Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

Well, I hope that I have helped to straighten all that out for you.

If there is any specific issue regarding free will or determinism that you would like to address, please bring it to the table and we'll see what we can do to figure it out.

Missed this bit. The free will debate has been about definitions, determinism, necessity, etc.....but now we have the evidence from neuroscience and a better understanding of how our thoughts and actions are produced. Definitions alone are not sufficient. A carefully crafted definition of compatibilism, for instance, does not account for inner necessity or the mechanisms of thought and action. That is its point of failure.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Peter van Inwagen wrote a very clear argument against compatibilism called the Consequence Argument. It is explained very clearly in the following 17 minute video by Gordon Pettit, a former student of van Inwagen. Pettit also reveals the premise in the argument where he (and van Inwagen) think that the argument is weakest--the conditional statement that "If determinism is true, then we have no free will". Both Pettit and van Inwagen seem to treat "free will" as if it meant freedom from causal determinism. They conclude that people do have a kind of free will in the sense that moral responsibility implies "metaphysical freedom" (whatever that means).



A much clearer explanation of free will and compatibilism comes from Daniel Dennett (looking very much like Santa Claus in the following 6 minute video ). It is interesting that DBT makes much out of the role of biology in his denials of compatibilism, but biology is exactly what Dennett relies on to explain why compatibilism is the most sensible position on free will.



What Dennett's position comes down to is very similar to that taken by Marvin or myself regarding the way we choose to define the concept of free will. I would have liked Dennett to talk a little more about the various types of free will, but that would have made the discussion a bit longer and harder to follow. Basically, though, he says that we need to retain the definitions of the expression that most matter to us or have the greatest consequence for us--exactly what Marvin has been hammering away at in this thread. In a way, Dennett's conclusion is not all that different from van Inwagen's idea that moral responsibility implies a kind of metaphysical "freedom". That is, people can be held accountable for their actions, because they can imagine how they or others might have behaved differently in the past if they had known how their future would turn out. That is, the discrepancy between the reality that we know and the reality that we can imagine is what ultimately gives us free will in a deterministic universe. We choose to duck when a brick that was never going to hit us (because we were predetermined to duck) comes flying at us precisely because we have imagined the consequence of not ducking at flying bricks. Those who don't learn to duck don't tend to survive and produce offspring.

I watched the Inwagen video and left a comment on YouTube. I had already commented on the Dennett video 4 years ago. There are two things to say about them.

1. The Inwagen video used 8 steps to confirm determinism, and then presumes that if determinism is true then free will must be false. Inwagen is expressing the incompatibilist's belief that one's actions cannot be both causally necessary and free. But this would only be true if causal necessity was a meaningful and relevant constraint, that is, something that we needed to be "free of" (meaningful constraint) and something that we could be "free of" (otherwise it is irrelevant).

If we do not need to be free of causal necessity, then incompatibilism fails. So, the burden of proof for the incompatibilist is to demonstrate that causal necessity is a meaningful and relevant constraint. Inwagen never touches upon this problem. Instead, he simply assumes it is must be true.

If I may use Inwagen's language, it is an untouchable truth that we never experience causal necessity as a constraint. A constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. Only specific causes, like being tied to a chair, or being forced at gunpoint to do something against our will, is a constraint.

But cause and effect itself is not a constraint. Everything that we want to do, whether walking, talking, or chewing gum, requires reliable cause and effect. So, generally, cause and effect actually enables us to do the things we want to do. To view cause and effect as a constraint, something that we must escape in order to be "truly" free, is a rather perverse view of causation.

Every freedom that we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable causation. To be free of causation would be to lose all freedom. So, it is an untouchable truth that reliable causation in itself is not a meaningful or relevant constraint. And causal necessity, which is nothing more than the chain of reliable causes and their effects, while it may sound like a constraint, is not a true constraint.

Unlike Dennett, I have no qualms with the word "inevitable" in the context of causal necessity. Deterministic inevitability does not remove our ability to decide for ourselves what we will do, rather it incorporates our choosing and our actions in the overall scheme of causation. When we make something evitable, it will be inevitable that we do so.

Also, Dennett stops at biology. But free will does not truly emerge until we evolve intelligence. In the same way that living organisms display a variety of behaviors that are never displayed by inanimate matter, with intelligence we also get a brain that creates a model of reality, and uses that model to imagine different scenarios, alternate possibilities, and mental processes like choosing. With intelligence we no longer respond to our biological urges instinctively, but instead we get to choose what, when, and how we go about satisfying our biological needs.

Choosing what we will do is what free will is about. Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will". That choice sets our specific intent, and that intent motivates and directs our subsequent actions. In my comment on the Dennett YouTube, I post a link to my article "Determinism: What's Wrong and How to Fix It". There I go over the three distinct causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

 

[fromderinside]

Deterministic inevitability is about what will happen in the real world. But this in no way restricts what can and cannot happen. The inevitable and the possible existence in separate semantic contexts.

There I go over the three distinct causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

These two statements from your article cause to set it aside. Determinism is quite distinct according to SJP (Stanford Journal of Philosophy)

The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism is a material specification. There is no difference between physical and biological except as a classification of qualitatively different material covered under natural law. More precisely everything physical is covered by  Scientific Law

Philosophy clings to a definition of Natural Law in the face of Determinism so it can be discussed among polite humanists. Point is anything other than the material is not determined by Causal Determinism, now, Determinism.

Instead, you are talking about  Humanistic Naturalism. Even in that realm you are in trouble since naturalistic and deterministic constructs need a bridge between immaterial and material.

 

[DBT]

All of which results from information processing, not will, not free will.

You keep pretending that information processing does not include choosing!

Wrong, what I am saying is that determinism necessitates the decision that is made and the action that follows, that no alternative is possible within a determined system. That option b, if determined, must necessarily be taken.

In other words, if you can see the distinction: ''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?''

Its a matter of input, your questions, act upon networks that process the information and spit out the reply in the conscious form, thoughts, urges, actions.

And one of those thoughts is, "Should I have the salad or the steak? Well, I had bacon and eggs for breakfast, so I should have the salad now" resulting in the action, "Waiter, I will have the salad, please." (which I try to say without spitting).

Choosing is a function of information processing! If I fail to choose between the salad and the steak, there's no dinner for me. Choosing must happen if I wish to eat.

Nope, the option that taken is the necessitated result of information processing. What you think and do follows from information processing; inputs > processing > thoughts > actions.

You are asked a question, thoughts emerge fully formed into consciousness in response. Inputs interacting with Memory Function enabling recognition and conscious thoughts as they come to mind, driven by information processing, not will, not free will.

The events are driven by my awareness that I need to answer the waiter, who just asked me, "And what will you be having tonight, sir?" If I have not yet "made up my mind", if my "urges" to have the steak are still competing with my judgment that the salad will be better for me, then my response would be, "Uh, could you get DBT's order first, I'm still trying to decide".

So, you order the steak. (You claims you do this without conscious awareness, and are a little surprised later when the waiter shows up with the steak and a bill you must pay. You explain this to yourself, after the fact. "Gee, I must have ordered this, so I must have deliberately chosen it, so now I guess I'll have to pay for it").

And now it's my turn again. I decide to curb my urge for the steak and order the salad instead. "I will have the chef salad, please".

This particular "information processing" is commonly known as "choosing what I will do". Perhaps you've heard of it?

Free will is a freely chosen "I will". "Freely chosen" means I did the choosing myself, without coercion or undue influence.

It's a simple, but very essential concept. Both the waiter and I understand it. The waiter brings the bill to me, because I am responsible for ordering the chef salad.

There, now you understand what free will is actually about.

Will, be it labelled free or not, plays no part in information processing, that is the work of neural networks....your conscious experience, including your will is necessitated by information processing.

Architecture and inputs determine output in the form of conscious thoughts and action, what you say and do is being generated by underlying neuronal activity.

To paraphrase Inwagen; how do you have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something you have no choice about?

Determinism is not force.

Exactly. Determinism simply asserts that all of the events, including my thoughts and my feelings, were causally necessary, one event reliably causing the next event, in a chain that stretches back (forward) as far as we can imagine. Each thought that popped into my head was caused by preceding events: The choice to eat at the restaurant led to my reading the menu, which led to my narrowing down my choice to just the steak and the salad, which led to my recalling the bacon and eggs for breakfast and having a bad feeling about the cholesterol, which led my attention to the salad and a good feeling that this was the right choice, which led to me deciding "I will have the salad", which led to me telling the waiter, "I will have the salad please", which led the waiter to bring me a salad and later bring me the bill.

Each event was reliably determined by prior causes. And we could extend our research into prior causes to cover the prior causes of me, and why I happened to be concerned with my cholesterol, and when I was born, and so on, back to the big bang.

But, instead of all that research, why don't we just presume that every event that ever happens is always reliably caused by prior events. We presume that determinism is correct in this assertion.

However, this is probably the only assertion made by determinists that is correct. (For example, they are always incorrect when they claim that a person "could not have done otherwise" when there are two or more options on the table. Two options equals two "I can's". Two "I can's" will always result in one "I will" and one "I could have").

If determinism is true, each event is determined by preceding events, each event being both a cause and an effect. You don't choose what goes on inside your brain, yet what goes on inside your brain is producing you, your thoughts and actions on the basis of neural architecture and environment, not will.

Response is not a matter 'force' or free will but neuronal necessity: information acting upon neural networks necessitates or determines output: your thoughts and actions.

Thoughts are also information that act upon the neural networks. Thoughts necessitate and determine other thoughts. Thoughts result in choosing what we will do. What we "will do" is a thought that necessitates and determines actions, for example, me telling the waiter "I will have the chef salad, please" is an action necessitated by my thoughts.

Thoughts necessitating other thoughts and actions is how the rational causal mechanism works. Neuroscience may eventually explain to us how the experience of these thoughts is reflected in the physical processes of the brain. But neuroscience will never tell us that these thoughts originate somewhere other than within our own brain.

Thoughts are an experience that the brain generates (conscious report). Thoughts must necessarily follow inputs and processing. The feedback you speak of comes from fresh information, both from within the system, memory, and sensory information.


Neuronal Mechanisms of Conscious Awareness
''This review focuses on conscious awareness: the state in which external and internal stimuli are perceived and can be intentionally acted on. Much investigative effort has been directed at testing theoretical constructs dealing with general as well as specific characteristics of conscious awareness.''

