Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

I think the key here is that Harris is forced to admit that it is in fact our own brain that is making the decision. And the decision is not too "deep" to rise to conscious awareness. For a complex decision, like buying a new car, or deciding where to vacation, a person may even take out a pencil and paper to make a list of pros and cons, or the costs and benefits. And there it is, the process of deciding, right there in the open for all to see.

Of course it's the brain that makes decisions. Nobody is forced to admit it. It's not only not a problem, but a key point in the argument against free will - that it's the unconscious of the brain that acquires, processes and represents [some] information in conscious form....that there is no choice in that process: the brain does what it does according to evolutionary role: information in, output out.


Electrical stimulation and the illusion of free will:

''When it comes to the human brain, even the simplest of acts can be counter-intuitive and deceptively complicated. For example, try stretching your arm.

Nerves in the limb send messages back to your brain, but the subjective experience you have of stretching isn't due to these signals. The feeling that you willed your arm into motion, and the realisation that you moved it at all, are both the result of an area at the back of your brain called the posterior parietal cortex. This region helped to produce the intention to move, and predicted what the movement would feel like, all before you twitched a single muscle.

Michel Desmurget and a team of French neuroscientists arrived at this conclusion by stimulating the brains of seven people with electrodes, while they underwent brain surgery under local anaesthetic. When Desmurget stimulated the parietal cortex, the patients felt a strong desire to move their arms, hands, feet or lips, although they never actually did. Stronger currents cast a powerful illusion, convincing the patients that they had actually moved, even though recordings of electrical activity in their muscles said otherwise.

But when Desmurget stimulated a different region - the premotor cortex - he found the opposite effect. The patients moved their hands, arms or mouths without realising it. One of them flexed his left wrist, fingers and elbow and rotated his forearm, but was completely unaware of it. When his surgeons asked if he felt anything, he said no. Higher currents evoked stronger movements, but still the patients remained blissfully unaware that their limbs and lips were budging.''

During brain surgery, they will monitor specific functions to make sure they don't unintentionally damage any working functions. Neuroscience continues to try to map specific functions to specific areas in the brain, to discover how the brain works. I remember from David Eagleman's "The Brain" series on PBS a woman who could not make decisions in the grocery store, because the ability to simply "feel" that her decision was right was damaged. And I think I read somewhere else that this feeling could be triggered by transcranial magnetic stimulation of a specific area.

Neuroscience will eventually be able to explain how the brain goes about making decisions. But the reductionist should never presume that by explaining how something works that they have somehow "explained it away".

Choosing will remain a real function of the brain even after we know all the neurological ins and outs of the process. Choosing doesn't disappear when it is fully explained.

And free will, will continue to be just what it is. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. How this happens inside the brain is nice to know. And it is medically significant for the diagnosis of specific injuries that impair the process. But it does not change the fact that people make decisions that causally determine what they will do.

The brain is not an external control. The brain is us. And what the brain decides, through whatever means, whatever combination of conscious or unconscious processes, what the brain has decided we have decided.

Had we not decided to buy that car, we would not have that car. But there it sits in the driveway. And the dealership presented us with the bill, holding us responsible for our deliberate action, our freely chosen "I will have the red Prius".

Now, had our neurosurgeons manipulated our brains into making that choice, then that would have been an extraordinary (undue) influence, and we would expect them to pay for the purchase.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Jahryn, Candide by Voltaire? And Leonard Bernstein made it an operetta.

 

[Jarhyn]

Jahryn, Candide by Voltaire? And Leonard Bernstein made it an operetta.

Yep. Strangely, it sat half finished on my drive for some time because it got droll and predictable in it's ridiculousness. After they managed to swing through a few different brands of letting idiotic determinism stand as an excuse to abandon reflection, I saw where it was going and it got droll. It was right about the time the lady told the story of how she became half-assed.

It was a skillful flaying of a useless excuse for letting your life literally go out of control.

 

[DBT]

You say all sorts of things that aren't accurate, that I hadn't provided arguments, quotes, links, citations, etc, etc, whereupon I trawled back and produced the material.....Which made no difference, you were not happy. False accusations, no sense of shame. Or just making remarks without reading or considering anything that's said?

If you are unable or unwilling to follow what is being said, or read what is being provided, don't bother. Express your frustration an angst elsewhere. Nothing I can say will help you.

You didn't say "interchangable". If you insist that I'm making a "false accusation", the onus is on you to provide evidence (a quote).

Your personal attacks are an unnecessary distraction..

The problem appears to be that I didn't give you a simple yes or no answer....nuances or shades can be very confusing for some folks, I guess. It is not I who attack you, but you who provoke the response that you get from me. Without your style of prompt, I would not reply as I do. Do you own a mirror?

 

[DBT]

I think the key here is that Harris is forced to admit that it is in fact our own brain that is making the decision. And the decision is not too "deep" to rise to conscious awareness. For a complex decision, like buying a new car, or deciding where to vacation, a person may even take out a pencil and paper to make a list of pros and cons, or the costs and benefits. And there it is, the process of deciding, right there in the open for all to see.

