilles would run to where the tortoise was rather than running to where the tortoise would be.

The correct answer to the second paradox: "How can we have free will if every choice we make was inevitable since the beginning of time?" is that the false but believable suggestion is that one must be free of reliable cause and effect to be "truly" free. After all, every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect.

As to QM, I am going to presume that all quantum events are reliably caused by prior events, because that seems to be how everything else works. The fact that quantum events behave differently, and even unpredictably, does not imply that they do not behave reliably, by some set of rules that apply specifically to that level of events.

 

[bilby]

The correct answer to the Achilles versus the Tortoise paradox is the false suggestion that Achilles would run to where the tortoise was rather than running to where the tortoise would be.

No.

To get to where the tortoise would be, Achilles must pass through the place the tortoise was, so the problem cannot be solved in that way.

The correct answer to the paradox is that the belief that the sum of an infinite series of fractions must itself be infinite is false.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The correct answer to the Achilles versus the Tortoise paradox is the false suggestion that Achilles would run to where the tortoise was rather than running to where the tortoise would be.

No.

To get to where the tortoise would be, Achilles must pass through the place the tortoise was, so the problem cannot be solved in that way.

The correct answer to the paradox is that the belief that the sum of an infinite series of fractions must itself be infinite is false.

That sounds more like the paradox of how to get from the chair to the door. First you must get half-way to the door. But in order to get half-way there, you must get half-way to the half-way mark. But before you can get there, you must...etc. ad infinitum.

My solution to that one was that whenever you cut the distance in half, it is like doubling your speed (it only takes half as long to get half-way there), such that, relatively speaking, you are going infinitely fast. So, it is a breeze getting from the chair to the door.

But actually, we never stop half-way, but simply set our sights upon the door, and don't stop until we get there. It is the stopping and restarting, an infinite number of times, that would prevent us from getting to the door.

 

[Jarhyn]

The correct answer to the Achilles versus the Tortoise paradox is the false suggestion that Achilles would run to where the tortoise was rather than running to where the tortoise would be.

No.

To get to where the tortoise would be, Achilles must pass through the place the tortoise was, so the problem cannot be solved in that way.

The correct answer to the paradox is that the belief that the sum of an infinite series of fractions must itself be infinite is false.

In other words, a series of decreasing significance may converge as long as the periodic decrease in significance increases over time time or stays stable. There is a thread on this in math about why this breaking point on convergence exists.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The correct answer to the Achilles versus the Tortoise paradox is the false suggestion that Achilles would run to where the tortoise was rather than running to where the tortoise would be.

No.

To get to where the tortoise would be, Achilles must pass through the place the tortoise was, so the problem cannot be solved in that way.

The correct answer to the paradox is that the belief that the sum of an infinite series of fractions must itself be infinite is false.

In other words, a series of decreasing significance may converge as long as the periodic decrease in significance increases over time time or stays stable. There is a thread on this in math about why this breaking point on convergence exists.

"Nobody told me there would be math on this test!"

 

[Jarhyn]

The correct answer to the Achilles versus the Tortoise paradox is the false suggestion that Achilles would run to where the tortoise was rather than running to where the tortoise would be.

No.

To get to where the tortoise would be, Achilles must pass through the place the tortoise was, so the problem cannot be solved in that way.

The correct answer to the paradox is that the belief that the sum of an infinite series of fractions must itself be infinite is false.

In other words, a series of decreasing significance may converge as long as the periodic decrease in significance increases over time time or stays stable. There is a thread on this in math about why this breaking point on convergence exists.

"Nobody told me there would be math on this test!"

I mean I've been pointing it out for some time now...

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Causal determinism is derived from the notion of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

I do wonder about your inclusion of 'reliable,' which seems to suggest that we somehow use this 'reliability' to our advantage.

The term "reliable cause and effect" distinguishes causal determinism from causal indeterminism. Indeterminism would be "unreliable cause and effect", where the cause sometimes produces one effect and at other times produces an entirely different effect, such that the effect could never be predicted from knowing the cause. With determinism we get "reliable" causation, in which all events are, at least in theory, predictable.

Most people have never considered what serious indeterminism would be like. I picture it like this:

The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause.