When
''When do humans become conscious of external stimuli? The seminal studies of Libet et al6,7 provide insights into the timing of conscious awareness. Using trains of electrical stimuli to the human cortex, Libet and colleagues demonstrated that perceptual threshold decreases as the train duration is extended up to about 300 to 500 milliseconds and that longer train durations do not further lower the perceptual threshold. They called this 300- to 500-millisecond window the utilization time and suggested that it was the time necessary for a stimulus to reach conscious awareness.

''Masking experiments have been instrumental in further defining the temporal gap between stimulus presentation and its conscious perception. Masking refers to the suppression of conscious perception of a target stimulus by another stimulus. The masking effect is enhanced in some patients with focal cerebral lesions (eg, neglect syndrome), but it can also be produced in healthy subjects. In the somatosensory modality, a mask given 50 to 100 milliseconds after the target stimulus to the opposite hand is actually more effective in blocking the target than if presented simultaneously with the target.8 These findings demonstrate not only that conscious perception is delayed but also that the mechanisms leading to conscious perception are particularly sensitive to disruptions at this specific time interval

You are not being forced. Your thoughts and actions are neither forced or the result of Will or Free Will.

Well, sometimes a person is actually forced to do something against their will, for example, by a guy with a gun or by a mental illness that prevents them from rationally deciding for themselves what they will do (e.g., hallucinations and delusions).

This is what free will is about. Free will is not the absence of necessity, it is the absence of coercion and undue influence. This is an empirical distinction, not an abstract issue.

It doesn't matter if we are not forced against our will, if determined, action must necessarily unfold or proceed as determined, unimpeded or unrestricted. This is not free will. It's simply unimpeded action.

We know that. Thinking happens within the brain, our "information processor". We have internal information and we have external information that play a role in choosing what we will do. The guy with the gun is external information. Our thoughts and feelings are internal information. And a mental illness or injury can disrupt the information processing.


This is common knowledge that does not require constant repetition in this discussion.

Given the nature of the rationale for free will, I feel compelled to continually point out the obvious.

But neuroscience will not resolve the debate for that very reason, because the debate IS about definitions. If determinism is defined as "the absence of free will", or, if free will is defined as "the absence of determinism", then we have an everlasting debate.

The only way to resolve such a debate is by getting our definitions straight.

This compatibilist defines determinism as the belief that every event is reliably caused by prior events. And, he finds this belief to be true.

This compatibilist defines free will as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other undue influences (such as mental illness, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.). And this is the free will that everyone uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

These two definitions are compatible.

Definitions alone prove nothing. Acting without coercion is simply means acting without coercion. No need to apply 'free will' label.

A more accurate description would be ''she acted according to her own will'' or ''he was not forced, he acted of his own will''

Which, for the given reasons, the underlying actions of neural networks, inputs, etc. Which for the reasons outlined above and numerous other posts, is not an instance of 'free will'

It is interesting that DBT makes much out of the role of biology in his denials of compatibilism, but biology is exactly what Dennett relies on to explain why compatibilism is the most sensible position on free will.

That misrepresents my position. I know that compatibilism 'relies' on determinism and of course biology, biology being deterministic is a part of compatibilism, and Dennett does indeed rely on biology for his argument for compatibilism.

I am pointing why this is wrong, why it doesn't prove the proposition, why freedom of will is not compatible with determinism or biology (which is inseparable from the world and its events)

Quote:
''The reason people like myself think Dennett is “wrong” is not that if we were to define free will like he does, that we are saying this doesn’t exist. Rather, it’s because we are saying the way he defines free will inappropriately side-steps some very important issues of concern and creates confusion. It’s not the ability a large majority of people feel they possess when they hear the term, it’s not the free will definition that is of philosophical importance to so many other topics, and using the term with a compatibilist definition causes more confusion than not.

In a nutshell, this is Dennett’s free will semantic that he suggests is the “free will worth wanting”:
the power to be active agents, biological devices that respond to our environment with rational, desirable courses of action.

Do note he’s often vague and not upfront when it comes to definitions and it takes wading through a lot of his material to get to a point in which he actually gives a solid definition of what he means.

Of course most (if not all) hard determinist or hard incompatibilist think we are and have this ability. In no way does a free will skeptic propose that we are not active agents that respond to our environment with (sometimes) rational, desirable courses of action. The only people who might think this are fatalists, but most serious free will skeptics who understand determinism do not hold to the position of fatalism – which is different from determinism.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Deterministic inevitability is about what will happen in the real world. But this in no way restricts what can and cannot happen. The inevitable and the possible existence in separate semantic contexts.

There I go over the three distinct causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

These two statements from your article cause to set it aside. Determinism is quite distinct according to SJP (Stanford Journal of Philosophy)

The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism is a material specification. There is no difference between physical and biological except as a classification of qualitatively different material covered under natural law. More precisely everything physical is covered by  Scientific Law

Philosophy clings to a definition of Natural Law in the face of Determinism so it can be discussed among polite humanists. Point is anything other than the material is not determined by Causal Determinism, now, Determinism.

Instead, you are talking about  Humanistic Naturalism. Even in that realm you are in trouble since naturalistic and deterministic constructs need a bridge between immaterial and material.

The distinction is between the Physical, Life, and Social sciences. Each category of science observes a different class of objects, inanimate matter, living organisms, or intelligent species. The Physical sciences observe the behavior of inanimate matter. When they observe a high reliability in a pattern of behavior, they document these patterns as "laws", such as the "law of gravity". They test these laws by experiments and then use them to predict things, such as where to aim the rocket, and how fast it must go, to arrive at the same location as the Moon, to assure a successful Moon landing (rather than the rocket flying out into empty space).

It is a similar process for the Life sciences. They observe the behavior of living organisms, both flora and fauna, under different conditions. A botanist can tell you which plants need more or less light, water, or other nutrients in order to survive, thrive, and reproduce seeds. In order to explain this behavior, they introduce the notion of biologically driven instinctual behavior, behavior that serves a purpose, to survive, thrive, and reproduce. This is a new causal mechanism that is never observed in inanimate matter. But we still look for reliable patterns of behavior, and create "principles", "rules", or "laws" to describe it, to make it predictable. And we test these predictions experimentally to confirm our theories.

With the evolution of intelligent species, we get yet another distinct new causal mechanism in play: a brain capable of modelling reality to provide the framework for imagination, evaluation, and choosing. Now we have not just purposeful instinctual behavior, but also deliberate behavior. And this is studied by the Social sciences, which include psychology and sociology. Here, too, reliable patterns of behavior are documented as "principles", as in William James's "Principles of Psychology".

With the three distinct classes of objects, we get three distinct causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational. So, how does this affect determinism? Determinism, to be true, must include all three causal mechanisms. It cannot leave any one of them out without loosing the ability to assert that every event is reliably caused by prior events. Some of these events have physical causes, some of them cannot be explained without the notion of biological causation, and some cannot be explained without including our deliberate actions.

Therefore, to rescue determinism, we assume that each of these causal mechanisms is perfectly reliable within its own domain, and that every event is the reliable result of some specific combination of physical, biological, and/or rational causation.

Any version of determinism that leaves out any one of these causal mechanism will be unable to claim that an event is, theoretically, 100% predictable by a knowledge of prior events. Failing that test, determinism fails. I think that determinism, properly defined, and taking into account all three causal mechanisms, can pass that test. However, with the rational causal mechanisms, we get this little thing called "choosing what we will do" by reason and calculation, otherwise known as "free will".

So, determinism must accommodate free will or it must retreat from the field.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

All of which results from information processing, not will, not free will.

You keep pretending that information processing does not include choosing!

Wrong, what I am saying is that determinism necessitates the decision that is made and the action that follows, that no alternative is possible within a determined system.

So, how does this determinism fellow go about necessitating my decision? Is he some spirit that invades my mind and takes over my brain?

Or, isn't it the case that this determinism is actually my own mind/brain as it causally necessitates my choice by my own thoughts and my own feelings?

It is an empirical fact that my own brain is making my own choices, and for my own reasons, according to my own goals, and in my own interests.

And, yes, we can also call that "determinism" if you like, because my choice is most certainly reliably determined by prior causes, such as my own reasons, goals, interests, thoughts, feelings, etc. And these reasons, goals, interests, thoughts, and feelings each will have their own prior causes (most of which will also be me), and each of those prior causes will have their prior causes, ad infinitum. After we follow the trail of the prior causes of me, we will eventually find causes that have nothing at all to do with me, such as the big bang.

That option b, if determined, must necessarily be taken.

Yes. If I find option B to be more in line with my goals and reasons, then those goals and reasons will causally necessitate that I choose B (even though I could have chosen A, I definitely would not have chosen it given those goals and reasons).

In other words, if you can see the distinction: ''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about?''

Your test is invalid. It suggests that I must cause and control the big bang before I can decide what to have for breakfast. IT IS NEVER NECESSARY FOR A CAUSE TO HAVE NO PRIOR CAUSES IN ORDER TO BE THE PRIOR CAUSE OF SOMETHING ELSE.

Did you cause the big bang? I'm pretty sure I didn't. That event was totally beyond our control. But I'm pretty sure that I did control what I had for breakfast this morning. Was my choice causally necessary from the point of the big bang? Why, yes it was. But not in any meaningful or relevant way.

The meaningful cause of an event efficiently explains why it happened. It identifies the causes that we would have to change in order to avoid it happening again (bad event), or to make it happen more often (good event).

To be a relevant cause of an event, it must be something that we can actually change. There's no point bringing up the big bang. It is totally irrelevant to my choosing what to have for breakfast.

So, Inwagen's assertion that we must control our prior causes before we can control our own choices is nonsense.

Nope, the option that taken is the necessitated result of information processing. What you think and do follows from information processing; inputs > processing > thoughts > actions.

Exactly:
1. Inputs: The restaurant's menu of realizable alternatives.
2. Processing: Me considering the consequences of the steak versus the salad upon my cholesterol levels.
3. Thoughts: "I think it would be best if I order the salad."
4. Actions: "Waiter, I will have the Chef Salad, please."
5. Consequences: I eat the salad and the waiter brings me the bill, holding me responsible for my deliberate act.

What did you think information processing was all about, if not this?

You are asked a question, thoughts emerge fully formed into consciousness in response. Inputs interacting with Memory Function enabling recognition and conscious thoughts as they come to mind, driven by information processing, not will, not free will.

The events are driven by my awareness that I need to answer the waiter, who just asked me, "And what will you be having tonight, sir?" If I have not yet "made up my mind", if my "urges" to have the steak are still competing with my judgment that the salad will be better for me, then my response would be, "Uh, could you get DBT's order first, I'm still trying to decide".

