Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

Well great finally Marvin Edwards says:
"Again, you repeat the fact that all events are reliably caused by antecedent events and then insert the claim "hence not freely chosen"."

"You are clearly using antecedent events as your freedom from causal necessity."

Uh, no. They are antecedent events are also determined. That there are necessary events between this and that is not proof of freedom. That are just evidence one has skipped some events in the cause-effect chain and called that freedom.

 

[DBT]

Not to mention that our thoughts and actions are also inevitably, fixed by antecedents as events evolve from prior states of the system where no alternative exist, hence not freely chosen.

Again, you repeat the fact that all events are reliably caused by antecedent events and then insert the claim "hence not freely chosen".

It's not a claim. It's how a deterministic system works. Just as you define it.

Logically, events that must happen as determined are not freely chosen because there was never the option to choose. What happens, must happen without deviation.

That's essentially the 'no choice principle.'

''Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism.

When all is said and done, all arguments for Compatibilism suffer from a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of the two incompatible concepts.'' - Bruce Silverstein.

You are clearly using "freedom from causal necessity" as your criteria for freedom.

Not really.

I am arguing that determinism is incompatible with free will as it is defined by Compatibilists, Libertarians, the common notion of freely choosing between a set of realizable options, etc.....in this instance the point of contention being Compatibilism.

I am arguing that the term 'free will' is incoherent. It doesn't add to our understanding of human behaviour or its drivers.

I am pointing out that choice requires the ability to choose between two or more options, yet determinism doesn't offer two or more realizable options, that whatever happens must happen.

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities

Determinism
All events develop or evolve as they must without deviation, where there are no possible alternate actions and no alternate choices.

Where all actions are necessitated, not freely chosen.

Gazzaniga's narrator function;

Yes, we've discussed the narrator function in some detail. The brain's narrator function can present an accurate description of its own decision making because it has access to all of the thoughts and feelings that reached conscious awareness during that operation. However, as Gazzaniga points out, when the narrator does not have sufficient information then it will attempt to construct a meaningful explanation with the limited or inaccurate knowledge that it does have.

The point is that the narrator function, as with all aspects of brain function, input, processing, conscious representation of information, etc, is not a matter of free will.

Free will is not the driver, it has no regulative control, it cannot select this rather than that......it is simply that the state of the physical system in any given instance, neural architecture, information exchange between cells and regions and structures, etc, equals output: what we think, feel and do.

Brain, mind, consciousness, behaviour has nothing to do with free will. It's just a definition, an ideology not a reality.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

"You are clearly using antecedent events as your freedom from causal necessity."

No. I said, "You are clearly using "freedom from causal necessity" as your criteria for freedom."

The basic question is: what requirement must be satisfied by the "free" in free will. Free will only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less. Free will cannot be required to be "free from causal necessity", because such a notion is paradoxical and irrational.

They are antecedent events are also determined. That there are necessary events between this and that is not proof of freedom. That are just evidence one has skipped some events in the cause-effect chain and called that freedom.

There is no "skipping some events" in the cause-effect chain. That's why we complain when someone tries to say that the choosing event is not really happening. Every freedom we have, to do anything at all, involves reliably causing some effect. So the notion that determinism is something we must be free of is a bit of silly nonsense. It is basically a self-induced hoax.

What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, doing whatever we choose to do. Thus, determinism is not a meaningful constraint. It is not something that we need to be "free of".

It's basically "what we would have done anyway".

 

[Jarhyn]

Free will is not the driver, it has no regulative control

Then explain why, when the soldier decides to practice, the soldier hits more targets.

Clearly it bespeaks the power to self-regulate.

In fact, failure to self-regulate is a major medical condition in most respects.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Logically, events that must happen as determined are not freely chosen because there was never the option to choose. What happens, must happen without deviation. That's essentially the 'no choice principle.'

Choosing actually happens. It is a logical operation that is just as real as addition or subtraction. Thinking is a physical process within the brain that is just as real as walking. Thinking, walking, adding, subtracting, and choosing are all things that people actually do.

There can no more be a 'no choice principle' than there can be a 'no addition principle' or a 'no walking principle'. Because, in principle, all of these events are undeniably taking place in physical reality. We can't say 'no' to any event and still say 'yes' to determinism.

''Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism.

Sorry, Bruce, but all that Free Will requires is freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more and nothing less. Free Will does not require freedom from deterministic cause and effect. To believe that it does is delusional.

When all is said and done, all arguments for Compatibilism suffer from a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of the two incompatible concepts.'' - Bruce Silverstein.

Nice rhetoric, Bruce, but completely false.
The "true and complete" nature of Determinism is that all events are reliably caused by prior events.
The "true and complete" nature of Free Will is that it is an event in which a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Any other claims as to the nature of Determinism or Free Will should be treated with skepticism and empirically validated. For example, the 'no choice principle' is contradicted by simply walking into a restaurant and watching people choose what they will order for dinner.

I am arguing that determinism is incompatible with free will as it is defined by Compatibilists, Libertarians, the common notion of freely choosing between a set of realizable options, etc.....in this instance the point of contention being Compatibilism.

