Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

Willing and middle earth have a lot in common. Not the least of which is irrelevance. First. Determinism isn't actually causal at all unless you have something that sets time t = 0 before things. As I understand it things are at time t = -1 as well. Will is a human construct searching for relevance because we believe in it so. We are individuals, separate and distinct entities for chissake. We were mindless chickens pecking at stuff until we began surviving. Now we're the height of life doing the work entropy was doing so poorly.

rat, tat, bumfp?

A person's will is their specific intent for the immediate ("I think I will have a banana now") or distant ("last will and testament") future. We usually choose what we will do. The choice is expressed as "I will X", where X is what we have decided to do. Once the will is set, that intention motivates and directs our subsequent actions (going to the fruit bowl, peeling and eating the banana, then disposing of the peel).

I think that's pretty much how our "will" works in empirical reality. The notion of "free will" has to do with the choosing operation itself. It is literally a freely chosen "I will".

What is it supposed to be free of? Cause and effect? No. If it were free of reliable causation we could never carry out our intent.

How about our own genetic dispositions and appetites? No. If it were free from us, then it would be someone else's will, not ours.

The choice only needs to be free of coercion and other forms of undue influence to be truly free will.

Late response to above hypothesis.

I guess if you are going to insist on free will you should wrap it in protective armor against any insinuation that it, as a derivative of physical things, isn't subject to physical constraints. The only problem with that is there is no justifiable rational for insisting mindful be real. To suggest it is responsive to cause and effect when even determined things aren't caused is the height of being disingenuous. Inventions all the way down the rabbit hole.

There are three distinct types of causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational. All three are founded upon a physical infrastructure. However, each operates differently, according to unique deterministic rules. Matter organized differently can behave differently. An automobile operates differently from a microwave oven. Oxygen and Hydrogen remain gases until their temperature is a few thousand degrees below zero, but when organized into molecules of H2O they become a liquid that we can drink at room temperature.

Inanimate matter behaves "passively" in response to physical forces. A bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill, its behavior governed by the force of gravity.

Living organisms behave "purposefully" due to biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. A squirrel placed on that same slope may go up, down, or any other direction where he hopes to find his next acorn. While he is still affected by gravity, he is not governed by it.

Intelligent species can behave "deliberately". They have evolved a neurology capable of imagination, evaluation, and choosing. While still affected by physical forces and biological drives, they are no longer governed by them. For example, we get to choose when, where, and how to eat.

We rescue determinism by assuming that each of these three mechanisms is reliable within its own domain, and that all events are reliably caused by some specific combination of physical, biological, and rational causes.

What I hear you saying is that ... well I'm not sure what I am hearing you say. It sounds like you're dismissing the rational causal mechanism when you said, "there is no justifiable rational for insisting mindful be real". And it also sounds like you're dismissing reliable causation when you said, "even determined things aren't caused".

So, I'm trying to respond by explaining the three causal mechanisms and how determinism is still possible even with several distinct causal mechanisms in play.

 

[Copernicus]

...

Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga also has a problem with Libet's interpretation:

"What difference does it make if brain activity goes on before we are consciously aware of something? Consciousness is its own abstraction on its own time scale and that time scale is current with respect to it. Thus, Libet’s thinking is not correct."
-- Gazzaniga, Michael S.. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (p. 141). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

But I like to point out that Libet's subjects were conscious when asked to volunteer to participate in the study (volunteer = choose to do so of their own free will). They were also conscious when the researchers explained to them the apparatus and what they were expected to do with it, usually something simple and mechanical like squeezing their fist or pressing a button when they felt the urge.

I'm still more in tune with Gazzaniga's point, which is that consciousness is a very complex phenomenon. For one thing, there are different degrees of consciousness. One can be more or less conscious. I could list a number of functions that we tend to think of as components of consciousness, but that would probably take us too far away from the topic. Time sense (episodic memory) is only one aspect of it.