To give you an idea of a “causally indeterministic universe”, imagine we had a dial we could use to adjust the balance of determinism/indeterminism. We start by turning it all the way to determinism: I pick an apple from the tree and I have an apple in my hand. Then, we turn the dial a little bit toward indeterminism: now if I pick an apple, I might find an orange or banana or some other random fruit in my hand. Turn the dial further toward indeterminism, and when I pick an apple I may find a kitten in my hand, or a pair of slippers, or a glass of milk. One more adjustment toward indeterminism and when I pick an apple gravity reverses!

If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. In such a universe, we could not reliably cause any effect, which means we would not be free to do anything. Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case.

(From Free Will: What's Wrong, and How to Fix It, "Deception #7 The Solution is Indeterminism")

Yes, the action taken has no alternatives, each and every action is determined as the system develops or evolves.

Every item on the menu is, by definition, a true alternative, something we may choose or may just as easily decline. One of them will be inevitably chosen. The others will inevitably not be chosen. But all of them will inevitably be real alternatives.

Entailment cannot be labelled free will.

We are not labelling entailment "free will". Entailment is entailment. Free will is free will. Within a deterministic world, it will sometimes be entailed that we will make the choice for ourselves, of our own free will, and it will sometimes be entailed that a choice will be imposed upon us against our will. Do you see the distinction? Do you see any contradiction between entailment and a choice we make for ourselves free of coercion and undue influence?

 

[fromderinside]

Second QM is, on its face, relevant to what free will is about

No it isn't. Superdeterminism, being non-disprovable, means that all systems may be represented with a Deterministic model.

At any rate, free will has absolutely nothing to do with randomness or deviation, so whether QM introduces some quantity of "randomness" (more accurately, unavoidably and unpredictable chaotic behavior), makes no difference.

I agree. Face validity is worthless for associating QM and free will. My bad.

 

[DBT]

Causal determinism is derived from the notion of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

I do wonder about your inclusion of 'reliable,' which seems to suggest that we somehow use this 'reliability' to our advantage.

The term "reliable cause and effect" distinguishes causal determinism from causal indeterminism. Indeterminism would be "unreliable cause and effect", where the cause sometimes produces one effect and at other times produces an entirely different effect, such that the effect could never be predicted from knowing the cause. With determinism we get "reliable" causation, in which all events are, at least in theory, predictable.

Most people have never considered what serious indeterminism would be like. I picture it like this:

Causal determinism is defined as conditions at time t and how things go ever after are fixed by natural law.

That is clearly different to causal indeterminism.

Adding 'reliable' is suggestive of something that can be used to our advantage, a reliable car, a reliable employee....

'Reliable' is a redundancy

Yes, the action taken has no alternatives, each and every action is determined as the system develops or evolves.

Every item on the menu is, by definition, a true alternative, something we may choose or may just as easily decline. One of them will be inevitably chosen. The others will inevitably not be chosen. But all of them will inevitably be real alternatives.

It's an alternative for countless people, each with their own proclivities.

All ordering their preference according to their own state and condition, one orders steak, the other orders fish, someone orders pizza.

Different items may ordered by different people at a given time, including an individual at different times - according to their state and condition in that instance in time - but there be no alternate actions at any point in time.

This, then that and nothing else.

That is the point.

That it is the state and condition of the system, including each and every person, that determines all actions in any given instance.

Entailment cannot be labelled free will.

We are not labelling entailment "free will". Entailment is entailment. Free will is free will. Within a deterministic world, it will sometimes be entailed that we will make the choice for ourselves, of our own free will, and it will sometimes be entailed that a choice will be imposed upon us against our will. Do you see the distinction? Do you see any contradiction between entailment and a choice we make for ourselves free of coercion and undue influence?

Entailment is ubiquitous. 'Free will' is just a term. Words and terms alone do not establish the proposition, God, gods, angels demons, believers can define them as they wish, it still doesn't establish their existence.

If free will is a real attribute of the human mind, it has to have abilities that make it free.

Compatibilism doesn't describe ''free will,'' it describes nothing more than actions performed without external force or coercion.

What you want to do is fully determined by prior causes, with actions following, necessarily, as determined.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'' - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

Adding 'reliable' is suggestive of something that can be used to our advantage

It is, because there is an advantage that you nonetheless look hard away from, possibly in fear.

This, then that and nothing else.

Nope. Wrong.

All of this that is such shall then become that, in such a way.

There is a set of rules applied to this. It doesn't JUST become that, but becomes that as a reliable uniform transform on this.

It is not a movie, it is a process.

