Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

Whether one acts appropriately or inappropriately is not a matter of will.

Whether one acts appropriately or inappropriately is a matter of choice. The choice sets the intent (will), the intent drives the action.

If a child lacks impulse control, due to a sense that he has no choice, then the child is taught the appropriate behavior, and is reinforced with praise, so that he learns to make the right choices in the future, and avoids the penalty of a stern look and perhaps a timeout.

Learning from our mistakes requires the notion of possibilities, actions that the child could have taken instead, like waiting until he was served his piece of the birthday cake. And he can try out these new possibilities at the next birthday party.

The state of the system determines output.

Now, if you can see it yet, "the state of the system determining output" is exactly what I just described. The state of the child's system before correction led to him taking a handful of the birthday cake. The interventions we provided have hopefully altered the state of the child's system, so that the child thinks twice before sticking his hand in the cake.

Now, after the child has acquired the habit of acting appropriately, he will no longer need to choose between what he feels like doing versus what he ought to do. He will behave appropriately without having to choose to do so.

A habit is behavior that is also governed by choice, however, the choosing took place a long time ago, and the habit makes repeated choosing unnecessary.

You say that it is ''the empirical event in which you made that choice for yourself, while free of coercion and undue influence'' - the problem being that there is no choice on the matter of brain condition in the moment of necessitated action realization. Therefore no absence of 'influence' (think necessitated), consequently it is not a free will choice.

As always, every event is always causally necessary from any prior point in time. That's just a background constant. We could describe any series of events by inserting "it was causally necessary from any prior point in time that X (the event) would happen". But that can simply be taken for granted, to avoid wasting a lot of time and space constantly repeating the obvious. In fact, we can forget about universal causal necessity altogether and get along just fine in the real world.

What we care about in the real world is the specific causes of specific effects. Knowing the causes of events gives us control over many events that affect our lives, like viral diseases.

The specific cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that chose to do it. For a habitual offender, the choice was made long ago, and the behavior will be difficult to extinguish, because the robber has been rewarded repeatedly by the money he successfully acquired by placing the clerk under duress (pointing a gun at them).

So, ironically, the less control the offender had over his most recent choice, the bigger the challenge to those who would rehabilitate him, and the longer he will need to be in jail.

To sum up, causal necessity always applies so it is never required to bring it up, and only the details as to how the robber was thinking when he decided to hold up the 7Eleven, and how we might alter that "line of thinking" (causal chain) in the future (later causal chain), through counseling and rehabilitation are important.

But the most important thing to keep in mind is that rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of alternatives to his past behavior, things he could have done instead, and having those alternatives perceived by the offender as real possibilities for his own future.

Of course, a functional brain with the necessary information should generate appropriate behaviour, empathy, ethics, law, societal expectations, etc. Not always perfectly, sometimes not even ideal, which is a matter of condition, not free will.

But the notion of free will, that one can choose, on his own, to behave differently in the future, is essential to his rehabilitation.

If we were to convince the offender that he was not responsible for his past behavior, because it was the result of causal necessity, and not anything over which he had control, then, to be consistent, we would also have to tell him that his future behavior will also be the result of causal necessity, and not anything over which he will have any control.

We must cease and desist from telling people that causal necessity removes their freedom and their control. First, because it is a lie. Second, because it is a harmful lie.

Free Will as a Matter of Law
''This chapter confronts the issue of free will in neurolaw, rejecting one of the leading views of the relationship between free will and legal responsibility on the ground that the current system of legal responsibility likely emerged from outdated views about the mind, mental states, and free will. It challenges the compatibilist approach to law (in which free will and causal determinism can coexist). The chapter argues that those who initially developed the criminal law endorsed or presupposed views about mind and free will that modern neuroscience will aid in revealing as false. It then argues for the relevance of false presuppositions embedded in the original development of the criminal law in judging whether to revise or maintain the current system. In doing so, the chapter shares the view that neuroscientific developments will change the way we think about criminal responsibility.''

So, now we're about to trap the legal system in the same stupid paradox? Geez, somebody needs to take some responsibility for what is about to happen, and put a stop to it.

... Life is far more complicated than that. The term 'free will' tells us nothing about human behaviour or its drivers.