Free will does not provide God with a "get-out-of-jail-free" card. If God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he is also omni-responsible for everything that happens. After all, he could have created Heaven in the first place and put us all in it. On top of that, we have a Hell of eternal torture which cannot be justified. There is nothing we could do in a finite time on Earth that would justify even having our knuckles rapped for all eternity. Eventually, the accumulated punishment would far outweigh the crime. (There is a comment a little later that looks at the problem of what justice is all about).

I don't consider the religious perspective on free will and omniscience to be coherent, so I don't often bother with it except to point out that it is the historical foundation of the free will debate.

We do come with a lot of built-in functionality, the hard-coded firmware of autonomic systems and reflexive behavior. But I don't care for the self-deprecation of calling us moist or meat robots, or automatons, or machines. A robot is a machine we build to help us carry out our will. We do not want to create a robot with a will of its own. That's why Asimov created the Three Laws of Robotics, to keep their behavior in check.

"Moist robots" was just a joke term that Scott Adams came up with, but it makes the correct point that animal bodies are essentially machines that, like robots, come equipped with sensors, actuators, and a central processor that integrates them and builds predictive models of its environment. I've seen robots navigate mazes and arrive at complex decisions under uncertain circumstances. They don't reason in quite the same way as humans do, but they can be quite impressive in their ability to make decisions that overcome unpredictable obstacles. As for whether we want to create a robot with a will of its own, we almost certainly do. If we want them to survive and perform tasks that we build them for, that is inevitable. All of Asimov's robots had free will, but his "laws of robotics" aren't really credible. (BTW, if you have Netflix, watch the Russian miniseries "Better than Us". Slickly done, and Asimov's laws play a big role in the plot line.)

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga also has a problem with Libet's interpretation:


But I like to point out that Libet's subjects were conscious when asked to volunteer to participate in the study (volunteer = choose to do so of their own free will). They were also conscious when the researchers explained to them the apparatus and what they were expected to do with it, usually something simple and mechanical like squeezing their fist or pressing a button when they felt the urge.

I'm still more in tune with Gazzaniga's point, which is that consciousness is a very complex phenomenon. For one thing, there are different degrees of consciousness. One can be more or less conscious. I could list a number of functions that we tend to think of as components of consciousness, but that would probably take us too far away from the topic. Time sense (episodic memory) is only one aspect of it.

Free will does not provide God with a "get-out-of-jail-free" card. If God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he is also omni-responsible for everything that happens. After all, he could have created Heaven in the first place and put us all in it. On top of that, we have a Hell of eternal torture which cannot be justified. There is nothing we could do in a finite time on Earth that would justify even having our knuckles rapped for all eternity. Eventually, the accumulated punishment would far outweigh the crime. (There is a comment a little later that looks at the problem of what justice is all about).

I don't consider the religious perspective on free will and omniscience to be coherent, so I don't often bother with it except to point out that it is the historical foundation of the free will debate.

We do come with a lot of built-in functionality, the hard-coded firmware of autonomic systems and reflexive behavior. But I don't care for the self-deprecation of calling us moist or meat robots, or automatons, or machines. A robot is a machine we build to help us carry out our will. We do not want to create a robot with a will of its own. That's why Asimov created the Three Laws of Robotics, to keep their behavior in check.

"Moist robots" was just a joke term that Scott Adams came up with, but it makes the correct point that animal bodies are essentially machines that, like robots, come equipped with sensors, actuators, and a central processor that integrates them and builds predictive models of its environment. I've seen robots navigate mazes and arrive at complex decisions under uncertain circumstances. They don't reason in quite the same way as humans do, but they can be quite impressive in their ability to make decisions that overcome unpredictable obstacles. As for whether we want to create a robot with a will of its own, we almost certainly do. If we want them to survive and perform tasks that we build them for, that is inevitable. All of Asimov's robots had free will, but his "laws of robotics" aren't really credible. (BTW, if you have Netflix, watch the Russian miniseries "Better than Us". Slickly done, and Asimov's laws play a big role in the plot line.)

