Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

Wrong, both Marvin Edwards and Jarhyn gave essentially the same definition that I use, which is from the Standford page on causal determinism

Sigh. Yes, I know, DBT, it’s from your precious Stanford page on causal determinism. Did you read the whole Hoefer article? He contests his own definition and concludes that causal determinism does not rule out free will. How about that, huh?

In any case, the definition is not holy writ. It is contestable. Hoefer himself recognizes this. We’ve been over this, yet you ignore all the rebuttals and simply repeat this stuff like a mantra. Any definition of determinism that incorporates or implies no free will, which btw Hoefer’s does not, is question begging and hence useless.

And this is what I keep talking about! The math itself of systems theory directly contradicts HARD determinism.

Once again. Determinism is essentially the same for both compatibilists and incompatibilists.

The only point of contention is free will.

Whether the world is fully determined or not is not the issue here.

The argument relates to freedom of will within a determined system.


Please, read carefully so I don't have to repeat this again.

Marvin Edwards uses the very same definition of determinism that I work with. The very same definition you gave.

Hard determinism is a religion.

Determinism as a statement about the universe is also a religion insofar as the universe has stochastic elements to it's resolution re: 'true' randomness in nature.

looking globally at the "just so" and adding that to the initial conditions is just hand waving away the problem.

That is "just so" determinism, and any stochastic system can be represented as a just-so deterministic system.

In fact converting stochastic systems built on pseudorandom numbers into just-so determinism is how such systems are debugged, usually

 

[DBT]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Decision making is not a free will process.

Decision making determines what you will do. When you are free to choose for yourself what you will do, it is a freely chosen will.

You - as a conscious person/entity - do whatever the brain itself determines through unconscious information processing.

Unconscious information processing is not free will. The state of a brain is not chosen, yet it is the state of the brain that determines our thoughts and actions.

That is not free will.

As pointed out, computers can select an action from a set of options based on a given set of criteria, and it is the information processor, the computer, that is doing the deciding.

The computer is a machine we have created to do our will. It has no will of its own.

The brain has evolved to acquire and process information and respond according to sets of criteria acquired through experience, it does that without will. Neural architecture, not will, is the agency.

The machine makes decisions according to its own nature and makeup, and the resulting action is freely implemented and performed by whatever system it runs.

No, not always. The bank teller exercises care with the bank's money, always giving the bank's customers only the cash that is available to them in their bank account. That is the "nature and makeup" of the bank teller. The bank robber, points a gun at the bank teller, forcing her to give him money that is not his. The gun forces the bank teller to submit her will to the will of the robber.

The architecture of a brain or construction of a mechanism determines its functions and abilities, attributes and features, strengths and weaknesses, inputs and outputs in terms of behaviour.

This is not willed.

When she is dealing with her customers she is making decisions according to her own nature and makeup, but when she is dealing with the robber pointing a gun at her, the guy with the gun is making those decisions for her.

In one case she is free to decide for herself what she will do. In the other case she is not free to decide for herself what she will do.

Do you deny that this is a real and meaningful distinction?

A distinction is there, as pointed out, the distinction lies between inner necessitation and external compulsion.

We can be free from external compulsion, but we are never free from internal necessitation, which is the non chosen state and condition of our brain, which is the source of our experience of self and the world.


Definition of freedom
1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action - Merrium Webster

No, everything came before inexorably brings you to that very action. Antecedents determine current brain state, current brain state initates the determined action.

And there you go again, sweeping meaningful information under the rug of abstract generalities. You are not hiding anything from me. Let's take a closer look at that causal chain to find the missing link.

No, I don't sweep away meaningful information. What I said above has been supported in multiple posts with quotes and references to neuroscience, brain function, pathologies, case studies, etc, referenced and cited.

Free will, by the essential meaning of the term ''free'' in relation to ''will'' would appear to require meaningful regulative control by this free will agency, an ability to make a difference to outcomes.