Of course it's the brain that makes decisions. Nobody is forced to admit it. It's not only not a problem, but a key point in the argument against free will - that it's the unconscious of the brain that acquires, processes and represents [some] information in conscious form....that there is no choice in that process: the brain does what it does according to evolutionary role: information in, output out.


Electrical stimulation and the illusion of free will:

''When it comes to the human brain, even the simplest of acts can be counter-intuitive and deceptively complicated. For example, try stretching your arm.

Nerves in the limb send messages back to your brain, but the subjective experience you have of stretching isn't due to these signals. The feeling that you willed your arm into motion, and the realisation that you moved it at all, are both the result of an area at the back of your brain called the posterior parietal cortex. This region helped to produce the intention to move, and predicted what the movement would feel like, all before you twitched a single muscle.

Michel Desmurget and a team of French neuroscientists arrived at this conclusion by stimulating the brains of seven people with electrodes, while they underwent brain surgery under local anaesthetic. When Desmurget stimulated the parietal cortex, the patients felt a strong desire to move their arms, hands, feet or lips, although they never actually did. Stronger currents cast a powerful illusion, convincing the patients that they had actually moved, even though recordings of electrical activity in their muscles said otherwise.

But when Desmurget stimulated a different region - the premotor cortex - he found the opposite effect. The patients moved their hands, arms or mouths without realising it. One of them flexed his left wrist, fingers and elbow and rotated his forearm, but was completely unaware of it. When his surgeons asked if he felt anything, he said no. Higher currents evoked stronger movements, but still the patients remained blissfully unaware that their limbs and lips were budging.''

During brain surgery, they will monitor specific functions to make sure they don't unintentionally damage any working functions. Neuroscience continues to try to map specific functions to specific areas in the brain, to discover how the brain works. I remember from David Eagleman's "The Brain" series on PBS a woman who could not make decisions in the grocery store, because the ability to simply "feel" that her decision was right was damaged. And I think I read somewhere else that this feeling could be triggered by transcranial magnetic stimulation of a specific area.

Neuroscience will eventually be able to explain how the brain goes about making decisions. But the reductionist should never presume that by explaining how something works that they have somehow "explained it away".

Choosing will remain a real function of the brain even after we know all the neurological ins and outs of the process. Choosing doesn't disappear when it is fully explained.

And free will, will continue to be just what it is. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. How this happens inside the brain is nice to know. And it is medically significant for the diagnosis of specific injuries that impair the process. But it does not change the fact that people make decisions that causally determine what they will do.

The brain is not an external control. The brain is us. And what the brain decides, through whatever means, whatever combination of conscious or unconscious processes, what the brain has decided we have decided.

Had we not decided to buy that car, we would not have that car. But there it sits in the driveway. And the dealership presented us with the bill, holding us responsible for our deliberate action, our freely chosen "I will have the red Prius".

Now, had our neurosurgeons manipulated our brains into making that choice, then that would have been an extraordinary (undue) influence, and we would expect them to pay for the purchase.

To establish that the brain has free will requires more than just a definition (compatibilism). With semantics it's possible to define all sorts of things that don't objectively exist, conjuring up concepts that do not relate to the way the world works.

Which is why the compatibilist argument is insufficient to prove its proposition. As an exercise in semantics, it may work on paper, it may work semantically, it may work logically, yet it does not relate to the world, if determined, as it is or how it works.

 

[none]

Yeah but look how handsome he is

 

[The AntiChris]

To establish that the brain has free will requires more than just a definition (compatibilism).

In your view what would be required to establish that "the brain has free will".

 

[Copernicus]

During brain surgery, they will monitor specific functions to make sure they don't unintentionally damage any working functions. Neuroscience continues to try to map specific functions to specific areas in the brain, to discover how the brain works. I remember from David Eagleman's "The Brain" series on PBS a woman who could not make decisions in the grocery store, because the ability to simply "feel" that her decision was right was damaged. And I think I read somewhere else that this feeling could be triggered by transcranial magnetic stimulation of a specific area.

Neuroscience will eventually be able to explain how the brain goes about making decisions. But the reductionist should never presume that by explaining how something works that they have somehow "explained it away".

Choosing will remain a real function of the brain even after we know all the neurological ins and outs of the process. Choosing doesn't disappear when it is fully explained.

And free will, will continue to be just what it is. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. How this happens inside the brain is nice to know. And it is medically significant for the diagnosis of specific injuries that impair the process. But it does not change the fact that people make decisions that causally determine what they will do.

The brain is not an external control. The brain is us. And what the brain decides, through whatever means, whatever combination of conscious or unconscious processes, what the brain has decided we have decided.

Had we not decided to buy that car, we would not have that car. But there it sits in the driveway. And the dealership presented us with the bill, holding us responsible for our deliberate action, our freely chosen "I will have the red Prius".

Now, had our neurosurgeons manipulated our brains into making that choice, then that would have been an extraordinary (undue) influence, and we would expect them to pay for the purchase.

To establish that the brain has free will requires more than just a definition (compatibilism). With semantics it's possible to define all sorts of things that don't objectively exist, conjuring up concepts that do not relate to the way the world works.