Hypnosis would also be a variation of consciousness. The subject is able to hear and to speak to the hypnotist, and may remember the session or forget it as the hypnotist suggests.

Michael Graziano ("Consciousness and the Social Brain") describes hemi-spatial neglect syndrome, where the patient who has an injury to the consciousness area of the brain is only aware of objects on one side of the room. Walk him to the other end and turn him around and it is the other side that he is unaware of. But he doesn't know that anything is missing, because that knowledge requires the missing consciousness. All of the other parts of visual processing still work, and the patient will reflexively bat away an object tossed at him from the missing side, be he cannot explain why.

Biological organisms, like us, come with a kind of built-in "biological will" to survive, thrive, and reproduce. The "deliberate will" doesn't show up until intelligent species appear, with the neurology sufficiently evolved to imagine alternatives, estimate the likely outcomes of our options, and choose for ourselves what we will do.

If we programmed the robot with the same biological will, then he would become a competing species, and I'm afraid we would likely have to destroy them.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilism based on ''the Right Stuff'' and the Pereboom rebuttal:

Character-based account: A decision can be said to be “free” if it is caused by, and not out of character for, a particular agent. This is the view traditionally associated with the likes of David Hume. It is probably too simplistic to be useful. Other compatibilist accounts offer more specific conditions.

Second-order desire account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a first-order desire (e.g. I want some chocolate) that is reflexively endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g. I want to want some chocolate). This is the account associated with Harry Frankfurt (and others).

Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).

Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.

As you can see, all of these accounts claim that a certain type of causal sequence has the “right stuff” for free will, irrespective of whether the decisions produced are fully determined by those causal sequences.


To put it more formally, Pereboom adopts the following argument against compatibilism:

(1) If one agent's decision is manipulated by another agent, then that first agent's action is not freely willed.

(2) There is no difference between a manipulation by another agent and causation by a causal factor external to the agent.

(3) On determinism, all of an agent's actions are determined (causally influenced) by at least some factors beyond that agent's control.

(4) Therefore, on determinism, no agent can be said to freely will their actions (or be morally responsible for them). (from 1, 2 and 3)

Pereboom is arguing against what he calls "basic desert moral responsibility" (SEP - Basic Desert moral responsibility).

Similarly Galen Strawson rejects "ultimate moral responsibility" while accepting everyday moral responsibility (Discussed earlier on this forum)

I think you'll find most compatibilists reject basic desert/ultimate moral responsibility but accept everyday moral responsibility.

Compatibilists reject the very thing that falsifies the idea of free will; determinism, instead redefining free will in order to bypass the consequences of determinism for freedom. Compatibilists, with their ''Right Suff'' sophistry try redefine the very idea of freedom, the ability to do otherwise in the same circumstances.

Compatibilists are closet Libertarians.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilism based on ''the Right Stuff'' and the Pereboom rebuttal:

Character-based account: A decision can be said to be “free” if it is caused by, and not out of character for, a particular agent. This is the view traditionally associated with the likes of David Hume. It is probably too simplistic to be useful. Other compatibilist accounts offer more specific conditions.

Second-order desire account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a first-order desire (e.g. I want some chocolate) that is reflexively endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g. I want to want some chocolate). This is the account associated with Harry Frankfurt (and others).

Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).

Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.

As you can see, all of these accounts claim that a certain type of causal sequence has the “right stuff” for free will, irrespective of whether the decisions produced are fully determined by those causal sequences.


To put it more formally, Pereboom adopts the following argument against compatibilism:

(1) If one agent's decision is manipulated by another agent, then that first agent's action is not freely willed.

(2) There is no difference between a manipulation by another agent and causation by a causal factor external to the agent.

(3) On determinism, all of an agent's actions are determined (causally influenced) by at least some factors beyond that agent's control.

(4) Therefore, on determinism, no agent can be said to freely will their actions (or be morally responsible for them). (from 1, 2 and 3)

I'm using a simpler resolution to the problem, the resolution that already exists and is currently practiced by most people who have not been infected with the philosophical paradox.