That's right. Free will, like causal necessity, tells us only one thing. But unlike causal necessity, the one thing it tells us happens to be very useful information when assigning responsibility to the appropriate causes of an event. It tells us whether the behavior was deliberate.

Knowing whether the behavior was, or was not, deliberate is essential to choosing the appropriate means of correction.
Knowing that the behavior was causally necessary, tells us nothing useful, because all behavior is always causally necessary.

 

[Copernicus]

Hard determinists believe that volunteers don't really exist. They are just deluded slaves to causal necessity who thought they were free to refuse service.

Who is a hard determinist? Are we not talking about compatibilism, which accepts determinism but claims that freedom of will is compatible with determinism?

Compatibilists don't claim that multiple options can be realized in any given instance.

Wikipedia has a good description of  hard determinism:

Hard determinism (or metaphysical determinism) is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism, it can also be a position taken with respect to other forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.

Hard determinism is contrasted with soft determinism, which is a compatibilist form of determinism, holding that free will may exist despite determinism. It is also contrasted with metaphysical libertarianism, the other major form of incompatibilism which holds that free will exists and determinism is false.

 

[DBT]

Point as many times as you like, you are still wrong.

No, it's quite clear that despite repeatedly quoting him, Strawson disagrees with you and accepts that "you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.".

Some reading material;

Introduction and Context
''There is something very important at stake in the free will vs determinism debate: is moral responsibility possible? Strawson's answer is "no" but this follows whether determinism is true or false! If Strawson is right, and we can't be morally responsible for our actions, why the heck do most people think that we can be morally responsible for our actions? Because free will is an illusion.''

Key Concepts
It's important to distinguish legal culpability or responsibility from moral responsibility. For example, many people don't think you do anything morally wrong by smoking pot but agree that you're legally responsible from breaking the law if you do so. Moral responsibility is closely tied to the idea of blameworthiness. That is, you are morally responsible it would it make sense to blame someone for their action or find you morally at fault. (This will be discussed in more detail in the 2nd section below).


Here is Strawson's article on the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.

 

[DBT]

Hard determinists believe that volunteers don't really exist. They are just deluded slaves to causal necessity who thought they were free to refuse service.

Who is a hard determinist? Are we not talking about compatibilism, which accepts determinism but claims that freedom of will is compatible with determinism?

Compatibilists don't claim that multiple options can be realized in any given instance.

Wikipedia has a good description of  hard determinism:

Hard determinism (or metaphysical determinism) is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism, it can also be a position taken with respect to other forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.

Hard determinism is contrasted with soft determinism, which is a compatibilist form of determinism, holding that free will may exist despite determinism. It is also contrasted with metaphysical libertarianism, the other major form of incompatibilism which holds that free will exists and determinism is false.

Once again; I work with the standard definition of determinism (given). Compatibilists don't deny this definition of determinism, it is the same definition. Compatibilism asserts that free will is compatible with the same definition of determinism. Compatibilism defines free will as acting according to ones will, not being coerced, decisions are made by the agent, etc, and asserting that this is free will.

The incompatibilist - me in this instance - in turn points out why this definition fails to establish freedom of will.

Because the same definition of determinism is being used by both parties, to call one 'hard determinism' as opposed to 'soft determinism' is kind of misleading in the sense of giving the impression that different definitions of determinism are being used.

As I see it, the question is simply: is free will compatible with determinism.

The incompatibilist reply - me in this instance - is: no, for the given reasons, it is not.

Some do call compatibilism a theological term, and in this instance they may be right.

''Compatibilism, sometimes called soft determinism, is a theological term that deals with the topics of free will and predestination. It seeks to show that God's exhaustive sovereignty is compatible with human freedom, or in other words, it claims that determinism and free will are compatible. Rather than limit the exercise of God's sovereignty in order to preserve man's freedom, compatibilists say that there must be a different way to define what freedom really means.''

 

[DBT]

Whether one acts appropriately or inappropriately is not a matter of will.

Whether one acts appropriately or inappropriately is a matter of choice. The choice sets the intent (will), the intent drives the action.

'Choice' is not a matter of free will, but brain function and condition. Information condition equals output, thoughts generated actions taken. No alternate actions possible in any instance in time. Consequently, output does not equate to free will.