Your argument rests upon the presumption of an incompatibility between reliable causation and people choosing for themselves what they will order for dinner. It insists that only one of these can be true, despite being shown both happening simultaneously within the same event.

I am arguing that the term 'free will' is incoherent.

And yet free will is obviously a coherent notion that is commonly understood and correctly applied to real-life scenarios by nearly everyone, including you. For example, if I asked you "Were the professor's students required to participate in his experiments in order to pass his class, or did they participate of their own free will", you would understand exactly what 'free will' meant in that context.

And if we posed a similar question regarding a bank teller who handed over the bank's money to a robber pointing a gun at her, and asked you whether she did so of her own free will, you would know the correct answer.

There is nothing incoherent about the notion of free will.

It doesn't add to our understanding of human behaviour or its drivers.

It doesn't need to. We have courses in psychology and sociology for that. Free will is specifically about the conditions under which choosing occurred: Was the choice coerced or otherwise unduly influenced? And everyone learns about these growing up.

I am pointing out that choice requires the ability to choose between two or more options,

Well of course it does!

yet determinism doesn't offer two or more realizable options, that whatever happens must happen.

Apparently, in the deterministic course of events, we often encounter two or more realizable options, and must choose between them. For example, this happens all day long in a restaurant when people order their dinners from a menu of realizable options.

So, the claim that determinism doesn't offer two or more realizable options is false. As you say, 'whatever happens must happen', and that is exactly what happened in the restaurant.

Determinism All events develop or evolve as they must without deviation, where there are no possible alternate actions and no alternate choices.

Your definition of determinism is incorrect. Alternate choices were Determined to appear on the menu, requiring us to choose between them.

Where all actions are necessitated, not freely chosen.

You keep ignoring the fact that it is sometimes necessary that we will make a choice, that we will necessarily consider multiple options, that we will necessarily compare those options, and that we will necessarily choose the option that appears best to us at that time. This series of events is called "free will", not because it was free from causal necessity, but simply because it was free of coercion and undue influence.

But, as I said earlier, you are using the incompatibilist notion of free will, a choice "free of causal necessity", which we've demonstrated repeatedly to be a bit of silly nonsense.

... Free will is not the driver, it has no regulative control, it cannot select this rather than that......it is simply that the state of the physical system in any given instance, neural architecture, information exchange between cells and regions and structures, etc, equals output: what we think, feel and do. ...

Choosing what we will do is exercising regulative control. We've seen this in the restaurant, where each customer orders their dinner. Their dinner order regulates the subsequent events: the waiter taking the order to the chef, the chef preparing the meal, the waiter returning with the meal and the bill.

So, what regulates choosing? The fact that we are sitting in a restaurant, facing a menu of realizable options, and must choose one of them or go without dinner. That's what causally necessitates choosing in the restaurant.

So, what regulates sitting in the restaurant? It was our earlier choice to have dinner at a restaurant rather then preparing a meal for ourselves at home.

Choosing determines the will. The will determines the subsequent thoughts and actions until the intention is completed. And then we choose something else to do.

And that is how determinism works. Each event reliably caused by prior events.
And that is how free will works. Choosing for ourselves what we will do and then doing it.
And, because choosing is a deterministic operation, we never need to step outside of the causal chain to do it. Thus, free will and determinism are obviously compatible.

 

[fromderinside]

So we react to an event. As we do we notice we are about to behave so we presume we are behaving because we choose to since nothing else is apparent 'causing' us to do so. Therefore it must be because of this thought that just appeared 'explaining' the reaction to the event. Looks to me that both are acts arising in such cases. By coupling them we just conclude we are behaving purposely.

Nothing other than determinism happening here.

 

[DBT]

... Logically, events that must happen as determined are not freely chosen because there was never the option to choose. What happens, must happen without deviation. That's essentially the 'no choice principle.'

Choosing actually happens. It is a logical operation that is just as real as addition or subtraction. Thinking is a physical process within the brain that is just as real as walking. Thinking, walking, adding, subtracting, and choosing are all things that people actually do.

Choice requires two or more possibilities. The outcome of brain activity is determined, which means a foregone conclusion.

A forgone conclusion is not a choice, it is a necessity. Necessity is not freedom of choice.

Necessitation is as much a problem for the notion of freedom of will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

There can no more be a 'no choice principle' than there can be a 'no addition principle' or a 'no walking principle'. Because, in principle, all of these events are undeniably taking place in physical reality. We can't say 'no' to any event and still say 'yes' to determinism.

Choice is defined as being able to take any one of a number of options at any given time.

Determinism is defined as a progression of events that have no alternatives, that what is done in any given instance is fixed by antecends.

Consequently, when presented with a number of options, only one is realizable: the determined option.

Where all actions are necessitated rather than freely chosen.

Hence the no choice principle of determinism, and the incompatibility of determinism and free will.

You keep ignoring the fact that it is sometimes necessary that we will make a choice, that we will necessarily consider multiple options, that we will necessarily compare those options, and that we will necessarily choose the option that appears best to us at that time. This series of events is called "free will", not because it was free from causal necessity, but simply because it was free of coercion and undue influence.

Considering multiple options does not mean that any option is realizable in any given instance in time.

Determinism permits only one course of action at any given time.