"Free will" is what we call the empirical event where a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

That's the operational definition of free will, the one that is actually used in practice when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It distinguishes deliberate choices, for one's own interests, from accidents, and from choices imposed upon us by someone (e.g., a guy pointing a gun at us) or something (e.g., a significant mental illness) else. This distinction guides how we go about correcting bad behavior. For example, if it is a deliberate choice by a sane adult to rob a bank to get some cash to spend, then we need to take steps to change how the offender thinks about these things in the future. If it is due to a significant mental illness or brain injury, then we need to apply medical and/or psychiatric treatment. In any case, we may need to secure the offender to protect the public, either in a correctional facility or a secure mental facility.

Determinism, universal causal necessity/inevitability, makes no difference to this process. Both the criminal's behavior and our own behavior in correcting the offender would be causally necessary from any prior point in eternity, just like all other events. Causal necessity/inevitability is basically a background constant found on both sides of every equation, and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result.

All four of Pereboom's arguments are based upon the mistaken assumption that determinism implies the absence of free will. It doesn't. Reliable causation is not something that anyone can or needs to be free of. Only certain specific causes compromise our free will. They can be grouped under the general category of "undue" or "extraordinary" influence. But reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive nor undue. It is what we all take for granted all the time.

There is no valid form of compatibilism. Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism. Determinism entails that all objects and events are fixed as a matter of natural law. Will cannot change a thing. Will, unable to alter a single event in the course of events, has no freedom.

Compatibilists carefully formulate what they consider to be the ''Right Stuff'' while conveniently ignoring or dismissing the most fundamental issue of determinism: you don't actually get a choice.

You have the impression of choice. Without choice, events proceed according to natural law, consequently, you have no freedom, you play your part like a actor in a video.

Actors in a video give an impression of freedom, there they are, they make love, argue, ride horses, shoot guns, discuss plans, carry out raids....but cannot deviate from the script.

 

[The AntiChris]

Compatibilists are closet Libertarians.

Can you explain your reasoning?

 

[The AntiChris]

Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism.

This is the essence of DBT's rejection of any form of free will.

It's an ideological position which is asserted without argument.

 

[DBT]

Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism.

This is the essence of DBT's rejection of any form of free will.

It's an ideological position which is asserted without argument.

I understand what determinism means and what it entails. It is the compatibilist who rejects the consequences of a determined system in order to define ''the Right Stuff'' (as quoted in my post) as an example of free will.

 

[DBT]

Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism.

This is the essence of DBT's rejection of any form of free will.

It's an ideological position which is asserted without argument.

It's not a rejection without reason. The reasons why compatibilism fails have been described over and over, arguments and source material quoted and cited. To say 'rejected without argument' is patently false.

I provided an example of an argument on this thread yesterday, quoted just above, which proves your claim to be false. That you fail to acknowledge or consider any of the arguments or reasons that have been given doesn't mean compatibilism is being rejected without argument.

It is your comment that is an example of a rejection made without argument or reason.

Compatibilism is an ideology that contradicts determinism, how the brain works, how decisions are made and actions carried out.

 

[DBT]

Another example:

Two Reasons for Thinking that Free Will is Incompatible with Determinism

''A common first response to determinism is to think that it means that our choices make no difference to anything that happens because earlier causes have pre-determined or “fixed” our entire future (Nahmias 2011). It is easy to think that determinism implies that we have a destiny or fate that we cannot avoid, no matter what we choose or decide and no matter how hard we try.