No. You're imagining another definition of free will, some kind of "freely floating" will, that is separate from the material world and from cause and effect. Some people may believe in souls that exist as ghosts, separate from the physical world.

But no one actually behaves as if that were true. For example, we do not see any of these people volunteering to give a demonstration of hands-free typing, where by simply giving thought to it, the keys are pushed by psychokinesis. The libertarian, just like the rest of us, types upon the material keyboard with her material fingers.

So, we have the libertarians acting as if they were "material girls in a material world" (Cindi Lauper), despite their claims.
So, we have the hard determinists acting as if free will and responsibility were real, despite their claims.

The only people making any sense are the compatibilists, who acknowledge causal necessity, but put it in its proper place, the trash.

Of course, there is no such free will. I'm essentially saying that free will is an incoherent notion. The idea of free will doesn't work in relation to determinism, indeterminism, quantum probability or randomness.

It's an ideology. An illusion based on the perception that we make conscious choices (which are determined unconsciously) and the idea that could have done otherwise had we wanted to.

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If it is determined it is measurable. "Whether I could" isn't measurable until it is observed then it is measured. So only if whether I could" is observed is it measurable. You'll find that that is the same as determined.

Events that "could have happened" did not happen. It's hard to observe or measure things that never happened. However, since "could have happened" does not require that anything actually happens, we can find evidence of "could have happened" in any list or display of items from which we can select one or more items. And every restaurant will have such a list, and every store will have such a display. Every item is something that you "can" select, if you choose to.

The fact that you will not select a given item does not mean that you cannot select the item.

On the other hand, the fact that you cannot select a given item does mean that you will not select the item.

What you can do constrains what you will do. But what you will do never constrains what you can do.

 

[Jarhyn]

Once again. Determinism is essentially the same for both compatibilists and incompatibilists.

The only point of contention is free will.

Whether the world is fully determined or not is not the issue here.

No, it isn't. Determinism is exactly the same thing for both hard determinists and compatibilist determinists.

The point of contention does not rely on "fully determined" for any of this. Both groups accept, exactly, "fully determined", but it wouldn't even matter if the compatibilist were not arguing this. I have explained why with the discussion of "just-so determinism".

That you do not understand this is about as understandable and acceptable as @MrIntelligentDesign going on about things HE clearly doesn't understand.

The issue is that globally deterministic systems can still have stochastic local subsystems, and the game theory of players in that closed system is one such aspect: stochastic modelling must happen for survival strategies to arise at all, and is the only type of usable model available to ANY "selfish" actor within the system.

Compatibilism WRT determinism says "the free will we see, the real thing that exists within the globally deterministic system of universal operation, is observed not as a global property but as a local one, applying contextually to the entire subsystem of it that is "closed system game theory", as I have been using the term game theory around survival of that which is hosted in the game.

Free will isn't non-existent, it's just the property of an inevitable absurdity: life.

It strikes me that this may imply a fundamental force schema.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

You - as a conscious person/entity - do whatever the brain itself determines through unconscious information processing.

That doesn't actually mean what you think it does. If it is my own brain doing the deciding then it doesn't matter that some or even all of the processing is beneath awareness. It is still my own brain, and no other object in the physical universe, that is doing the deciding. And I, as a "conscious person/entity" will be held responsible for whatever my "unconscious information processing" decided to do.

For example, if my "unconscious information processing" decides to rob a bank, then the whole me, the "conscious person/entity" will find itself being arrested and carried off to jail.

But bank robbers are not sleep-walking when they rob a bank. They do not wake up in a jail cell wondering, "What happened?! How did I get here?!". Their conscious explanation of their intentions and their actions begins long before that. It is involved in all of their choosing and planning, that happens before they walk into the bank, with a gun in their hand.