There may be countless things that can be done, and are done by different people at different times, yet each and every person only has one possible course of action in any given instance.

But, as I said earlier, you are using the incompatibilist notion of free will, a choice "free of causal necessity", which we've demonstrated repeatedly to be a bit of silly nonsense.

This issue has nothing much to do with me or 'incompatibilist notions of free will.'

The compatibilist definition of free will is flawed for the given reasons, therefore as a definition it is insufficient to prove the proposition.

... Free will is not the driver, it has no regulative control, it cannot select this rather than that......it is simply that the state of the physical system in any given instance, neural architecture, information exchange between cells and regions and structures, etc, equals output: what we think, feel and do. ...

Choosing what we will do is exercising regulative control.

There is no possibility of doing otherwise. Outcome is determined by an intricate web of deterministic interactions.

This, then that.

No deviation.

No alternatives.

We've seen this in the restaurant, where each customer orders their dinner. Their dinner order regulates the subsequent events: the waiter taking the order to the chef, the chef preparing the meal, the waiter returning with the meal and the bill.

Each and every customer places their own order according to their own proclivities, their state and condition in the moment of each and every action.


''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from 'hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.


Arthur W. Pink: "if the will is their servant then it is not sovereign, and if the will is not sovereign, we certainly cannot predicate ‘freedom’ of it."

 

[Jarhyn]

The outcome of brain activity is determined, which means a foregone conclusion.

No, the outcome of the brain activity is not determined until it is determined, a conclusion not FOREgone, but gone the way all observable conclusions go: through the resolution of alternatives into a single choice.

When you stand in Bucca's, the alternatives are clearly still there. They are reified objects.

It is still YOUR brain making the choice so when YOUR brain makes choices that are fucked up, it is YOUR brain everyone else is going to be seeking to modify somehow, because modifying all the things that modified your brain will not stop your brain from making fucked up choices.

Once your brain makes fucked up choices the only way to stop it is to modify your brain.

Therefore when you make fucked up choices, you get your brain modified.

This is the core of responsibility within compatibilism

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So we react to an event. As we do we notice we are about to behave so we presume we are behaving because we choose to since nothing else is apparent 'causing' us to do so. Therefore it must be because of this thought that just appeared 'explaining' the reaction to the event. Looks to me that both are acts arising in such cases. By coupling them we just conclude we are behaving purposely.

By decoupling them, they become random, and determinism doesn't like that.

Nothing other than determinism happening here.

Determinism doesn't happen at all. What is happening is all of the specific events that are causing other events to happen. Determinism merely comments upon this activity, asserting that all events are reliably caused. Determinism is not an actor on this stage. At best determinism simply sits in the corner taking notes.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Choice requires two or more possibilities.

Whenever choosing is inevitable, two or more possibilities are also inevitable.

The outcome of brain activity is determined, which means a foregone conclusion.

The conclusion inevitably appears at the end of the choosing process, and not a moment before.

A forgone conclusion is not a choice, it is a necessity.

No. A "forgone conclusion" is a logical impossibility. It is another example of figurative speech and it is literally false.

Necessity is not freedom of choice.

Necessity is necessity. And sometimes our choices will necessarily be unduly influenced and out of our control. But most times, we will be free to make the choice for ourselves, as we do in the restaurant.

Necessitation is as much a problem for the notion of freedom of will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

No. Necessitation in itself is not a problem at all. What we deliberately do by causal necessity is exactly identical to us doing what we choose. There's no problem there. To see it as a problem is a delusion.

On the other hand, we get really pissed off if a guy points a gun at us and makes us give him our wallet. That is a real problem.

Choice is defined as being able to take any one of a number of options at any given time.

Yes, we both know what a choice is. It is the appearance of multiple options, such as happens when we open a menu in the restaurant. Encountering multiple options is the event that causally necessitates the choosing process.

Determinism is defined as a progression of events that have no alternatives, that what is done in any given instance is fixed by antecedents.

And we also both know what determinism is. (Although you keep wanting it to mean more than it does).

Consequently, when presented with a number of options, only one is realizable: the determined option.

The fact that only one option will be realized does not imply than any of the other options are "unrealizable". All of the real options are always realizable, regardless whether they will ever be realized or not.

Something that "can" happen may happen, or it may never happen, yet it still "could have" happened. That is what these words mean in the English language.

Where all actions are necessitated rather than freely chosen.

All of this has been adequately disproved, over and over. But, if you've chosen to forget it, then I'll repeat it:

Among all of the necessitated actions, we find all of the actions that were causally necessitated by a choosing operation, one that was free of coercion and undue influence.

Hence the no choice principle of determinism, and the incompatibility of determinism and free will.

There can be no 'no choice principle' in a deterministic world in which choosing is a necessitated event. Your claim, if true, would invalidate determinism.

Considering multiple options does not mean that any option is realizable in any given instance in time.

A real option, by definition, "can" be realized, even if it never "will" be realized. This is a simple matter of correctly using the English language.

Determinism permits only one course of action at any given time.

Of course. It permits only one "actual" course of action.

There may be countless things that can be done, and are done by different people at different times,

But what you keep missing is that there are countless things that "can" be done in a given instance of time which never "will" be done. Something that "will" be done must necessarily be done. But something that "can" be done is not necessarily done.

yet each and every person only has one possible course of action in any given instance.