Man, when running over, frequently without his own knowledge, frequently in spite of himself, the route which nature has marked out for him, resembles a swimmer who is obliged to follow the current that carries him along; he believes himself a free agent because he sometimes consents, sometimes does not consent, to glide with the stream, which, notwithstanding, always hurries him forward. (Holbach 1770 [2002]: 181; see also Wegner 2003)

It is widely agreed, by incompatibilists as well as compatibilists, that this is a mistake. Empirical discoveries about our brain and behavior might tell us that we don’t have as much conscious control as we think we have (Wegner 2003; Libet 1999). (For critique of arguments claiming that recent scientific research has shown that “conscious will is an illusion”, see Mele 2009, some of the essays in Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel 2011 and Roskies & Nahmias 2016.) And there are worries, arising from certain versions of physicalism, that our mental states don’t have the causal powers we think they have (Kim 1998). But these threats to free will have nothing to do with determinism. Determinism might imply that our choices and efforts have earlier sufficient causes; it does not imply that we don’t make choices or that our choices and efforts are causally impotent. Determinism is consistent with the fact that our deliberation, choices and efforts are part of the causal process whereby our bodies move and cause further effects in the world. And a cause is the kind of thing that “makes a difference” (Sartorio 2005). If I raise my hand because I chose to do so, then it’s true, ceteris paribus, that if my choice had not occurred, my hand-raising would not have occurred.

Putting aside this worry, we may classify arguments for incompatibilism as falling into one of two main varieties:

Arguments for the claim that determinism would make it impossible for us to cause and control our actions in the right kind of way.
Arguments for the claim that determinism would deprive us of the power or ability to do or choose otherwise.''

 

[The AntiChris]

Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism.

This is the essence of DBT's rejection of any form of free will.

It's an ideological position which is asserted without argument.

It's not a rejection without reason. The reasons why compatibilism fails have been described over and over, arguments and source material quoted and cited. To say 'rejected without argument' is patently false.

I provided an example of an argument on this thread yesterday, quoted just above, which proves your claim to be false. That you fail to acknowledge or consider any of the arguments or reasons that have been given doesn't mean compatibilism is being rejected without argument.

It is your comment that is an example of a rejection made without argument or reason.

Compatibilism is an ideology that contradicts determinism, how the brain works, how decisions are made and actions carried out.

I was hoping for an argument (or a link to an argument) in support of your assertion that "Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism". Oh well.

(Please note: I'm not asking why you think free will is incompatible with determinism, I'm asking why you think freedom is incompatible with determinism)

 

[DBT]

It's not a rejection without reason. The reasons why compatibilism fails have been described over and over, arguments and source material quoted and cited. To say 'rejected without argument' is patently false.

I provided an example of an argument on this thread yesterday, quoted just above, which proves your claim to be false. That you fail to acknowledge or consider any of the arguments or reasons that have been given doesn't mean compatibilism is being rejected without argument.

It is your comment that is an example of a rejection made without argument or reason.

Compatibilism is an ideology that contradicts determinism, how the brain works, how decisions are made and actions carried out.

I was hoping for an argument (or a link to an argument) in support of your assertion that "Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism". Oh well.

(Please note: I'm not asking why you think free will is incompatible with determinism, I'm asking why you think freedom is incompatible with determinism)

Just what I expected. You either don't read what is provided, or can't understand what is said, be it what I say or what any of the articles say.

It seems that nobody but you understands compatibilism, but you can't explain. Your method of attack is what we see here, innuendo and denial.

Try reading what was provided and explain why you believe it fails, be it mine or an article. Just don't repeat your assertion that no argument against compatibilism has been given. It's getting tiresome.

 

[The AntiChris]

It's not a rejection without reason. The reasons why compatibilism fails have been described over and over, arguments and source material quoted and cited. To say 'rejected without argument' is patently false.

I provided an example of an argument on this thread yesterday, quoted just above, which proves your claim to be false. That you fail to acknowledge or consider any of the arguments or reasons that have been given doesn't mean compatibilism is being rejected without argument.

It is your comment that is an example of a rejection made without argument or reason.

Compatibilism is an ideology that contradicts determinism, how the brain works, how decisions are made and actions carried out.

I was hoping for an argument (or a link to an argument) in support of your assertion that "Freedom is simply not compatible with determinism". Oh well.

(Please note: I'm not asking why you think free will is incompatible with determinism, I'm asking why you think freedom is incompatible with determinism)

Just what I expected. You either don't read what is provided, or can't understand what is said, be it what I say or what any of the articles say.