So, you order the steak. (You claim you do this without conscious awareness, and are a little surprised later when the waiter shows up with the steak and a bill you must pay. You explain this to yourself, after the fact. "Gee, I must have ordered this, so I must have deliberately chosen it, so now I guess I'll have to pay for it").

And now it's my turn again. I decide to curb my urge for the steak and order the salad instead. "I will have the chef salad, please".

This particular "information processing" is commonly known as "choosing what I will do".

Free will is a freely chosen "I will". "Freely chosen" means I did the choosing myself, without coercion or undue influence.

It's a simple, but very essential concept. Both the waiter and I understand it. The waiter brings the bill to me, because I am responsible for ordering the chef salad.

There, now you understand what free will is actually about.

Will, be it labelled free or not, plays no part in information processing, that is the work of neural networks....your conscious experience, including your will is necessitated by information processing.

Where does your comment deviate from this:
1. Inputs: The restaurant's menu of realizable alternatives.
2. Processing: Me considering the consequences of the steak versus the salad upon my cholesterol levels.
3. Thoughts: "I think it would be best if I order the salad. So, I will order the salad."
4. Actions: "Waiter, I will have the Chef Salad, please."
5. Consequences: I eat the salad and the waiter brings me the bill, holding me responsible for my deliberate act.

Architecture and inputs determine output in the form of conscious thoughts and action, what you say and do is being generated by underlying neuronal activity.

Again, how doe that deviate from this:
1. Inputs: The restaurant's menu of realizable alternatives.
2. Processing: Me considering the consequences of the steak versus the salad upon my cholesterol levels.
3. Thoughts: "I think it would be best if I order the salad. So, I will order the salad."
4. Actions: "Waiter, I will have the Chef Salad, please."
5. Consequences: I eat the salad and the waiter brings me the bill, holding me responsible for my deliberate act.

To paraphrase Inwagen; how do you have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something you have no choice about?

As I mentioned above, I had no control over the big bang, and yet I had complete control over what I would have for breakfast. The fact that my choice is causally necessary does not contradict the fact that I am the most meaningful and relevant cause of my choice of breakfasts, despite all of the prior causes that followed from the big bang. Nearly all of those prior causes are totally meaningless and irrelevant to my breakfast. So, Inwagen clearly has his head in a dark place.

If determinism is true, each event is determined by preceding events, each event being both a cause and an effect.

Correct, as always. However, only a few those causes are meaningful and relevant, while the rest are meaningless and irrelevant.

You don't choose what goes on inside your brain,

Well, sometimes we do. A college coed is invited to a party. She would really like to go, but she has a chemistry exam in the morning. So, she chooses to stay home and study. What will be happening in her brain for the next few hours will be caused by that choice that she made for herself.

But you are correct that we do not micromanage our own neural activity, nor are we aware of most of it.

... yet what goes on inside your brain is producing you, your thoughts and actions on the basis of neural architecture and environment, not will.

I would put that differently. Rather than the brain producing me, I exist as a physical process running upon that brain. There is no "me" that exists separately from that process. Whatever the brain deliberately decides to do, I have deliberately decided to do. There is no dualism.

As the brain models all of the reality that we can experience, it also models us. And it has the ability to report verbal descriptions of this information. But, as it is speaking for us, it's words are our words.

So, when I say that I chose for myself what I would have for breakfast, I am speaking for my brain as well, as if we were one and the same.

Thoughts are an experience that the brain generates (conscious report). Thoughts must necessarily follow inputs and processing. The feedback you speak of comes from fresh information, both from within the system, memory, and sensory information.

Yes. It is what us ordinary folk call "thinking". And it is surprising what we already knew about the brain before looking inside. We knew about the senses and we knew about thinking and choosing and memory. What neuroscience does is to find the specific areas of the brain that appear to be involved in performing these functions, and how they are coordinated for the benefit of the whole person.

Neuronal Mechanisms of Conscious Awareness
''This review focuses on conscious awareness: the state in which external and internal stimuli are perceived and can be intentionally acted on. Much investigative effort has been directed at testing theoretical constructs dealing with general as well as specific characteristics of conscious awareness.''

When
''When do humans become conscious of external stimuli? The seminal studies of Libet et al6,7 provide insights into the timing of conscious awareness. Using trains of electrical stimuli to the human cortex, Libet and colleagues demonstrated that perceptual threshold decreases as the train duration is extended up to about 300 to 500 milliseconds and that longer train durations do not further lower the perceptual threshold. They called this 300- to 500-millisecond window the utilization time and suggested that it was the time necessary for a stimulus to reach conscious awareness.

''Masking experiments have been instrumental in further defining the temporal gap between stimulus presentation and its conscious perception. Masking refers to the suppression of conscious perception of a target stimulus by another stimulus. The masking effect is enhanced in some patients with focal cerebral lesions (eg, neglect syndrome), but it can also be produced in healthy subjects. In the somatosensory modality, a mask given 50 to 100 milliseconds after the target stimulus to the opposite hand is actually more effective in blocking the target than if presented simultaneously with the target.8 These findings demonstrate not only that conscious perception is delayed but also that the mechanisms leading to conscious perception are particularly sensitive to disruptions at this specific time interval

Cool that they mentioned the "neglect syndrome". That's the one that Michael Graziano described in his book, "Consciousness and the Social Brain". Due to a specific injury in a specific brain area, the patient becomes unaware of objects on the left side of the room. March him to the end of the room and turn him around and now he is aware of the other half. But, because it is a legitimate injury to awareness itself, he is never aware that he is missing anything. You can toss a ball at him from that side and he will swat it away, which demonstrates that the problem is not anywhere along the visual input lines. His reaction to the thrown object is reflexive, controlled by the neural circuits that do not involve awareness. Perhaps I'll read the PDF later if I have time.

My other neuroscientist, Michael Gazzaniga, points out that conscious awareness need not be instantaneous in order to function in practice as we experience it.

These experiments that involve minimal choices, like squeezing your fist 40 times randomly over two minutes, are not involving conscious participation that we would find in a more significant decision, such as deciding what to have for lunch. And every subject in these experiments volunteered, of their own free will, to participate. This chosen intent resulted in their subsequent actions: listening to the experimenter's instructions about how to use the apparatus and what they were expected to do, and then performing the tasks they were asked to do.

It doesn't matter if we are not forced against our will, if determined, action must necessarily unfold or proceed as determined, unimpeded or unrestricted.

And that's the problem with assigning responsibility to that mysterious spirit, Mr. Determinism. Nothing ever matters to him. All events are equally necessary.

But whether a person decides for himself to give someone five dollars or the guy is pointing a gun and telling us to give him our wallet, does matter. And the notion of free will makes this important distinction between a choice we make for ourselves versus a choice imposed upon us against our will by someone or something else.

So, while it is okay to say that all events are causally necessitated by prior events, it is definitely not okay to say that free will versus coerced will doesn't matter. It really does matter.

Given the nature of the rationale for free will, I feel compelled to continually point out the obvious.

Yeah, me too! It's really cool that all this stuff is as obvious as it is.

But neuroscience will not resolve the debate for that very reason, because the debate IS about definitions. If determinism is defined as "the absence of free will", or, if free will is defined as "the absence of determinism", then we have an everlasting debate.

The only way to resolve such a debate is by getting our definitions straight.

This compatibilist defines determinism as the belief that every event is reliably caused by prior events. And, he finds this belief to be true.

This compatibilist defines free will as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other undue influences (such as mental illness, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.). And this is the free will that everyone uses when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

These two definitions are compatible.

Definitions alone prove nothing.

Right. But they do clarify what we are talking about. As we learned in computer systems analysis: "A problem well defined is half solved." So we start out a new project with a well written problem definition.

Acting without coercion is simply means acting without coercion. No need to apply 'free will' label.
A more accurate description would be ''she acted according to her own will'' or ''he was not forced, he acted of his own will''

The term "free will" excludes all undue influences with one term. Otherwise we would have to itemize, as in "he was not coerced, he was not insane, he was not manipulated by hypnotic suggestion, he was not commanded by someone with authority over him, etc." We simply say that he acted of his own free will, and all the specifics are included by implication.

Which, for the given reasons, the underlying actions of neural networks, inputs, etc. Which for the reasons outlined above and numerous other posts, is not an instance of 'free will'

But the underlying actions of a neural network are how I go about choosing whether to have the salad or the steak for dinner. However the choosing happens, it is still me, and no other object in the universe, doing the choosing.

The only way to say it is something else is to name it and explain how it operates. As it turns out, the meaningful and relevant causal determinants that necessitate my choice happen to be my own thoughts and feelings, my own goals and reasons, my own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, and all the other stuff that makes me "me". So, the empirical fact is that I am what is causally necessitating and causally determining what I am choosing.

 

[fromderinside]

Deterministic inevitability is about what will happen in the real world. But this in no way restricts what can and cannot happen. The inevitable and the possible existence in separate semantic contexts.

There I go over the three distinct causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

These two statements from your article cause to set it aside. Determinism is quite distinct according to SJP (Stanford Journal of Philosophy)

The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism is a material specification. There is no difference between physical and biological except as a classification of qualitatively different material covered under natural law. More precisely everything physical is covered by  Scientific Law

Philosophy clings to a definition of Natural Law in the face of Determinism so it can be discussed among polite humanists. Point is anything other than the material is not determined by Causal Determinism, now, Determinism.

Instead, you are talking about  Humanistic Naturalism. Even in that realm you are in trouble since naturalistic and deterministic constructs need a bridge between immaterial and material.

The distinction is between the Physical, Life, and Social sciences. Each category of science observes a different class of objects, inanimate matter, living organisms, or intelligent species.

So, determinism must accommodate free will or it must retreat from the field.

Deterministic inevitability is about what will happen in the real world. But this in no way restricts what can and cannot happen. The inevitable and the possible existence in separate semantic contexts.

There I go over the three distinct causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

These two statements from your article cause to set it aside. Determinism is quite distinct according to SJP (Stanford Journal of Philosophy)

The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Determinism is a material specification. There is no difference between physical and biological except as a classification of qualitatively different material covered under natural law. More precisely everything physical is covered by  Scientific Law

Philosophy clings to a definition of Natural Law in the face of Determinism so it can be discussed among polite humanists. Point is anything other than the material is not determined by Causal Determinism, now, Determinism.

Instead, you are talking about  Humanistic Naturalism. Even in that realm you are in trouble since naturalistic and deterministic constructs need a bridge between immaterial and material.

The distinction is between the Physical, Life, and Social sciences. Each category of science observes a different class of objects, inanimate matter, living organisms, or intelligent species.

Physical, life, and "social sciences', a subcategory of life, all fall under the sway of Scientific Law, which is material Determinism. So no get out of jail free. Scientific law covers the behavior of all three subcategories of material science.