Quote;
''Because most behavior is driven by brain networks we do not consciously control, the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior. In the light of modern neuroscience, it no longer makes sense to ask "was it his fault, or his biology's fault, or the fault of his background?", because these issues can never be disentangled. Instead, the only sensible question can be "what do we do from here?" -- in terms of customized sentencing, tailored rehabilition, and refined incentive structuring.''

If a child lacks impulse control, due to a sense that he has no choice, then the child is taught the appropriate behavior, and is reinforced with praise, so that he learns to make the right choices in the future, and avoids the penalty of a stern look and perhaps a timeout.

Learning from our mistakes requires the notion of possibilities, actions that the child could have taken instead, like waiting until he was served his piece of the birthday cake. And he can try out these new possibilities at the next birthday party.

Impulse control, as described in articles on the neuroscience of decision making is a matter of brain function and condition;

On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

A person may be self conscious, intelligent, have both the perception and the experience of making conscious choices, decisions that are based on his or her beliefs and desires, yet lack self control.''

Rather than free will enabling self control, it is the necessary hardware; the work of fully functional neural networks specific to that task.

The state of the system determines output.

Now, if you can see it yet, "the state of the system determining output" is exactly what I just described. The state of the child's system before correction led to him taking a handful of the birthday cake. The interventions we provided have hopefully altered the state of the child's system, so that the child thinks twice before sticking his hand in the cake.

Yes, you describe the state of the system, then simply slap on a 'free will' label where it doesn't apply. Acting in accord to determined output does not equate to free will. It is simply 'acting without explicit external force or coercion' - which ignores the constraints and limitations of the system and available information. A split second delay in memory function and a bad decision is made, saying or doing something that you regret a moment later.

Now, after the child has acquired the habit of acting appropriately, he will no longer need to choose between what he feels like doing versus what he ought to do. He will behave appropriately without having to choose to do so.

A habit is behavior that is also governed by choice, however, the choosing took place a long time ago, and the habit makes repeated choosing unnecessary.

Yes, learning cultural and social rules enabled by an intelligent functional brain. Just because 'free will' is a irrelevant term doesn't mean that we can't learn, think and act appropriately. Of course, there are some, who through no fault of their own, are unable to function normally.

You say that it is ''the empirical event in which you made that choice for yourself, while free of coercion and undue influence'' - the problem being that there is no choice on the matter of brain condition in the moment of necessitated action realization. Therefore no absence of 'influence' (think necessitated), consequently it is not a free will choice.

As always, every event is always causally necessary from any prior point in time. That's just a background constant. We could describe any series of events by inserting "it was causally necessary from any prior point in time that X (the event) would happen". But that can simply be taken for granted, to avoid wasting a lot of time and space constantly repeating the obvious. In fact, we can forget about universal causal necessity altogether and get along just fine in the real world.

What we care about in the real world is the specific causes of specific effects. Knowing the causes of events gives us control over many events that affect our lives, like viral diseases.

The specific cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that chose to do it. For a habitual offender, the choice was made long ago, and the behavior will be difficult to extinguish, because the robber has been rewarded repeatedly by the money he successfully acquired by placing the clerk under duress (pointing a gun at them).

So, ironically, the less control the offender had over his most recent choice, the bigger the challenge to those who would rehabilitate him, and the longer he will need to be in jail.

To sum up, causal necessity always applies so it is never required to bring it up, and only the details as to how the robber was thinking when he decided to hold up the 7Eleven, and how we might alter that "line of thinking" (causal chain) in the future (later causal chain), through counseling and rehabilitation are important.

But the most important thing to keep in mind is that rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of alternatives to his past behavior, things he could have done instead, and having those alternatives perceived by the offender as real possibilities for his own future.

Information enables a wider range of possibilities. Information enables options that are not otherwise available. The process by which an option is realized is the same. Only one option can be realized in any given instance in time, with no alternate action possible.

The difference being that with the necessary information acting upon your neural architecture you are enabled do what you could not have otherwise done.