Some of the activities across that process satisfy the definition of "choosing".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Causal determinism is defined as conditions at time t and how things go ever after are fixed by natural law.

Yes, but keep in mind that "fixed by natural law" is a metaphor for reliable causation. Each object is acting according to its nature. The bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill due to gravity. However, the squirrel may go uphill, downhill, or any other direction, governed by its biological drives more than by gravity. And it is the nature of intelligent species to choose when where and how they will go about satisfying their biological drives.

So, there are no law books telling these objects what they can and cannot do. Whether inanimate, living, or intelligent, they each are simply acting according to the nature of their construction.

Adding 'reliable' is suggestive of something that can be used to our advantage, a reliable car, a reliable employee....

Oh! That is what you meant by "advantage". Yes, a reliable car, one that starts when you turn the key, is definitely an advantage over a car that only starts sometimes when you turn the key. If the car is reliable, then we can predict what will happen when we turn the key. If the car is unreliable, then we cannot predict what will happen when the key is turned. The same is true of determinism versus indeterminism. With a deterministic world, we have predictability. With an indeterministic world, we lose predictability.

'Reliable' is a redundancy

It may be a redundancy, but as long as there is the notion of indeterminism, we need 'reliable' to distinguish a deterministic system (one that, given specific inputs, will always produce the same result) versus an indeterministic system (one that, given specific inputs, will sometimes produce the result and sometimes not).

So, I'm going to hang onto 'reliable' for the sake of precision. Determinism presumes a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, such that every event is reliably necessitated by prior events.

Meanwhile, back in the restaurant...

Every item on the menu is, by definition, a true alternative, something we may choose or may just as easily decline. One of them will be inevitably chosen. The others will inevitably not be chosen. But all of them will inevitably be real alternatives.

It's an alternative for countless people, each with their own proclivities.

Every item on the menu is viewed as a real alternative by every customer. This is a logically necessary truth. Choosing requires at least two real options to choose from. If there is only one alternative, then choosing will not happen. For example, if the menu listed just the Steak, then everyone would be ordering the Steak, but no one would be choosing to order it (other than by choosing to enter the "We Only Have Steaks" restaurant in the first place).

All ordering their preference according to their own state and condition, one orders steak, the other orders fish, someone orders pizza.

Yes. All choosing what they would order according to their own goals and reasons as they were at that time and place. We are not arguing that they would order anything else. We are simply pointing out that they each could have ordered whatever they wanted from the menu.

Different items may ordered by different people at a given time, including an individual at different times - according to their state and condition in that instance in time - but there be no alternate actions at any point in time.

At each point in time, each person will inevitably have the same menu, inevitably listing the alternate possibilities that they can choose, whether they choose that item or not.

This, then that and nothing else. That is the point.

Of course. And that is what will happen every time. There will be the menu of alternate possibilities, the person will be able to choose any item on the menu, but they will inevitably order a specific dinner, based upon their own current goals and reasons.

That it is the state and condition of the system, including each and every person, that determines all actions in any given instance.

I really don't think that what Harry orders will have anything to do with what I order. Nor will it be the state of the restaurant that controls what I will order.

It will be my own inner necessity that determines what I will order. And the causal mechanism of that necessity is my own choosing according to my own goals and reasons.

Meanwhile, regarding entailment ...

Within a deterministic world, it will sometimes be entailed that we will make the choice for ourselves, of our own free will, and it will sometimes be entailed that a choice will be imposed upon us against our will.

Entailment is ubiquitous.

Yes. And the key insight here is that entailment is made irrelevant by its own ubiquity. It is like a background constant, that appears on both sides of every equation, and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result. Deterministic entailment is a grand triviality. The intelligent mind simply acknowledges it, and then ignores it. It is never appropriate to bring it up, because it never makes any difference to any human scenario. It contains only one piece of totally useless information, fully elucidated by the philosopher Doris Day in the song "Que Sera, Sera. Whatever will be, will be".

'Free will' is just a term.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. This is a significant distinction that most people understand and correctly use, especially when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions. Consider, for example, the following question: "Were the professor's student subjects required to participate in his experiments in order to pass his course, or did they volunteer of their own free will?" Is there any question in your mind as to the meaning of the term 'free will' in that sentence?

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'' - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism.

Ironically, that quote demonstrates that determinism poses no threat to free will, because determinism will never make us do anything that we don't already want to do.