The rest of your post tries to collect all those together without acknowledging they are all governed by Scientific Law.

Therefore it adds nothing useful to the discussion.

The way matter, life, a form of matter, and transactions among groups of living things, or transactions of groups of life, which together form what some call the stuff of Hard Determinism. All are under the sway of Scientific Law which governs the behavior of material things.

If you want to explain laws and mores you need to find systematic connections between how things work and the scientific law derivatives through which such are realized.

We do that for large things like airplanes routinely. Pilots learn to operate systems that permit the plane to taxi, take off, climb, fly a route, descend, land and berth. The ground crew has their place for treating the plane on the ground and repairing it when needed. boarding and deplaning are handled by service and corporate personnel et. Cetera. System control is handled by government personnel who track and control plane and aircrew interactions among planes, ports, and weather. When it comes to arbitrating air travel language and customs there are services and regulations for such.

I'm sure you can fill volumes with other social and personal guidance and regulations all tied to cause and effect.

At least try to apply objective argument rather than subjective argument. Mind, feeling, hypothesis untied to material things, are not good starting places.

 

[DBT]

All of which results from information processing, not will, not free will.

You keep pretending that information processing does not include choosing!

Wrong, what I am saying is that determinism necessitates the decision that is made and the action that follows, that no alternative is possible within a determined system.

So, how does this determinism fellow go about necessitating my decision? Is he some spirit that invades my mind and takes over my brain?

How did you come to that conclusion?

Aren't we working with the standard definition of determinism?

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. - Stanford.

The brain is a physical system operating within the physical world as an aspect of it and inseparable from it. The objects and events of the world, if determinism is true, are necessitated by the 'way things are at time t' and proceed as a matter of natural law.

Whatever happens is determined. Which means fixed, unable to be altered or modified from its fixed state.

Which means each and every input of information into the system, the brain, determines output precisely.

Every thought and every action is fixed by information acting upon neural networks in precise ways, producing precise reactions in terms of thought and action.

This is not compatible with 'freedom of the will'

It has nothing to do with spirits or autonomous elements at work, it is the system as a whole interacting deterministically.

''Neurons are highly specialized cells that transmit impulses within animals to cause a change in a target cell such as a muscle effector cell or glandular cell.''

Further, the physical structure of a neuron is itself composed of 'determinants' in the form of the nucleus and cytoplasmic inclusions and organelles, etc....as such, a neuron is no more than biological mechanism that has evolved to process information in a set way.

''The cell body of a neuron, called the soma, contains the cell nucleus and the majority of the cytoplasmic inclusions and organelles. Radial extensions of the soma cell membrane, called dendrites, extend to other neurons and form the interface where impulses are transmitted from neuron to neuron. One long extension of the soma, called the axon, is the primary conduit through which the neuron transmits impulses to neurons downstream in the signal chain. Axons range in length from around 0.1 millimeters to nearly a meter in length with some neurons in the sciatic nerve. Axons branch into smaller extensions at their terminal end and eventually create synapses with the target cell (neuron, muscle cell, etc.).''

''Radial extensions of the soma cell membrane, called dendrites, extend to other neurons and form the interface where impulses are transmitted from neuron to neuron.'' - the network of neurons and their connectors are an example of a deterministic system. As are physical structure such as computers, internal combustion engines, etc.



I'll leave the rest for now. Time constraints.

Post size gets out of hand.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Physical, life, and "social sciences', a subcategory of life, all fall under the sway of Scientific Law, which is material Determinism. So no get out of jail free.

That's just the thing. Reliable causation is not a jail that we need to escape. Reliable causation enables every freedom that we have to actually do anything at all. In order to exercise control, the results of our actions must be predictable. Scientific Law makes things predictable, enabling us to exercise control.

Scientific law covers the behavior of all three subcategories of material science.

Yes. But the laws describe the behavior, they don't actually cause it. The laws of nature, whether physical, biological, or rational, describe what is likely to happen, for example: (1) if we step off a cliff (physical) or (2) if we take an antibiotic (biological) or (3) if I believe you have been sleeping with my wife (rational).

The rest of your post tries to collect all those together without acknowledging they are all governed by Scientific Law.

But Scientific Law doesn't actually "govern" events, that's a metaphor. Scientific Law "describes" what is likely to happen if we do one thing versus if we do something else. Scientific Law makes events "predictable". And once events become predictable, we are able to exercise some "control" over what happens next.

The article in the SEP that contains this quote:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Also contains this one (Section 2.4 Laws of Nature):

In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws “governing” and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical.

I love the irony in Carl Hoefer's, "it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical".

The way matter, life, a form of matter, and transactions among groups of living things, or transactions of groups of life, which together form what some call the stuff of Hard Determinism. All are under the sway of Scientific Law which governs the behavior of material things.

Well, the hard determinists tend to take all metaphors literally, which creates a lot of empirically false ideas. But every figurative statement is literally false. For example, they will claim that in a deterministic system there is no choice, because if our choice is inevitable then it is AS IF choosing never happened. But choosing actually does happen in physical reality.

If you want to explain laws and mores you need to find systematic connections between how things work and the scientific law derivatives through which such are realized.

Generally speaking, social laws are created by us to help us all get along better with each other.

We do that for large things like airplanes routinely. Pilots learn to operate systems that permit the plane to taxi, take off, climb, fly a route, descend, land and berth. The ground crew has their place for treating the plane on the ground and repairing it when needed. boarding and deplaning are handled by service and corporate personnel et. Cetera. System control is handled by government personnel who track and control plane and aircrew interactions among planes, ports, and weather. When it comes to arbitrating air travel language and customs there are services and regulations for such.

Exactly.

I'm sure you can fill volumes with other social and personal guidance and regulations all tied to cause and effect.

All events are always tied to cause and effect. That is why it is unnecessary to bring up causation in a general sense, because we all take it for granted that there is a cause for every effect. Instead, we simply deal with the specific causes of specific effects, because that's where all the useful information exists. The notion of causal necessity itself tells us nothing useful. The fact that every event is reliably caused by prior events can be said once, acknowledged, and then ignored for the rest of our lives. Everything useful comes from knowing the specific causes of an event.

At least try to apply objective argument rather than subjective argument. Mind, feeling, hypothesis untied to material things, are not good starting places.

I'm pretty sure that I'm offering the most objective descriptions of empirical reality. Certainly more objective than can be found in the tangle of metaphors that the hard determinists rely upon.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So, how does this determinism fellow go about necessitating my decision? Is he some spirit that invades my mind and takes over my brain?

How did you come to that conclusion?
Aren't we working with the standard definition of determinism?

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. - Stanford.

If I may quote from my blog:

Error, By Tradition

“Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.” (SEP)

In this formal definition from the SEP article, we now have determinism anthropomorphically appearing as an actor in the real world. And not just any actor, but one with the power to “govern” everything that happens. Even less attractive is the suggestion that it might also be viewed as a Svengali, holding everything “under its sway”.

In either case, we are given the impression that our destiny is no longer chosen by us, but is controlled by some power that is external to us. And that viewpoint is functionally equivalent to this:

“Fatalism is the thesis that all events (or in some versions, at least some events) are destined to occur no matter what we do. The source of the guarantee that those events will happen is located in the will of the gods, or their divine foreknowledge, or some intrinsic teleological aspect of the universe…” (SEP)

The SEP article attempts to draw a distinction between determinism and fatalism, by attributing the external control in determinism to “natural law” rather than “the will of the gods”. But as long as the cause remains a force that is external to us, it is only “a distinction without a difference”.

Delusion, By Metaphor
The SEP article seems to be aware of the metaphorical nature of their definition:

“In the loose statement of determinism we are working from, metaphors such as ‘govern’ and ‘under the sway of’ are used to indicate the strong force being attributed to the laws of nature.” (SEP)

“In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws ‘governing’ and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical.” (SEP)

Take a moment to appreciate the irony. It “takes an effort of will” to see it for what it is.

It is the fashion these days to refer to free will as an “illusion” while imparting causal powers to determinism. But, in the real world, the opposite is true. Determinism, being neither an object nor a force, causes nothing in the real world. However, the object we call a “human being”, estimates the best choice and acts upon it, physically bringing about the future, in a causally reliable way.

The process of making a decision is not an illusion. It is an empirical event. A neuroscientist, performing a functional MRI while someone is making a decision, can point to the activity monitor, and say, “Look, there, he’s doing it right now.” So, there is no “illusion” as to who is doing what, and where causal agency resides. And it will also be an empirical fact as to whether a person made the decision for themselves, or whether the choice was imposed upon him by someone else, against his will, either through coercion or some other undue influence.

The view that determinism is an object or a force of nature, acting to bring about events in the real world, is a delusion we create when we take the metaphorical expressions literally.

The brain is a physical system operating within the physical world as an aspect of it and inseparable from it. The objects and events of the world, if determinism is true, are necessitated by the 'way things are at time t' and proceed as a matter of natural law.

Sure, you can use that metaphor as long as you do not imagine that natural law is a causal agent, going about in the world making things happen for its own reasons.

Whatever happens is determined. Which means fixed, unable to be altered or modified from its fixed state.

But that tells us nothing useful. What we really need to know is how this single inevitable future comes about, and what our role is in causally determining what it will be. You see, determinism and the laws of nature are descriptions. They are not causes.

The laws of nature, as they apply to us, describe how our behavior is caused. And our behavior is not caused by the laws of nature. If I stub my toe on a rock, that is the specific event that caused me to release a string of angry off-color remarks aimed at the rock. I do not blame the laws of nature, I blame the f***ing rock. And perhaps I'll remove that rock from my yard, so that this event doesn't happen again. But there is nothing I can do about the laws of nature. And, I'll need those laws when I estimate how much force to exert as I throw the rock into the woods.

The laws of nature do not constrain us, they enable us.

Which means each and every input of information into the system, the brain, determines output precisely.

Well, we hope it will be precise, otherwise I'm likely to drop the rock on my foot rather than tossing it into the woods. Again, determinism, that is, reliable cause and effect, is our friend. It is not a meaningful constraint, not something that we need to be free of. I am going to require reliable causation if I hope to toss the rock into the woods.

Every freedom that we have requires reliable causation. Thus, the notion of "freedom from causal necessity" (freedom from reliable cause and effect), is such a silly notion.

Every thought and every action is fixed by information acting upon neural networks in precise ways, producing precise reactions in terms of thought and action.