Neuroscience does not contradict any of these facts. Experiments, such as Benjamin Libet's, involve minimum decision making and no planning at all. They were minor hand motions that subjects were asked to perform over a span of a couple of minutes, whenever they felt the urge to do so. The subject recorded when they felt the urge and the EEG recorded when their motor cortex began building up to send a signal to the hand to move. The result was that the buildup happened before they experienced the urge.

To demonstrate the difference between this and free will, I like to ask the question, "Were Libet's student subjects required to participate in the experiment to pass his course, or did they participate of their own free will?" Did you understand what the term "free will" means in that sentence? Does it mean that the students were "free from causal necessity" or does it mean that the students were "free of undue influence"?

When I go out to eat at a restaurant, I am consciously aware of what I am doing and why. I will know when I am reading about an item on the menu. I will know that I need to make a decision. I will know when I have made that decision, and can probably tell you why I made it. I will know when I have given my order to the waiter. I will not be surprised when the waiter brings me the dinner or when he brings me the bill. And I will know that I am responsible for the bill and I will know why I am handing money to the cashier.

Neuroscience does not contradict any of these facts. It makes no claims that we are sleep-walking through our lives.

But you seem to be making such a claim, so I must assume you are contradicting the neuroscience.

The brain has evolved to acquire and process information and respond according to sets of criteria acquired through experience, it does that without will. Neural architecture, not will, is the agency.

1. Choosing is the agency that determines the will.
2. Will is the agency that determines the action.
3. The brain is the agency that performs the choosing and implementation of the will.
4. The location of this agency is within each person.

No, I don't sweep away meaningful information. What I said above has been supported in multiple posts with quotes and references to neuroscience, brain function, pathologies, case studies, etc, referenced and cited.

Well, you do have multiple quotes from multiple sources. And you have many references to neuroscience that you believe support your position, even when they don't.

And I've pointed out when the opinions of your philosophical sources were incorrect. And I've pointed out where your interpretation of the neuroscience is incorrect.

But if you want to refresh or re-examine any of your references, I'll be happy to deal with them one at a time.

I'm essentially saying that free will is an incoherent notion.

And I have no doubt that your notion of free will is indeed incoherent. However, my notion of free will is meaningful and relevant, even in a perfectly deterministic universe:

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

And this is the notion that is coherent enough to be used in court cases when assessing a person's legal responsibility for their actions.

The idea of free will doesn't work in relation to determinism, indeterminism, quantum probability or randomness.

But I have demonstrated that my notion of free will is perfectly compatible with a deterministic universe:

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

It's an ideology.

No ideology, just a well reasoned argument with a reasonable conclusion.

An illusion based on the perception that we make conscious choices (which are determined unconsciously)

There is no claim as to whether the brain is making the choice consciously, unconsciously, or both. It is only claimed that it is the person (containing the brain) that is doing the choosing.

and the idea that could have done otherwise had we wanted to.

And I've demonstrated in detail why "I could have done otherwise" is always true whenever a choosing event appears in the causal chain.

So, I'm not sure what else you need at this point, in order to agree with the conclusion that
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

 

[Jarhyn]

If it is determined it is measurable. "Whether I could" isn't measurable until it is observed then it is measured. So only if whether I could" is observed is it measurable. You'll find that that is the same as determined.

Events that "could have happened" did not happen. It's hard to observe or measure things that never happened. However, since "could have happened" does not require that anything actually happens, we can find evidence of "could have happened" in any list or display of items from which we can select one or more items. And every restaurant will have such a list, and every store will have such a display. Every item is something that you "can" select, if you choose to.

The fact that you will not select a given item does not mean that you cannot select the item.

On the other hand, the fact that you cannot select a given item does mean that you will not select the item.

What you can do constrains what you will do. But what you will do never constrains what you can do.

Yes!

Interestingly, The Axiom of Choice is one of the things the math of the physics that FDI believes operates deterministically as a "system" as in "systems theory" as in "math" is founded on.