Actually, each and every person only has one "actual" course of action in any given instance, even though they have many "possible" courses of action.

 

[fromderinside]

So we react to an event. As we do we notice we are about to behave so we presume we are behaving because we choose to since nothing else is apparent 'causing' us to do so. Therefore it must be because of this thought that just appeared 'explaining' the reaction to the event. Looks to me that both are acts arising in such cases. By coupling them we just conclude we are behaving purposely.

By decoupling them, they become random, and determinism doesn't like that.

Nothing other than determinism happening here.

Determinism doesn't happen at all. What is happening is all of the specific events that are causing other events to happen. Determinism merely comments upon this activity, asserting that all events are reliably caused. Determinism is not an actor on this stage. At best determinism simply sits in the corner taking notes.

Good. You got the definition of the process determinism right.

 

[DBT]

Choice requires two or more possibilities.

Whenever choosing is inevitable, two or more possibilities are also inevitable.

Determined actions are inevitable.

Inevitable actions eliminate all possible alternatives.

There are no 'possible alternatives' within a deterministic system.

Consequently, there can be no alternate actions in any given moment in time,

Actions - being inevitable - negate choice in any given moment in time.

What happens must happen as determined, not freely chosen.

Entailment is not a choice.

The outcome of brain activity is determined, which means a foregone conclusion.

The conclusion inevitably appears at the end of the choosing process, and not a moment before.

All actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.

Choosing involves sorting through a set of realizable options.

Actions being inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized is not an example of choosing.

There is no choosing within a deterministic system.


Necessitation;
''Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation.'' - J. W. N. Watkins, "Between Analytic and Empirical," Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 121, p. 114:

free·dom
1: the quality or state of being free: as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action

A forgone conclusion is not a choice, it is a necessity.

No. A "forgone conclusion" is a logical impossibility. It is another example of figurative speech and it is literally false.

Sorry, it relates to your definition of determinism - ''without deviation.''

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Necessity is not freedom of choice.

Necessity is necessity. And sometimes our choices will necessarily be unduly influenced and out of our control. But most times, we will be free to make the choice for ourselves, as we do in the restaurant.

Our 'own actions' are a matter of inner necessity. We are an expression of whatever the brain is doing, be it is functional or dysfunctional, or our behaviour adaptive or maladaptive.

Necessitation is as much a problem for the notion of freedom of will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

No. Necessitation in itself is not a problem at all. What we deliberately do by causal necessity is exactly identical to us doing what we choose. There's no problem there. To see it as a problem is a delusion.

Yes, what we deliberately do is causally necessary. Necessity by definition is not something we can control, modify or regulate: whatever happens, happens necessarily....so If external force, coercion or undue influence is a problem for free will, so is inner necessity, for which we have no control or ability to regulate.

Necessity, by definition, permits no control or regulation.

On the other hand, we get really pissed off if a guy points a gun at us and makes us give him our wallet. That is a real problem.

There are problems for free will any way you look at it, external, internal....

Choice is defined as being able to take any one of a number of options at any given time.

Yes, we both know what a choice is. It is the appearance of multiple options, such as happens when we open a menu in the restaurant. Encountering multiple options is the event that causally necessitates the choosing process.

Given determinism, the appearance of multiple options doesn't mean there is freedom to choose any option in any given moment.

The no deviation stipulation eliminates that possibility.

Determinism is defined as a progression of events that have no alternatives, that what is done in any given instance is fixed by antecedents.

And we also both know what determinism is. (Although you keep wanting it to mean more than it does).

Consequently, when presented with a number of options, only one is realizable: the determined option.

The fact that only one option will be realized does not imply than any of the other options are "unrealizable". All of the real options are always realizable, regardless whether they will ever be realized or not.

Alternate options/actions have to be unrealizable. Otherwise, it's not determinism. That's not to say that these events do not, or cannot happen, just that the event cannot happen if that event has not been determined to happen.

Something that "can" happen may happen, or it may never happen, yet it still "could have" happened. That is what these words mean in the English language.

It can happen when determined. If not determined to happen, it cannot happen.

Where all actions are necessitated rather than freely chosen.

All of this has been adequately disproved, over and over. But, if you've chosen to forget it, then I'll repeat it:

Among all of the necessitated actions, we find all of the actions that were causally necessitated by a choosing operation, one that was free of coercion and undue influence.

Disproven? No, necessitation is not a process of choosing. All the objects within a deterministic system, including the brain, are shaped and formed by countless elements that are outside of their ability control to regulate.


''Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.'' - Brittanica.


''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Whenever choosing is inevitable, two or more possibilities are also inevitable.

Determined actions are inevitable.

Yes, they are.

Inevitable actions eliminate all possible alternatives.

No they don't. The menu in the restaurant was inevitable. Thus the possible alternatives were also inevitable.

There are no 'possible alternatives' within a deterministic system.

And yet there they are, undeniably embedded in the chain of events. They cannot be removed without invalidating determinism.

Consequently, there can be no alternate actions in any given moment in time,

You are attempting to conflate the two contexts. The correct assessment is that there is no alternative to there being alternatives. The restaurant menu will be there, whether we like it or not. And we will have to make a choice, from that list of alternatives, before we can have dinner. There is no alternative to this chain of events happening just so.