Yes. But do keep in mind that the brain itself is pulling information from its own memory and creating new information by combining and sorting and choosing, you know, the process of "thinking". The process of thinking actually modifies the neural connections. Every time you access memory you alter your brain by making those connections stronger.

This is not compatible with 'freedom of the will'

Of course it is! Every choice we make is reliably caused by our thinking process, which is reliably caused by our nature and nurture up to that point. And, as long as are making this choice for ourselves, rather than the choice being imposed upon us by coercion or other undue influence, then it is a freely chosen "I will" (free will). But if we are coerced by a guy with a gun, who forces us to submit our will to his will, then our will is subjugated and is not freely chosen by us (unfree will).

It has nothing to do with spirits or autonomous elements at work, it is the system as a whole interacting deterministically.

And I would suggest that "the system as a whole interacting deterministically" is just another ghost. The system as a whole has no interest in what I choose for breakfast. Control (the ability to decide what will happen next) is local.

... ...

More neuroscience, see DBT's link if you wish to read it. Unless it directly relates to the issue, I'm not going to repeat the link or waste time addressing it.

 

[fromderinside]

Physical, life, and "social sciences', a subcategory of life, all fall under the sway of Scientific Law, which is material Determinism. So no get out of jail free.

That's just the thing. Reliable causation is not a jail that we need to escape. Reliable causation enables every freedom that we have to actually do anything at all. In order to exercise control, the results of our actions must be predictable. Scientific Law makes things predictable, enabling us to exercise control.

Causation isn't just descriptive it is necessary for every physical system. Nothing man has encountered evades being a physical system. Try it. If there is a physical system cause there will follow an effect.

Scientific law covers the behavior of all three subcategories of material science.

Yes. But the laws describe the behavior, they don't actually cause it. The laws of nature, whether physical, biological, or rational, describe what is likely to happen, for example: (1) if we step off a cliff (physical) or (2) if we take an antibiotic (biological) or (3) if I believe you have been sleeping with my wife (rational).

Input energy things happen. The problem with antibiotics is there are a number of causes and effects encapsulated in the biological system when any antibiotic is introduced. Go back to my Airplane example and list them in order so you understand.

The rest of your post tries to collect all those together without acknowledging they are all governed by Scientific Law.

But Scientific Law doesn't actually "govern" events, that's a metaphor. Scientific Law "describes" what is likely to happen if we do one thing versus if we do something else. Scientific Law makes events "predictable". And once events become predictable, we are able to exercise some "control" over what happens next.

The article in the SEP that contains this quote:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Also contains this one (Section 2.4 Laws of Nature):

I'm pretty sure Scientific Law developed by the use of deterministic methods when applied will produce exact, to our limit of measurement, results. What the law describes occurs IAC with the law. If it doesn't the law is either falsified or tuned.

In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws “governing” and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical.

I love the irony in Carl Hoefer's, "it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical".

Hoefer was dealing with an impossibility under the broadness of the law cited. Take away ad hoc descriptions of behavior like mind, think, soul, etc, reduce them to material operations then determinism becomes much more likely.

The way matter, life, a form of matter, and transactions among groups of living things, or transactions of groups of life, which together form what some call the stuff of Hard Determinism. All are under the sway of Scientific Law which governs the behavior of material things.

Well, the hard determinists tend to take all metaphors literally, which creates a lot of empirically false ideas. But every figurative statement is literally false. For example, they will claim that in a deterministic system there is no choice, because if our choice is inevitable then it is AS IF choosing never happened. But choosing actually does happen in physical reality.

The problem isn't with determinists. The problem is with those who buy into the idea that determinism applies to the subjective description. It doesn't. It only applies to material that is described in objective language.

If you want to explain laws and mores you need to find systematic connections between how things work and the scientific law derivatives through which such are realized.

Generally speaking, social laws are created by us to help us all get along better with each other.

Generally speaking, groups form laws convenient for keeping leaders in place. Laws and regulations have very little to do with the actual mechanics of human nature. They are usually meant to sustain existing privilege.

We do that for large things like airplanes routinely. Pilots learn to operate systems that permit the plane to taxi, take off, climb, fly a route, descend, land and berth. The ground crew has their place for treating the plane on the ground and repairing it when needed. boarding and deplaning are handled by service and corporate personnel et. Cetera. System control is handled by government personnel who track and control plane and aircrew interactions among planes, ports, and weather. When it comes to arbitrating air travel language and customs there are services and regulations for such.

Exactly.

What I wrote about were operating processes. They may be codified but are all generated through an objectively derived methodology. That is not how people are governed or subjected to sanctions by ad hoc groups or nations.

I'm sure you can fill volumes with other social and personal guidance and regulations all tied to cause and effect.

All events are always tied to cause and effect. That is why it is unnecessary to bring up causation in a general sense, because we all take it for granted that there is a cause for every effect. Instead, we simply deal with the specific causes of specific effects, because that's where all the useful information exists. The notion of causal necessity itself tells us nothing useful. The fact that every event is reliably caused by prior events can be said once, acknowledged, and then ignored for the rest of our lives. Everything useful comes from knowing the specific causes of an event.

That is about as much nonsense as you've ever posted.

At least try to apply objective argument rather than subjective argument. Mind, feeling, hypothesis untied to material things, are not good starting places.

I'm pretty sure that I'm offering the most objective descriptions of empirical reality. Certainly more objective than can be found in the tangle of metaphors that the hard determinists rely upon.

You may be pretty sure but your descriptions are neither objective nor based on objective anything.

 

[DBT]

So, how does this determinism fellow go about necessitating my decision? Is he some spirit that invades my mind and takes over my brain?

How did you come to that conclusion?
Aren't we working with the standard definition of determinism?

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. - Stanford.

If I may quote from my blog:

Error, By Tradition

“Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.” (SEP)

In this formal definition from the SEP article, we now have determinism anthropomorphically appearing as an actor in the real world. And not just any actor, but one with the power to “govern” everything that happens. Even less attractive is the suggestion that it might also be viewed as a Svengali, holding everything “under its sway”.

Of course determinism is not an 'actor' that 'andromorphically appears,' nobody is saying or suggesting such a thing.

The conditions of the world shape us as an 'actor,' physical makeup, attributes, capacitates, abilities, etc, and the environment provides information: identity, language, culture, attractions, aversions and so on, which determines behaviour.

We as the 'actor' are an inseparable part of the system. If deterministic, the world is a web of cause/effect, our actions are both cause and effect.

The process of making a decision is not an illusion. It is an empirical event. A neuroscientist, performing a functional MRI while someone is making a decision, can point to the activity monitor, and say, “Look, there, he’s doing it right now.” So, there is no “illusion” as to who is doing what, and where causal agency resides. And it will also be an empirical fact as to whether a person made the decision for themselves, or whether the choice was imposed upon him by someone else, against his will, either through coercion or some other undue influence.

The process of decision making is not an illusion, neural networks acquire and process information and produce a response.

Unfortunately for the concept of 'free will' the response is not driven by will, nor holds the possibility of an alternate possibility.

The action produced is the only possible response in any given instance in time. The 'actor' being the information condition of neural networks/brains, not will.

More neuroscience, see DBT's link if you wish to read it. Unless it directly relates to the issue, I'm not going to repeat the link or waste time addressing it.

You don't have to read my quotes or links. Whether you read or not is being brought to conscious attention by the underlying processing that occurs when information is acquired, you see the material that is being presented.

I refer to neuroscience because it is important to understand how the brain functions and how response is achieved in relation to the idea of free will, that decision making is a matter of information processing, that an option realized is determined by a set criteria and information exchange within the brain, not will, not free will.

For instance;

What neuroscience says about free will;

''We're convinced that it exists, but new research suggests it might be nothing more than a trick the brain plays on itself''


''For example, if the experience of choice is a kind of causal inference, as Wegner and Wheatley suggest, then swapping the order of choice and action in conscious awareness may aid in the understanding that we are physical beings who can produce effects out in the world. More broadly, this illusion may be central to developing a belief in free will and, in turn, motivating punishment.

Yet, whether or not there are advantages to believing we’re more in control of our lives than we actually are, it’s clear that the illusion can go too far. While a quarter-of-a-second distortion in time experience may be no big deal, distortions at longer delays—which might plague people with mental illnesses like schizophrenia and bipolar disorder—could substantially and harmfully warp people’s fundamental views about the world. People with such illnesses may begin to believe that they can control the weather or that they have an uncanny ability to predict other people’s behavior. In extreme cases, they may even conclude that they have god-like powers.

It remains to be seen just how much the postdictive illusion of choice that we observe in our experiments connects to these weightier aspects of daily life and mental illness. The illusion may only apply to a small set of our choices that are made quickly and without too much thought. Or it may be pervasive and ubiquitous—governing all aspects of our behavior, from our most minute to our most important decisions. Most likely, the truth lies somewhere in between these extremes. Whatever the case may be, our studies add to a growing body of work suggesting that even our most seemingly ironclad beliefs about our own agency and conscious experience can be dead wrong.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Of course determinism is not an 'actor' that 'andromorphically appears,' nobody is saying or suggesting such a thing.

And yet hard determinists repeatedly reference people as being "puppets on a string", suggesting that determinism is the "puppet master". Or, that we are "passengers on a bus" being driven by causal necessity. Or, that our thoughts and actions are being controlled by the past and the laws of nature, leaving us as we are in the present with no control over ourselves.

The conditions of the world shape us as an 'actor,' physical makeup, attributes, capacitates, abilities, etc, and the environment provides information: identity, language, culture, attractions, aversions and so on, which determines behaviour.

Yes. But we do not enter the world as a blank slate. We enter with a full set of biological needs, genetic dispositions, and even with some mental firmware. So, we also cause the world to adapt to us. The example I use all the time is the parents of a newborn being awakened by the newborn's cries for the 2AM feeding. We adapt to the world. The world also adapts to us. And we are obviously present in all of these interactions with the world.

We as the 'actor' are an inseparable part of the system.

I object to statements such as that because they tend to make us disappear. I am trying to make our role in reality appear real and significant again. Hard determinists attempt to shrink us into nonexistence.

If deterministic, the world is a web of cause/effect, our actions are both cause and effect.

That's much better. Thanks.

The process of decision making is not an illusion, neural networks acquire and process information and produce a response.

Good. If decision making is not an illusion, and the neural networks making the decision are my own, then all that remains is to call that by its common name, "free will".

Unfortunately for the concept of 'free will' the response is not driven by will, nor holds the possibility of an alternate possibility.

To be clear, the "will" is the output of the decision making process. A person decides what they will do. This is a mental operation. The mental operation is a physical process that happens within the neural architecture.