Which is why the compatibilist argument is insufficient to prove its proposition. As an exercise in semantics, it may work on paper, it may work semantically, it may work logically, yet it does not relate to the world, if determined, as it is or how it works.

I would prefer to replace Marvin's "brain" with "brain activity", since the mind is not present unless the brain is functioning. However, that is just a quibble that is not substantively different from the points he has been making. I still believe that we need a definition of "free will" (not just "will") to have a coherent discussion on this subject. The problem is that free will exists or does not exist, depending on one's perspective. From the perspective of a neuron, it doesn't exist, because neurons just respond to local conditions They are like water molecules in a wave. The H2O molecule is only "aware" of local forces that affect it, not the systemic wave phenomenon that affects those conditions. Free will cannot possibly exist from the perspective of an omniscient observer that knows all of the causes and effects that go into making a plan of action and executing it. So free will is an illusion from that perspective. From the perspective of the person making the decision, where the future remains uncertain, the choice leads to an uncertain outcome. You can't have a rational discussion of determinism and free will if you keep jumping back and forth between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. Compatibilism, as I understand it, is just the position that there is no real contradiction between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. They are just different perspectives on the same objective reality.

 

[DBT]

During brain surgery, they will monitor specific functions to make sure they don't unintentionally damage any working functions. Neuroscience continues to try to map specific functions to specific areas in the brain, to discover how the brain works. I remember from David Eagleman's "The Brain" series on PBS a woman who could not make decisions in the grocery store, because the ability to simply "feel" that her decision was right was damaged. And I think I read somewhere else that this feeling could be triggered by transcranial magnetic stimulation of a specific area.

Neuroscience will eventually be able to explain how the brain goes about making decisions. But the reductionist should never presume that by explaining how something works that they have somehow "explained it away".

Choosing will remain a real function of the brain even after we know all the neurological ins and outs of the process. Choosing doesn't disappear when it is fully explained.

And free will, will continue to be just what it is. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. How this happens inside the brain is nice to know. And it is medically significant for the diagnosis of specific injuries that impair the process. But it does not change the fact that people make decisions that causally determine what they will do.

The brain is not an external control. The brain is us. And what the brain decides, through whatever means, whatever combination of conscious or unconscious processes, what the brain has decided we have decided.

Had we not decided to buy that car, we would not have that car. But there it sits in the driveway. And the dealership presented us with the bill, holding us responsible for our deliberate action, our freely chosen "I will have the red Prius".

Now, had our neurosurgeons manipulated our brains into making that choice, then that would have been an extraordinary (undue) influence, and we would expect them to pay for the purchase.

To establish that the brain has free will requires more than just a definition (compatibilism). With semantics it's possible to define all sorts of things that don't objectively exist, conjuring up concepts that do not relate to the way the world works.

Which is why the compatibilist argument is insufficient to prove its proposition. As an exercise in semantics, it may work on paper, it may work semantically, it may work logically, yet it does not relate to the world, if determined, as it is or how it works.

I would prefer to replace Marvin's "brain" with "brain activity", since the mind is not present unless the brain is functioning. However, that is just a quibble that is not substantively different from the points he has been making. I still believe that we need a definition of "free will" (not just "will") to have a coherent discussion on this subject. The problem is that free will exists or does not exist, depending on one's perspective. From the perspective of a neuron, it doesn't exist, because neurons just respond to local conditions They are like water molecules in a wave. The H2O molecule is only "aware" of local forces that affect it, not the systemic wave phenomenon that affects those conditions. Free will cannot possibly exist from the perspective of an omniscient observer that knows all of the causes and effects that go into making a plan of action and executing it. So free will is an illusion from that perspective. From the perspective of the person making the decision, where the future remains uncertain, the choice leads to an uncertain outcome. You can't have a rational discussion of determinism and free will if you keep jumping back and forth between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. Compatibilism, as I understand it, is just the position that there is no real contradiction between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. They are just different perspectives on the same objective reality.

There are no apparent contradictions to be found within Compatibilism as presented in the premises as they are set out.

The premises - basically, that decisions or actions that are uncoerced, unrestricted or unrestrained are examples of free will - is flawed because it does not fully account for the implications of determinism, that all things within the system, that 'every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature' - a condition where there are no special exemptions.

No special exemptions means that there is only one perspective on freedom, that within a deterministic system all things of equal status, (determined) and it cannot be said that x is free but y is not.

Within a determined system, all objects and events proceed equally freely along their determined paths. None have free will.

Freedom of action, things proceeding as determined, unimpeded, is not equivalent to freedom of will.

Compatibilism seeks special exemption through the wording of its premises.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

During brain surgery, they will monitor specific functions to make sure they don't unintentionally damage any working functions. Neuroscience continues to try to map specific functions to specific areas in the brain, to discover how the brain works. I remember from David Eagleman's "The Brain" series on PBS a woman who could not make decisions in the grocery store, because the ability to simply "feel" that her decision was right was damaged. And I think I read somewhere else that this feeling could be triggered by transcranial magnetic stimulation of a specific area.

Neuroscience will eventually be able to explain how the brain goes about making decisions. But the reductionist should never presume that by explaining how something works that they have somehow "explained it away".