Actions - being inevitable - negate choice in any given moment in time.

Choosing is an inevitable action. Therefore your claim that inevitability negates choice is clearly false.

What happens must happen as determined, not freely chosen.

Except when it is determined that you will be making your choice while free of coercion and undue influence. Whenever that happens your will is freely chosen (not free of causal necessity, of course, but simply free of coercion and undue influence, you know, free will).

Entailment is not a choice.

Right. We do not choose entailment versus not entailment. However, causal necessity often entails that we will be making choices of our own free will. Thus, our choices are entailed, and inevitably must happen, exactly as they do happen.

Conclusions inevitably appear at the end of the choosing process, and not a moment before.

All actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.

Yes. But no action will happen before it actually happens. A conclusion will happen at the end of our choosing, and not one moment earlier. If the conclusion happened any earlier, there would be no need for choosing.

Choosing involves sorting through a set of realizable options.

Indeed it does.

Actions being inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized is not an example of choosing.

Except when the action is choosing. Choosing, just like every other event, is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity, and it must happen, exactly as it does happen, without deviation. There is no alternative.

There is no choosing within a deterministic system.

It should be quite obvious to you by now that there is choosing within our deterministic system. It is there by causal necessity.

Necessitation;
''Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation.'' - J. W. N. Watkins, "Between Analytic and Empirical," Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 121, p. 114:

Geez, there is no need to get spooky about it. As everyone knows, events have causes, and one event will cause another event. This is something that is obvious to every person on the street. It is something they all take for granted.

free·dom
1: the quality or state of being free: as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action

The "absence of necessity" in that definition refers to things like: "You must finish your homework before you watch TV", which means you are not free to watch TV until you finish your homework. When you're old enough to make decisions for yourself, you will be free to watch TV and then do your homework.

But there is no absence of causal necessity, anywhere, ever. When you're old enough to make decisions for yourself, whatever you decide to do will exactly match causal necessity. So, you are free to make either choice, without any concern for causal necessity. Causal necessity takes care of itself. So you can go on about your business without giving it a thought.

And that's the only intelligent response to universal causal necessity, to acknowledge it, and then to forget about it.

About the "forgone conclusion" ...

All events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.

This means that each event happened exactly as it did at its specific place and time. And the conclusion of each choosing operation will happen only at the end of choosing, and not a moment before.

The suggestion that the conclusion is "foregone" is a figurative statement: "It is AS IF the conclusion were reached before the choosing began". But, of course, the conclusion was not reached until the choosing ended. So the figurative statement is literally false.

Figurative statements are commonly used in our communication, but they have one serious drawback: Every figurative statement is literally false. And, if you take a figurative statement literally, you end up with more errors down the line.

About "necessity" ...

Necessity is necessity. And sometimes our choices will necessarily be unduly influenced and out of our control. But most times, we will necessarily be free to make the choice for ourselves, as we do in the restaurant.

Our 'own actions' are a matter of inner necessity. We are an expression of whatever the brain is doing, be it is functional or dysfunctional, or our behaviour adaptive or maladaptive.

Of course. And our choosing controls what we will do. If our brain is functional, we will open the restaurant menu, consider our options, and order our dinner. If our brain is dysfunctional, we may scream at the waiter and throw food at him resulting in us being thrown out of the restaurant.

In either case, as in all cases, the behavior will be causally necessary given the conditions of our own brain. And if the brain is dysfunctional, we'll need to address that problem. But causal necessitation itself cannot be fixed or altered in any way, so it is never considered the cause of any problem.

Yes, what we deliberately do is causally necessary. Necessity by definition is not something we can control, modify or regulate: whatever happens, happens necessarily....

Exactly. So it is pointless to bring it up if there is nothing we can do about it. To be relevant, a cause must be something we can actually do something about. For example, we can remove a brain tumor that makes the brain dysfunctional or treat a mental illness psychiatrically.

But there is nothing to be done about causation itself, or causal necessity itself, or determinism itself. So, it is never appropriate to bring such things to the table when we are trying to solve a real problem in the real world.

so If external force, coercion or undue influence is a problem for free will, so is inner necessity, for which we have no control or ability to regulate.

But we do have control over the inner necessity of choosing. If someone deliberately chooses to commit a crime, we can arrest them, to prevent them from doing further harm, and we can give them the opportunity to reform their thinking through rehabilitation programs, and if their behavior can be corrected, we can safely return them to society, and if it cannot, we can continue to secure them.

Necessity, by definition, permits no control or regulation.

Causal necessity, by definition, permits every thing that ever happens, including our control and regulation. Determinism changes nothing at all.

Given determinism, the appearance of multiple options doesn't mean there is freedom to choose any option in any given moment.

Freedom is the ability to do what we want. And you should recognize by now that an "ability" is something that we "can" do, and not necessarily something that we "will" do. The freedom to choose any option does not require us to choose or not choose any option. It simply means that we "can" choose the Steak and we also "can" choose the Salad, regardless of what we actually choose.

The no deviation stipulation eliminates that possibility.