Which is still not a 'free will' choice.

https://oxford.universitypressschol...43095.001.0001/acprof-9780198743095-chapter-2

Free Will as a Matter of Law
''This chapter confronts the issue of free will in neurolaw, rejecting one of the leading views of the relationship between free will and legal responsibility on the ground that the current system of legal responsibility likely emerged from outdated views about the mind, mental states, and free will. It challenges the compatibilist approach to law (in which free will and causal determinism can coexist). The chapter argues that those who initially developed the criminal law endorsed or presupposed views about mind and free will that modern neuroscience will aid in revealing as false. It then argues for the relevance of false presuppositions embedded in the original development of the criminal law in judging whether to revise or maintain the current system. In doing so, the chapter shares the view that neuroscientific developments will change the way we think about criminal responsibility.''

So, now we're about to trap the legal system in the same stupid paradox? Geez, somebody needs to take some responsibility for what is about to happen, and put a stop to it.

Isn't it the case that to improve outcomes in rehabilitation, etc, the legal system needs to take the nature of decision making into account?
Isn't simply declaring; ''he acted of his own free will'' and imposing a prescribed sentence simplistic and outdated?

The idea of free will adds nothing to our understanding of human behaviour.

 

[The AntiChris]

Here is Strawson's article on the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.

And here is an An Interview with Galen Strawson which took place 10 years after the paper you cite. In this interview he makes it clear that he accepts the everyday sense of moral responsibility (he's arguing against the kind of responsibility beloved by those who have been seduced by the "freedom from cause and effect" paradox.).

but I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

 

[WAB]

Hard determinists believe that volunteers don't really exist. They are just deluded slaves to causal necessity who thought they were free to refuse service.

Who is a hard determinist? Are we not talking about compatibilism, which accepts determinism but claims that freedom of will is compatible with determinism?

Compatibilists don't claim that multiple options can be realized in any given instance.

There are always multiple options, in every second, across every moment in time. Marvin keeps playing with eggs or pancakes, and he simplifies things by creating posts where simple, often binary choices are available to people at most instances of most of the time. But the reality is that there are in fact a literally innumerable amount of choices, all the time.

 

[pood]

WAB,

Marvin and I have been using “eggs of pancakes” just to simplify the discussion, a kind of toy model that strips the situation down to its bare essentials. We both obviously agree with you that all of us have multiple choices at any given moment. I was interested in your earlier claim that some people don’t want there to be freedom of choice, and would like to destroy freedom or at least the notion of free choice. I’m pretty sure DBT is not arguing for that — he’s not against free choice, he just doesn’t think we have it. The idea of some people wish to destroy free choice, or destroy belief in it, was one of the animating philosophical ideas in Rand’s novel The Fountainhead, interestingly enough. See: “The Gallant Gallstone,” from the novel. I’m not a Rand fan by any means but it’s a great novel.

DBT,

There is a clear difference between determinism, hard determinism, and soft determinism.

Determinism is the position that the world exhibits reliable cause-and-effect relations.

Hard determinism is the thesis that antecedent events, in conjunction with the “laws” of nature, entail all future events, including human acts.

Soft determinism is the thesis that human acts are part of the deterministic stream, and that some things are determined — made to be true — by human free choice, but also that the outcomes of these choices depend upon determinism being true.

The soft determinist does believe we have multiple realizable choices, only that, given identical circumstances, humans would always make the same choice — not that they MUST make the same choice, only. that they WILL make the same choice. You continually commit the modal fallacy, which I have described in some detail. The entire hard determinist position rests on a modal fallacy!


It’s true that the determinism/free will debate arises from theological concerns. I have addressed this on multiple occasions as well. It‘s called theological determinism. The issue is that an omnipotent God, knowing in advance what we will do, precludes our free will, because if God knows what we will do, then we MUST do that thing. This, again, is the classic modal fallacy.


WRONG ARGUMENT: If today God knows that tomorrow I will choose eggs for breakfast (Sorry, WAB), then tomorrow I MUST choose eggs for breakfast — no free will.

CORRECTED ARGUMENT: Necessarily (If today God knows that tomorrow I will choose eggs for breakfast, then tomorrow I will [NOT MUST!] choose eggs for breakfast — free will preserved.

If I were to choose pancakes instead, then God would foreknow THAT fact instead. But the choice is entirely my own.