It's like, right there. FDI generally MUST axiomatically accept "choice" if they would wish to use non-paradoxical and non-contradictory language to support a position of any kind on the subject.

Of course the axiom of choice is controversial, but I don't see FDI getting into the controversy there? They are not approaching it from a sane direction.

 

[fromderinside]

If it is determined it is measurable. "Whether I could" isn't measurable until it is observed then it is measured. So only if whether I could" is observed is it measurable. You'll find that that is the same as determined.

Events that "could have happened" did not happen. It's hard to observe or measure things that never happened. However, since "could have happened" does not require that anything actually happens, we can find evidence of "could have happened" in any list or display of items from which we can select one or more items. And every restaurant will have such a list, and every store will have such a display. Every item is something that you "can" select, if you choose to.

The fact that you will not select a given item does not mean that you cannot select the item.

On the other hand, the fact that you cannot select a given item does mean that you will not select the item.

What you can do constrains what you will do. But what you will do never constrains what you can do.

Yes!

Interestingly, The Axiom of Choice is one of the things the math of the physics that FDI believes operates deterministically as a "system" as in "systems theory" as in "math" is founded on.

It's like, right there. FDI generally MUST axiomatically accept "choice" if they would wish to use non-paradoxical and non-contradictory language to support a position of any kind on the subject.

Of course the axiom of choice is controversial, but I don't see FDI getting into the controversy there? They are not approaching it from a sane direction.

I respond the way I do because the structure of determination is very constrained. That follows this is its axiomatic definition. Some want choice because humans seem to choose. You invent a determined that exists with possibility being a parameter for which there is no cause. I keep it simple. The world has been shown measurable if it is determined. So I remove self-identifying things to keep determined measurable.

You don't. Yet you are all over the place trying to deterministically justify the self-identified. And you wonder why I don't accept that immeasurable crap. Simply I don't accept self-determined entities because they can't be measured or shown to be reality.

Jarhyn you just wrote this piece of incomprehensible prose..

It's like, right there. FDI generally MUST axiomatically accept "choice" if they would wish to use non-paradoxical and non-contradictory language to support a position of any kind on the subject.

Go ahead take my presented axiom for determinism - "That follows this" - and use it to support the aimless wandering in your statement. No. You have to to construct another determinism made of whole cloth based on a piece justified in self-identified fictions. Go ahead use all all your self-identified aspects and determinism as I define it remains, its measurable in real terms. It remains because all the choice stuff is for human consumption in thinking having little to do with determinism. Include only self-identified aspects and you can't build a realistic determinism for them.

 

[DBT]

Once again. Determinism is essentially the same for both compatibilists and incompatibilists.

The only point of contention is free will.

Whether the world is fully determined or not is not the issue here.

No, it isn't. Determinism is exactly the same thing for both hard determinists and compatibilist determinists.

That's what I said.

The point of contention does not rely on "fully determined" for any of this. Both groups accept, exactly, "fully determined", but it wouldn't even matter if the compatibilist were not arguing this. I have explained why with the discussion of "just-so determinism".

Compatibilists basically define free will as 'acting in accordance with one's nature and will'' - that definition is the point of contention.

That you do not understand this is about as understandable and acceptable as @MrIntelligentDesign going on about things HE clearly doesn't understand.

It is your interpretation of the argument that is flawed.

Basically, you have no idea. No matter how many times something is explained, you come up with a flawed interpretation.

The definition of determinism that Marvin uses is the same definition I work with. Which is essentially the same definition as you gave.

So, once again, the point of contention between the incompatibility or compatibility of free will in relation to determinism lies in the Compatibilist definition of free will.

It is the given definition that is flawed for the given reasons.

 

[DBT]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The premises are still flawed. Will is not chosen, it is formed by unconscious processes in response to external stimuli. Information processing, not will, is the agent, the work of neural networks is not an example of free will.

A label doesn't alter the status, state or condition of the system.