Now, I'm still trying to get you to see the two distinct levels of description:

Level 1: The process of deciding is deterministic, in that every mental event will be reliably caused by prior events. Each specific event, whether becoming aware of an option, evaluating it, or outputting our choice, is causally necessary to occur precisely as it does, without variation, without alternative.

Level 2: Among these mental events is an awareness of our options. Each option is an alternative. A real possibility that we are able to choose and able to carry out if we so choose.

Now, if you can work this out in your own head, you'll see that each Level 2 option is a Level 1 necessity. As odd as it sounds, each real possibility within the choosing process must show up in the brain as a matter of causal necessity. Thus, alternative possibilities are causally necessary.

... I refer to neuroscience because it is important to understand how the brain functions and how response is achieved in relation to the idea of free will, that decision making is a matter of information processing, that an option realized is determined by a set criteria and information exchange within the brain, not will, not free will.

This article was more on point and I enjoyed reading it. But I don't think we need to study the workings of the individual neurons to address the issue of free will. We can just presume that all mental events are the result of physical processes running upon the neural architecture.

For instance;

What neuroscience says about free will;

''We're convinced that it exists, but new research suggests it might be nothing more than a trick the brain plays on itself''

''For example, if the experience of choice is a kind of causal inference, as Wegner and Wheatley suggest, then swapping the order of choice and action in conscious awareness may aid in the understanding that we are physical beings who can produce effects out in the world. More broadly, this illusion may be central to developing a belief in free will and, in turn, motivating punishment.

Yet, whether or not there are advantages to believing we’re more in control of our lives than we actually are, it’s clear that the illusion can go too far. While a quarter-of-a-second distortion in time experience may be no big deal, distortions at longer delays—which might plague people with mental illnesses like schizophrenia and bipolar disorder—could substantially and harmfully warp people’s fundamental views about the world. People with such illnesses may begin to believe that they can control the weather or that they have an uncanny ability to predict other people’s behavior. In extreme cases, they may even conclude that they have god-like powers.

It remains to be seen just how much the postdictive illusion of choice that we observe in our experiments connects to these weightier aspects of daily life and mental illness. The illusion may only apply to a small set of our choices that are made quickly and without too much thought. Or it may be pervasive and ubiquitous—governing all aspects of our behavior, from our most minute to our most important decisions. Most likely, the truth lies somewhere in between these extremes. Whatever the case may be, our studies add to a growing body of work suggesting that even our most seemingly ironclad beliefs about our own agency and conscious experience can be dead wrong.''

I think the authors of the study point out that the false belief that the subjects caused the circle to turn red has a very short time limit, about a quarter of a second. When they bring up schizophrenics who believe they control the weather, we are now talking about a person's behavior being caused by the undue influence of a significant mental illness, something they are not doing of their own free will.

You've also included the link to the "Free to punish" article. I think I may have already read at least one of the studies referenced in the abstract. Subjects are more likely to attribute free will to serious crimes that produce significant harm, than to insignificant events. The authors point to the motivation for this as being a need to punish.

But the need to punish is not motivated not by free will, but rather by the harm that the criminal caused. Attributing free will simply makes it easier to satisfy the need to punish, by eliminating excuses, such as coercion and undue influence. So, the need to punish is a natural response to the harm the criminal has inflicted.

No one is ever punished for having free will. They are punished due to the harm they have caused. Now, this natural urge to punish should not be granted control over our deliberate choice to impart fair and just penalties. And what should guide our choice of a fair and just penalty?

Well, a system of justice is created to help protect everyone's rights. So, a just penalty would seek to (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) protect society by securing the offender until his behavior is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender and his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Physical, life, and "social sciences', a subcategory of life, all fall under the sway of Scientific Law, which is material Determinism. So no get out of jail free.

That's just the thing. Reliable causation is not a jail that we need to escape. Reliable causation enables every freedom that we have to actually do anything at all. In order to exercise control, the results of our actions must be predictable. Scientific Law makes things predictable, enabling us to exercise control.

Causation isn't just descriptive it is necessary for every physical system. Nothing man has encountered evades being a physical system. Try it. If there is a physical system cause there will follow an effect.

Scientific law covers the behavior of all three subcategories of material science.

Yes. But the laws describe the behavior, they don't actually cause it. The laws of nature, whether physical, biological, or rational, describe what is likely to happen, for example: (1) if we step off a cliff (physical) or (2) if we take an antibiotic (biological) or (3) if I believe you have been sleeping with my wife (rational).

Input energy things happen.

Yes, but to understand why specific things happen you need to know which causal mechanisms were involved.
(1) Inanimate matter reacts passively to physical forces. A bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill. It's behavior is governed by the force of gravity.
(2) A living organism behaves purposefully, according to biological drives to survive, thrive and reproduce. Place a worm on that slope and it will crawl uphill as easily as downhill, defying gravity, as it pursues the food it needs to survive. Its behavior is affected by gravity, but is not governed by it.
(3) An intelligent species behaves deliberately. It has an evolved neurology capable of modeling external reality internally. With that model it can imagine possibilities and alternatives. It can run mental simulations to estimate how different options are likely to play out. While it is still affected by gravity and biological drives, it is governed by its own choices. It can decide when, where, and how it will go about satisfying its biological needs.

To understand the distinction between biology and intelligence, consider this from neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga:

Are we just a fancier and more ingenious animal snorting around for our dinner? Sure, we are vastly more complicated than a bee. Although we both have automatic responses, we humans have cognition and beliefs of all kinds, and the possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process and hardware, honed by evolution, that got us to this place. Possession of a belief, though a false one, drove Othello to kill his beloved wife, and Sidney Carton to declare, as he voluntarily took his friend’s place at the guillotine, that it was a far, far better thing he did than he had ever done.
Gazzaniga, Michael S.. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (pp. 2-3). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

The rest of your post tries to collect all those together without acknowledging they are all governed by Scientific Law.

But Scientific Law doesn't actually "govern" events, that's a metaphor. Scientific Law "describes" what is likely to happen if we do one thing versus if we do something else. Scientific Law makes events "predictable". And once events become predictable, we are able to exercise some "control" over what happens next.

I'm pretty sure Scientific Law developed by the use of deterministic methods when applied will produce exact, to our limit of measurement, results. What the law describes occurs IAC with the law. If it doesn't the law is either falsified or tuned.

I think I agree with you, but when you throw in abbreviations like "IAC" you leave me guessing.

... Take away ad hoc descriptions of behavior like mind, think, soul, etc, reduce them to material operations then determinism becomes much more likely.

As far as I know, no one has ever backed up that claim with a demonstration. For example, it is impossible to describe why a car stopped at a red light using only the laws of inanimate matter (physics and chemistry).

The way matter, life, a form of matter, and transactions among groups of living things, or transactions of groups of life, which together form what some call the stuff of Hard Determinism. All are under the sway of Scientific Law which governs the behavior of material things.

Well, the hard determinists tend to take all metaphors literally, which creates a lot of empirically false ideas. But every figurative statement is literally false. For example, they will claim that in a deterministic system there is no choice, because if our choice is inevitable then it is AS IF choosing never happened. But choosing actually does happen in physical reality.

The problem isn't with determinists. The problem is with those who buy into the idea that determinism applies to the subjective description. It doesn't. It only applies to material that is described in objective language.

A person is an object. A decision is an event. Will is a specific intent that motivates and directs our actions. We do not need to reduce a discussion to what the atoms are doing in order to describe what is happening with objective language.

Generally speaking, groups form laws convenient for keeping leaders in place. Laws and regulations have very little to do with the actual mechanics of human nature. They are usually meant to sustain existing privilege.

Interesting, but I'd prefer not to wander off into a political discussion.

You may be pretty sure but your descriptions are neither objective nor based on objective anything.

Perhaps you could provide a specific statement I've made to demonstrate your point.

 

[fromderinside]

Physical, life, and "social sciences', a subcategory of life, all fall under the sway of Scientific Law, which is material Determinism. So no get out of jail free.

That's just the thing. Reliable causation is not a jail that we need to escape. Reliable causation enables every freedom that we have to actually do anything at all. In order to exercise control, the results of our actions must be predictable. Scientific Law makes things predictable, enabling us to exercise control.

Causation isn't just descriptive it is necessary for every physical system. Nothing man has encountered evades being a physical system. Try it. If there is a physical system cause there will follow an effect.

Scientific law covers the behavior of all three subcategories of material science.

Yes. But the laws describe the behavior, they don't actually cause it. The laws of nature, whether physical, biological, or rational, describe what is likely to happen, for example: (1) if we step off a cliff (physical) or (2) if we take an antibiotic (biological) or (3) if I believe you have been sleeping with my wife (rational).

Input energy things happen.

Yes, but to understand why specific things happen you need to know which causal mechanisms were involved.
(1) Inanimate matter reacts passively to physical forces. A bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill. It's behavior is governed by the force of gravity.
(2) A living organism behaves purposefully, according to biological drives to survive, thrive and reproduce. Place a worm on that slope and it will crawl uphill as easily as downhill, defying gravity, as it pursues the food it needs to survive. Its behavior is affected by gravity, but is not governed by it.
(3) An intelligent species behaves deliberately. It has an evolved neurology capable of modeling external reality internally. With that model it can imagine possibilities and alternatives. It can run mental simulations to estimate how different options are likely to play out. While it is still affected by gravity and biological drives, it is governed by its own choices. It can decide when, where, and how it will go about satisfying its biological needs.

To understand the distinction between biology and intelligence, consider this from neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga:

Are we just a fancier and more ingenious animal snorting around for our dinner? Sure, we are vastly more complicated than a bee. Although we both have automatic responses, we humans have cognition and beliefs of all kinds, and the possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process and hardware, honed by evolution, that got us to this place. Possession of a belief, though a false one, drove Othello to kill his beloved wife, and Sidney Carton to declare, as he voluntarily took his friend’s place at the guillotine, that it was a far, far better thing he did than he had ever done.
Gazzaniga, Michael S.. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (pp. 2-3). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

Do you want subjective? Look at your setup of Gazzaniga and in his example. I highlighted a few subjective bits just to illuminate how you and your acolyte mix the subjective with the objective.

The rest of your post tries to collect all those together without acknowledging they are all governed by Scientific Law.

But Scientific Law doesn't actually "govern" events, that's a metaphor. Scientific Law "describes" what is likely to happen if we do one thing versus if we do something else. Scientific Law makes events "predictable". And once events become predictable, we are able to exercise some "control" over what happens next.

I'm pretty sure Scientific Law developed by the use of deterministic methods when applied will produce exact, to our limit of measurement, results. What the law describes occurs IAC with the law. If it doesn't the law is either falsified or tuned.