Choosing will remain a real function of the brain even after we know all the neurological ins and outs of the process. Choosing doesn't disappear when it is fully explained.

And free will, will continue to be just what it is. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. How this happens inside the brain is nice to know. And it is medically significant for the diagnosis of specific injuries that impair the process. But it does not change the fact that people make decisions that causally determine what they will do.

The brain is not an external control. The brain is us. And what the brain decides, through whatever means, whatever combination of conscious or unconscious processes, what the brain has decided we have decided.

Had we not decided to buy that car, we would not have that car. But there it sits in the driveway. And the dealership presented us with the bill, holding us responsible for our deliberate action, our freely chosen "I will have the red Prius".

Now, had our neurosurgeons manipulated our brains into making that choice, then that would have been an extraordinary (undue) influence, and we would expect them to pay for the purchase.

To establish that the brain has free will requires more than just a definition (compatibilism). With semantics it's possible to define all sorts of things that don't objectively exist, conjuring up concepts that do not relate to the way the world works.

Which is why the compatibilist argument is insufficient to prove its proposition. As an exercise in semantics, it may work on paper, it may work semantically, it may work logically, yet it does not relate to the world, if determined, as it is or how it works.

The way the world works is that people are held responsible for their deliberate acts. People choose what they will do. And if they deliberately do something harmful we need to take measures to prevent further harm and to motivate them to think differently about their choices in the future. This is how the world works.

The hard determinist then enters and tells us that people have no free will, no choice, no responsibility. Turns out, that doesn't work. The compatibilist is the realist, the empiricist, the pragmatist. We're the ones who care about how things actually work, and what the words mean.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

During brain surgery, they will monitor specific functions to make sure they don't unintentionally damage any working functions. Neuroscience continues to try to map specific functions to specific areas in the brain, to discover how the brain works. I remember from David Eagleman's "The Brain" series on PBS a woman who could not make decisions in the grocery store, because the ability to simply "feel" that her decision was right was damaged. And I think I read somewhere else that this feeling could be triggered by transcranial magnetic stimulation of a specific area.

Neuroscience will eventually be able to explain how the brain goes about making decisions. But the reductionist should never presume that by explaining how something works that they have somehow "explained it away".

Choosing will remain a real function of the brain even after we know all the neurological ins and outs of the process. Choosing doesn't disappear when it is fully explained.

And free will, will continue to be just what it is. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. How this happens inside the brain is nice to know. And it is medically significant for the diagnosis of specific injuries that impair the process. But it does not change the fact that people make decisions that causally determine what they will do.

The brain is not an external control. The brain is us. And what the brain decides, through whatever means, whatever combination of conscious or unconscious processes, what the brain has decided we have decided.

Had we not decided to buy that car, we would not have that car. But there it sits in the driveway. And the dealership presented us with the bill, holding us responsible for our deliberate action, our freely chosen "I will have the red Prius".

Now, had our neurosurgeons manipulated our brains into making that choice, then that would have been an extraordinary (undue) influence, and we would expect them to pay for the purchase.

To establish that the brain has free will requires more than just a definition (compatibilism). With semantics it's possible to define all sorts of things that don't objectively exist, conjuring up concepts that do not relate to the way the world works.

Which is why the compatibilist argument is insufficient to prove its proposition. As an exercise in semantics, it may work on paper, it may work semantically, it may work logically, yet it does not relate to the world, if determined, as it is or how it works.

I would prefer to replace Marvin's "brain" with "brain activity", since the mind is not present unless the brain is functioning. However, that is just a quibble that is not substantively different from the points he has been making. I still believe that we need a definition of "free will" (not just "will") to have a coherent discussion on this subject. The problem is that free will exists or does not exist, depending on one's perspective. From the perspective of a neuron, it doesn't exist, because neurons just respond to local conditions They are like water molecules in a wave. The H2O molecule is only "aware" of local forces that affect it, not the systemic wave phenomenon that affects those conditions. Free will cannot possibly exist from the perspective of an omniscient observer that knows all of the causes and effects that go into making a plan of action and executing it. So free will is an illusion from that perspective. From the perspective of the person making the decision, where the future remains uncertain, the choice leads to an uncertain outcome. You can't have a rational discussion of determinism and free will if you keep jumping back and forth between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. Compatibilism, as I understand it, is just the position that there is no real contradiction between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. They are just different perspectives on the same objective reality.

Activity? Yes. One of the things that I wondered about was how to classify a "process", because we are basically processes running on the neural infrastructure. If the process stops, then the brain reverts to a lump of inert matter, or we're "brain dead", we cease to exist even though the physical infrastructure is still there. A process is not the physical object, but rather a sequences of complex changes going on within the physical object. So, we are a physical process.

I think free will can still be observed from the universal viewpoint, but you need a magnifying glass to view the control links in the causal chain. A control link, like a computer or a brain, deterministically performs the calculation as to what will happen next. The brain calls this calculation "choosing", because it has developed a language based on its own awareness of how things work, and "choosing" is what it calls this operation. The brain is also aware of other brains, and it can distinguish when it performs the choosing versus when another brain points a gun at it and forces a choice upon it. When it performs the choosing itself, it calls it "free will". When a choice is forced upon it at gunpoint, it calls it "coercion".