Afraid not. The no deviation stipulation guarantees that we will encounter those possibilities and deal with them as we decide what we will order for dinner.

Alternate options/actions have to be unrealizable. Otherwise, it's not determinism.

No. Alternate options/actions only have to be "unrealized" to qualify as determinism. They can still be (and are) "realizable".

That's not to say that these events do not, or cannot happen, just that the event cannot happen if that event has not been determined to happen.

To escape the paradox, simply change "cannot" to "will not" when speaking of determinism. Determinism says that any event that is determined not to happen "will not" happen.

It can happen when determined.

It will happen when determined.

If not determined to happen, it cannot happen.

If not determined to happen, it will not happen.

Disproven? No, necessitation is not a process of choosing.

But choosing is definitely a process of necessitation. Necessitation includes choosing, in the same way that it includes other logical processes like mathematical calculations. And these logical operations control what we do, which controls what we cause to happen in the real world. So, necessitation also includes choosing in the same way that it includes gravity.

 

[Jarhyn]

Inevitable actions eliminate all possible alternatives.

No, they don't. they always were alternatives while they were alternatives, in that time prior to the resolution of the choice.

From there all the rest of your nonsense falls apart.

 

[pood]

All actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.

Let’s examine all the ways DBT goes wrong.

First, it simply isn’t true that “all actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.”

This is totally ruled out by the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. At best, we have, as one philosopher called it, “adequate determinism.”

But second, even if there were no QM, it still would not be true that “all actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.”

Actions only become “inevitable” when they are realized.

Finally, as I have pointed out, “inevitability” has nothing to do with anything. Even if actions were “inevitable” tracing all the way back to the big bang, it can easily be the case that our freely chosen acts were inevitably freely chosen. Even if the future is already set in stone, as it were, and all future acts are fixed right now, the question arises: what, exactly, fixes them? In the case of human acts, they are fixed by our free choices, those choices being free provided they are not coerced.

DBT has invented some jargon called “inner necessity.” Once again, this is the modal fallacy. As I have repeatedly shown, the only necessarily true propositions are matters of logic — propositions that are true at all possible worlds, such as all triangles have three sides and there are no married bachelors. All other true propositions are contingently true — could have been otherwise.

But even if we accept, for the sake of argument, DBT’s “inner necessity,” what does it mean? It’s jargon because it’s just a fancy synonym for “I” and “me.”

“Inner necessity makes me do what I do” just means that I make me do, what I do. I am “inner necessity.”

DBT is unable to distinguish between “will” and “must,” though a simple dictionary would clear up his confusion. Because of this, he mistakenly believes that an “unrealized” option is ipso facto “unrealizable. Of course it is realizable. We understand this with our ordinary language.

Jack might say, for example, “I would have taken the job in Boston, if they had offered a higher salary. They didn’t, so I took the higher-paying job in New York instead.”

This is straightforward, and poses a riddle only, I think, to bad philosophers. Jack taking the job in Boston is a possible but non-actual world. This means it is, was, and always will be, a realizable world. The fact that it was not realized is because of antecedent circumstances: The company in Boston could have, but did not, offer Jack a higher salary than was offered by the company in New York. So Jack, acting on reasons and motives of his own, took the higher-paying New York job. Had antecedent circumstances been different — had the Boston company offered a higher salary — then Jack would have taken the Boston job instead. But Jack was free to take either job. His actual choice was based on his own motives and desires which in turn were based on actual antecedent circumstances.

In all ways, hard determinism (not to be confused with causal determinism) is a secularized version of Calvinistic predestination, and as such is basically a religious dogma with no empirical evidence or logical argument to support it.

 

[Jarhyn]

All actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.

Let’s examine all the ways DBT goes wrong.

First, it simply isn’t true that “all actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.”

This is totally ruled out by the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. At best, we have, as one philosopher called it, “adequate determinism.”

But second, even if there were no QM, it still would not be true that “all actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.”

Actions only become “inevitable” when they are realized.

Finally, as I have pointed out, “inevitability” has nothing to do with anything. Even if actions were “inevitable” tracing all the way back to the big bang, it can easily be the case that our freely chosen acts were inevitably freely chosen. Even if the future is already set in stone, as it were, and all future acts are fixed right now, the question arises: what, exactly, fixes them? In the case of human acts, they are fixed by our free choices, those choices being free provided they are not coerced.

DBT has invented some jargon called “inner necessity.” Once again, this is the modal fallacy. As I have repeatedly shown, the only necessarily true propositions are matters of logic — propositions that are true at all possible worlds, such as all triangles have three sides and there are no married bachelors. All other true propositions are contingently true — could have been otherwise.

But even if we accept, for the sake of argument, DBT’s “inner necessity,” what does it mean? It’s jargon because it’s just a fancy synonym for “I” and “me.”

“Inner necessity makes me do what I do” just means that I make me do, what I do. I am “inner necessity.”

DBT is unable to distinguish between “will” and “must,” though a simple dictionary would clear up his confusion. Because of this, he mistakenly believes that an “unrealized” option is ipso facto “unrealizable. Of course it is realizable. We understand this with our ordinary language.

Jack might say, for example, “I would have taken the job in Boston, if they had offered a higher salary. They didn’t, so I took the higher-paying job in New York instead.”