 

[DBT]

Causal determinism is defined as conditions at time t and how things go ever after are fixed by natural law.

Yes, but keep in mind that "fixed by natural law" is a metaphor for reliable causation. Each object is acting according to its nature. The bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill due to gravity. However, the squirrel may go uphill, downhill, or any other direction, governed by its biological drives more than by gravity. And it is the nature of intelligent species to choose when where and how they will go about satisfying their biological drives.

So, there are no law books telling these objects what they can and cannot do. Whether inanimate, living, or intelligent, they each are simply acting according to the nature of their construction.

I think that 'Natural Law' refers to the attributes of the system. Where, the initial conditions and physical properties of the system determine everything that happens ever after; this event sets that event which sets the next event...with no deviation.

Not only reliable, but inexorable, immutable, implacable....

Adding 'reliable' is suggestive of something that can be used to our advantage, a reliable car, a reliable employee....

Oh! That is what you meant by "advantage". Yes, a reliable car, one that starts when you turn the key, is definitely an advantage over a car that only starts sometimes when you turn the key. If the car is reliable, then we can predict what will happen when we turn the key. If the car is unreliable, then we cannot predict what will happen when the key is turned. The same is true of determinism versus indeterminism. With a deterministic world, we have predictability. With an indeterministic world, we lose predictability.

We are also subject to the same process, our makeup, thoughts and actions. We are also 'reliable' in the sense that whatever happens, must happen and given the nature of determinism, we cannot alter a thing.

'Reliable' is a redundancy

It may be a redundancy, but as long as there is the notion of indeterminism, we need 'reliable' to distinguish a deterministic system (one that, given specific inputs, will always produce the same result) versus an indeterministic system (one that, given specific inputs, will sometimes produce the result and sometimes not).

The respective definitions do that. Indeterminism is clearly different to determinism as its opposite.

Saying determinism is 'reliable' doesn't add anything useful. A system where events evolve without deviations is more than just reliable, it is fixed, immutable.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'' - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism.

Ironically, that quote demonstrates that determinism poses no threat to free will, because determinism will never make us do anything that we don't already want to do.

What we want is fixed.

What we want is neither chosen or freely willed.

Again, the physical organism interacts with the external world through the medium of consciousness. Personality, character traits, etc, are developed in response to internal and external stimuli.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I think that 'Natural Law' refers to the attributes of the system. Where, the initial conditions and physical properties of the system determine everything that happens ever after; this event sets that event which sets the next event...with no deviation.

Yes, and everything as it is now will inevitably lead to everything as it will be. So, our thoughts and choices and actions shape the future within our domain of influence.

Not only reliable, but inexorable, immutable, implacable....

Well, no. Both inexorable (immune to persuasion) and implacable (immune to pleading) cast the "system" in the role of an entity exercising control. You know, that "determinism as a boogeyman" metaphor that sends everyone into escape mode.

And "immutable"? Absolutely not. Everything in the system is constantly moving and changing. The system is not static or fixed. Events are happening all over the place, and they are reliably causing new events, ad infinitum.

Indeterminism is clearly different to determinism as its opposite.

The only thing that distinguishes them is that, in one case causation is perfectly reliable, and in the other causation is unreliable.

A system where events evolve without deviations is more than just reliable, it is fixed, immutable.

A system that is "fixed" or "immutable" is motionless. It cannot evolve, with or without deviations. To evolve logically implies changing over time.

What we want is neither chosen or freely willed.

We may not choose what we want, but we definitely do choose what we will do about those wants. For example, we did not choose to be hungry, but now that we are, we can choose whether to eat at home or at a restaurant, we can choose from among the many different things that we can prepare at home or order from the menu. That's why it is called "free will" rather than "free want".

Again, the physical organism interacts with the external world through the medium of consciousness. Personality, character traits, etc, are developed in response to internal and external stimuli.

Right. For example, in the restaurant, the physical organism interacts with the menu, and becomes consciously aware of its options, from which it chooses what it will order for dinner. The internal stimuli is the hunger. The external stimuli is the menu, and the waiter tapping his foot while waiting for us to decide what we will order.

 

[DBT]

I think that 'Natural Law' refers to the attributes of the system. Where, the initial conditions and physical properties of the system determine everything that happens ever after; this event sets that event which sets the next event...with no deviation.