As I have already shown, this modal solution to the problem generalizes to both epistemic determinism (Aristotle’s sea battle) and to causal determinism, which is what we are discussing in this thread.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

'Choice' is not a matter of free will, but brain function and condition. Information condition equals output, thoughts generated actions taken.

You still don't get it. One does not preclude the other. Choosing is a brain function that is easily demonstrated by walking into a restaurant and observing people browsing the menu and placing their order.

No alternate actions possible in any instance in time.

You are staring at a literal menu of alternate possibilities, of which every one of them can be realized.

You certainly will choose only one, but you certainly can choose any one of them.

That's what these two words are all about. And that is all that the "ability to do otherwise" amounts to, having two or more "I can's" even though there is only one "I will".

The notion of "something that can happen" evolved so that the brain can deal with matters of uncertainty. And, lacking omniscience, the human brain must deal with a heck of a lot of uncertainty. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare for what does happen.

Choosing is necessitated by our uncertainty as to "what we will do" in a given situation, such as when we are seated in a restaurant, and we must decide what we will order.

In order to perform this function, the brain converts the most likely candidates, the as yet unknown "I will's", into "I can's". And it begins evaluating the multiple "I can's" to decide which "I can" is the inevitable "I will" and which of the "I can's" are the inevitable "I could have's".

By logical necessity, choosing will always output a single inevitable "I will" and at least one inevitable "I could have (but didn't)".

That is what the brain does.

And, when the brain does this, while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called "free will", because it is a freely chosen "I will" from among the multiple "I can's" available to it.

Consequently, free will is a real event that happens in the real world.

Consequently, the definition of determinism must drop its claim that we "could not have done otherwise", because it will always be the case that we, in fact, could have done otherwise when choosing between two or more possibilities. Instead determinism must replace it with the claim that we "would not have done otherwise". Without this change, determinism is false.

Quote;
''Because most behavior is driven by brain networks we do not consciously control, the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior. In the light of modern neuroscience, it no longer makes sense to ask "was it his fault, or his biology's fault, or the fault of his background?", because these issues can never be disentangled. Instead, the only sensible question can be "what do we do from here?" -- in terms of customized sentencing, tailored rehabilition, and refined incentive structuring.''

I did not find your specific quote at Center for Science & Law. But I did find David Eagleman's description of how they were using neuroscience to inform and reform our approaches to dealing with criminal offenders. And I fully support this process. I have often pointed out in these discussions that it is not the determinism "versus" free will paradox that motivates progress in this area, but rather the social sciences, like psychology and sociology (and we can add neuroscience and medicine) that inform our judgment in these matters.

Science is concerned with the specific causes of specific events. That is where all of the useful knowledge is. Science should not be wringing its hands over theological or metaphysical abstractions, like universal causal necessity, and all of the paradoxes that philosophers introduce to distract us.

Most of us who took a general sociology class in college know that cultures shape the beliefs and practices of individuals. As they say, "It takes a village to raise a child", and we have a lot of villages in our country with major problems. Gangs are subcultures that spring up to establish control in a vacuum.

And those of us who took psychology courses are aware of mental illnesses that significantly affect behavior. And we know that facilities for caring for and rehabilitating the mentally ill have been disappearing over the years, leaving many of those in need of psychiatric therapy in the hands of prison guards.

Sociologists and psychologists have been advocating against retributive punishments for years. That is why we have correctional facilities and rehabilitation programs today. I'm happy to see neuroscience join the team.

Impulse control, as described in articles on the neuroscience of decision making is a matter of brain function and condition;

Yes, we get that. Everything that our brain does for us is "a matter of brain function and condition". No one is saying otherwise. Everything that I'm continually pointing out to you, including free will, is "a matter of brain function and condition".

Now, if you can see it yet, "the state of the system determining output" is exactly what I just described. The state of the child's system before correction led to him taking a handful of the birthday cake. The interventions we provided have hopefully altered the state of the child's system, so that the child thinks twice before sticking his hand in the cake.

Yes, you describe the state of the system, then simply slap on a 'free will' label where it doesn't apply.

The label of "free will" applies to only one thing: a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence. Free will does not mean a choice "free of our brain" or a choice "free of causation". It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. Neither our brain, nor causation, qualifies as coercive or undue.