This is straightforward, and poses a riddle only, I think, to bad philosophers. Jack taking the job in Boston is a possible but non-actual world. This means it is, was, and always will be, a realizable world. The fact that it was not realized is because of antecedent circumstances: The company in Boston could have, but did not, offer Jack a higher salary than was offered by the company in New York. So Jack, acting on reasons and motives of his own, took the higher-paying New York job. Had antecedent circumstances been different — had the Boston company offered a higher salary — then Jack would have taken the Boston job instead. But Jack was free to take either job. His actual choice was based on his own motives and desires which in turn were based on actual antecedent circumstances.

In all ways, hard determinism (not to be confused with causal determinism) is a secularized version of Calvinistic predestination, and as such is basically a religious dogma with no empirical evidence or logical argument to support it.

In some ways, DBT is trying to pull more water from the stone than it would give, as far as pushing back that wave past Boston not offering enough money and all the way back to the initial condition of the universe.

The problem with that logic is, it ignores the approximately accessible discussion of the universe created Last Thursday that is identical to ours except that the HR guy in Boston has a cosmic ray hit their skull just right the moment they consider it and this makes them suddenly think that offering more salary is a really good idea.

In short it ignores other initial configurations to the system, especially instantaneous and complicated momentary initial configurations.

But even if I was created as I am an instant ago to make the decisions I make, even if the "real" big bang was 1 Planck second ago and I was assembled with care just so, the person who makes the decisions I make in this plank second is still me, and mitigation of those decision making processes will, MUST target me, not the inaccessible god who created me as I was 1 Planck second prior.

 

[DBT]

All actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.

Let’s examine all the ways DBT goes wrong.

You'd be better off looking at all the ways that you go wrong with your attempts at defending compatibilism.

First, it simply isn’t true that “all actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.”

It is precisely how determinism works and how it is defined.

Think about it.

Once again:
''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards

Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

No randomness or variation in output is the inevitability of output, ie, everything that happens within the system and its development over time.

Your objections are not only wrong, they are badly wrong.

 

[Jarhyn]

No randomness or variation in output is the inevitability of output, ie, everything that happens within the system and its development over time.

Neither variation or randomness is necessary for this discussion to continue. What is necessary for this discussion to continue is for you to actually consummate this belief that randomness or variation are necessary for the discussion of free will.

Otherwise, you could go back and find something in that post I keep mentioning and hilight it red.

The fact is, entailment doesn't make any problems for responsibility.

even if I was created as I am an instant ago to make the decisions I make, even if the "real" big bang was 1 Planck second ago and I was assembled with care just so, the person who makes the decisions I make in this plank second is still me, and mitigation of those decision making processes will, MUST target me, not the inaccessible god who created me as I was 1 Planck second prior.

 

[DBT]

Inevitable actions eliminate all possible alternatives.

No, they don't. they always were alternatives while they were alternatives, in that time prior to the resolution of the choice.

From there all the rest of your nonsense falls apart.

Too silly to deal with.

Why?

Because you don't understand the very definition of determinism that you yourself gave.

Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.


You must know that 'no randomness is involved in the development in the system' entails no variations? Yet apparently you don't.

You must know that ''no randomness'' means that nothing that has not been determined to happen precisely when it must happen, can happen? Yet apparently you don't.

You should know that no randomness/no variations, means that there are no alternatives within the system as it develops? Yet apparently you don't.

Why are you unable to grasp the basics of your own definition and its implications? That is the question that you should be asking yourself.

 

[DBT]

Whenever choosing is inevitable, two or more possibilities are also inevitable.

Determined actions are inevitable.

Yes, they are.

Inevitable actions eliminate all possible alternatives.

No they don't. The menu in the restaurant was inevitable. Thus the possible alternatives were also inevitable.

There are no 'possible alternatives' within a deterministic system.

And yet there they are, undeniably embedded in the chain of events. They cannot be removed without invalidating determinism.

Consequently, there can be no alternate actions in any given moment in time,

You are attempting to conflate the two contexts. The correct assessment is that there is no alternative to there being alternatives. The restaurant menu will be there, whether we like it or not. And we will have to make a choice, from that list of alternatives, before we can have dinner. There is no alternative to this chain of events happening just so.

Actions - being inevitable - negate choice in any given moment in time.

Choosing is an inevitable action. Therefore your claim that inevitability negates choice is clearly false.

What happens must happen as determined, not freely chosen.

Except when it is determined that you will be making your choice while free of coercion and undue influence. Whenever that happens your will is freely chosen (not free of causal necessity, of course, but simply free of coercion and undue influence, you know, free will).

Entailment is not a choice.

Right. We do not choose entailment versus not entailment. However, causal necessity often entails that we will be making choices of our own free will. Thus, our choices are entailed, and inevitably must happen, exactly as they do happen.

Conclusions inevitably appear at the end of the choosing process, and not a moment before.

All actions are inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized.

Yes. But no action will happen before it actually happens. A conclusion will happen at the end of our choosing, and not one moment earlier. If the conclusion happened any earlier, there would be no need for choosing.

Choosing involves sorting through a set of realizable options.

Indeed it does.