Now our external, high placed viewer, can set the magnifying glass down, and still recall what it saw. It saw causal determinism working itself out through unique causal mechanisms that performed choosing operations. And it saw what these operations, under different circumstances, were called. One was called "free will" and the other was called "coercion".

So, if any other high placed viewer asked our HPV about free will, it could explain what the word meant, and loan it the magnifying glass so that the friend could see it for themselves.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I would prefer to replace Marvin's "brain" with "brain activity", since the mind is not present unless the brain is functioning. However, that is just a quibble that is not substantively different from the points he has been making. I still believe that we need a definition of "free will" (not just "will") to have a coherent discussion on this subject. The problem is that free will exists or does not exist, depending on one's perspective. From the perspective of a neuron, it doesn't exist, because neurons just respond to local conditions They are like water molecules in a wave. The H2O molecule is only "aware" of local forces that affect it, not the systemic wave phenomenon that affects those conditions. Free will cannot possibly exist from the perspective of an omniscient observer that knows all of the causes and effects that go into making a plan of action and executing it. So free will is an illusion from that perspective. From the perspective of the person making the decision, where the future remains uncertain, the choice leads to an uncertain outcome. You can't have a rational discussion of determinism and free will if you keep jumping back and forth between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. Compatibilism, as I understand it, is just the position that there is no real contradiction between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. They are just different perspectives on the same objective reality.

There are no apparent contradictions to be found within Compatibilism as presented in the premises as they are set out.

The premises - basically, that decisions or actions that are uncoerced, unrestricted or unrestrained are examples of free will - is flawed because it does not fully account for the implications of determinism, that all things within the system, that 'every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature' - a condition where there are no special exemptions.

No special exemptions means that there is only one perspective on freedom, that within a deterministic system all things of equal status, (determined) and it cannot be said that x is free but y is not.

Within a determined system, all objects and events proceed equally freely along their determined paths. None have free will.

Freedom of action, things proceeding as determined, unimpeded, is not equivalent to freedom of will.

Compatibilism seeks special exemption through the wording of its premises.

My position is that philosophy has stumbled itself into a paradox, by choosing a "special" definition of freedom, that is applied only to one specific freedom, free will. They require of free will that it be "free from causal necessity" before it can be called free. But this constraint is not applied to any other use of the notion of freedom. All other uses of the term "free" are exempt from this requirement. All other uses of the term "free" reference meaningful and relevant constraints.

So, the application of this requirement to "free will" is a special exemption from the normal definition of freedom that applies to every other use of the word "free".

If we drop this odious and unjustifiable special requirement, then we are left with the limited but adequate type of free will. Free will is a chosen "I will" where the choice is free from coercion and undue influence. These constraints are meaningful and relevant. And we find that this is how free will is understood and applied in practical matters, such as assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

The question for the incompatibilists is how do they justify this special requirement for free will, and not for any other freedom. How do they refer to "freedom of action" without also requiring freedom from causal necessity? Every action is equally constrained by causal necessity. How do they refer to "freedom of speech" without also requiring freedom from causal necessity? Every word is equally constrained by causal necessity. How do they refer to "freedom from slavery" without also requiring that the slave's behavior is free from causal necessity?

It would appear that "freedom from causal necessity" is only applied to free will in order to either make free will impossible or to make causal necessity impossible. This is a silly business that has gone on for too long. It is an unnecessary war, to which only compatibilism can bring peace.

 

[Copernicus]

I would prefer to replace Marvin's "brain" with "brain activity", since the mind is not present unless the brain is functioning. However, that is just a quibble that is not substantively different from the points he has been making. I still believe that we need a definition of "free will" (not just "will") to have a coherent discussion on this subject. The problem is that free will exists or does not exist, depending on one's perspective. From the perspective of a neuron, it doesn't exist, because neurons just respond to local conditions They are like water molecules in a wave. The H2O molecule is only "aware" of local forces that affect it, not the systemic wave phenomenon that affects those conditions. Free will cannot possibly exist from the perspective of an omniscient observer that knows all of the causes and effects that go into making a plan of action and executing it. So free will is an illusion from that perspective. From the perspective of the person making the decision, where the future remains uncertain, the choice leads to an uncertain outcome. You can't have a rational discussion of determinism and free will if you keep jumping back and forth between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. Compatibilism, as I understand it, is just the position that there is no real contradiction between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. They are just different perspectives on the same objective reality.

There are no apparent contradictions to be found within Compatibilism as presented in the premises as they are set out.

The premises - basically, that decisions or actions that are uncoerced, unrestricted or unrestrained are examples of free will - is flawed because it does not fully account for the implications of determinism, that all things within the system, that 'every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature' - a condition where there are no special exemptions.