You - as a conscious person/entity - do whatever the brain itself determines through unconscious information processing.

That doesn't actually mean what you think it does. If it is my own brain doing the deciding then it doesn't matter that some or even all of the processing is beneath awareness. It is still my own brain, and no other object in the physical universe, that is doing the deciding. And I, as a "conscious person/entity" will be held responsible for whatever my "unconscious information processing" decided to do.

This is about the right kind of control to qualify as 'free will.' If you are not aware of something that is going on in your body, you are not in control of it. If a cancer is growing, you did not will it to happen. If your brain is malfunctioning, you did not will it to happen.

This is beyond the control of consciousness or will. If will lacks the right kind of control, it is not 'free will.'

For example, if my "unconscious information processing" decides to rob a bank, then the whole me, the "conscious person/entity" will find itself being arrested and carried off to jail.

That's right, off to jail you go. But that doesn't alter the fact that something drove you to rob banks. That you did not necessarily plan bank robbery as a career option while at school. Who plans to be a thief or a killer? Who plans to have a criminal record or spend their lives in a cell? A combination of life, the world, their own circumstances and mental and physical makeup brings them down.

And I've demonstrated in detail why "I could have done otherwise" is always true whenever a choosing event appears in the causal chain.

I don't see that you have demonstrated that you 'could have done otherwise.' It's just wordplay. Determinism, by definition, doesn't allow ''could have done otherwise.''

Given a range of what we from our limited perspective call options or possibilities, there is only one realizable option per person in any given situation in any given instance in time.

Your option is one thing, your friends or family each have their determined option. Given determinism, nobody can do otherwise.

So, I'm not sure what else you need at this point, in order to agree with the conclusion that
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

I can only point out that the premises are flawed for the reasons outlined above.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Go ahead take my presented axiom for determinism - "That follows this" .

That's a suitable axiom for determinism. A person encounters a problem or issue that requires a choice. From that follows the choosing operation. From the choosing operation follows the deliberate action. Free will is just another example of "that follows this".

 

[Jarhyn]

Compatibilists basically define free will as 'acting in accordance with one's nature and will''

So, you don't get to tell me how I define things. Full stop.

I define things the way I define them, and this is not it.

"Free" is a property. "Will" is a property. While "will" is a property of the actor, "free" is a property of the will.

I define free will as a will which is, and may be assessed as, "fulfilled within the bounds of it's foundational vision."

A will that is not free is a will which cannot be fulfilled within the bounds of it's foundational vision.

You could as easily say "that was/is a good plan" and you accomplish the same intent of utterance.

Plan quality can be objectively assessed.

 

[fromderinside]

Go ahead take my presented axiom for determinism - "That follows this" .

That's a suitable axiom for determinism. A person encounters a problem or issue that requires a choice. From that follows the choosing operation. From the choosing operation follows the deliberate action. Free will is just another example of "that follows this".

Oh, I see. Let the inventing begin.

One doesn't encounter or issue. When this input occurs to one then that output is produced. Nothing else.

It's singular, unexceptional, just happens.

Your scenario is inappropriate to the activities listed. There are no intervening variables, no deliberation nor choosing.

Without options there is nothing deliberate, to choose.

This and that are specified. Full stop.

Automata can be scaled infinitely. No matter what number of connections inside, identity is retained, only this and that are seen. It is as if there were only two elements because that always happens when this takes place.

 

[Jarhyn]

Go ahead take my presented axiom for determinism - "That follows this" .

That's a suitable axiom for determinism. A person encounters a problem or issue that requires a choice. From that follows the choosing operation. From the choosing operation follows the deliberate action. Free will is just another example of "that follows this".

Oh, I see. Let the inventing begin.

One doesn't encounter or issue. When this input occurs to one then that output is produced. Nothing else.

It's singular, uncaused, unexceptional, just happens.

Your scenario is inappropriate to the activities listed. There are no intervening variables, no deliberation nor choosing.