It seems that nobody but you understands compatibilism, but you can't explain. Your method of attack is what we see here, innuendo and denial.

Try reading what was provided and explain why you believe it fails, be it mine or an article. Just don't repeat your assertion that no argument against compatibilism has been given. It's getting tiresome.

Do you make any distinction in your writing between 'freedom' and 'free will'? Or do you view them as synonymous and therefore interchangeable?

 

[DBT]

Just what I expected. You either don't read what is provided, or can't understand what is said, be it what I say or what any of the articles say.

It seems that nobody but you understands compatibilism, but you can't explain. Your method of attack is what we see here, innuendo and denial.

Try reading what was provided and explain why you believe it fails, be it mine or an article. Just don't repeat your assertion that no argument against compatibilism has been given. It's getting tiresome.

Do you make any distinction in your writing between 'freedom' and 'free will'? Or do you view them as synonymous and therefore interchangeable?

The term Free Will refers to freedom. Specifically, freedom of the will. There is no conflict between "free"" and/or ""freedom."

Compatibilism asserts, basically, that an example of free will occurs when an agent/subject thinks or acts without constraint or coercion.

 

[The AntiChris]

Just what I expected. You either don't read what is provided, or can't understand what is said, be it what I say or what any of the articles say.

It seems that nobody but you understands compatibilism, but you can't explain. Your method of attack is what we see here, innuendo and denial.

Try reading what was provided and explain why you believe it fails, be it mine or an article. Just don't repeat your assertion that no argument against compatibilism has been given. It's getting tiresome.

Do you make any distinction in your writing between 'freedom' and 'free will'? Or do you view them as synonymous and therefore interchangeable?

The term Free Will refers to freedom. Specifically, freedom of the will. There is no conflict between "free"" and/or ""freedom."

Compatibilism asserts, basically, that an example of free will occurs when an agent/subject thinks or acts without constraint or coercion.

Was that a 'yes' or 'no'?

 

[WAB]

And around and around we go.

 

[DBT]

And around and around we go.

Yep.

 

[DBT]

The term Free Will refers to freedom. Specifically, freedom of the will. There is no conflict between "free"" and/or ""freedom."

Compatibilism asserts, basically, that an example of free will occurs when an agent/subject thinks or acts without constraint or coercion.

Was that a 'yes' or 'no'?

I said interchangable. Nothing that makes a difference.

 

[The AntiChris]

The term Free Will refers to freedom. Specifically, freedom of the will. There is no conflict between "free"" and/or ""freedom."

Compatibilism asserts, basically, that an example of free will occurs when an agent/subject thinks or acts without constraint or coercion.

Was that a 'yes' or 'no'?

I said interchangable.

You didn't.

One of the problems here is the lack of precision in the language you use - it makes meaningful exchanges virtually impossible.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Just what I expected. You either don't read what is provided, or can't understand what is said, be it what I say or what any of the articles say.

It seems that nobody but you understands compatibilism, but you can't explain. Your method of attack is what we see here, innuendo and denial.

Try reading what was provided and explain why you believe it fails, be it mine or an article. Just don't repeat your assertion that no argument against compatibilism has been given. It's getting tiresome.

Do you make any distinction in your writing between 'freedom' and 'free will'? Or do you view them as synonymous and therefore interchangeable?

The term Free Will refers to freedom. Specifically, freedom of the will. There is no conflict between "free"" and/or ""freedom."

Compatibilism asserts, basically, that an example of free will occurs when an agent/subject thinks or acts without constraint or coercion.

If you view determinism as a "constraint", then your definition of compatibilism is incorrect. The only constraints that are meaningful to free will are those that prevent the person from choosing for themselves what they will do. Determinism does not prevent this. Determinism guarantees that the person will be "that which made the choice". Determinism means that it was causally necessary and inevitable that the person would be free of coercion and undue influence when they made their choice. (Or, if they did not choose of their own free will, then determinism guarantees that their choice was coerced or unduly influenced).