I'm not sure that you see the point I was trying to make. The problem is that the term "free will" can have more than one meaning, as Dennett has been at great lengths to point out in his detailed reviews of the literature. You seem to be going for a single restricted interpretation that not everyone agrees with. All I was trying to say is that free will is either an illusion or a real thing, depending on the eye of the beholder. An omniscient being could never treat it as real, because such a being would know all causes and all possible outcomes. Actors within the system would never have a free choice, because, from that perspective, the outcome is always predictable. An agent within the system would have free will, because, from its perspective, all causes and outcomes are uncertain. So it can only always be placing bets on future outcomes. We have free will, because we are operating under such conditions of uncertainty. That does not mean that our behavior is undetermined, only that our goals and plans lead us to make choices, albeit fully determined choices from the perspective of an external omniscient observer. Robots make choices. They may be very limited in comparison to the choices that humans make, but robots are programmed to simulate the same processes that human minds go through, to the best of our understanding. From their perspective, they have options and choices that they may arrive at only seconds before they take action. From the perspective of a human programmer, those choices are fully determined, because we can observe the processes they go through in analyzing their options and executing a plan that they calculate as most likely to overcome all foreseeable obstacles.

No special exemptions means that there is only one perspective on freedom, that within a deterministic system all things of equal status, (determined) and it cannot be said that x is free but y is not.

Within a determined system, all objects and events proceed equally freely along their determined paths. None have free will.

Freedom of action, things proceeding as determined, unimpeded, is not equivalent to freedom of will.

Exactly right. The problem is that you stipulate "within a determined system", which can only reflect the perspective of an external "omniscient" observer of the system. The entities and actors within the system do not share that perspective. So they can make free choices within their limited perspective.

Compatibilism seeks special exemption through the wording of its premises.

No, it does not. Compatibilism just recognizes that there are different perspectives that affect the reification of free will. It is not real from a godlike perspective. It is real from a human perspective. The only special exemption being claimed here is by those who refuse to recognize the different perspectives that observers can have, i.e. system-internal or system-external. In principle, chaotic deterministic systems are predictable in principle, but they are unpredictable unless one has a considerable amount of knowledge about the initial state and rules governing systemic behavior (see  Chaos Theory).

 

[fromderinside]

Copernicus I'm going to interject my obviously very specific criteria for finding meaning.

My long departed good friend and classical philosopher enjoyed having discussions with me since I wasn't a Positivist or Logicism oriented descendent of philosophy at UCLA where he was trained. He handled Empiricists pretty well, even credited them for not building self-fulfilling little worlds. We had many discussions about empirical philosophy in which we tried to reach agreement on a system that built a philosophy similar to how physics is approached. We failed over and over because we couldn't agree definitions or methods. It always came down to the same problem how to include the human in the philosophy.

What was obvious to me was not what was obvious to him. To Abraham man is central to philosophy. To me man is the object of philosophy.

Transferring those sentiments to this discussion it really doesn't matter that 'free' has many meanings unless each of them are verifiable in the physical world in which we exist. Anything resorting to mind, government, belief, self validations, situation, crumbles with change. They must be discarded since they cannot be consistently defined in the world which what is being defined label must operate.

I'm saying the construct must tie in to what is independently verifiable in physical world where things can be defined in a way that permits them to tie into the body of actual knowledge and stand repeated testing over significant time and environments.

It makes no sense to construct a human conceit definition since such definitions crumble with every change in personal and social situation.

It's through analyses such as one that builds on previous formulations and works consistently that meaning survives.

I believe that criticisms such as mine are the ones that bring down the idea of compatibilism in a this-then-that material world.

As far as I can tell the discussion about 'free' by most here centers on presumed uniqueness of man - you can chose whatever gender floats your boat, makes makes you comfortable - and how he sees himself in the world. I'm not comfortable with such self fitting notions.

 

[DBT]

I'm not sure that you see the point I was trying to make. The problem is that the term "free will" can have more than one meaning, as Dennett has been at great lengths to point out in his detailed reviews of the literature. You seem to be going for a single restricted interpretation that not everyone agrees with.

I don't deny that terms, including free will can have more than one meaning. Terms and words being symbols used to communicate information, ideas, beliefs, etc, can mean whatever significance we assign to them, whatever premises we care to support ideas with may logically support the proposition, yet not prove the reality of the thing itself. Which is why I pointed out the limitation of semantic arguments.

If will is free, it is not free because the compatibilist formulates a set of premises that support his conclusion, it is free as an objective agent of freedom at work within the system.

Mere definition, word play, is insufficient to establish facts in real world.

No, it does not. Compatibilism just recognizes that there are different perspectives that affect the reification of free will. It is not real from a godlike perspective. It is real from a human perspective. The only special exemption being claimed here is by those who refuse to recognize the different perspectives that observers can have, i.e. system-internal or system-external. In principle, chaotic deterministic systems are predictable in principle, but they are unpredictable unless one has a considerable amount of knowledge about the initial state and rules governing systemic behavior (see  Chaos Theory).

The special exemption lies in applying the term free to a select set of criteria, free will is x, y or z, things that in reality have no special status within a determined system. If the given definition is applied to will, it applies to all things.


Within a determined system, human will has no more freedom than the moon orbiting the earth or the earths motion around the sun....all being of equal status in a determined world.