Without options there is nothing deliberate, to choose.

This and that are specified. Full stop.

An electron is in an orbital around a proton. The orbital this electron is occupying is "higher" than normal and an electron is absent from the orbital below.

We call this state "excited".

What direction will the photons go, when a virtual electron pops up into the lower orbital, and it's antiparticle eats the original electron?

 

[Jarhyn]

One doesn't encounter or issue. When this input occurs to one then that output is produced.

One doesn't (have input occur) or (produce output). When this input occurs, then that output is produced.

!(A (logical AND) B). A -> B

Therefore input doesn't occur, and no output ever happens.

Good job!

Your statement is incoherent

You keep ignoring that the system of the actor is the arbiter of the function, not the system entire, that there is LOCALITY involved.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Will is not chosen, it is formed by unconscious processes in response to external stimuli. Information processing, not will, is the agent, the work of neural networks is not an example of free will.

The "external stimulus" is the restaurant menu. The specific "information processing" in response to that external stimulus is called "choosing". Choosing inputs two or more options from the menu, applies some criteria of evaluation, and outputs a single choice, such as "I will have the salad please". And the process is carried out upon our neural networks.

There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that the brain is choosing from the menu what the person will order for dinner. The choice is reliably determined by the choosing process, so it is also consistent with causal necessity.

The term "free will" is used to distinguish cases where a person is free to make this choice for themselves versus those cases where the choice is imposed upon them by someone or something else. You know,
"P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. "

This is the operational definition of free will. The one that is actually used when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions. It requires nothing supernatural. It makes no claims to being an uncaused event. It simply does its job of distinguishing a deliberate act from a coerced act or an insane act or an act caused by hypnosis, etc. Whether it was an act of the person's freely chosen will or not is a matter of objective evidence, not a matter of illusions.

A label doesn't alter the status, state or condition of the system.

The brain is altering its own "status, state, and condition" as it moves from reading the menu, to considering its options, to setting its intent upon having the chef salad for dinner, to acting upon this intent by telling the waiter, "I will have the chef salad, please".

It is a deterministic process, one event leading to the next in a reliable chain of cause and effect.

The brain's task is to reduce the menu of alternate possibilities to a single dinner order. The process is called "choosing" or "deciding". And it is a normal function of every normal brain.

This is about the right kind of control to qualify as 'free will.' If you are not aware of something that is going on in your body, you are not in control of it. If a cancer is growing, you did not will it to happen. If your brain is malfunctioning, you did not will it to happen.

This is beyond the control of consciousness or will. If will lacks the right kind of control, it is not 'free will.'

The only control necessary is the ability to read or scan the menu for options, the ability to consider those options in terms of my own criteria, the ability to choose the option that best satisfies my criteria, and the ability to tell the waiter what I have decided that I will have for dinner.

That is the only kind of control needed for free will. The evidence of that control is the simple fact of my successfully performing each of those functions.

You create a strawman by imagining that I must consciously choose the firing of each neuron in order to control what I will have for dinner. Obviously I do not have that kind of control. And, just as obviously, that imaginary kind of control is unnecessary to my choosing what I will have for dinner.

But that doesn't alter the fact that something drove you to rob banks.

The robber just needed some cash to pay off his gambling debts, and it seemed like robbing the bank would be the quickest way to get it.

Who plans to be a thief or a killer?

Al Capone, Jesse James, your local psychopathic serial killer, the drug companies pushing fentanyl. They all have specific plans.

Who plans to have a criminal record or spend their lives in a cell?

The plan usually includes not getting caught.

A combination of life, the world, their own circumstances and mental and physical makeup brings them down.

Of course. All events are reliably caused by something. But that cannot be used to excuse anything, because then it would excuse everything. So, causal necessity never excuses anything.

In fact, the more the behavior is ingrained by habitually being rewarded with cash for committing the robbery, the longer it will take to correct the behavior.