Actions being inevitable long before they come to the point of being realized is not an example of choosing.

Except when the action is choosing. Choosing, just like every other event, is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity, and it must happen, exactly as it does happen, without deviation. There is no alternative.

There is no choosing within a deterministic system.

It should be quite obvious to you by now that there is choosing within our deterministic system. It is there by causal necessity.

Necessitation;
''Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation.'' - J. W. N. Watkins, "Between Analytic and Empirical," Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 121, p. 114:

Geez, there is no need to get spooky about it. As everyone knows, events have causes, and one event will cause another event. This is something that is obvious to every person on the street. It is something they all take for granted.

free·dom
1: the quality or state of being free: as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action

The "absence of necessity" in that definition refers to things like: "You must finish your homework before you watch TV", which means you are not free to watch TV until you finish your homework. When you're old enough to make decisions for yourself, you will be free to watch TV and then do your homework.

But there is no absence of causal necessity, anywhere, ever. When you're old enough to make decisions for yourself, whatever you decide to do will exactly match causal necessity. So, you are free to make either choice, without any concern for causal necessity. Causal necessity takes care of itself. So you can go on about your business without giving it a thought.

And that's the only intelligent response to universal causal necessity, to acknowledge it, and then to forget about it.

About the "forgone conclusion" ...

All events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.

This means that each event happened exactly as it did at its specific place and time. And the conclusion of each choosing operation will happen only at the end of choosing, and not a moment before.

The suggestion that the conclusion is "foregone" is a figurative statement: "It is AS IF the conclusion were reached before the choosing began". But, of course, the conclusion was not reached until the choosing ended. So the figurative statement is literally false.

Figurative statements are commonly used in our communication, but they have one serious drawback: Every figurative statement is literally false. And, if you take a figurative statement literally, you end up with more errors down the line.

About "necessity" ...

Necessity is necessity. And sometimes our choices will necessarily be unduly influenced and out of our control. But most times, we will necessarily be free to make the choice for ourselves, as we do in the restaurant.

Our 'own actions' are a matter of inner necessity. We are an expression of whatever the brain is doing, be it is functional or dysfunctional, or our behaviour adaptive or maladaptive.

Of course. And our choosing controls what we will do. If our brain is functional, we will open the restaurant menu, consider our options, and order our dinner. If our brain is dysfunctional, we may scream at the waiter and throw food at him resulting in us being thrown out of the restaurant.

In either case, as in all cases, the behavior will be causally necessary given the conditions of our own brain. And if the brain is dysfunctional, we'll need to address that problem. But causal necessitation itself cannot be fixed or altered in any way, so it is never considered the cause of any problem.

Yes, what we deliberately do is causally necessary. Necessity by definition is not something we can control, modify or regulate: whatever happens, happens necessarily....

Exactly. So it is pointless to bring it up if there is nothing we can do about it. To be relevant, a cause must be something we can actually do something about. For example, we can remove a brain tumor that makes the brain dysfunctional or treat a mental illness psychiatrically.

But there is nothing to be done about causation itself, or causal necessity itself, or determinism itself. So, it is never appropriate to bring such things to the table when we are trying to solve a real problem in the real world.

so If external force, coercion or undue influence is a problem for free will, so is inner necessity, for which we have no control or ability to regulate.

But we do have control over the inner necessity of choosing. If someone deliberately chooses to commit a crime, we can arrest them, to prevent them from doing further harm, and we can give them the opportunity to reform their thinking through rehabilitation programs, and if their behavior can be corrected, we can safely return them to society, and if it cannot, we can continue to secure them.

Necessity, by definition, permits no control or regulation.

Causal necessity, by definition, permits every thing that ever happens, including our control and regulation. Determinism changes nothing at all.

Given determinism, the appearance of multiple options doesn't mean there is freedom to choose any option in any given moment.

Freedom is the ability to do what we want. And you should recognize by now that an "ability" is something that we "can" do, and not necessarily something that we "will" do. The freedom to choose any option does not require us to choose or not choose any option. It simply means that we "can" choose the Steak and we also "can" choose the Salad, regardless of what we actually choose.

The no deviation stipulation eliminates that possibility.

Afraid not. The no deviation stipulation guarantees that we will encounter those possibilities and deal with them as we decide what we will order for dinner.

Alternate options/actions have to be unrealizable. Otherwise, it's not determinism.

No. Alternate options/actions only have to be "unrealized" to qualify as determinism. They can still be (and are) "realizable".

That's not to say that these events do not, or cannot happen, just that the event cannot happen if that event has not been determined to happen.

To escape the paradox, simply change "cannot" to "will not" when speaking of determinism. Determinism says that any event that is determined not to happen "will not" happen.

It can happen when determined.

It will happen when determined.

If not determined to happen, it cannot happen.

If not determined to happen, it will not happen.

Disproven? No, necessitation is not a process of choosing.

But choosing is definitely a process of necessitation. Necessitation includes choosing, in the same way that it includes other logical processes like mathematical calculations. And these logical operations control what we do, which controls what we cause to happen in the real world. So, necessitation also includes choosing in the same way that it includes gravity.

I was halfway through with in my reply, but an inadvertent mouse click somehow deleted the page. I don't have time to start again.