P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.
... We are composed of the stuff of the Big Bang. The stuff of the Big Bang allows enables chemistry and evolution, animals and plants, brains capable of experiencing the world to emerge, form and evolve.
The key point here is that matter
organized differently
behaves differently.
1.
Inanimate matter, like a bowling ball, responds
passively to physical forces. Place a bowling ball on a slope and it will always roll downhill, governed by the force of gravity.
2.
Living organisms, like a squirrel, behave
purposefully, biologically driven to survive, thrive, and reproduce. Place a squirrel on that same slope and he is free to go uphill or down, or any other direction where he expects to find his next acorn. While still affected by gravity, he is not governed by it.
3.
Intelligent species, like us, can behave
deliberately. We can imagine alternate ways to satisfy our biological needs and we get to
choose when, where, and how we go about meeting them. Our behavior is still affected by physical forces and biological drives, but is governed by our choices.
Purposeful behavior showed up for the first time in the universe with the appearance of living organisms.
Deliberate behavior, as well as language, logic, and reasoning, showed up for the first time in the universe with the appearance of intelligent species.
Deliberately chosen behavior is
executive control. That which gets to
choose what happens next is exercising executive control.
This ability to choose what happens next is
located within the individual brains of intelligent species,
and in no other place in the physical universe.
There was no executive control exercised by the Big Bang. There is no executive control exercised by the universe itself. There was no executive control exercised by evolution. It is only exercised by the individual brains of intelligent species.
Again, nobody is arguing that the BB has a current input into brain activity, information processing, decision making or action initiation.
Good. Then we shouldn't need to bring up the Big Bang or evolution as meaningful or relevant causes of anything we choose to do.
That is determined by the architecture of the brain responding to its environment through its 'avatar' the conscious self: Marvin Edwards choosing Lobster at a dinner party.
Cool, consciousness as an avatar. Gazzaniga's "interpreter" is the part of the brain that speaks for it, explaining to itself and others why it decided to do what it did.
Your character, disposition, proclivities, etc, are a part of your biological makeup and psychological development as you live, experience and learn.
Yes, but keep in mind that it is my character and my personality that decide what I will do.
None of it is run, organized or regulated by 'will' or 'free will.'
Free will is a choice a person makes for themselves, while free of coercion and undue influence.
If my brain chooses to spend time responding to your comment, then what my brain is doing right now was the result of a freely chosen will. That chosen intent then motivates and directs my subsequent actions, including my typing "That chosen intent then motivates and directs my subsequent actions".
So, freely chosen conscious intentions can actually organize and regulate further brain behavior.
On the other hand, there are other inputs that can also affect conscious behavior, like my stomach saying, "when am I going to get some breakfast?!".
''So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor - Metaphysics.
We simply lack the right kind of control to qualify as free will.
Listing the many things that we do not choose never eliminates any of the things that we actually do choose!
(I'm pretty sure Prof Taylor has fallen victim of one of the logical fallacies, but I don't try to keep up with their names. Still, I can know one when I see one. Perhaps we should ask Taylor, he should know, even if he doesn't know better than to step in one.)
So, we do have sufficient control to qualify as free will in all of the choices we actually do make (assuming we are free of coercion and undue influence at the time).
Possible alternate actions exist for other guests, each with their own determined selection, some steak, others Lasagna, some Lobster, Vegetarian, etc. None with the possibility of an alternate action of their own, just what was determined in each instance for each and every guest, each according to their own proclivities/taste.
Each person ordered the dinner that they chose according to their own goals and their own reasons. And they did so voluntarily, of their own free will (that is, each was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner).
If an action is determined, how could you choose to do otherwise? How is that possible? How would it work?
When we do not know what
will happen, we imagine what
can happen, to better prepare for what
does happen.
The choosing operation is invoked whenever we face two or more options and we must choose only one before we can continue. At the beginning,
we do not know what we
will choose. Will I choose the steak or will I choose the lobster? I don't know. Let me think about it.
Both items are on the menu, so both are real possibilities. They are both things that I
can choose. How do I
know that I have the
ability to choose the steak? Because I've chosen the steak before. How do I
know that I have the
ability to choose the lobster? Because I've chosen the lobster before as well.
In fact, I've been making choices all my life, so I'm confident that I continue to have that ability to choose between things. (David Eagleman, in his "The Brain" television series, had a patient whose ability to choose was impaired, because the emotion that confirmed "this is the right choice" was not working in her brain).
The choosing operation itself logically requires
at least two things that you
can choose. "I can choose the steak"
must be true and "I can choose the lobster"
must also be true. Both statements are true by
logical necessity, because they are required by the operation.
At the end of the choosing operation I finally knew what I
would do. I told the waiter, "I
will have the lobster, please." (I did not say to the waiter, "I
can have the lobster, please", as that would make no sense to me or the waiter).
After the choosing was finished, there was the single inevitable thing that I
would do, and the other inevitable thing that I
could have done, but didn't.
And that is the case with
every choosing operation. There will always be the single thing that you will do, plus all of the other things that you could have done.
Choosing will always have
at least one thing that you could have done instead, but didn't choose to do.
So, while determinism can safely say that you "
would not have done otherwise", it will always be
false to claim that you "
could not have done otherwise".
This is how the
logic of the language works. Therefore, if it is
determined that I
would have the lobster, then it is also
determined that I
could have had the steak.
(As you recall, I flipped a coin, it came up tails, so I chose the lobster. Even with the coin, there were two things that certainly
could happen, heads or tails. I did not know what would happen, so I imagined what could happen, to prepare for what did happen. I was prepared to eat the steak and I was prepared to eat the lobster, both were equally desirable, so I deliberately chose to flip a coin rather than continue agonizing between the two).
Whatever happens must necessarily happen. That's the nature of determinism.
Correct. And what
necessarily happened was that I
would choose the lobster, even though I
could have chosen the steak.