I think I agree with you, but when you throw in abbreviations like "IAC" you leave me guessing.

The 'C' is my problem. It should be "IAW"

... Take away ad hoc descriptions of behavior like mind, think, soul, etc, reduce them to material operations then determinism becomes much more likely.

As far as I know, no one has ever backed up that claim with a demonstration. For example, it is impossible to describe why a car stopped at a red light using only the laws of inanimate matter (physics and chemistry).

Really? Yes it must be a problem for you. You can't even construct an example that fits my critique. As I see it we can get there two ways, then combine the two ways into a single descriptive example.

Why does the car stop at a red light?
and
How does a car stop at a red light?

To the why we first operationalize the processes of learning and traffic control. The how comes through the operations the person who learned the law of traffic control as a condition of being permitted to drive executes his tasks.

Just like building an airplane.

The way matter, life, a form of matter, and transactions among groups of living things, or transactions of groups of life, which together form what some call the stuff of Hard Determinism. All are under the sway of Scientific Law which governs the behavior of material things.

Well, the hard determinists tend to take all metaphors literally, which creates a lot of empirically false ideas. But every figurative statement is literally false. For example, they will claim that in a deterministic system there is no choice, because if our choice is inevitable then it is AS IF choosing never happened. But choosing actually does happen in physical reality.

The problem isn't with determinists. The problem is with those who buy into the idea that determinism applies to the subjective description. It doesn't. It only applies to material that is described in objective language.

A person is an object. A decision is an event. Will is a specific intent that motivates and directs our actions. We do not need to reduce a discussion to what the atoms are doing in order to describe what is happening with objective language.

A human is a complex biological object. Complexity cannot be the hand wave that permits us to introduce subjective statements to objective analysis.

Your problem is that you introduce a bunch of subjective unproven and justified placeholders as objects to which you attribute much without explaining how they make the complex biological object that way through deterministic material processes. You make a huge leap that no one has yet laid out.

Generally speaking, groups form laws convenient for keeping leaders in place. Laws and regulations have very little to do with the actual mechanics of human nature. They are usually meant to sustain existing privilege.

Interesting, but I'd prefer not to wander off into a political discussion.

Ah, but by inserting a bunch of Marvin-splanations as substance - I call them improper use of subjective mechanisms - which you are trying to force us to explain your meanings when you have not provided the operations to do so. You need to operationalize each and every subjective placeholder in your, so-called, theory so one can analyze it.

You may be pretty sure but your descriptions are neither objective nor based on objective anything.

Perhaps you could provide a specific statement I've made to demonstrate your point.

See my first comment. You and your exemplar both make liberal use of undefined subjective functions, like mind,

 

[DBT]

Of course determinism is not an 'actor' that 'andromorphically appears,' nobody is saying or suggesting such a thing.

And yet hard determinists repeatedly reference people as being "puppets on a string", suggesting that determinism is the "puppet master". Or, that we are "passengers on a bus" being driven by causal necessity. Or, that our thoughts and actions are being controlled by the past and the laws of nature, leaving us as we are in the present with no control over ourselves.

Do they? I've already said that the brain is an intelligent, responsive system.

Just that a brain does not work on the principle of free will, or even will, neural architecture and information exchange being the agency of response.

Unfortunately for 'free will' the system response in any given moment in time does not allow an alternate action.

Without a possible alternate action in any given moment in time, there is no freedom to have done otherwise, and no freedom of will - not that will is responsible for information processing or decision making.

Which means the compatibilist must formulate a definition that appears to support free will: unimpeded action/acting according to one's will.

Which fails because it ignores the means of production and that acting according to ones will is determined and inevitable, that too is determined.

The conditions of the world shape us as an 'actor,' physical makeup, attributes, capacitates, abilities, etc, and the environment provides information: identity, language, culture, attractions, aversions and so on, which determines behaviour.

Yes. But we do not enter the world as a blank slate. We enter with a full set of biological needs, genetic dispositions, and even with some mental firmware. So, we also cause the world to adapt to us. The example I use all the time is the parents of a newborn being awakened by the newborn's cries for the 2AM feeding. We adapt to the world. The world also adapts to us. And we are obviously present in all of these interactions with the world.

The environment and evolution encodes our genetic makeup, our 'mental firmware,' our instincts, attributes, abilities, proclivities....

We as the 'actor' are an inseparable part of the system.

I object to statements such as that because they tend to make us disappear. I am trying to make our role in reality appear real and significant again. Hard determinists attempt to shrink us into nonexistence.

Not disappear, just inseparable, we are composed of matter/energy, life has evolved from the energized chemical soup, billions of years of evolution has brought us to the point were we can perceive the world, think and act. That was not achieved through will.

If deterministic, the world is a web of cause/effect, our actions are both cause and effect.

That's much better. Thanks.

I've said it before.

The process of decision making is not an illusion, neural networks acquire and process information and produce a response.

Good. If decision making is not an illusion, and the neural networks making the decision are my own, then all that remains is to call that by its common name, "free will".

Information processing is not something that you choose. It has nothing to do with 'free will' - which is just pasting a label where it doesn't belong. Intelligence is not driven by will. Processing information is not driven by will.

Everything that can act, acts according to makeup and environment, not 'free will'

I think the authors of the study point out that the false belief that the subjects caused the circle to turn red has a very short time limit, about a quarter of a second. When they bring up schizophrenics who believe they control the weather, we are now talking about a person's behavior being caused by the undue influence of a significant mental illness, something they are not doing of their own free will.

You've also included the link to the "Free to punish" article. I think I may have already read at least one of the studies referenced in the abstract. Subjects are more likely to attribute free will to serious crimes that produce significant harm, than to insignificant events. The authors point to the motivation for this as being a need to punish.

But the need to punish is not motivated not by free will, but rather by the harm that the criminal caused. Attributing free will simply makes it easier to satisfy the need to punish, by eliminating excuses, such as coercion and undue influence. So, the need to punish is a natural response to the harm the criminal has inflicted.

No one is ever punished for having free will. They are punished due to the harm they have caused. Now, this natural urge to punish should not be granted control over our deliberate choice to impart fair and just penalties. And what should guide our choice of a fair and just penalty?

Well, a system of justice is created to help protect everyone's rights. So, a just penalty would seek to (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) protect society by securing the offender until his behavior is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender and his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).

It's just a matter of the timing of conscious thought and response.

Basically: unconscious input > unconscious processing > conscious report and response.

The point being that it is unconscious information processing that determines what you experience, your thoughts, feelings and actions.

Which of course is being constantly 'refreshed' as new information acts upon the system, you think to do x, but a moment later the thought to do y instead comes to mind.

Information processing rather than 'free will.'

Once more;

''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems! - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Yes, but to understand why specific things happen you need to know which causal mechanisms were involved.
(1) Inanimate matter reacts passively to physical forces. A bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill. It's behavior is governed by the force of gravity.
(2) A living organism behaves purposefully, according to biological drives to survive, thrive and reproduce. Place a worm on that slope and it will crawl uphill as easily as downhill, defying gravity, as it pursues the food it needs to survive. Its behavior is affected by gravity, but is not governed by it.
(3) An intelligent species behaves deliberately. It has an evolved neurology capable of modeling external reality internally. With that model it can imagine possibilities and alternatives. It can run mental simulations to estimate how different options are likely to play out. While it is still affected by gravity and biological drives, it is governed by its own choices. It can decide when, where, and how it will go about satisfying its biological needs.

To understand the distinction between biology and intelligence, consider this from neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga:

Are we just a fancier and more ingenious animal snorting around for our dinner? Sure, we are vastly more complicated than a bee. Although we both have automatic responses, we humans have cognition and beliefs of all kinds, and the possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process and hardware, honed by evolution, that got us to this place. Possession of a belief, though a false one, drove Othello to kill his beloved wife, and Sidney Carton to declare, as he voluntarily took his friend’s place at the guillotine, that it was a far, far better thing he did than he had ever done.
Gazzaniga, Michael S.. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (pp. 2-3). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

Do you want subjective? Look at your setup of Gazzaniga and in his example. I highlighted a few subjective bits just to illuminate how you and your acolyte mix the subjective with the objective.

Let's see if you're right:
Biological drives, objectively refer to the needs that motivate a living organism to acquire food and other things that it needs to provide the energy to reproduce.
Thrive, objectively refers to the condition of the living organism, whether it is in fact acquiring what it needs to survive and reproduce, or more like on the verge of dying.
Deliberately, objectively refers to whether the action was motivated and directed by a decision (as opposed to, say, an accident).
Imagination, objectively refers to our ability to symbolically model reality in our brains, to run mental simulations to assess possible outcomes of our deliberate actions.
Mental, objectively refers to the subjective experience of our thoughts and feelings, etc.
Intelligence, objectively refers to a person's ability to recall and process information, especially in order to decide what to do.
Cognition, objectively, is the ability to store and process information. For objective confirmation of cognition, watch one episode of the TV show "Jeopardy".
Beliefs, objectively, can be objectively confirmed by asking yourself "Why do I believe all of these notions are subjective?"
Possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process, is objectively demonstrated when someone spits out their food after being told it has been infected with e coli.

So, all of those notions are used to describe what happens in objective reality.

Why does the car stop at a red light?
and
How does a car stop at a red light?

To the why we first operationalize the processes of learning and traffic control. The how comes through the operations the person who learned the law of traffic control as a condition of being permitted to drive executes his tasks.

In other words, in order to explain why a car stops at a red light, you must first evolve a human being with the biological need to survive, thrive, and reproduce (biological causation) and with the intelligence to understand that the best way to do that is by following the traffic laws rather than plowing through the intersection (rational causation).

It cannot be explained without all three causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

A human is a complex biological object. Complexity cannot be the hand wave that permits us to introduce subjective statements to objective analysis.

Again, you're assuming subjective statements when I'm using objective statements.

Your problem is that you introduce a bunch of subjective unproven and justified placeholders as objects to which you attribute much without explaining how they make the complex biological object that way through deterministic material processes.

The problem is how to explain why the car stops at the red light using just the laws of physics. It cannot (or, at least it will not) be done.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Yes, but to understand why specific things happen you need to know which causal mechanisms were involved.
(1) Inanimate matter reacts passively to physical forces. A bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill. It's behavior is governed by the force of gravity.
(2) A living organism behaves purposefully, according to biological drives to survive, thrive and reproduce. Place a worm on that slope and it will crawl uphill as easily as downhill, defying gravity, as it pursues the food it needs to survive. Its behavior is affected by gravity, but is not governed by it.
(3) An intelligent species behaves deliberately. It has an evolved neurology capable of modeling external reality internally. With that model it can imagine possibilities and alternatives. It can run mental simulations to estimate how different options are likely to play out. While it is still affected by gravity and biological drives, it is governed by its own choices. It can decide when, where, and how it will go about satisfying its biological needs.