Acting in accord to determined output does not equate to free will. It is simply 'acting without explicit external force or coercion' - which ignores the constraints and limitations of the system and available information.

Do you view a functioning brain as a constraint upon our freedom? I view a functioning brain as an enabler of imagination, evaluation, and choosing what we will do.

And our information is always incomplete. We often do not know what "will" happen. So, our brain evolved the notion of things that "might" happen, so that we can prepare for what eventually "does" happen.

A split second delay in memory function and a bad decision is made, saying or doing something that you regret a moment later.

Interesting. One of the things that William James pointed out in his essay, The Dilemma of Determinism, is that with determinism there are no such things as regrets, and that one of the costs he is willing to pay for believing in free will is to suffer regrets, because that is how moral progress proceeds.

Now, after the child has acquired the habit of acting appropriately, he will no longer need to choose between what he feels like doing versus what he ought to do. He will behave appropriately without having to choose to do so.

A habit is behavior that is also governed by choice, however, the choosing took place a long time ago, and the habit makes repeated choosing unnecessary.

Yes, learning cultural and social rules enabled by an intelligent functional brain. Just because 'free will' is a irrelevant term doesn't mean that we can't learn, think and act appropriately. Of course, there are some, who through no fault of their own, are unable to function normally.

Yes, normally people understand what it means to do something of their own free will. It means to do something deliberately or voluntarily. But some people get trapped in Spinoza's paradox, and come to believe that one must be free of causation in order to be "truly" free.

You say that it is ''the empirical event in which you made that choice for yourself, while free of coercion and undue influence'' - the problem being that there is no choice on the matter of brain condition in the moment of necessitated action realization. Therefore no absence of 'influence' (think necessitated), consequently it is not a free will choice.

As always, every event is always causally necessary from any prior point in time. That's just a background constant. We could describe any series of events by inserting "it was causally necessary from any prior point in time that X (the event) would happen". But that can simply be taken for granted, to avoid wasting a lot of time and space constantly repeating the obvious. In fact, we can forget about universal causal necessity altogether and get along just fine in the real world.

What we care about in the real world is the specific causes of specific effects. Knowing the causes of events gives us control over many events that affect our lives, like viral diseases.

The specific cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that chose to do it. For a habitual offender, the choice was made long ago, and the behavior will be difficult to extinguish, because the robber has been rewarded repeatedly by the money he successfully acquired by placing the clerk under duress (pointing a gun at them).

So, ironically, the less control the offender had over his most recent choice, the bigger the challenge to those who would rehabilitate him, and the longer he will need to be in jail.

To sum up, causal necessity always applies so it is never required to bring it up, and only the details as to how the robber was thinking when he decided to hold up the 7Eleven, and how we might alter that "line of thinking" (causal chain) in the future (later causal chain), through counseling and rehabilitation are important.

But the most important thing to keep in mind is that rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of alternatives to his past behavior, things he could have done instead, and having those alternatives perceived by the offender as real possibilities for his own future.

Information enables a wider range of possibilities. Information enables options that are not otherwise available. The process by which an option is realized is the same. Only one option can be realized in any given instance in time, with no alternate action possible. "

Actually, only one option "will" be realized, while many alternate actions remain real possibilities that simply were not chosen. But you are correct that "the process by which an option is realized is the same", and given the exact same circumstances, that same option "will" always be chosen again, even though the other options once again "could have" been chosen.

The difference being that with the necessary information acting upon your neural architecture you are enabled do what you could not have otherwise done.

The information would have to be different in order to have made a different choice. It is AS IF the information were controlling the choice, but, of course, it was actually the brain itself that was doing the choosing. The information had no skin in the game, but the brain did.

Which is still not a 'free will' choice.

Whether the choice was of the brain's own free will is empirically decided by whether the brain was being coerced or unduly influenced at the time of the choosing.

Isn't it the case that to improve outcomes in rehabilitation, etc, the legal system needs to take the nature of decision making into account?
Isn't simply declaring; ''he acted of his own free will'' and imposing a prescribed sentence simplistic and outdated?

"Basic desert" is an instinctive response to wrongdoing. For example, you grab my biscuit from my plate and I stick a fork in your hand. These instinctive reactions apparently evolved because they served a purpose, establishing social justice within a community. You will now think twice before you reach for my biscuit again. The social rule is established, communicated, and enforced by one simple act.