I don't see that you have demonstrated that you 'could have done otherwise.' It's just wordplay.

No wordplay. Just the actual meaning of the words. And I'm sure you use them yourself routinely in the way that I described. For example, if I were to say to you that "I had a salad for lunch. I could have had a cheese burger, but I had bacon and sausage for breakfast, so I decided to have the salad instead."

Does "I could have had a cheese burger" mean that I did have a cheeseburger? No, it doesn't.
Does it mean that it was possible for me to have had a cheeseburger? Yes, it does.
Does "I had a salad for lunch" contradict "I could have had a cheese burger"? No, it doesn't.

Determinism, by definition, doesn't allow ''could have done otherwise.''

Nope. Determinism, by definition, means "every event is reliably caused by prior events" (P2). The logical implication of this is that, given the same circumstances, determinism doesn't allow "would have done otherwise".

But a "could have done otherwise" will always be true whenever a choosing event occurs in the causal chain. The choosing event logically requires at least two things that you can do. Thus, it will always be the case that you could have done otherwise, even if you never would have done otherwise.

Given a range of what we from our limited perspective call options or possibilities, there is only one realizable option per person in any given situation in any given instance in time.

What you fail to realize is that "realizable" falls into the same limited perspective as "options" and "possibilities". To realize (as used here) means to make it real. To be "realizable" means that is it possible to make it real, but not necessary that it will ever be made real.

Your option is one thing, your friends or family each have their determined option. Given determinism, nobody can do otherwise.

For the reasons above, which have been explained to you many times now, the correct statement is this: Given determinism nobody will do otherwise (even though they could have).

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Go ahead take my presented axiom for determinism - "That follows this" .

That's a suitable axiom for determinism. A person encounters a problem or issue that requires a choice. From that follows the choosing operation. From the choosing operation follows the deliberate action. Free will is just another example of "that follows this".

Oh, I see. Let the inventing begin.

One doesn't encounter or issue. When this input occurs to one then that output is produced. Nothing else.

It's singular, unexceptional, just happens.

Your scenario is inappropriate to the activities listed. There are no intervening variables, no deliberation nor choosing.

Without options there is nothing deliberate, to choose.

This and that are specified. Full stop.

Automata can be scaled infinitely. No matter what number of connections inside, identity is retained, only this and that are seen. It is as if there were only two elements because that always happens when this takes place.

So, your axiom is useless because it has no practical applications. Hmm. Not such a good axiom after all.

 

[Jarhyn]

One doesn't encounter or issue. When this input occurs to one then that output is produced.

One doesn't (have input occur) or (produce output). When this input occurs, then that output is produced.

!(A (logical AND) B). A -> B

Therefore input doesn't occur, and no output ever happens.

Good job!

Your statement is incoherent

You keep ignoring that the system of the actor is the arbiter of the function, not the system entire, that there is LOCALITY involved.

Oh, I'm wrong here. It's a conjunction you used not a disjunction. If it was AND, then you could still get B without A.

My explanation of your incoherence was wrong, but it's still incoherence.

 

[fromderinside]

This then that. This follows that. When is relevant to this only in the sense it occurs to this before that occurs when that is directly associated to this. Nope. No cause.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilists basically define free will as 'acting in accordance with one's nature and will''

So, you don't get to tell me how I define things. Full stop.

I'm not telling you anything. I merely outlined the compatibilist definition of free will.

I define things the way I define them, and this is not it.

"Free" is a property. "Will" is a property. While "will" is a property of the actor, "free" is a property of the will.

I define free will as a will which is, and may be assessed as, "fulfilled within the bounds of it's foundational vision."

Vague to the point of being meaningless. The way you word it could be interpreted as 'being able to act freely according to ones nature without external coercion. Which relates to the Compatibilist definition. Or you may mean who knows what. It's a hazard to ask.

A will that is not free is a will which cannot be fulfilled within the bounds of it's foundational vision.