Yes, and everything as it is now will inevitably lead to everything as it will be. So, our thoughts and choices and actions shape the future within our domain of influence.

Not to mention that our thoughts and actions are also inevitably, fixed by antecedents as events evolve from prior states of the system where no alternative exist, hence not freely chosen.

Not only reliable, but inexorable, immutable, implacable....

Well, no. Both inexorable (immune to persuasion) and implacable (immune to pleading) cast the "system" in the role of an entity exercising control. You know, that "determinism as a boogeyman" metaphor that sends everyone into escape mode.

''Control'' implies the ability to do otherwise, to choose either this or that option at any given time. Which of course is not how determinism works.

And "immutable"? Absolutely not. Everything in the system is constantly moving and changing. The system is not static or fixed. Events are happening all over the place, and they are reliably causing new events, ad infinitum.

''Immutable'' in this instance is just way of saying ''no deviation.'' The system is constantly may be moving and changing, yet nothing can deviate, what happens must happen, whatever must happen is immutable, a fixed progression of events that cannot be altered.

That is determinism.

Indeterminism is clearly different to determinism as its opposite.

The only thing that distinguishes them is that, in one case causation is perfectly reliable, and in the other causation is unreliable.

Fixed output as opposed to not fixed output.

A system where events evolve without deviations is more than just reliable, it is fixed, immutable.

A system that is "fixed" or "immutable" is motionless. It cannot evolve, with or without deviations. To evolve logically implies changing over time.

'Fixed' is a matter of a fixed state or outcome at each and every step in the development of the system. A system where the initial conditions produce always produce the determined result, ie, as defined ''fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.'

What we want is neither chosen or freely willed.

We may not choose what we want, but we definitely do choose what we will do about those wants. For example, we did not choose to be hungry, but now that we are, we can choose whether to eat at home or at a restaurant, we can choose from among the many different things that we can prepare at home or order from the menu. That's why it is called "free will" rather than "free want".

What you do after feeling hungry or thirsty, make a sandwich, get a drink, is subject to the same deterministic process as the initial prompt, the feeling of hunger or thirst.

Information is sent from the organs and the brain responds by generating conscious thoughts, 'I'll make a sandwich, I'll get a drink from the fridge.'

Gazzaniga's narrator function;
''Experiments on split-brain patients reveal how readily the left brain interpreter can make up stories and beliefs. In one experiment, for example, when the word walk was presented only to the right side of a patient’s brain, he got up and started walking. When he was asked why he did this, the left brain (where language is stored and where the word walk was not presented) quickly created a reason for the action: “I wanted to go get a Coke.”

Even more fantastic examples of the left hemisphere at work come from the study of neurological disorders. In a complication of stroke called anosognosia with hemiplegia, patients cannot recognize that their left arm is theirs because the stroke damaged the right parietal cortex, which manages our body’s integrity, position, and movement. The left-hemisphere interpreter has to reconcile the information it receives from the visual cortex—that the limb is attached to its body but is not moving—with the fact that it is not receiving any input about the damage to that limb.

The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere interpreter. The interpreter must, then, create a belief to mediate the two known facts “I can see the limb isn’t moving” and “I can’t tell that it is damaged.” When patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and why they can’t move it, they will say “It’s not mine” or “I just don’t feel like moving it”—reasonable conclusions, given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is receiving.'' M. Gazzaniga

Again, the physical organism interacts with the external world through the medium of consciousness. Personality, character traits, etc, are developed in response to internal and external stimuli.

Right. For example, in the restaurant, the physical organism interacts with the menu, and becomes consciously aware of its options, from which it chooses what it will order for dinner. The internal stimuli is the hunger. The external stimuli is the menu, and the waiter tapping his foot while waiting for us to decide what we will order.

What is selected in any given instance is inevitable. There is never a chance that something else could have happen.

It doesn't matter if there is a hundred items on the menu, each and every customer orders according to their own - non chosen - state and condition in the moment of 'selection'

'Selection' in this instance refers to the presence of multiple options on the menu, yet each customer must necessarily fulfill their determined order, Bob orders steak, his wife June orders Chefs Salad.....the multiple options catering to different customers/different tastes or regular customer at a different time, state and condition developing over time, with each and every moment being fixed by antecedents.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think that 'Natural Law' refers to the attributes of the system

Then you are only partially right. "Natural law" refers to a specific part of the system.

It does not refer at all to the state.