But we've evolved beyond that. Now we can explain what we are trying to accomplish to everyone, through our philosophy of justice. Justice seeks to protect the rights we have agreed to respect and protect for everyone. A just penalty, what the criminal offender justly deserves, would include the following: (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) protect society from further harm by securing the offender until his behavior is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender or his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).

 

[pood]

I should amend my above post. Aristotle’s sea battle is an example of logical determinism (the problem of future contingents). Epistemic and theological determinism are the same, incorrect idea that infallible foreknowledge of human actions precludes those acts from being free.

 

[Jarhyn]

I should amend my above post. Aristotle’s sea battle is an example of logical determinism (the problem of future contingents). Epistemic and theological determinism are the same, incorrect idea that infallible foreknowledge of human actions precludes those acts from being free.

Or, just ecause I can determine that "process A" will return "45" because I can simulate out the general behaviors and abstract away complications does not mean any less that the process was the source of it's own return value.

 

[fromderinside]

Setting up neural mechanisms for choice. Think about it. A deterministic world provides stimuli 'directing survival of neural processes responding appropriately', in the statistical evolutionary processes of continuing the organism's existence in given circumstances. Those neural processes cannot become the basis for free will.

 

[pood]

So neural processes are interested in continuing an organism’s existence? Does that mean neural processes have a mind or will of their own?

I think that organisms are interested in continuing their own existence and that they evaluate options based on neural inputs to decide the best course of action for survival in any given circumstance.

 

[Copernicus]

Because the same definition of determinism is being used by both parties, to call one 'hard determinism' as opposed to 'soft determinism' is kind of misleading in the sense of giving the impression that different definitions of determinism are being used.

Paying lip service to a definition is not the same as agreeing to the same concept, as you have amply demonstrated over many, many pages of disagreement with Marvin's detailed explanations of why free will is a fully determined process. The expression "free will" exists, because it makes sense to beings that expect the future to be causally determined but are unable to know it. You simply are unwilling to accept the ordinary usage of a common sense term that is associated with other everyday concepts such as moral responsibility, sin (even though a god can be omniscient, people aren't), praise, and guilt.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Setting up neural mechanisms for choice. Think about it. A deterministic world provides stimuli 'directing survival of neural processes responding appropriately', in the statistical evolutionary processes of continuing the organism's existence in given circumstances. Those neural processes cannot become the basis for free will.

The survival advantage from evolved intelligence comes from adapting creatively to an environment, versus hard-coded instinctual responses. Creativity includes design choices for machines, bridges, procedures. Some approaches to a problem work better than others. The notion of "one thing better than another" is the root of moral judgment.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Setting up neural mechanisms for choice. Think about it. A deterministic world provides stimuli 'directing survival of neural processes responding appropriately', in the statistical evolutionary processes of continuing the organism's existence in given circumstances. Those neural processes cannot become the basis for free will.

So, rather than neural processes, you would propose what, a soul? We know that people make choices, which car to buy, when and where to eat lunch, which tie goes best with a shirt, and so on. We don't know how neural mechanisms do it, but we presume they do it somehow. After all, what are the alternatives? DBT has suggested that the information is making the choices, as if the shirts and ties were doing our choosing for us. The only thing we know for sure is that whatever is making the choices can be coerced or unduly influenced to make choices they would rather not make. So, free will is a choice we make for ourselves without coercion or undue influence. And since choosing must inevitably happen, free will must also inevitably happen. Think about it.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Key Concepts
It's important to distinguish legal culpability or responsibility from moral responsibility. For example, many people don't think you do anything morally wrong by smoking pot but agree that you're legally responsible from breaking the law if you do so. Moral responsibility is closely tied to the idea of blameworthiness. That is, you are morally responsible it would it make sense to blame someone for their action or find you morally at fault.

Law and Conscience
We have law and we have conscience. A person's conscience usually agrees with most laws, or at least is willing to follow those laws for the sake of supporting law generally, because his conscience recognizes law as a moral good. But a person's conscience may find that following a specific law is immoral. In the 1970's young men were burning their draft cards to protest the war in Viet Nam. Law sometimes accommodates conscience. Those with a religious objection to killing people, even in war, are allowed to serve in the armed forces in non-combat roles. These are called "conscientious objectors".