You could as easily say "that was/is a good plan" and you accomplish the same intent of utterance.

Plan quality can be objectively assessed.

Vague to the point of being meaningless.

 

[DBT]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Still flawed for the given reasons.

Will is not chosen, it is formed by unconscious processes in response to external stimuli. Information processing, not will, is the agent, the work of neural networks is not an example of free will.

The "external stimulus" is the restaurant menu. The specific "information processing" in response to that external stimulus is called "choosing". Choosing inputs two or more options from the menu, applies some criteria of evaluation, and outputs a single choice, such as "I will have the salad please". And the process is carried out upon our neural networks.

Yes, the work of neural networks, not will, not free will.

''It seems obvious that we exist in the present. The past is gone and the future has not yet happened, so where else could we be? But perhaps we should not be so certain.''

''Sensory information reaches us at different speeds, yet appears unified as one moment. Nerve signals need time to be transmitted and time to be processed by the brain. And there are events – such as a light flashing, or someone snapping their fingers – that take less time to occur than our system needs to process them. By the time we become aware of the flash or the finger-snap, it is already history.''


Objects and events in the external world -> information input ->propagation of information throughout the neural networks of the brain -> conscious perception of that information forms ->conscious feelings and emotions emerge ->conscious thoughts and deliberations emerge -> a conscious impulse to respond (the conscious will to act) -> a conscious action is performed.

There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that the brain is choosing from the menu what the person will order for dinner. The choice is reliably determined by the choosing process, so it is also consistent with causal necessity.

Not sufficient to qualify as free will. Unconscious information processing is not willed, yet alone freely willed.

To qualify as free will, actions must be actually freely willed, not merely labelled as such.

The personal narrative;
''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains.

The term "free will" is used to distinguish cases where a person is free to make this choice for themselves versus those cases where the choice is imposed upon them by someone or something else. You know,
"P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. "

To be accurate, the distinction lies between external coercion or force, and inner necessitation.

Acting without external force or coercion does not free us from inner necessitation, ie, 'he acted according to his will, as opposed to being forced against his will.'

Will is just will. We can act according to our will. In fact it is inevitable that we act according to our will if action is determined. Not only action, but will itself.

For instance;
Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans;
''Parietal and premotor cortex regions are serious contenders for bringing motor intentions and motor responses into awareness. We used electrical stimulation in seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery. Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a strong intention and desire to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas stimulating the left inferior parietal region provoked the intention to move the lips and to talk. When stimulation intensity was increased in parietal areas, participants believed they had really performed these movements, although no electromyographic activity was detected. Stimulation of the premotor region triggered overt mouth and contralateral limb movements. Yet, patients firmly denied that they had moved.''

This is the operational definition of free will. The one that is actually used when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions. It requires nothing supernatural. It makes no claims to being an uncaused event. It simply does its job of distinguishing a deliberate act from a coerced act or an insane act or an act caused by hypnosis, etc. Whether it was an act of the person's freely chosen will or not is a matter of objective evidence, not a matter of illusions.

Will is the conscious impulse or urge to act according to thoughts or plans. Underlying the conscious experience thought and will are the production mechanisms, of which we are blissfully unaware.

''The amygdala interacts with the cortical sensory systems in the assessment of fear-related stimuli and modulates the reflex responses through projections to the hypothalamus and brainstem. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex, especially the medial prefrontal network, is connected to the amygdala, hypothalamus, and PAG, and allows cortical control over the system in relation to a wider set of emotions. This cortical region is involved both in the assessment of reward and in mood disorders and it plays a central role in the ability to discern the consequences of one's actions and make appropriate behavioral choices. It also forms an interconnected circuit with specific cortical areas in the rostral superior temporal cortex, posterior parahippocampal cortex, and retrosplenial/posterior cingulate cortex.'' - J. Comp. Neurol. 493:132-139, 2005. © 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.