Rather, it refers to the process that happens upon the state.

You keep glossing over it, in fact: given initial conditions. That's what you keep missing.

system where no alternative exist

Except the alternatives do exist, explicitly as alternatives.

They are objects presented to a choice function and are literally artifacts. at Bucca's you can actually point to the alternative meals already there.

Clearly "the alternatives" exist in the system.

every customer orders according to their own - non chosen - state and condition in

Again, you trip and fall face first in the genetic Fallacy: you don't need to have chosen who you are for the person you are now to choose something.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Not to mention that our thoughts and actions are also inevitably, fixed by antecedents as events evolve from prior states of the system where no alternative exist, hence not freely chosen.

Again, you repeat the fact that all events are reliably caused by antecedent events and then insert the claim "hence not freely chosen".

You are clearly using "freedom from causal necessity" as your criteria for freedom.

No one expects to be free from cause and effect, because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, involves us reliably causing some effect.

Thus the incompatibilist definition of "freely chosen" is simply irrational. "Freedom from causal necessity" is a self-contradiction. It is an oxymoron. It is paradoxical. As such it cannot rationally be used as the definition for anything, ever.

If taken seriously, it would wipe out all notions of freedom, and we could remove "free" and "freedom" from the dictionary.

So let's not do that.

Instead, let's use a more modest notion of freedom, where we limit ourselves to freedom from specific constraints, that are meaningful and relevant.

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. In our country we enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. The woman in the grocery store was offering us free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

None of these freedoms requires "freedom from causal necessity". All of them are consistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

In each case, the term "free" or "freedom" references some meaningful and relevant constraint, something that can actually constrain us, and something that we can actually be free of.

But causal necessity is not a relevant constraint, because it is not something that we can ever be free of.
And causal necessity is not a meaningful constraint, because what we choose to do by causal necessity is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we choose to do. And that is not a meaningful constraint.

You often complain that compatibilists are using a specially contrived definition of free will that makes it compatible with determinism. But I would suggest that the opposite is really true. And that it is the incompatibilists who are using a definition of free will that is specifically contrived to make it incompatible with determinism. The notion of "freedom from causal necessity" is "freedom from determinism".

I don't think this was deliberately done. I think it was a self-induced hoax, created by figurative language, and a simple misinterpretation of universally reliable cause and effect.

''Control'' implies the ability to do otherwise, to choose either this or that option at any given time.

Of course. And we have that ability to do otherwise, to choose either this or that option whenever we are confronted with a problem or issue that requires us to make a choice. After all that's the whole point of words like "ability" and "can" and "possibility" and "option", to enable us to logically work our way to our single inevitable choice.

An obvious example is when we go to a restaurant, and must choose from the menu which dinner to order. If there is no ability to do otherwise, then there can be no choosing. If there can be no choosing, then there can be no dinner.

When we don't know what we "will" choose, we consider what we "can" choose, evaluate those options, and based on that evaluation decide what we "will" do.

The fact that we "will" order the Salad never implies that we "could not" order the Steak. We "could" have ordered the Steak, but we "would" not order it tonight.

Which of course is not how determinism works.

Which is exactly how determinism works. The restaurant menu causes us to perform choosing. Choosing causes us to order the Salad. Ordering the Salad causes us to eat the salad and to responsibly pay the cashier for our meal on the way out. That is exactly how determinism works, one event reliably causes the next event, ad infinitum.

Gazzaniga's narrator function;

Yes, we've discussed the narrator function in some detail. The brain's narrator function can present an accurate description of its own decision making because it has access to all of the thoughts and feelings that reached conscious awareness during that operation. However, as Gazzaniga points out, when the narrator does not have sufficient information then it will attempt to construct a meaningful explanation with the limited or inaccurate knowledge that it does have.

 

[The AntiChris]

This bears repeating for emphasis:

You are clearly using "freedom from causal necessity" as your criteria for freedom.

No one expects to be free from cause and effect, because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, involves us reliably causing some effect.

Thus the incompatibilist definition of "freely chosen" is simply irrational. "Freedom from causal necessity" is a self-contradiction. It is an oxymoron. It is paradoxical. As such it cannot rationally be used as the definition for anything, ever.

If taken seriously, it would wipe out all notions of freedom, and we could remove "free" and "freedom" from the dictionary.

It'd be really interesting to see DBT directly respond to this. I'm guessing he won't.