To understand the distinction between biology and intelligence, consider this from neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga:

Are we just a fancier and more ingenious animal snorting around for our dinner? Sure, we are vastly more complicated than a bee. Although we both have automatic responses, we humans have cognition and beliefs of all kinds, and the possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process and hardware, honed by evolution, that got us to this place. Possession of a belief, though a false one, drove Othello to kill his beloved wife, and Sidney Carton to declare, as he voluntarily took his friend’s place at the guillotine, that it was a far, far better thing he did than he had ever done.
Gazzaniga, Michael S.. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (pp. 2-3). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

Do you want subjective? Look at your setup of Gazzaniga and in his example. I highlighted a few subjective bits just to illuminate how you and your acolyte mix the subjective with the objective.

Let's see if you're right:
Biological drives, objectively refer to the needs that motivate a living organism to acquire food and other things that it needs to provide the energy to reproduce.
Thrive, objectively refers to the condition of the living organism, whether it is in fact acquiring what it needs to survive and reproduce, or more like on the verge of dying.
Deliberately, objectively refers to whether the action was motivated and directed by a decision (as opposed to, say, an accident).
Imagination, objectively refers to our ability to symbolically model reality in our brains, to run mental simulations to assess possible outcomes of our deliberate actions.
Mental, objectively refers to the subjective experience of our thoughts and feelings, etc.
Intelligence, objectively refers to a person's ability to recall and process information, especially in order to decide what to do.
Cognition, objectively, is the ability to store and process information. For objective confirmation of cognition, watch one episode of the TV show "Jeopardy".
Beliefs, objectively, can be objectively confirmed by asking yourself "Why do I believe all of these notions are subjective?"
Possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process, is objectively demonstrated when someone spits out their food after being told it has been infected with e coli.

So, all of those notions are used to describe what happens in objective reality.

Why does the car stop at a red light?
and
How does a car stop at a red light?

To the why we first operationalize the processes of learning and traffic control. The how comes through the operations the person who learned the law of traffic control as a condition of being permitted to drive executes his tasks.

In other words, in order to explain why a car stops at a red light, you must first evolve a human being with the biological need to survive, thrive, and reproduce (biological causation) and with the intelligence to understand that the best way to do that is by following the traffic laws rather than plowing through the intersection (rational causation).

It cannot be explained without all three causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational.

A human is a complex biological object. Complexity cannot be the hand wave that permits us to introduce subjective statements to objective analysis.

Again, you're assuming subjective statements when I'm using objective statements.

Your problem is that you introduce a bunch of subjective unproven and justified placeholders as objects to which you attribute much without explaining how they make the complex biological object that way through deterministic material processes.

The problem is how to explain why the car stops at the red light using just the laws of physics. It cannot (or, at least it will not) be done.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

...
Just that a brain does not work on the principle of free will, or even will, neural architecture and information exchange being the agency of response.

Assuming we have a working brain, that brain will be making decisions. Free will is not about how the brain works, but about the empirical conditions that affect the decision making process. For example:

If someone is holding a gun to our head, then they will control the decision making process. What the victim does is not under their own control, but under the control of the guy with the gun. The victim is not held responsible for what he is forced to do against his will.

There are other empirical conditions that exert an extraordinary influence upon our decision making process. For example, a significant mental illness that distorts our perception of reality by hallucinations and delusions, or that impair the ability to reason, or that subject the patient to an irresistible impulse. In these empirical cases the patient's illness is held responsible for his actions, and the illness is treated medically and psychiatrically.

Unfortunately for 'free will' the system response in any given moment in time does not allow an alternate action.

That's okay. The decision making process will always include an alternate action. So, if a decision must be made, there will always be at least two alternate actions to choose from. This is always true by logical necessity whenever a decision is to be made.

Without a possible alternate action in any given moment in time, there is no freedom to have done otherwise, and no freedom of will - not that will is responsible for information processing or decision making.

In order to make a decision, the brain must hold two "I can's" to be true. When choosing between A and B, the brain must believe that "I can choose A" is true and that "I can choose B" is also true. Thus, at the end of the decision, one of them will become "That which I will do" and the other will become "That which I could have done".

If the decision is "I will choose A" then "I could have chosen B" will also be true. If the decision is "I will choose B" then "I could have chosen A" will also be true.

By logical necessity, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true at the end of a decision.
By causal necessity, "I would have done otherwise" will always be false at the end of a decision.

Which means the compatibilist must formulate a definition that appears to support free will: unimpeded action/acting according to one's will.

Free will is an empirical event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

It's quite simple, and well understood by everyone who actually uses the concept in real-life human scenarios. For example, "Were the professor's student subjects forced to participate in his experiments in order to pass his course, or did they participate of their own free will?"

When you read that sentence, are you at all uncertain as to what the term "free will" implies?
A) Does it imply "freedom from causal necessity"?
B) Or does it imply "freedom from coercion and undue influence"?

Which fails because it ignores the means of production and that acting according to ones will is determined and inevitable, that too is determined.

No, it doesn't at all contradict the means of production (it was in fact the brain, operating normally, that performed the operation of making a decision). No, it doesn't at all contradict the fact that the choice was causally inevitable from any prior point in time.

The only way that those contradictions arise is when you use the paradoxical definition, "freedom from causal necessity". So, stop using the paradoxical definition.

The environment and evolution encodes our genetic makeup, our 'mental firmware,' our instincts, attributes, abilities, proclivities....

Of course. We have prior causes that result in us appearing as a newborn in the delivery room. But once we're here, we become active participants in what happens next. For example, a person can be raised in a fundamentalist Christian church and still end up as an atheist.

Not disappear, just inseparable, we are composed of matter/energy, life has evolved from the energized chemical soup, billions of years of evolution has brought us to the point were we can perceive the world, think and act. That was not achieved through will.

Yet, once the human species arrived, its own thoughts and actions have extremely modified the environment. For example, the Wilbur and Orville Wright imagined a machine that would enable people to fly, and decided they would attempt to build one. That freely chosen intent, to build a flying machine, motivated and directed their actions as they went about doing all of the things needed to accomplish that intent (also known as "will").

Information processing is not something that you choose.

And yet I can choose to read a book or take a course in college. That choice will causally determine what information I will be processing.

It has nothing to do with 'free will' - which is just pasting a label where it doesn't belong.

Then I suggest we paste that label precisely where it does belong: Free will is a deterministic, empirical event, in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

Basically: unconscious input > unconscious processing > conscious report and response.
The point being that it is unconscious information processing that determines what you experience, your thoughts, feelings and actions.
Which of course is being constantly 'refreshed' as new information acts upon the system, you think to do x, but a moment later the thought to do y instead comes to mind.
Information processing rather than 'free will.'

Free will does not imply any freedom from the brain. After all, that's where the deciding is actually taking place. And, while the brain itself is incapable of explaining what its neurons are doing, it does present us with a logical model of what is going on:
The logical model includes concepts such as "problems" or "issues" that require it to "decide" what it "will" do.
The logical model includes "realizable options" and "alternative possibilities".
The logical model includes a series of logical operations upon these tokens, such as "estimating the likely outcome" of each option by imagining how events will play out and "choosing the one we think/feel is best".
The logical model includes both of the conclusions "I will do this" and "I could have done that".

Since the brain is not going to lay out for us the sequence of neuron firings that produced each of the mental events, we're pretty much stuck with the explanation provided by the brain itself, using its own logical modelling.

Once more;
''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems! - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

Doctor Farah is following the crowd. It is the current trend to bash free will. The paradox of determinism "versus" free will is very seductive, and people become easily trapped in the self-induced hoax.

 

[pood]

Unfortunately for 'free will' the system response in any given moment in time does not allow an alternate action.

You keep saying this, and it keeps being an unsupported assertion. You have a dogma. Hard determinism is a dogma. It is every bit as much of a dogma as “goddidit,” only your dogma is “hard determinism did it.”

Not only it is a dogma, it’s wrong. The world at bottom is quantum indeterministic. What we call “determinism” is a combination of vast numbers of wave functions that wash out into a kind of statistical determinism, wherein what we experience is overwhelmingly likely to replicate a cause and effect model without necessarily doing so.

You don’t think there is a difference between a rock rolling down a hill and a human deciding what to have for breakfast. A rock is not alive. It does not have a brain. It does not have controllable appendages. A rock must roll down a hill — follow a geodesic — in accord with general relativity, but even here, as both Marvin and I have pointed out, the “laws of nature” are not laws at all, not prescriptions, but descriptions of regularities in nature. Some phenomena are regularities that occur without exception (gravity), others are plainly statistical (second law of thermodynamics) and still others are free (human choice).

The human brain evolved, among other reasons, to consider options. A rock has no options. Humans do. This is plain.

You are not even talking about determinism. You are talking about fatalism, which is not the same thing.

If I am fated to choose eggs for breakfast — no other option permitted — why do I even have an evaluative brain, which weighs options? What is the survival advantage in it? Where is the selection effect? If I have to choose eggs for breakfast, then there is no selection for a brain that can elastically evaluate options in the context of self-awareness: memory, hunger, foresight, planning.

A world you describe would be much more parsimoniously inclined to produce philosophical zombies — entities who perhaps seem to be self aware and to choose but in fact have no consciousness at all.

Our options for breakfast are deterministically generated. Our brains evaluate the available options and deterministically output a choice — either eggs, or pancakes, or something else. Our brains and choices are part of the deterministic stream. WE determine what we have for breakfast, not the Big Bang. Past events deterministically influence (but do not control) our choices.

The Libet experiments did not, as so often characterized, show that we lack free will. On the contrary, they show that we DO have free will, in the only relevant sense.

 

[Jarhyn]

So, fundamentally, the universe has locations which internalize states.

The basic shape of a decision is an event which determines based on the local state.

But some states are registers, living as potential pieces of the smaller instruction, as arguments.

(Jump if cr1 < 0) is the code of the instruction, but it embeds decision: IF this thing vs that thing. Note "cr1", a reference to some other state held by the processor machine.

This is decision, and it unquestionably happens.

In this way, "the cause" is a function plus an input, not some monolithic "event".

The hard determinists says "there is only one I put therefore the function is farce!"

But that is not true. The function is the function which determines and decides how input is processed; the same Input to different function yields different results.