Moral and Legal
There is no distinction between moral and legal responsibility, other than the means of enforcement. In one case it is the court of conscience, in the other a court of law. The penalties imposed by conscience are guilt and regret.

Blameworthiness
Ideally, to be fair and just, we must select the least harmful penalty that effectively corrects the behavior. If blame gets the job done, then it is most likely the least harmful penalty, and is fully justified. The offender, whether of law or conscience, who can be corrected simply by blaming him, does not justly deserve anything more than that. But also does not deserve anything less than that.

A policeman who lets you off with a warning, has deemed you blameworthy, and trusts that his reprimand and warning will be sufficient penalty to correct your behavior.

So, blame works both in the legal system and the moral system. It is not unique to moral offenses.

 

[fromderinside]

So neural processes are interested in continuing an organism’s existence? Does that mean neural processes have a mind or will of their own?

I think that organisms are interested in continuing their own existence and that they evaluate options based on neural inputs to decide the best course of action for survival in any given circumstance.

It's the more fit surviving (providing reproducing offspring) which makes the process of evolution work. It matters v very little whether organisms evaluate anything. What matters is that those that survive and reproduce are generally more fit than those who don't survive or reproduce. So no. Neural processes don't have mind property whatever that that might be in your view.

 

[fromderinside]

Setting up neural mechanisms for choice. Think about it. A deterministic world provides stimuli 'directing survival of neural processes responding appropriately', in the statistical evolutionary processes of continuing the organism's existence in given circumstances. Those neural processes cannot become the basis for free will.

So, rather than neural processes, you would propose what, a soul? We know that people make choices, which car to buy, when and where to eat lunch, which tie goes best with a shirt, and so on. We don't know how neural mechanisms do it, but we presume they do it somehow. After all, what are the alternatives? DBT has suggested that the information is making the choices, as if the shirts and ties were doing our choosing for us. The only thing we know for sure is that whatever is making the choices can be coerced or unduly influenced to make choices they would rather not make. So, free will is a choice we make for ourselves without coercion or undue influence. And since choosing must inevitably happen, free will must also inevitably happen. Think about it.

Fortunately, I'm not so confused as to think that choosing, whatever you mean by that, happens. I'm just of the opinion that humans, at least, attempt to retain fitness advantage by supporting various processes magnifying one's own status.
There are many ways one can envision why one chooses to justify such. I know that when I talk myself into being confident when confronted by the threat that I've tended to fare better than when I'm caught unaware of the threat or when I am not prepared to respond to a threat. I'm best when confident and prepared.

I'm a prepared for fight or flight type of gee.

Side thought. I've been confronted by bullies most of my life because I'm slight. I learned early to be as fit as possible because I'm a normally assertive person. I had a child like me. I prepared him some. I didn't assure that he had acquired the heavy training required for boxing and wrestling threats. He got sucker-punched in a parking lot and died.

I survived a similar attack when I was his age because I was prepared. Fitness is not generationally guaranteed. It all comes down to having the proper skill set at the proper time. Another nail in the silly old consciousness/choice notions.

 

[fromderinside]

Setting up neural mechanisms for choice. Think about it. A deterministic world provides stimuli 'directing survival of neural processes responding appropriately', in the statistical evolutionary processes of continuing the organism's existence in given circumstances. Those neural processes cannot become the basis for free will.

The survival advantage from evolved intelligence comes from adapting creatively to an environment, versus hard-coded instinctual responses. Creativity includes design choices for machines, bridges, procedures. Some approaches to a problem work better than others. The notion of "one thing better than another" is the root of moral judgment.

Every time you answer you float a new banana boat. Your latest is adapting creatively to an environment. You don't do anything.

What you are and what you experience are what you have for tools. I don't care how creative you may be. Besides most of what we are finding that kills us is not interspecies. What kills us is within species. All of our species are pretty damn intelligent. If you don't meet force and/or knowledge with sufficient (think better) force and/or knowledge you will not likely survive.

Notice all the probable's I dropped there. Maybe statistics have something to do with it.