''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein

 

[DBT]

I would prefer to replace Marvin's "brain" with "brain activity", since the mind is not present unless the brain is functioning. However, that is just a quibble that is not substantively different from the points he has been making. I still believe that we need a definition of "free will" (not just "will") to have a coherent discussion on this subject. The problem is that free will exists or does not exist, depending on one's perspective. From the perspective of a neuron, it doesn't exist, because neurons just respond to local conditions They are like water molecules in a wave. The H2O molecule is only "aware" of local forces that affect it, not the systemic wave phenomenon that affects those conditions. Free will cannot possibly exist from the perspective of an omniscient observer that knows all of the causes and effects that go into making a plan of action and executing it. So free will is an illusion from that perspective. From the perspective of the person making the decision, where the future remains uncertain, the choice leads to an uncertain outcome. You can't have a rational discussion of determinism and free will if you keep jumping back and forth between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. Compatibilism, as I understand it, is just the position that there is no real contradiction between the omniscient perspective and the uncertain one. They are just different perspectives on the same objective reality.

There are no apparent contradictions to be found within Compatibilism as presented in the premises as they are set out.

The premises - basically, that decisions or actions that are uncoerced, unrestricted or unrestrained are examples of free will - is flawed because it does not fully account for the implications of determinism, that all things within the system, that 'every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature' - a condition where there are no special exemptions.

No special exemptions means that there is only one perspective on freedom, that within a deterministic system all things of equal status, (determined) and it cannot be said that x is free but y is not.

Within a determined system, all objects and events proceed equally freely along their determined paths. None have free will.

Freedom of action, things proceeding as determined, unimpeded, is not equivalent to freedom of will.

Compatibilism seeks special exemption through the wording of its premises.

My position is that philosophy has stumbled itself into a paradox, by choosing a "special" definition of freedom, that is applied only to one specific freedom, free will. They require of free will that it be "free from causal necessity" before it can be called free. But this constraint is not applied to any other use of the notion of freedom. All other uses of the term "free" are exempt from this requirement. All other uses of the term "free" reference meaningful and relevant constraints.

So, the application of this requirement to "free will" is a special exemption from the normal definition of freedom that applies to every other use of the word "free".

If we drop this odious and unjustifiable special requirement, then we are left with the limited but adequate type of free will. Free will is a chosen "I will" where the choice is free from coercion and undue influence. These constraints are meaningful and relevant. And we find that this is how free will is understood and applied in practical matters, such as assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

The question for the incompatibilists is how do they justify this special requirement for free will, and not for any other freedom. How do they refer to "freedom of action" without also requiring freedom from causal necessity? Every action is equally constrained by causal necessity. How do they refer to "freedom of speech" without also requiring freedom from causal necessity? Every word is equally constrained by causal necessity. How do they refer to "freedom from slavery" without also requiring that the slave's behavior is free from causal necessity?

It would appear that "freedom from causal necessity" is only applied to free will in order to either make free will impossible or to make causal necessity impossible. This is a silly business that has gone on for too long. It is an unnecessary war, to which only compatibilism can bring peace.

Freedom of action refers to the unimpeded, unrestricted activity within a determined system, where all things work without coercion (even as manifestations of coercion itself in human affairs) which is not a matter of will but deterministic actions.

Hence the distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will.

Will, as with all things, is formed and acted upon by the events of the world and action freely follows.

‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer

''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

Word play alters nothing.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Copernicus I'm going to interject my obviously very specific criteria for finding meaning.

My long departed good friend and classical philosopher enjoyed having discussions with me since I wasn't a Positivist or Logicism oriented descendent of philosophy at UCLA where he was trained. He handled Empiricists pretty well, even credited them for not building self-fulfilling little worlds. We had many discussions about empirical philosophy in which we tried to reach agreement on a system that built a philosophy similar to how physics is approached. We failed over and over because we couldn't agree definitions or methods. It always came down to the same problem how to include the human in the philosophy.

What was obvious to me was not what was obvious to him. To Abraham man is central to philosophy. To me man is the object of philosophy.

Transferring those sentiments to this discussion it really doesn't matter that 'free' has many meanings unless each of them are verifiable in the physical world in which we exist. Anything resorting to mind, government, belief, self validations, situation, crumbles with change. They must be discarded since they cannot be consistently defined in the world which what is being defined label must operate.

I'm saying the construct must tie in to what is independently verifiable in physical world where things can be defined in a way that permits them to tie into the body of actual knowledge and stand repeated testing over significant time and environments.

It makes no sense to construct a human conceit definition since such definitions crumble with every change in personal and social situation.

It's through analyses such as one that builds on previous formulations and works consistently that meaning survives.

I believe that criticisms such as mine are the ones that bring down the idea of compatibilism in a this-then-that material world.

As far as I can tell the discussion about 'free' by most here centers on presumed uniqueness of man - you can chose whatever gender floats your boat, makes makes you comfortable - and how he sees himself in the world. I'm not comfortable with such self fitting notions.

Independent verification from empirical evidence is how courts of law operate. My understanding is that when someone pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity" that there will be evidence presented from both sides to determine whether the mental disorder related to the crime in a causative way. If so, then that mental illness is held responsible for what happened, and the illness would be subject to corrective measures through psychiatric treatment. The same would apply to matters of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Whether the coercion or undue influence was responsible for the behavior would be matters of empirical evidence. If coercion is involved then the person holding the gun is held responsible and subject to correction. If undue influence, for example, if a parent involves their minor child in a crime, then the parent is held responsible and subject to correction.

But how does one hold "causal necessity" responsible? It is clearly not subject to correction. We can do something about the mental illness, the person holding the gun, and the parent. But there is nothing to be done about causal necessity. So, holding causal necessity responsible presents us with an absurdity.

Causal necessity is a background constant, that effectively shows up on both sides of every equation, and can be subtracted from both sides without changing the result. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

My position is that philosophy has stumbled itself into a paradox, by choosing a "special" definition of freedom, that is applied only to one specific freedom, free will. They require of free will that it be "free from causal necessity" before it can be called free. But this constraint is not applied to any other use of the notion of freedom. All other uses of the term "free" are exempt from this requirement. All other uses of the term "free" reference meaningful and relevant constraints.

So, the application of this requirement to "free will" is a special exemption from the normal definition of freedom that applies to every other use of the word "free".

If we drop this odious and unjustifiable special requirement, then we are left with the limited but adequate type of free will. Free will is a chosen "I will" where the choice is free from coercion and undue influence. These constraints are meaningful and relevant. And we find that this is how free will is understood and applied in practical matters, such as assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

The question for the incompatibilists is how do they justify this special requirement for free will, and not for any other freedom. How do they refer to "freedom of action" without also requiring freedom from causal necessity? Every action is equally constrained by causal necessity. How do they refer to "freedom of speech" without also requiring freedom from causal necessity? Every word is equally constrained by causal necessity. How do they refer to "freedom from slavery" without also requiring that the slave's behavior is free from causal necessity?

It would appear that "freedom from causal necessity" is only applied to free will in order to either make free will impossible or to make causal necessity impossible. This is a silly business that has gone on for too long. It is an unnecessary war, to which only compatibilism can bring peace.

Freedom of action refers to the unimpeded, unrestricted activity within a determined system, where all things work without coercion (even as manifestations of coercion itself in human affairs) which is not a matter of will but deterministic actions.

Hence the distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will.

Will, as with all things, is formed and acted upon by the events of the world and action freely follows.

‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer

''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

Word play alters nothing.

Okay, let me take them one at a time:

Freedom of action refers to the unimpeded, unrestricted activity within a determined system, where all things work without coercion (even as manifestations of coercion itself in human affairs) which is not a matter of will but deterministic actions.

If I understand you correctly, "freedom of action" works within a broader context of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Like the river, our actions are both "being caused" by internal and external events and also "exercising causation" that brings about new internal and external events. The river picks up sediment and carries it to new places, slowly carving out its path through lines of least resistance. Both the river, by its internal force, and the soil, by its external resistance, shape each other. This happens without any deliberate choosing by either the river or the soil.

With intelligent species we get deliberate behavior. Deliberation does not step outside of causal necessity. It happens through a fully deterministic choosing operation, a causal mechanism that imagines how it might cross the river, "Will I build a bridge?" or "Will I build a boat?" or "Will I look for a shallow point where I can just wade across?". It imagines how it might go about building a bridge, or building a boat, or finding a shallow location. Each imagined option that it discerns that it can carry out becomes a "real possibility", something that it "could" actualize. Each imagined option that it determines it cannot carry out becomes an "impossibility".

Based upon that analysis, and perhaps some trial and error to more fully inform its decision, it settles upon a single choice, the one thing that it "will" do. The other real possibilities are referred to as things that it "could have" done.

"Word play alters nothing."

Right. So let us stick to the words as they are actually used and the meaning that they actually convey. What I "will" do is what I will do. What I "could have" done is all the other real possibilities that I chose not to do.

"Hence the distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will."

Choosing what we will do is an action. Freedom of action includes freely choosing what we will do.

"Will, as with all things, is formed and acted upon by the events of the world and action freely follows."

Correct. The events of the world include our internal events involved in choosing what we will do.

‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer

Man wants to do many things, but he chooses what he will do.

''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

Correct. That inner necessity is an integral part of who and what we are. What that inner necessity chooses, we have chosen.

By leaving out the inner choosing process, Einstein ends up with an incoherent position. Here's another quote that demonstrates this:

"In a sense, we can hold no one responsible. I am a determinist. As such, I do not believe in free will. ... Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed. If I wish to live in a civilized community, I must act as if man is a responsible being."
Page 114 of "The Saturday Evening Post" article "What Life Means to Einstein" "An Interview by George Sylvester Viereck" (Oct 26, 1929)

Einstein says that, while he does not believe in free will and responsibility, he must pretend that he does. That is not a coherent position.

 

[none]

...
Einstein says that, while he does not believe in free will and responsibility, he must pretend that he does. That is not a coherent position.

Why is it not coherent?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

...
Einstein says that, while he does not believe in free will and responsibility, he must pretend that he does. That is not a coherent position.

Why is it not coherent?

His actions are not consistent with his beliefs. The beliefs and the actions do not cohere.